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Abstract 
 
As a notable academic, Marxist writer and one-time political activist, an 
extensive critique of Rudolf Schlesinger’s writings is long overdue. Raised in 
the revolutionary atmosphere of early twentieth century Austria, Schlesinger 
soon became embroiled in central European communism, taking on full-time 
work for the German Communist Party in Berlin, Prague and Moscow. He left 
the Soviet Union during the purges, having been described as ‘alien to the 
party’, and made his way to the UK where he fostered a reputation as an 
informed and prolific scholar. 
 
This investigation is not intended to be a biography of Schlesinger, but rather 
an ‘intellectual biography’, an examination of his monographs, papers, drafts 
and memoir reflections. This allows for an appreciation of his academic 
contribution and an understanding of his unique personal motivation and 
perspective. Given his experiences, as well as the cultural, political and 
ideological paradigm from which he emerged, this analysis provides insights 
into Marxist theory, the labour movement, the Soviet Union and German 
communism. It also throws light upon the intellectual climate in the West 
during the cold war, providing a historiographical snapshot of academic Soviet 
studies, particularly in the UK. 
 
The thesis is divided into two sections, with each exploring a different aspect 
of Schlesinger’s writing. The first traces Schlesinger’s theoretical development 
and education, detailing and analysing the impact of Luxemburg, Lenin, Marx 
and Engels on his thought and writing. Schlesinger emerges as a Leninist, 
whose understanding of the dialectical nature of Marxism leads him to seek 
the next stage in its development, since Lenin’s revolutionary successes 
forever altered the socio-economic landscape and thus fated his theories to 
obsolescence. An examination of Schlesinger’s attitude towards Stalin as a 
Marxist theorist illuminates his pragmatic stance regarding the Soviet leader. 
Whilst Stalin’s rule had a considerable human cost and a deleterious impact 
upon Marxist theory, to Schlesinger, his leadership was necessary to further 
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the existence of the Soviet state, the sole manifestation of the great social 
democratic experiment. 
 
The second section focuses on Schlesinger’s writings concerning Soviet 
historiography. It is possible to discern changes in tone, emphasis and 
argument in his work on this subject. A dichotomy emerges between 
Schlesinger’s positive portrayal of historiographical developments in the 
Soviet Union in papers written before Stalin’s death and his retrospective 
condemnation of these events after 1953. This latter attitude chimes with his 
personal memoir reflections of life as an intellectual in Stalin’s Russia, in 
which he described a highly controlled, academically stagnant society; yet it 
contrasts starkly with his earlier position. It is also possible to detect parallels 
between Schlesinger’s changing emphasis and the dynamics of official Soviet 
attitudes. An explanation is required if Schlesinger is not to be dismissed as 
inconsistent or polemical. 
 
It is argued that Schlesinger can be accurately described as a ‘scholar 
advocate’, both in terms of a defender of the Soviet experiment and a 
proponent of Marxism and social democracy. This characterisation allows for 
an understanding of Schlesinger’s changing stance and motivations and 
explains his apparent inconsistency. Schlesinger was loyal to Marxism in 
general, but not to the fluctuating dictates of the Russian party. He was not a 
polemicist or propagandist but instead sought to stay loyal to wider Marxist 
ideals and methodology. For Schlesinger, his pragmatism ensured that he did 
not judge events in Russia from the rose-tinted spectacles of utopianism; his 
attitude was not swayed by single events, however tragic, and he was aware 
both of the utility and the transient nature of Stalin’s rule. This helps to explain 
his positive attitude. 
 
In addition, Schlesinger was keen to defend Marxism and the Soviet Union 
against what he perceived as unfair criticism; he sought to counter myths and 
misunderstandings propagated by disillusioned supporters and opponents. 
Schlesinger consciously attempted to combat what he saw, and many 
academics have recognised, as the cold war bias of a section of Western 
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comment and scholarship. This may, perhaps, have led Schlesinger to paint 
too optimistic a picture of the Soviet Union, but his work is a useful and 
necessary counterbalance to other literature. Schlesinger was no 
propagandist, and recognition of his unique and conscious motivation allows 
for a full appreciation of his rich and varied writings. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Rudolf Schlesinger: Background 
Rudolf Schlesinger was born on 4 February 1901 in Vienna. His father was 
from an old Viennese Jewish family. He had attended university and was 
baptised in order to marry Schlesinger’s mother. His mother originated from a 
West German intellectual family, baptised two generations previously in order 
to gain, as Schlesinger expressed it, the ‘entrance ticket to European 
civilisation’.1 The family were relatively prosperous, intellectual and 
aspirational, hence the baptisms. 
 
Schlesinger claimed that his ethnicity limited his social interaction in his 
childhood years. He found racial hatred to be endemic amongst intellectuals 
and the lower middle class within Austrian society and this naturally affected 
his choice of friends. He became aware of the anti-Semitism he saw as 
prevalent in Vienna at a very early age; one of his first nursemaids was 
dismissed from the household when his mother heard that she had narrated 
an anti-Semitic children’s story to Schlesinger and his sister.2 The young 
Schlesinger noticed that racial discrimination and hatred were commonplace 
at his school too; some of his teachers were markedly bigoted and fights over 
race issues were common amongst pupils. He soon learnt that nationalists of 
this type had to be treated with fists, feet or whatever else was available;3 
“heaven, hell or Siberia are the most appropriate places for people who rouse 
racial hatred”.4 Yet Schlesinger described soon learning at university to regard 
the Zionist organisations as political opponents too.5  
 
Schlesinger depicted his schooling as supportive but not stimulating. He often 
encountered difficulties with discipline, his keenness to organise student 
                                                
1 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany? (Glasgow University Library, 1953-
1961, Unpublished) Memoirs Volume I, p1. 
2 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, (1944, Unpublished) Band I p. 
6. 
3 Ibid. p. 10. 
4 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 6. 
5 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, pp. 78-9. 
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representation would lead him into trouble with the school authorities. Even at 
university, Schlesinger remained unsatisfied by the level and tone of learning 
provided by its curriculum. However, walking and mountaineering quickly 
became a means of escape from adult control. It remained an important 
hobby throughout his life, offering peace, freedom and the possibility to 
overcome his physical shortcomings – he had suffered from TB early in life, 
leaving him with a shortened leg.6 
 
According to his memoirs, certain events within Schlesinger’s formative years 
appear to have had a dramatic effect upon his development. He wrote: ‘Under 
the impact of World War One I became a socialist; under the impact of the 
revolution of 1918-1919 I decided to devote my life to service of the socialist 
cause. Without the war, I would have become a somewhat radical liberal 
intellectual’.7 This description of his path to socialism was mirrored and 
expanded upon in an article on Rosa Luxemburg published in 1966. He wrote 
of the influence that Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, as leaders of the 
Marxist Left and the anti-war movement in Germany, had had upon him: ‘The 
present author is not the only one whom they, and the Russian October 
revolution, helped to find his way to revolutionary socialism. (The war, in 
isolation, would have produced an indignant pacifism.)’.8 After the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, Schlesinger began to read Marx and became a 
defeatist, supporting the fall of his own country in the belief this would further 
the revolutionary cause. This development led to a near permanent rupture in 
his relationship with his father, an army officer. The brief existence of the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic also had a deep impact upon his personal 
development. The joint efforts of Social Democrats and Communists to solve 
the problems of political power were inspirational to the young student, 
although Schlesinger was still aware of the Republic’s sins of omission: 
‘Surely they did not do what was necessary to root their power’.9 
                                                
6 Ibid. p. 18. 
7 Ibid. p. 23. Where the two versions of the memoirs are very similar, and unless otherwise 
stated, Schlesinger’s translation from German to English has been used. It is assumed that 
he knew best how he wished to express himself. 
8 Schlesinger, ‘Marxism Without an Organizing Party’, Soviet Studies, 18, 2, October 1966, 
pp225-251 at p. 225. 
9 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 42. 
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The various tremors and aftershocks involved in the collapse of the Hapsburg 
Empire also affected Schlesinger.10 For example, a demonstration by the 
unemployed workers on ‘bloody’ Maundy Thursday 1919 gave Schlesinger a 
picture of the awful conditions in which the Viennese population were 
struggling. He witnessed starving women risking their lives by rushing into the 
streets, between shots, to take flesh from dead police horses.11 Schlesinger 
described his first confrontation with political opponents as occurring at 
around the same time. In one incident at university, which contained an 
overwhelming fascist front of both students and staff, Schlesinger’s 
Association (The Free Association of Socialist Students) invited Otto Bauer to 
speak.12 Fascists stormed the meeting and, according to Schlesinger, he had 
to run to the nearby left-wing Rossauer barracks to get help. When leaving the 
university he was confronted by a fascist gang and was only able to escape 
by pretending his spectacle case was a revolver.13 
 
Schlesinger was involved in a number of organisations of the labour 
movement during his youth in Austria. During the ‘revolution’ of November 
1918, ‘councils’ were formed throughout Austria. The more advanced of the 
youth movement emulated the pattern in schools and Schlesinger described 
doing so at the Schottengymnasium, his own school. He was immediately 
elected to the Central Committee of the youth council and became 
responsible for its educational activities. He was re-elected by the council 
                                                
10 For an academic treatment of this same period in Austrian history by the author see 
Schlesinger, Central European Democracy and Its Background, (London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul ltd., 1953), pp. 132… For an alternative description, and one hotly disputed by 
Schlesinger, see R. Fischer, Stalin and German Communism, (Cambridge Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1948) pp. 64…, footnote 14. Schlesinger wrote: ‘Ruth Fischer gives her 
personal account of the incident, which seems inexact’ (Schlesinger, Central European 
Democracy, p. 143, footnote 2). He disagreed with many elements of Fischer’s book, 
criticising her claim to have written ‘an objective history’ (Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: 
Whither Germany?, p. v.).  
11 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 30-32. 
12 Otto Bauer (1881-1938) was one of the founders of the school of Austro-Marxism and wrote 
on matters of nationalism. Bauer joined the Social Democratic Party in 1907 and was a 
member of the government for a short period following World War One. He was critical of a 
Bolshevik-style revolution and advocated the ‘slow revolution’. For more information see T. 
Bottomore and P Goode, Austro-Marxism (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978). 
13 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 78. 
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even when his school failed to back him, after an anti-Semitic smear 
campaign by a teacher.14 
 
The council soon brought him into contact with the Free German Youth 
Movement, which he enthusiastically joined. In his memoirs, Schlesinger 
explained that the Austrian version was much less romantic than the Reich 
one, involving a lot less dancing or national dress. For Schlesinger, its main 
activities were walking and political discussions and he noted the political 
evolution of diverse trends within the movement. For example, members of its 
right-wing were mainly gentile, lower-middle class males who formed Men’s 
Associations excluding women and Jews. The left-wing of the movement was 
primarily concerned with educational reform. They hoped that the ‘councils’ 
would become a vehicle for student participation in curriculum setting etc. 
Unfortunately, little was actually accomplished in this direction because many 
students simply wanted to use the ‘council’ to ensure easier exam papers.15 
 
After an abortive attempt by Schlesinger to unite the Students’ Association 
(the ‘council’), the Communist Young Workers’ Association and the Socialist 
Young Workers’ Association (SYWA) into a loose federation, he joined the 
SYWA as a member of the Education Committee. According to Schlesinger, 
this kind of work made him very aware of his ‘emotional distance’ from the 
average worker.16 This was a problem he believed was common to many of 
the best working-class activists and Schlesinger found himself unable to 
rationalise the dilemma until five years later when he read Lenin’s ‘What is to 
be Done?’.17  
 
At university, Schlesinger joined the Free Association of Socialist Students. 
He described it as a predominantly communist, although non-sectarian, 
organisation. Schlesinger wrote that communist students did little actual party 
work, since the Austrian Communist Party left its students to study and 
                                                
14 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 23. 
15 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 31. 
16 Ibid. p. 38. 
17 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 37-38, Lenin, Polnoe sobranie 
sochinenii , (Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe, Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1958) 6, pp. 1-
192. 
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prepare for their eventual role in the service of the labour movement. He 
contrasted this attitude with that of the KPD where: ‘… the young intellectual’s 
usefulness for the Communist Youth Association was measured by the 
number of evenings devoted to organisational life and street propaganda’.18 
Schlesinger felt that this was to the detriment of the young party members’ 
studies. 
 
Schlesinger joined the Austrian Communist Party in 1921 but was always 
relatively critical of its policies and leaders. He felt that communist 
propaganda during the revolutionary period contained more enthusiasm than 
actual understanding of political realities. He cited Elfriede Friedländer’s (Ruth 
Fischer) speech in the Soviet Congress of June 1919 as an example of this. 
She closed her talk with a call to assume power saying: ‘Follow the way on 
[in] which Rosa Luxemburg has preceded us, the way of triumph and of 
death’.19 Yet the Chairman of the Soldiers’ Council then outlined the technical 
conditions necessary for a successful struggle and demonstrated that many 
were wholly lacking: over one hundred machine guns, for example.  
 
Having gained his doctorate, Schlesinger moved to Berlin, in February 1923, 
to begin work for the Soviet economist Eugene Varga.20 Now politically active, 
he joined the KPD immediately on arrival in Germany, eventually taking on full 
                                                
18 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 69. 
19 Ibid. p. 38. There is an error in the page number ordering within this edition. The numbers 
read 37, 38, 39, 37, 38, 39, 40… This quote is taken from the second p. 38. Ruth Fischer 
(1895-1961) was born Elfride Eisler. She helped to found the Austrian Communist Party in 
November 1918 but moved to Berlin in 1919 and became active in the KPD. In 1924 the left, 
including Fischer and her then partner Arkadi Maslow, took over leadership of the KPD and 
she also entered parliament as a communist deputy. In 1925 the Comintern sent an open 
letter to the KPD criticising their leadership. They were expelled from the party the next year. 
Fischer then traveled throughout Europe and Asia, briefly living in the US, and published 
books on the history of communism (B. Lazitch and M. M. Drachkovitch, Biographical 
Dictionary of the Comintern (Stanford, The Hoover Institute Press, 1986), p. 119). Schlesinger 
appears to have been mistaken about Fischer’s original name.  
20 Ibid. p. 96-97. Jenö (Eugen) Varga (1879-1964) was born in Hungary. He was commissar 
for finance and chairman of the supreme economic council during the brief Hungarian Soviet 
Republic. After its collapse, Varga fled to Austria and then to Russia where he joined the party 
and was active in Comintern. As an economist, Varga wrote a great deal on planning and 
economic problems. In 1927 he became head of the Institute of World Economy and Politics 
and was elected to the Academy of Science in 1939.  Despite occasionally falling foul of 
orthodoxy, Varga remained a key figure in the Soviet Union until his death (Lazitch and 
Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, pp. 492-493). For more information 
on Varga, see, T. Remington, ‘Varga and the Foundation of Soviet Planning’, Soviet Studies, 
34, 4, Oct. 1982, pp. 585-600. 
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time work for the party in spring 1925. On 22 May of the same year 
Schlesinger married Mila Sellvig, a communist party worker, in a secret 
ceremony at Werbellin Lake. They took part in an official, civil ceremony three 
years later at the insistence of a landlord.21 They remained together for the 
rest of his life. 
 
Schlesinger remained a committed and active member of the KPD until his 
expulsion in 1937. He had many different roles and undertook various tasks 
for the party. He witnessed and participated in many of its key events: the 
aborted revolutionary attempts in 1923;22 the repercussions of Comintern’s 
‘Open Letter’ to the party; the development of the theory of ‘social fascism’ in 
1928/9 and the failure of the May Day demonstrations and strikes in 1929 are 
just a few examples. The fluctuations of the KPD party majority involved an 
ever-changing body of leaders and theoreticians and Schlesinger sometimes 
found himself in agreement with the party majority. In his memoirs, he wrote, 
‘… my support for Thälmann in 1928-30, and for Ulbricht in 1933-4 was free 
from any mental reservation’.23 During such periods, Schlesinger was able to 
enjoy more responsible party positions and an increased influence. At other 
times, he found himself unable to agree with the tactical and theoretical 
assumptions made by the majority. This would inevitably impact upon his role 
within the party and he would often have to resort to freelance journalism or 
the role of an isolated theorist, until such time as the dominant faction 
                                                
21 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 188. 
22 Again, a more scholarly treatment of these issues by Schlesinger can be found in 
Schlesinger, Central European Democracy, p. 212… and Fischer, Stalin and German 
Communism, p. 291… 
23 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, (1944, Unpublished) Band II, p. 232. 
Ernst Thälmann (1886-1944) was a member of the USPD when it’s left-wing merged with the 
KPD in 1920. He was on the left of the party and took part in the abortive Hamburg 
insurrection during the German October of 1923. He became chairman of the KPD in 1925 
despite the explusion of his left-wing peers. Thälmann survived the ‘Wittorf affair’, in which he 
attempted to cover up the appropriation of party funds by a member of the CC, and remained 
a member of the Presidium of Comintern and on the CC of the KPD for the remainder of his 
life. He was arrested by the Nazis in 1933 and was executed in Buchenwald concentration 
camp in August 1944. Walter Ulbricht (1893-1973) became a member of the KPD on its 
founding in 1918. He became a member of the CC in 1923 and remained so, except for the 
period of left-wing dominance in the mid-1920s. After a few months undertaking underground 
partywork, Ulbricht left Germany for Prague in October 1933. He took part in the Spanish Civil 
War before settling in Moscow in 1938, where he found work at Comintern. In 1945 Ulbricht 
returned to Berlin and became vice-chairman of the SED in April 1946 and eventually first 
Secretary and head of the East German State until his resignation in May 1971(Lazitch and 
Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, pp. 465-467 and pp. 486-487).  
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changed its opinions or was replaced. In fact, Schlesinger was so at odds with 
the party line in early 1926 that he was sent to Russia to work for the 
International Agrarian Institute; like many of his comrades Schlesinger spent 
time in Moscow in order to ‘sit out his uklon’- deviation from the party line of 
the majority.24 Deviationists were sent to be schooled by the Russian party 
and to correct their theoretical positions or await a time when their own 
attitude became that of the party majority. Schlesinger, having made the 
necessary adjustments to his party line, returned to Germany in April 1927 
and resumed KPD work. 
 
In his unpublished memoirs, Schlesinger described many of the key events in 
KPD history in the 1920s and early 1930s. His description of the development 
of the theory of ‘social fascism’ is perhaps one of the most interesting, as it 
puts Schlesinger at the epicentre of the theoretical evolution of the party. With 
the increasing success of fascism in the late 1920s, the KPD sought a new 
theoretical line on which to base its tactical decisions. The key theory to 
emerge from this debate was that of ‘social fascism’; whereby the main 
enemy of communism and the labour movement was Social Democracy, 
rather than Nazism.25 According to the theory, Social Democracy and its party 
had increasingly collaborated with the bourgeois government to create an 
authoritarian and fascistic state, all propaganda and tactical considerations 
should therefore be directed towards exposing its true nature.26 This theory 
was of little use when encouraging resistance to fascism and led to a 
disastrous underestimation of Hitler’s appeal and support.  
 
 As Schlesinger explained: ‘I had been one of the first who had coined the 
term, and I immediately made my effort at elaborating the concept – not quite 
on those lines on which it soon became a popular slogan and greatly harmed 
                                                
24 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 202. 
25 Fischer, Stalin and German Communism, p. 655-656. 
26 The use of ‘social fascist’ as a derogatory label has been traced as far back as November 
1922 in the Soviet newspaper Izvestiia. In early 1924 Zinoviev and Stalin spoke of social 
democracy transforming into ‘a wing of fascism’. However, the concept was not developed 
until the late 1920s (McDermott K, and Agnew J., The Comintern A History of International 
Communism from Lenin to Stalin (London, MacMillan Press Ltd.) p. 98). Schlesinger may 
have been unaware of its earlier origins and was referring to his part in the evolution of its 
later, more developed formulation.  
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our struggle against fascism’.27 Schlesinger participated in the debates that 
led to the theory’s elaboration but disagreed with its eventual development 
into a slogan that suggested all Social Democrats were, in fact, fascists. In 
early 1929, under his regular pseudonym of Rudolf Gerber, Schlesinger wrote 
an article upon the foundations of ‘social fascism’, published in Communist 
International.28 According to his memoirs, he also wrote a report on the same 
subject to the Central Committee of the KPD in February 1929. He argued 
that the German state was becoming characteristic of a fascist state because 
of monopoly capitalism’s tendency to directly control the state machine. There 
was also a tendency amongst trade unions and political parties to become 
direct supporters of the state instead of representatives of distinct sectional 
interests. These groups were then, ‘… collaborating with the employers on a 
corporative basis and handling the broad masses of the workers with a 
combination of terror and demagogic phraseology’.29 There had also been a 
change in the character of the ‘workers aristocracy’. It no longer consisted of 
skilled workers, since their position had been undermined by mechanisation 
and rationalisation. There was now a new privileged group consisting of 
foremen, supervisors and those employed in the state machine or in municipal 
or cooperative enterprises. This group, once bribed with the promise of job 
security, willingly collaborated with the state. It gained control of the trade 
unions and Social Democratic party organisations and proceeded to use them 
as instruments of repression against the revolutionary workers’ movement. In 
light of these new developments, the KPD’s struggle to gain the loyalty of the 
broad mass of Social Democratic workers should not aim at winning over 
parts of the reformist machine; this pursuit was hopeless since that machine 
was now part of the problem. The KPD should instead explain to the Social 
Democrat workers that, ‘… their party as such had become a tool of the 
fascisation of Germany and that, in the decisive hour, it would be found on the 
other side of the barricade’.30 A struggle along these lines would be made 
easier by the fact that the new ‘workers aristocracy’ was much narrower and, 
                                                
27 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 363. 
28 R. Gerber (Schlesinger), ‘The Face of German Social-Fascism’, The Communist 
International, 6, 21, 1929, pp. 800-808. 
29 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 363. 
30 Ibid. p. 364. 
 9 
in its fight against communism, was now opposing even the traditions of 
bourgeois democracy. 
 
 Schlesinger explained that he was less concerned about whether Social 
Democratic workers would be prepared to give up their party tickets than 
whether they would join the revolutionary struggle against the advice of their 
leaders. Schlesinger used the expression ‘left-wing social fascists’ in terms of 
insincere Social Democrat leaders but was very much against its 
generalisation. However, despite his protests, the term ‘social fascism’ quickly 
became a popular slogan within the KPD and came to mean that all non-
communist parties were fascist. Later in his memoirs, he referred to the theory 
of ‘social fascism’ as ‘my unwanted child’.31 Schlesinger offered a unique and 
insightful analysis of this important theoretical concept. His contemporary and 
retrospective descriptions provide useful information on what a middle-ranking 
party activist felt about party developments. It also helps to clarify the limits of 
Schlesinger’s influence upon the party; he was respected enough to submit a 
report to the central committee and have a paper published in Comintern’s 
central international organs, yet he had no real impact on the definition of 
‘social fascism’ adopted by the KPD. 
 
Schlesinger continued his varied KPD roles throughout the 1920s. He was to 
play a decisive part in the, ultimately unsuccessful, Mansfeld strike of June 
and July 1930, involving workers in the area’s copper mines and foundries as 
well as the local unemployed populace.32 Schlesinger opted to stay in 
Germany after Hitler’s rise to power, going underground on 30 June 1933 in 
order to continue illegal KPD work against the Nazis.33 On 7 August 1933 he 
was arrested and taken to the notorious General Pape Street headquarters of 
the SA and then the equally infamous Columbia House.34 After two weeks of 
torture and imprisonment, Schlesinger’s wife, Mila, was able to secure his 
                                                
31 Ibid. p. 417. In the German edition Schlesinger referred to it as his ‘unfortunate’ child. 
Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p 318.  
32 See Kapitel 14, ‘Der Mansfeld Streik’ in Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers 
Machtübernahme, pp. 301…   
33 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 46. 
34 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 55… 
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release and expulsion to Austria on account of his citizenship.35 
 
Schlesinger and Mila then moved to Prague and settled into émigré life. He 
organised educational activities for other German exiles and worked closely 
with Joseph Lenz, an old friend and German correspondent of the Communist 
Press Agency.36 However, after becoming involved with internal KPD 
squabbles, Schlesinger was ordered to move to the Soviet Union by the KPD 
representatives in Russia. They wished to investigate him in person.37 The 
investigation produced nothing against Schlesinger and in early 1935 he 
began work as the editor of the German edition of the Communist 
International in Moscow.38 
 
Schlesinger was in the Soviet Union at the time of the first ‘purge’ trial and 
was himself subject to the process of investigation and expulsion. Despite this 
he remained a strong supporter of both the party and the Soviet Union. In his 
memoirs, he stated: ‘My expulsion from the party was the hardest experience 
of my life, incomparably harder than the two occasions where I had to face 
death in its least desirable forms, in General Pape street and later in England 
when I had to undergo a serious operation because of cancer’.39 He explained 
that Mila was actually pleased he was in bed with flu when his party group 
suggested his expulsion, because she feared he might have had a breakdown 
if present. His whole life had been the party and to be without it had, until 
then, been inconceivable. Yet at the time, Schlesinger believed that there was 
indeed a general conspiracy against Stalin. There must, therefore, have been 
a wider belt of sympathisers. As Schlesinger later wrote in his memoirs, he, 
‘… granted the party the right, if it suspected someone to belong to that belt 
even if being incapable of proving it, to expel him so as to avoid future 
mischief, the assumption being that, if the suspicion should prove unfounded, 
the party would make amends to those innocently expelled’.40 In an 
                                                
35 Ibid. pp. 88-89. 
36 Ibid. p. 103. 
37 Ibid. p. 122. 
38 Ibid. p. 136. 
39 Ibid. p. 222. 
40 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches (Glasgow University Library, 
1953-1961, Unpublished) Memoirs Volume II, p. 226. 
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anonymous paper to the journal Pacific Affairs written the year after he left the 
Soviet Union, Schlesinger insisted on the reality of an anti-Stalin conspiracy 
that justified the ‘purges’. He wrote: ‘That serious trouble existed is proven by 
the mere fact of the trials, whatever one may think of their details, for the 
holding of the trials was so detrimental to the repute abroad of the Soviet 
Union that it can hardly be assumed that they were ‘trumped up’’.41 According 
to Schlesinger, even when the full scale of the ‘purges’ emerged and it 
became clear, ‘… at least the majority of charges levelled against the victims 
of the ‘great purge’’ were trumped up’, Schlesinger remained a Soviet 
sympathiser and a member of the communist party in the wider Marxist 
sense.42  He believed that subsequent information about the ‘purges’ had 
justified the behaviour of those, like Schlesinger, who would not let their 
attitude towards the Soviet Union be determined by a ‘tragic episode’. On 
reflection, his opinion was that: 
 
The ‘purge’ was a violent and to a large extent criminal way of 
carrying out the unavoidable change of generations, to replace 
those whose ways of thought had been nurtured by the need of 
overthrowing the old society by people grown up in the new one 
and knowing no other aims than its gradual strengthening and 
development.43 
 
The purges were violent and criminal but seemingly essential or unavoidable. 
 
Schlesinger described the atmosphere within the party as becoming 
increasingly tense over the summer of 1936, with Schlesinger himself 
becoming concerned when learning of the arrest of people that he actually 
knew – mainly Russians working within the German party.44 In July the 
                                                
41 Schlesinger, ‘The ‘War Potential’ of the Soviet Union’, Pacific Affairs, 12, 1, March 1939, 
pp. 34-53 at p. 41. Schlesinger claimed authorship in Schlesinger, Spirit of Post War Russia, 
(London, Dennis Dobson Limited, 1947) p. 7 and in his memoirs, Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: 
Illegalität und Emigration, p. 273. 
42 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 282. 
43 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 231. 
44 The tense atmosphere felt by foreign communists in Russia up to 1938 is described by 
McDermott and Agnew, The Comintern, p. 148… E. Varga wrote to Stalin on 28 March 1938 
to bemoan the intolerable tension under which foreign communists were living: ‘One-sided, 
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German representative at Comintern informed Schlesinger of the arrest of 
Emel Lurye, a member of the KPD and a historian at Moscow University.45 As 
party procedure dictated, he immediately told the representative frankly of his 
relationship to Emel. It was of a purely social nature having had factional 
disagreements in the past. However, Schlesinger was surprised at Emel’s 
arrest. He assumed that historians at the University formed academic cliques 
– this would explain Emel’s tendency to cut short phone conversations in 
Schlesinger’s presence, but his having formed a clique did not seem a 
sufficient explanation for his arrest. He had been an oppositionist and, 
perhaps, had continued to be so after falsely submitting to the party majority. 
But no one in Schlesinger’s circle could have regarded him as a potential 
terrorist.   
 
On the day before Schlesinger went on holiday to the Caucasus he learnt of 
the arrest of Fritz David.46 David had been editor of the German edition of 
Communist International and, on promotion to the chief Editorial Board, he 
had secured his old job for Schlesinger. He also worked for Wilhelm Pieck, 
the chairman of the German Politburo, as something amounting to personal 
secretary.47 Since the information about his arrest was told to Schlesinger in 
confidence, he did not feel able to make any declaration regarding his 
relationship with David. He described being very shocked at the arrest: ‘David 
had never belonged to any opposition within the party (in his confession he 
stated that Trotsky himself was surprised at him embracing Trotskyism – how 
could I have expected it!)’.48 Schlesinger explained that if he had had to locate 
David politically, both in that year in Moscow and during their diverse contacts 
                                                                                                                                       
narrow nationalism is increasingly gaining ground at the expense of the correct combination 
of Soviet patriotism and internationalism. Hatred for foreigners is rampant. Foreigners are 
indiscriminately considered spies; foreign children are called fascists at school’ (McDermott 
and Agnew, The Comintern, p. 245). 
45 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 202. 
46 Ibid. p. 203. 
47 Wilhelm Pieck (1876-1960) joined the SPD in 1895 and was one of the chairmen at the 
founding meeting of the KPD. He was a leader of the party from 1918 to 1960, surviving the 
various purges and shifts in orientation. Beginning work with Comintern in 1921, Pieck 
advanced to higher and higher positions of authority, moving permanently to Moscow on 
Hitler’s accession to power. He became the official head of the KPD on Thämann’s arrest. In 
1946 he became one of the two presidents of the SED and in October 1949 he was elected 
president of the German Democratic Republic. He held both positions until his death in 1960 
((Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, pp. 364-365). 
48 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 209. 
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in Germany, he would have placed him slightly on the right of the broad range 
of political views which made up the German party majority; just as 
Schlesinger tended to be near its left fringe. In fact, such was his surprise at 
David’s arrest that Schlesinger immediately feared he was an enemy agent. 
However, his frank ventilation of heterodox views within private discussions 
seemed to contradict this initial suspicion. His arrest was, therefore, a 
mystery. 
 
Whilst on holiday, Schlesinger was able to get details of the first ‘purge’ trial 
from Moscow newspapers.49 He described his amazement on reading that 
Kirov had not been killed by an individual on the fanatical fringe of the 
Zinoviev group, as he had previously assumed, but by a concerted group of 
Zinovievites, including Emel. Even stranger than the terrorism of the Zinoviev 
group was the revelation that David was an individual terrorist working for 
Trotsky and preparing an attempt upon Stalin’s life.  At this time, Schlesinger 
believed that the Soviet Government would not groundlessly arrest a well-
connected person such as David and that there would not have been a trial if 
no actual conspiracy existed. Schlesinger asserted that he never discovered 
what it was that David actually did to cause his arrest but still believed that a 
person so closely associated with the chairman of the KPD would not have 
been randomly made an example of for political purposes. 
 
Schlesinger noticed on his return from the Caucasus that the editorial office 
had developed a tense atmosphere. The former head of the department had 
been expelled from the party for his having advocated David’s appointment. 
Other investigations were in the process of being prepared and amongst them 
was one on Schlesinger. The issue of Communist International he had edited 
before going on holiday was subject to a special review to determine whether, 
as well as demonstrating a lack of vigilance as regards David, he had been 
consciously distorting the party line.50 The Commission reported a number of 
stylistic mistakes but no political tendency.  
 
                                                
49 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 207. 
50 Ibid. p. 213. 
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 The real focus of the investigation was Schlesinger’s relationship to David 
and several issues were central to the argument. The first was Schlesinger’s 
political past. Everyone knew of his former connection to Ruth Fischer’s 
group, yet the ten years since he had publicly broken with them had been 
those of his most responsible party positions. Besides, according to 
Schlesinger, there were few in the KPD who had not, at some time, been 
involved with a group that had since been condemned. The second issue was 
that David had proposed Schlesinger for his editorial job. Schlesinger wrote in 
his memoirs: ‘David was a counterrevolutionary; hence David had proposed 
me for counterrevolutionary purposes, namely in order to have tolerable 
surroundings in which he would not be denounced’.51 Schlesinger responded 
that David had other obvious reasons for proposing Schlesinger, his editorial 
experience and knowledge of Russian, for example. He also argued that in 
ventilating his private views and tactical ideas, David had never exceeded 
acceptable deviations from the party line. Yet Schlesinger was deemed to 
have been insufficiently vigilant in his dealings with the ‘traitor’ David and was 
thus declared ‘alien to the party’ and encouraged to leave the country. It was 
agreed that he could not have known of David’s terrorism but Schlesinger was 
guilty of ‘liberalism’, in the sense of a readiness to frankly air disagreements 
within the party, something no longer desirable or tolerated. Schlesinger was 
regarded as a helper of treason, however involuntarily. Thus, he wrote, ‘… an 
example had to be made with a person who certainly was not involved in the 
conspiracies (otherwise it would have been no example of the necessary 
suppression of ‘liberalism’ but another treason case)’.52  
 
Being ‘alien to the party’ rather than ‘anti-party’, official party bodies offered 
him advice and material help for the first few months after expulsion, 
something that he thought demonstrated a reasonable attitude within Russian 
party circles towards those expelled for lack of vigilance.53 He determined to 
                                                
51 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 221. In the German edition, 
Schlesinger wrote: ‘David had suggested me for the editorial board, David was a counter-
revolutionary, therefore, David, at least, must have been of the subjective opinion that my 
work for the editorial board would be useful for his counter-revolutionary purposes.’ 
(Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 218). 
52 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 222. Author’s underlining. 
53 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 233. 
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return to Prague, from where he could, in his own words, ‘… refute, not a 
certain sociological concept of the party, but the assertion that Rudolf Gerber 
was morally capable of lending any support to the enemies of the USSR or of 
his party’.54 He would counter the label of ‘alien to the party’ by remaining 
faithful to the Soviet Union whilst in the West. Yet on his return to Europe, 
Schlesinger found it nearly impossible to publish, due to the stigma of 
expulsion. Mila also suffered from Schlesinger’s expulsion. According to 
Schlesinger, in Moscow no one had questioned her party membership, yet in 
Prague her repeated request for admission to normal party work was met with 
the response from the German party organisation that, ‘… you must 
understand, Rudolf’s case slightly stains you’.55 
 
With the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia in early 1939, Schlesinger and Mila 
were forced to flee to Poland. They escaped on foot over the Carpathian 
Mountains and, from Poland, were able to secure a place on a refugee ship 
from Gydnia to Britain on 21 April.56 In England they were provided with some 
money by a fund for refugee scholars and lived in an abandoned cottage in 
the Fens near Cambridge.57 Schlesinger was eventually to secure work at the 
University of Glasgow in 1948 and, as well as being a lecturer and researcher, 
he became co-editor of the journal Soviet Studies and founder of the journal 
Co-existence. He also spent time as a visiting professor at Sir George 
Williams University in Canada.58 He retired in 1966 and died at his home in 
Argyllshire on 11 November 1969.  
 
 
Why study Rudolf Schlesinger? 
Rudolf Schlesinger remains a relatively unknown figure within the history of 
socialism, both as an active fighter within its ranks and as a theoretician and 
academic. Nevertheless, he is worthy of detailed study for a great many 
                                                
54 Ibid. p. 234. 
55 Ibid. p. 268. 
56 Ibid. p. 427. 
57 R. Beerman, ‘Rudolf Schlesinger – An Appreciation’, Soviet Studies, 21, 4, April 1970, pp. 
409-410 p. 410. 
58 For more information on the founding of Co-existence see K. Levitt, ‘Karl Polanyi and Co-
Existence’, Co-existence, 2, Nov. 1964, pp. 113-121. 
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reasons, not least because of the sheer number and scale of movements and 
events in which he was personally involved. Schlesinger lived, at various 
times, in Austria, Germany, the Soviet Union, the Czechoslovak Republic and 
Great Britain. He was deeply involved in political developments and 
participated in, or witnessed, significant events in many of these countries – 
the collapse of the Hapsburg Monarchy and Hitler’s invasion of 
Czechoslovakia are just two examples. 
 
Schlesinger was well educated with a distinguished publishing career. He was 
a keen, intelligent observer who was able to successfully put his memories, 
thoughts and feelings to paper, inevitably enhancing his reputation as an 
academic, the locus of this investigation. Schlesinger was born into an 
intellectual family and attended the Schottengymnasium, Vienna’s most 
renowned secondary school.59 He then attended the University of Vienna from 
autumn 1919, initially to read medicine but deciding upon social sciences after 
his first year.60 On arrival in Berlin in February 1923 he began work as a 
professional economist in a research institute associated with Comintern (The 
Communist International).61 From February 1926 to April 1927 Schlesinger 
worked in Moscow as the German member of the International Agrarian 
Institute, researching agrarian problems in Central and Western Europe, 
especially Germany.62 From 1939 onwards Schlesinger continued his 
scholarly activities in Britain, eventually to work as a lecturer and researcher 
at the University of Glasgow. He published academic and theoretical work 
throughout his life on a vast number of differing topics including Soviet foreign 
policies, Marxist philosophy and Soviet legal theory.63  Schlesinger became 
an expert in many academic disciplines. He trained as an economist but was 
also a proficient and well respected sociologist, historian and political theorist. 
As his obituary in the academic journal Soviet Studies noted: “His wide variety 
                                                
59 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 8.  
60 Ibid. p. 65. 
61 Ibid. p. 97. 
62 Ibid. p. 192… 
63 See, for example, G Keeton and R. Schlesinger, Russia and her Western Neighbours, 
(London, Jonathan Cape, 1942); Schlesinger, Marx: His Time and Ours, (London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950); Schlesinger, Soviet Legal Theory, (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1945). 
 17 
of interests and encyclopaedic knowledge of the Soviet Union made him 
invaluable to the students of the Institute [Institute of Soviet and East 
European Studies] and of the University as a whole and especially to his 
colleagues”.64 
 
Another pertinent factor making the study of Schlesinger in general, and his 
writings in particular, so valuable is the fact that he was a professional writer. 
Schlesinger not only wrote as part of his scholarly work but was also a prolific 
contributor to the communist press. In fact, many of his party posts within the 
KPD (German Communist Party) were as a freelance writer or editor of party 
organs. For example, in spring 1925 Schlesinger moved to Halle to work as 
an editor for Klassenkampf, a KPD provincial daily.65 After a gap of a number 
of years Schlesinger became the organ’s chief editor in autumn 1928.66 In 
1935-6 Schlesinger became editor of the German edition of The Communist 
International and worked within Comintern headquarters in Moscow.67 This 
editorial and journalistic experience would have enabled Schlesinger to gain 
particularly good writing and observational skills. One can assume that these 
skills would be used to the full in his publications and thus suggests that a 
thorough critique of them is worthwhile. 
 
Rudolf Schlesinger performed a vast number of roles within the labour 
movement. He was an eyewitness to many decisive occurrences and his 
perception of such matters would be of undoubted benefit to historians. He 
was also an organiser within the labour movement, a Marxist theoretician, an 
editor, an underground activist and, at times, an isolated intellectual. These 
different roles allowed Schlesinger to view the European labour movement 
from many perspectives. His varying functions also gave him the opportunity 
to associate with a great number of people from many different countries, 
backgrounds and political affiliations, something which would inevitably add to 
the depth of Schlesinger’s experiences and thus promote him as an object of 
historical investigation. In fact, Schlesinger came to know many key figures 
                                                
64 R. Beerman, ‘Rudolf Schlesinger – An Appreciation’, p, 409.  
65 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 167. 
66 Ibid. p. 287. 
67 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 137. 
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within the labour movement and the history of the twentieth century. For 
example, at various times he enjoyed a close association with Ruth Fischer 
and Arkadi Maslow.68 At university he became friends with the sons of the co-
founder of the German Communist Party (KPD), Karl Liebknecht, and made 
the aquaintance of leading Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer. In Germany he worked 
under the reputable economist Eugen Varga and maintained working 
relationships with many key intellectuals within the socialist fold. During his 
first stay in Moscow, he came into contact with Stalin, since his wife, Allilueva, 
was Schlesinger’s librarian and personal secretary.69 
 
Schlesinger was unique in several ways. This makes a study of his academic 
writings worthwhile and overdue. He was both a politically active and 
theoretical man, a combination Schlesinger no doubt adopted from Marx.70 
Schlesinger was unquestionably an active worker within the Communist party 
machine, both in Germany and the Soviet Union: he spent the two months of 
the Mansfeld strike of 1930 racing around the district on a motorbike with his 
colleague Willy Dolgner acting as party liaison for the strikers and making 
public speeches of encouragement.71 He also played an active role in the 
Berlin underground after the KPD was outlawed on Hitler’s accession to 
power. For example, he produced information sheets for factory and district 
newspapers, from which local editors could pick out relevant material.72 Yet 
alongside this active party work, Schlesinger was also a theoretician and 
academic, researching and writing numerous publications, as mentioned 
                                                
68 Arkadi Maslow (1891-1941) was German born to Russian parents. He joined the KPD 
immediately after it was founded, and was always on its left-wing. After his expulsion he 
traveled with Ruth Fischer but was unable to obtain a visa for the US and died in Havana, 
awaiting her return (Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p. 
307-8). 
69 Nadezhda Sergeevna Allilueva (1901-1932) was the daughter of a revolutionary and the 
goddaughter of prominent Bolshevik Abel Enukhidze. Stalin met her when she was sixteen 
years old and she became his personal assistant at the Commissariat of Nationalities. They 
were married in 1919 and she bore him two children. After a tempestuous marriage in which 
she became increasingly isolated, Nadezhda was found dead from a gunshot wound on 8 
November 1932 and the circumstances remain unclear (Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 
Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, pp. 3-4). 
70 As Marx pointed out in his eleventh ‘Thesis on Feuerbach’ of 1845: ‘The philosophers have 
only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however is to change it’ (Marx and 
Engels, Werke, 3, pp. 5 – 7 at p. 7, Author’s italics). 
71 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 310-11. 
72 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 16. 
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above. There are other examples of people within this category. Rosa 
Luxemburg and Lenin were a combination of the theoretical and the active. 
Yet both died at a relatively young age and thus did not have the opportunity 
to reflect upon events fully and write memoirs of their experiences. Perhaps 
Ruth Fischer and Trotsky are also examples, but their later writings and 
recollections seem coloured by overt political agendas to a far greater extent 
than Schlesinger’s. 
 
Schlesinger also occupied a relatively unique historiographical position. He 
was a participant and eyewitness to many important events in the labour 
movement and the history of socialism in the first half of the twentieth century, 
yet completed his analysis and recollection of these events in the West, much 
later. Living in the West, he was free from the ideological constraints placed 
upon Soviet scholars and memoirists. Yet he also appeared relatively free of 
the bitterness that often accompanied the writings of those who had 
emigrated or been expelled from communists parties and the Soviet Union. 
 
A study of Schlesinger is of value to students of history and political thought 
because of his reputation as an academic within the UK. He co-founded and 
edited the multi-disciplinary journal Soviet Studies. This reputable 
publication helped to establish Soviet studies as an academic discipline in 
its own right. As the co-founder J. Miller pointed out, both editors wished for 
the publication to be accessible to all scholars, regardless of political 
complexion:  
 
Schlesinger and I were both communists, in very different ways, 
but it never occurred to us that Soviet Studies could be anything 
other than a vehicle for the purpose of publishing any 
reasonably serious scholar, the more empirical the better, who 
cared to use it…. When the late Naum Jasny, who was at the 
opposite pole to Schlesinger amongst serious students of the 
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USSR, found publication difficult in the United States we both 
encouraged him to the utmost to use Soviet Studies.73 
 
Schlesinger’s commitment to academic integrity, especially as regards his 
editorial role, is demonstrated in private correspondence between Miller and 
the then Principal of Glasgow University, Sir Hector Hetherington. In 1951 
Miller wrote of a, ‘…tenet, which he [Schlesinger] holds in practice as well as 
in theory and as firmly as anybody ever will, namely that the editors, as 
trustees of their office, must maintain standards of scholarship’.74 According to 
Miller, although often ‘blinkered’ by his ‘own intellectual idiom’, Schlesinger 
strove for ‘objectivity’.75 His administration of the periodical provides evidence 
of an academic endeavouring to create an objective forum for the discussion 
of all questions related to the study of the Soviet Union. 
 
Whilst at Glasgow University Schlesinger contributed prolifically to the 
journal.76 He also lectured on the subjects of Marxism, the Soviet Union, and 
its legal theory. One of his final acts within academia was to help establish 
and edit the journal Co-existence from 1963 until his death in 1969. As D. 
Nelson, the editor of its successor International Politics pointed out, this 
international journal,  
 
…provided an insistent and innovative reminder that the 
problems of statecraft and governance were not merely 
explained by ideological distinctions or the differences between 
developed and underdeveloped world. In an era when little 
constructive dialogue existed across East-West ideological 
divides or North-South developmental chasms, Co-existence 
                                                
73 J. Miller, ‘The Origins of Soviet Studies: A Personal Note’, Soviet Studies, 25, 2, October 
1973, pp. 167-169 at p. 168. For more information on Jasny see J. Wilhelm, ‘The Failure of 
the American Sovietological Economics Profession’, Europe Asia Studies, 55, 1, 2003, pp. 
59-74. 
74 Miller, private correspondence to Sir Hector Hetherington (3 December 1951). The letter 
was given to me by a private collector.  
75 Ibid. 
76 In the four issues of Volume 1 Schlesinger contributed six reports and eight review articles. 
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offered much of lasting significance while widening the audience 
of scholars from both sides of Cold War divides.77 
 
Once again, Schlesinger demonstrated his commitment to the provision of a 
multi-disciplinary academic forum. Co-existence was intended to facilitate the 
free discussion of issues across political, cultural and developmental divides. 
As Schlesinger wrote in the first issue of the journal, ‘Marx, indeed foresaw 
that socialism will rescue mankind from barbarism in its struggle for survival. 
Yet this journal is not produced by socialists for socialists, but is intended to 
offer a broad forum for discussion’.78 He made his political allegiance clear but 
sought to provide an open journal that conformed to the strictest scholarly 
integrity and countered prevailing cold war tendencies. 
 
Schlesinger was viewed by some peers as one of a small circle of intellectuals 
and academics with expertise on what was still a new subject. For example, in 
1947 Miller wrote in an initial proposal for Soviet Studies: ‘The outstanding 
five or six authorities on the USSR in Britain (Dobb, Baykov, Sumner, 
Rothstein, Schlesinger and E. H. Carr) are all very interested in the 
proposal’.79 It was clear to Miller that Schlesinger was an ‘outstanding 
authority’. In 1951 he wrote, ‘… Schlesinger, in his books and articles, is doing 
a lot of spadework in helping to lay the foundations for work on Russia as a 
scholarly subject’.80 At this time his academic pre-eminence, and notoriety 
within the cold war context, was thought to be as great as other notable 
scholars of his generation, such as I. Deutscher and E. H. Carr. In fact 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, the academic and one-time US national security advisor, 
was reported to have said that alongside Carr and Deutscher, Schlesinger 
was one of the most dangerous scholars in the UK.81 Schlesinger certainly 
contributed significantly to the establishment of Soviet studies as an academic 
discipline. 
                                                
77 D. N. Nelson, (1997), ‘Introducing International Politics’, International Politics, 34, 1, March 
1997, pp. 1-5 at p. 1. 
78 Schlesinger, ‘Co-existence as a Framework of Social Evolution’, Coexistence, 1, May 1964, 
pp. 46 – 53 at p. 47. 
79 Miller, Proposal for a Journal of Soviet Studies (8 April 1947). Private papers. 
80 Miller, private correspondence to Sir Hector Hetherington (3 December 1951). 
81 J. Haslam, The Vices of Integrity: E. H. Carr, 1892-1982 (London, Verso, 1999), p. 223. 
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Methodological/Theoretical foundations of the thesis 
The first thing to make clear is that this thesis in not a biography of Rudolf 
Schlesinger. The approach taken assumes an immutable separation between 
the object of study and the study itself. Whilst source material and 
publications exist which allow for a perception of Schlesinger the man, any 
representation of him could never be anything near to complete or accurate. 
The study is too far removed from the object. Therefore, one cannot hope to 
fully comprehend Schlesinger as a ‘personality’ or effectively communicate 
that to others.  
 
As eminent historian A. J. P. Taylor has noted, psychologists and Freudians 
argue that the most important thing when studying an individual is the 
subject’s unconscious mind: 
 
This is all very well when the psychologist or perhaps even the 
historian has personal contacts with a living man. Even the most 
uninstructed of us can form some sort of impression, noting 
whether our subject is bad-tempered, vain or sympathetic…. But 
how do you interview a dead man? The answer is: you guess. 
The psychologist takes concepts that he has derived from living 
subjects and imposes them on dead ones. The results are far 
from satisfactory.82 
 
There will, thus, be no psychoanalytical investigation based on the self-
conscious utterances of memoirs in an attempt to gauge Schlesinger’s 
‘unconscious mind’.  
 
According to Taylor, the task of a biographer and that of a historian are very 
different things. The biographer,  
 
… claims to know what his subject was thinking as well as what 
his subject was doing. He writes confidently of his subject’s 
                                                
82 A.J.P. Taylor, ‘The Historian as Biographer’ in W. Buhl and G Heiss (ed.), Biographie und 
Geschichtswissenchaft, (Munich, R Oldbourg Verlag, 1979), pp. 254-261 at p. 256. 
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aims even when they were not revealed at that time. He often 
provides us with a vivid picture of the subject’s thoughts. As a 
result each biographer presents an entirely different version, 
based more on conjecture than on evidence.83 
 
In contrast, the historian must be constantly aware of what he/she does not, 
and perhaps cannot, know about their subject. Conjecture must be kept to a 
minimum and clearly labelled as such, and there can be little reason to 
suggest what was in the subject’s thoughts. 
 
This investigation also makes no attempt to provide a detailed narrative or 
description of Schlesinger’s life. This is, once again, due to scepticism 
regarding the scholarly efficacy of ‘biography’ and also because of a lack of 
source material to substantiate the information given in Schlesinger’s 
memoirs. Details of his non-scholarly activities and home life have only been 
added to considerations of his academic writings in order to provide a context 
for them, when appropriate. 
 
This is, instead, an ‘intellectual biography’, an investigation of Schlesinger’s 
intellectual career and achievements. It consists of an examination of his 
scholarly writings, a critique of their contents and an enquiry into their 
academic value both for his peers and subsequent generations. This is done 
with particular reference to his writings on Marxism and the Soviet historical 
field, in order to determine his peculiar political, intellectual and theoretical 
paradigm.   
 
However, this investigation is more than simply an ‘intellectual biography’. It 
uses Schlesinger’s work, and the investigation and critique of it, to refocus on 
the Soviet Union’s history. The thesis should throw new light on aspects of 
Soviet history and society, as well as illuminating the value of Schlesinger as 
an academic to peers and modern students. It will also provide an insight into 
the work of a Western Marxist intellectual during the cold war. This is due to 
                                                
83 Ibid. p. 258. 
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the employment of an overtly anti-determinist, anti-essentialist and 
irreductionist approach. This investigation utilises an overdeterminist theory of 
Marxist derivation, developed by Resnich and Wolff, which states that every 
aspect of society is both cause and effect of all others.84 According to the 
authors, ‘Overdeterminism’ is:  
 
 … the proposition that all aspects of society condition and 
shape one another. Hence it is not possible to reduce society or 
history to the determinant effect of some one or a subset of its 
constituent aspects. What theory or explanation does – all it can 
do or has ever done – is to select and draw attention to some 
aspects and some relationships of whatever object it scrutinizes. 
That object’s overdetermined complexity and ceaseless change 
place a comprehensive grasp beyond any theory’s reach. All 
theories and explanations remain partial, open to ceaseless 
addition, contestation, and change. This is because, to be 
intelligible, they can focus on only a few aspects. They 
necessarily leave out most of the other aspects.85 
 
This theory adds further ammunition to the assumption, asserted earlier, that 
it is impossible to fully comprehend Schlesinger as a ‘personality’, thus 
precluding any attempt at biography. Any understanding of him must 
necessarily ‘remain partial’ and so a definite aspect of the man is focused 
upon: his academic writings and those on Marxism and the Soviet historical 
field in particular. Whilst this ‘overdeterminist’ approach may appear negative 
and limiting, it does offer a more constructive element. No explanation or 
theory of events can be fully satisfactory, since they are not reducible to 
certain essential factors. Therefore, what is currently known about Marxist 
theory, Soviet society and the study and research of history in the Soviet 
Union is not finite or comprehensive. Anything an investigation and thorough 
reading of Schlesinger’s input in this field can add to that bank of knowledge 
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and theory, will, therefore, be illuminating. New aspects can be highlighted in 
this complex area, without questioning the validity or importance of what has 
been previously discovered.  
 
The majority of sources utilised in this investigation are published works by 
Schlesinger. These are employed as primary sources, critically assessed to 
determine theories and analyses which Schlesinger wished to have attributed 
publicly to him. They are read in conjunction with one another to allow for 
broad perceptions of Schlesinger’s theoretical and political assumptions, over 
time and across disciplines. They consist of monographs, journal articles, 
papers, commentaries and book reviews. The vast majority were published in 
the West, after Schlesinger’s expulsion from the party, and most of these 
were written in the UK. Some unpublished sources have also been used. 
Private letters, early drafts of published works and copies of lectures have 
been used where appropriate. This is mainly when the subject matter 
contained in an unpublished work mirrors that of a published one or if it will 
help in the exposition and increased understanding of the nature of 
Schlesinger’s published scholarly work. These private materials were 
obtained from the Rudolf Schlesinger Papers housed at Glasgow University 
Library or from private collectors. 
 
Another major source is Schlesinger’s unpublished memoirs. This form of 
self-representation is very much within the Western male tradition of 
autobiography. As the literary critic Leigh Gilmore has pointed out: 
‘Autobiography… has come to be identified… with master narratives of 
conflict resolution and development, whose hero – the overrepresented 
Western white male – identifies his perspective with a God’s-eye view and, 
from that divine height, sums up his life’.86 Schlesinger’s memoirs fit this 
definition well. They are an attempt by Schlesinger to describe and explain his 
life and work. There are several copies of the memoirs. Early versions were 
written in German and the later drafts in English. An early, complete, German 
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version and the most up to date English one have been used in the present 
study, with reference given to the German edition where possible. Neither 
copy has been published. The English version was donated to Glasgow 
University Library on Rudolf Schlesinger’s death and a private collector kindly 
gave one of the existing German editions to the author, others are retained in 
the Schlesinger Papers in Glasgow University Library.87  
 
It is unclear why the memoirs were not published in Britain but it is certain that 
they were written with the intention of publication. Throughout the text, 
Schlesinger referred to ‘my readers’, clearly suggesting that he was intending 
it to be read.88 It is also apparent that he expected an international readership. 
In the preface to the English edition, Schlesinger stated that when writing the 
first draft in 1944, he had hoped that the memoirs would be published after his 
death for the benefit of a resurrected democratic and socialist Central Europe 
as much as the ‘Anglo-Saxon world’.89 In view of the period covered and the 
depth of analysis in the memoirs, it also appears that Schlesinger anticipated 
an audience with a reasonably wide knowledge of the European labour 
movement and twentieth century history. However, he did occasionally 
provide background information to the events he described, for those less 
familiar with the material covered.90 
 
Rudolf Schlesinger first began work on his memoirs whilst in England in 
spring 1944, the catalyst being a serious illness.91 In summer 1951 he 
managed to retrieve his personal archive from Germany and those of his 
papers he had been forced to leave in Prague. He was, thus, able to 
supplement his first draft and correct any erroneous details from 1953 to 
1957.  
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The memoirs cover the period from Rudolf Schlesinger’s birth on 4 February 
1901 to his escape from Poland to Britain on 18 April 1939. Or, as 
Schlesinger explained in the preface to his second draft, the memoirs are a 
record of the failed efforts of the central European labour movement, 
concentrating on the ‘interwar years’, up to the point where armed conflict 
began between the fascists and the rest of the world, including the Soviet 
Union.92  
 
In the preface to the memoirs, Schlesinger insisted, as a historian, that he 
was well aware of the pitfalls and bias involved in memoirs. He, thus, saw his 
own as adding no more than interesting and colourful detail to his academic 
work. He also argued that he made no claim to be able to transcend the social 
conflicts of his time and so would clearly state his political standpoint from the 
very beginning:  
 
For many years I have not only ceased to be a member of any 
particular party organisation, but even arrived at the conclusion 
that I, given my background and capacities, can serve the cause 
of socialism best without belonging to a definite party 
framework. But this does not prevent me from being partisan ‘in 
the great historical sense’, to speak with Marx.93  
 
He argued that a clear statement of the author’s political standpoint would 
promote the memoirs’ use by the historian and, thus, presented himself as a 
non-partisan socialist from the offset. 
 
The memoirs are a useful source for a better understanding of Schlesinger 
and his background and they provide a wealth of material on many key events 
of the twentieth century. Whilst it is clear that Schlesinger consciously 
attempted to give as honest a portrayal of events as possible, admitting to 
errors and conceding mistakes, the memoirs are not without speculation and 
inevitable self-justification. They must be used with caution and an awareness 
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of all the caveats applicable to a source of this nature. In the words of A.J.P. 
Taylor: ‘I have a word of counsel for any historian who is puzzled as to how to 
assess an autobiography: he should write one himself. He will find that 
however resolutely he tries to tell the truth the narrative gets out of control. 
Little successes are magnified and failures passed over unless of course they 
are blown up into monstrous grievances’.94  
 
 
Schlesinger’s Marxism: His writing on theory as a key to 
understanding his wider work 
Half of this thesis is devoted to an investigation of Schlesinger’s writing on 
Marxism.  As the theory that underpinned all of Schlesinger’s scholarly work a 
thorough appreciation of his understanding of Marxism is essential. It is only 
by acknowledging Schlesinger’s theoretical foundation that one can fully 
comprehend his other writing, something which Schlesinger would have fully 
admitted. 
 
Marxism featured in all of Schlesinger’s work, in method if not in subject 
matter. Consequently, there is a wealth of source material for this 
investigation. However, two works in particular are of relevance. Schlesinger’s 
Marx His Time and Ours published in 1950 was his main philosophical work. It 
traced the history of Marxism, from its development in the nineteenth century 
through its reception in Russia and the success of the Russian revolution to 
its applicability in the world of the mid-twentieth century. The second 
important source is a series of nine lectures on Marxism-Leninism Schlesinger 
delivered at Glasgow University in 1964-1965 and 1965-1966, and at Sir 
George Williams University, Canada the following year.95  The series was 
intended for postgraduate students of Soviet studies or advanced economics 
undergraduates. The lectures were written in full, with references and 
footnotes, and traced Marxism from its roots through to 1960s China. 
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Schlesinger developed the lectures into a book entitled Marxism-Leninism: An 
Outline.96 However, this does not appear to have been published, presumably 
due to Schlesinger’s death. Alongside these main texts are a vast array of 
papers and reviews. 
 
Schlesinger spent his entire adult life in the cause of Marxism, both as a 
political activist and academic theoretician. In his memoirs, he wrote that he 
had devoted most of his life to the critical development of Marxist theory.97 To 
Schlesinger, Marxism was both a political ideology and a philosophical 
methodology. It was the movement that would, in his words, lead to, ‘…the 
emancipation of mankind from misery and de-humanisation’.98 He argued:  
 
The rule of man over man, and the fact that the means of 
production were controlled by a certain class different from the 
mass of society was nothing natural (and hence unchangeable) 
but an historical phenomenon which had a beginning and, 
hence, presumably, an end: this had to be brought about by the 
action of those who were not interested in its eternity.99 
 
Schlesinger believed that Marxism explained this situation and inspired and 
guided the movement that would remedy it. Marxism and its thinkers showed 
social-democracy how to organise to bring about revolution and how to 
construct a new state following that success. However, Marxism was also a 
philosophical methodology. Its historico-materialist outlook was a valid 
explanation of society and the way in which it operated. Marxism was a 
scientific method for scholarly pursuits, a way of understanding the world and 
investigating it.  This method remained valid as circumstances changed and 
developed; Marxism was not a set of commandments or mere political 
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instructions but a universal theory of permanent veracity. Schlesinger wrote 
that Marxism was, ‘…a theory of social development which, at the same time, 
claims to provide guidance for action transforming society’.100 He argued that 
it was to be defined, ‘…not as a collection of dogmata but by its historically 
given origins and its continuing approach and method’.101 
 
To Schlesinger, the essence of Marxism consisted of historical materialism 
and dialectics. Together, these concepts produced the Marxist method, a 
scientific, verifiable methodology. Marxism was not a set of instructions or a 
political creed, but was primarily this method. He outlined his basic 
understanding of Marxist theory in the second of his series of lectures, by 
quoting Marx’s ’A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’: 
 
The entity of production relations constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal 
and political superstructure and to which correspond the definite 
forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of 
material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life 
processes in general. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being 
that determines their consciousness.102 
 
The materialistic conception of history explained the nature of society and 
how it developed from one form to another. The character of production 
determined the nature of society at any given stage; means of production and 
an individual’s relationship to that means dictated man’s relationship to nature 
and other people.  
 
Marxism was a historical method as much as a philosophical or economic 
one.103 Historical materialism was concerned with the succession of different 
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social formations, as determined by production.  As Schlesinger expressed it 
in 1964: 
  
Marxism is…a certain conception of the objective conditions of 
human action and, in particular, of such actions as lead to the 
replacement of one form of social organization by another one. 
In particular it asserts the basic importance of the industrial 
working class in the replacement of a capitalist by a socialist 
order of society.104 
 
In the lectures he made clear how this transformation from one social 
formation to another took place. Once more quoting Marx, Schlesinger 
argued: 
 
At a certain stage of development, the material productive 
forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of 
production, or – this merely expressed the same thing in legal 
terms – with the property relations within which they have 
operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive 
forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era 
of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation 
lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense 
superstructure.105 
 
According to Schlesinger, historical materialism demonstrated that revolution 
was not a utopian hope but a necessary link in the inexorable development of 
mankind. The realisation of socialist ideals, although impossible in earlier 
stages, was essential in later periods, when contradictions between 
productive forces and productive relations became apparent.106 
 
The key constituent alongside historical materialism was dialectics. This was 
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derived from Hegel’s concept and Schlesinger described it in Marx His Time 
and Ours:  
 
As against the current assertion that only one argument can be 
correct and that contradiction in itself is a proof of logical 
mistake, Hegel showed that the thesis as well as the anti-thesis 
contain elements of truth, in that they reflect different stages in 
the development of human society and human thought.107 
 
Contradiction was inherent in all things. This struggle between opposites led 
from a transformation of quantitative change to one of qualitative change. 
According to Schlesinger, this was a somewhat problematic concept when 
applied to Nature but it did explain the revolutionary progression of society.108 
Antagonistic forces grew within society, eventually expressing themselves 
through revolutionary change. The new formation developed within the old 
and change was an essential element of society. 
 
Schlesinger made clear the importance of dialectics to Marxism. He argued 
that the Hegelian inheritance was essential because it allowed Marxism to 
develop beyond its origin. It allowed Marxism to reject the finality of human 
thought or achievement. It, thus, became a developing, transforming theory 
capable of evolving with a changing society.109  
 
This dynamic quality is what made Marxism as a method so important to 
Schlesinger. If Marxism was merely a set of instructions or a philosophical 
theory then it would inevitably have been time-bound, able to be disproved by 
new information or inaccurate predictions. Since it was a method this was not 
the case. In a 1962 paper on Marxist theory Schlesinger argued that Marxism 
could not become obsolete because of the method, which he described as, 
‘…the analysis of economic process as the interaction of social aggregates, 
and the associated interpretation of history, down to the abolition of class 
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divisions, as a history of class struggles’.110 He made clear the robust character 
of such an understanding of Marxism in his unpublished The Marxist 
Movement, writing: ‘The strength of Historical Materialism rests precisely upon 
its being a method, i.e. that every mistake in the application can be corrected 
by improved application of the method upon new subject matters’.111   
 
There were a number of features of Schlesinger’s Marxism, alongside its 
significance as a scientific method. Firstly, Schlesinger emphasised Marxism’s 
transforming quality. This was, in part, because it was a method. It developed 
as science and society developed. Hence it was secure from obsolescence.  
In his unpublished book of lectures he argued:  
 
But Marxism is not a specialist economic theory, as many 
people erroneously believe (hence they also believe that it can 
be refuted by the fact that the science of Economics, like any 
other, has made some progress during the century past since 
the publication of the first volume of ‘Capital’); it is a definite way 
of understanding and synthesizing the achievements of 
individual social sciences: hence, it must develop with the 
latter.112 
 
Critics pointed to elements in the Marxist classics that were no longer true or 
had proven unfounded as if this disputed the relevance of Marxism as a whole. 
Schlesinger argued that this was erroneous. Of course elements would become 
redundant, predictions would fail to materialise, but Marxist theory would move 
on as events did. The method would incorporate these developments. As 
Schlesinger argued in 1963: ‘Communism regards itself as the expression of 
continuous contradictions of society which it should help to solve’.113 Marxism 
and communism understood the world dialectically: antagonism; contradictory 
forces and an ever-developing society. The theory to emerge from this 
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understanding would inevitably be dynamic. 
 
A consequence of this aspect of Schlesinger’s Marxism was that his main area 
of concern was the relevance of theory for the present day. He had little interest 
in classical Marxism beyond what was necessary to understand its most recent 
manifestation. The ‘classics’ were inherently ephemeral. Thus, Schlesinger 
focussed upon what was still applicable to modern developments and ways in 
which Marxism had adapted and developed. 
 
A final characteristic of Schlesinger’s Marxism was his desire to counter 
errors and myths in general understanding, a feature of all Schlesinger’s 
scholarship. It can be discerned in his assertion of Marxism’s continued 
relevance, his insistence that critics who pointed to instances of redundancy 
in the classic texts failed to comprehend the nature of Marxism. He argued 
that many opponents of Marxism wrote from a distorted cold war perspective 
and that many within the Marxist camp presented a vulgar or utopian version 
that was equally incorrect. For example, he consistently sought to expose 
vulgar theorists who reduced Marxism to the level of basic economic 
determinism. In 1964 he wrote: 
 
Thus the twentieth century vulgarizers of Marxism, including the 
‘economists’ not only misrepresented Marxist doctrine, but were 
indeed several decades behind the course of history. Their 
misrepresentation of Marx’ early political writings as some kind 
of ‘infantile disorder’ of Young Hegelian origin, and their neglect 
of Engels’ later writings stressing the non-economic factors on 
the shaping and interaction of history, belongs to the realm of 
political mythology.114 
 
In his lecture series, Schlesinger insisted that Marxism was not a theory of 
simple ‘economic breakdown’ despite the efforts of Marx’s pupils to turn it in to 
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one.115  
 
There are a number of reasons why a thorough investigation of Schlesinger’s 
writings on Marxism is necessary. Firstly, it was the foundation of his 
scholarship. Marxism was the methodology underpinning his work; impacting 
upon everything: from the choice of subject, to method of investigation, to his 
paradigmatic assumptions. Without first exploring that theoretical foundation, 
it is not possible to fully appreciate his writings. The overdeterminist character 
of this thesis makes such an investigation imperative. Schlesinger’s 
theoretical understanding was overdetermined by, and in its turn 
overdetermined, all other arenas of his life – his other scholarly work and 
political activities for example.  In addition, an explicit recognition of 
Schlesinger’s political standpoint, something he was keen to make as 
transparent as possible, provides a further layer of understanding. It provides 
context and background, as well as a deeper understanding of his 
motivations. 
 
Secondly, Schlesinger was a respected, erudite and prolific scholar. His 
theoretical development and writings on the subject of Marxism are worthy of 
detailed examination for that reason alone. They represent a neglected 
resource, material that can provide information on one of the most significant 
political and philosophical doctrines of the last century. His work offers new 
perspectives and insights on Marxism and, in particular, the great Marxist 
theoreticians such as Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin. Schlesinger’s 
interpretations were original and add to the existing body of literature but have 
not been investigated to any great extent. 
 
Finally, a focussed study of Schlesinger’s Marxism is valid because it provides 
an opportunity to understand and elucidate, as much as is possible, the work 
of a twentieth century thinker and political activist. Schlesinger was a 
representative of his generation – a Central European communist and scholar 
who devoted his entire life to his political cause. He was an active party 
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member in Austria, Germany and Russia, but like many of his comrades, one 
who fell foul of the Soviet authorities and spent the latter part of his life in 
purely academic surroundings. In many ways, Schlesinger, as a Marxist, 
epitomised his time. An investigation of his writings on the subject can, thus, 
illuminate many aspects of that time and generation.  
 
Schlesinger had remarkably similar experiences to many of his more well-
known colleagues and contemporaries and they shared a common 
understanding of their ideology. For example, Schlesinger had much in 
common with fellow Austrian and party member Ruth Fischer. They emerged 
from similar backgrounds, politically and educationally. They maintained 
contact throughout their lives and worked within the same party milieu.116 
However, Schlesinger established his post-Soviet life in the UK rather than 
the USA and retained his allegiance to the Marxist cause and, to him, its 
greatest hope and embodiment, the Soviet Union. In contrast, Fischer made 
her disillusionment and antipathy to Stalin’s Russia and the leading Soviet 
Party clear in her work. Also, whilst she was a more senior figure in the 
communist movement, Schlesinger was her more well-known superior in their 
latter academic careers. An investigation of Schlesinger’s Marxism and 
theoretical understanding can provide a background for the better 
appreciation of his contemporaries, such as Fischer, and the environment in 
which they developed and worked. 
 
Schlesinger’s writings on Marxism place him firmly within the European post-
Leninist Marxist intellectual era. He shared many of the concepts of peers 
Georg Lukács and Karl Korsch and, again, emerged from the same party 
experiences.  Schlesinger used the same vocabulary and wrote from within 
the Marxist intellectual paradigm of that time. However, he differed in his 
analysis from them and this is investigated in some detail within the thesis. 
Schlesinger provided original commentary, but an examination of his work 
also presents an opportunity to throw light on a man of his time, a 
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representative of European radical activism and thought. 
  
 
The writing of history in the Soviet Union as a window on 
Schlesinger’s scholarly career  
The second focus of this investigation concerns Schlesinger’s work on the 
subject of historical writing and its theoretical framework in the USSR. The 
devotion of much of this thesis to the issue of Soviet historical output may 
seem unusual, since Schlesinger is not primarily known for his work in this 
field. However, it will be shown that such an approach is significant for a 
greater understanding of Schlesinger as an academic, commentator and 
memoirist, as well as furthering knowledge on the nature of the Soviet state, 
both under Stalin and following his death. In fact, it is by far the most fruitful 
method of investigation available to any student of Rudolf Schlesinger. 
 
The production of historical writing had always been seen as a vital cog in the 
Communist party and state machinery in the Soviet Union. As J. Barber has 
argued, 
 
…history as a branch of knowledge was basic to Marxism in a way 
that no other subject, with the exception of political economy, 
was… For Marx, the fundamental task of intellectual enquiry was 
understanding the process of social change, and to this the study of 
history held the key. Hence the central place occupied by historical 
analysis in his writings and in those of his most distinguished 
followers – and hence, conversely, given the political purpose of 
Marxist theory and practice, the intrinsic political importance of 
historical scholarship to Marxists.117 
 
A state, which was purportedly Marxist in essence, would regard the 
researching, writing and teaching of history as a matter of great political 
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significance. Such was the importance of historical analysis to the CPSU, it 
was deemed necessary to intervene directly in the historical sphere and to 
exert a degree of control over historical production. 
 
G. M. Enteen has pointed out how important the work of historians was to 
Soviet life in general: 
 
Party officials and historians themselves demanded that the 
past be made useful. Industrialization, heroic leadership in 
World War II, enhanced status in the community of nations, 
even the passage of time – none of these could provide the vital 
links of identification and loyalty between the regime and the 
populace. Nor was their universal acceptance of roles delegated 
by virtue of images of the future…Thus even though there was 
so little Soviet history, so little experience marking the new path 
to the future, the burden of justification fell to the Marxist 
historians.118 
 
A great deal of the party and, thus, the state’s legitimacy was based on its 
superior understanding of historical forces and relationships; this was the 
Marxist cornerstone which assured the confidence of the populace. As Enteen 
argued, ‘… party rule rested on promises about the future that claimed 
credibility by virtue of knowledge of the past’.119 This ensured that party and 
state machinery would take more than a passing interest in the historical field.  
 
The very legitimacy and morality of the Communist regime rested upon the 
historical necessity, even inevitability, of the Revolution and the subsequent 
assumption of power by the Bolshevik party. It was, therefore, vital for that 
regime to insist that its people were educated in a manner which emphasised 
that legitimacy.  This task lay with the historians, and as such, the state was 
bound to exert a great deal of influence, if not control, over them. The 
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significance of historical legitimacy increased with the continued survival of 
the Communist state. The absence of the anticipated European revolution 
required explanation, with reference to the past and the teachings of the 
founders of Marxism, as did the continued hardships of civil war followed by 
rapid industrialisation. The political ascendancy of Lenin and the subsequent 
crises in the search for a suitable heir, culminating in Stalin’s supremacy, laid 
yet more importance on the concept of historical legitimacy. Individual 
authority could now be traced in a direct line from the founders of Marxism, 
through Lenin. One’s actions during and immediately after the Revolutions of 
1917 were the historical legacy on which one’s authority came to be based. 
Control over the portrayal of that legacy became paramount. 
 
The Bolsheviks demonstrated the significance they attached to historical 
writing almost immediately after the October Revolution. As historian J. D. 
White argued, ‘… from its very inception the Soviet regime established a firm 
control over how the history of the Russian revolution was written’.120 In 
another work, he warned, ‘… the period [1917-1924] was not at all a relatively 
free one for historical scholarship. There was no time whatsoever in which 
important areas of history were not subject to political control’.121 As early as 
spring 1918, Trotsky was to write an authoritative historical account of the 
revolution, entitled The Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk.122 In this 
presentation of events Trotsky was keen to demonstrate that the Bolsheviks 
had not simply seized power. They had enjoyed popular support and would 
have achieved a democratic victory; but were, ultimately, forced to act, since 
their opponents were attempting to interfere with that democratic process. 
That the Bolsheviks saw an urgent need for a formal historical account of 
events is further evidenced in the fact that Trotsky wrote the short text whilst 
participating in the vital Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations.123 As Trotsky wrote 
in My Life: 
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We had with us a good many stenographers who had once 
been on the staff of the State Duma, and so I began dictating to 
them, from memory, a historical sketch of the October 
revolution. From a few sessions there grew a book intended 
primarily for foreign workers. The necessity of explaining what 
had happened was imperative; Lenin and I had discussed this 
necessity more than once, but no one had any time to spare.124 
 
 The Bolsheviks immediate concern with the portrayal of events of the 
Revolution could also be seen in the glowing forward Lenin gave to the 
American journalist, John Reed’s Ten Days That Shook the World.125 This text 
followed Trotsky’s account; asserting that the Bolsheviks reluctantly took up 
the reins of power only after such a course was demanded by the masses. 
 
By the time the Bolsheviks had begun to sense victory in the Civil War they 
were able to take a more positive historical approach to their part in the 
October Revolution. The new interpretation was initially represented by Lenin 
himself, in ‘Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder’, a pamphlet 
distributed to delegates at the Second Congress of Comintern in July and 
August 1920.126 Lenin argued that the Bolshevik party, with its methods of 
organisation, its Marxist principles and strict discipline, were uniquely 
responsible for the success of the Revolution and their assumption of power. 
He continued: ‘Certainly, almost everyone now realises that the Bolsheviks 
could not have maintained themselves in power for two and a half months, let 
alone two and a half years, unless the strictest, truly iron discipline had 
prevailed in our Party’.127 If others aspired to socialist revolutions in their own 
countries they would have to follow the model of Bolshevik experiences, as 
propounded by Lenin. He argued: ‘Now we already have very considerable 
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international experience which  most definitely shows that certain fundamental 
features of our revolution have a significance which is not local, not peculiarly 
national, not Russian only, but international’.128 Once again a leading member 
of the Bolshevik hierarchy took it upon themselves to expound an 
interpretation of historical events. 
 
None of these works were undertaken by professional historians. Nor did the 
authors claim any accurate scholarly methodology. Yet, they were all intended 
as truthful accounts of a significant historical event. The speed at which they 
were produced suggests the importance that the Bolsheviks placed on the 
need for official interpretations. That these works had significant political and 
propagandist motivations enhances the thesis that the writing of history was of 
great importance to the Russian Communists. These examples only cover the 
period immediately concerning the Revolution and the Bolshevik party. They 
do not prove that the regime was concerned with the historical field in general. 
However, they do show an apparent fixation by the party and new Soviet 
power with historical writing and the presentation of history. In fact, J. D. 
White, referring to Lenin’s ‘Left-Wing Communism’, argued that since there 
were no historical accounts published that supported Lenin’s account: ‘For 
Lenin the next logical step was to find a means by which historical works 
supporting his point of view could be published, or at least prevent the 
publication of works which contested it’.129 This would certainly indicate how 
important a concern it was to the new regime. 
 
This is further evidenced in the establishment of a ‘Commission on the History 
of the Russian Communist party and the October Revolution’ (Istpart) in 
August 1920, which was under the direct authority of the Central Committee. 
This institution was responsible for collecting, editing and publishing materials 
related to the party and the Revolution. It could demand the handing over of 
materials and had Soviet authority at its disposal to enforce this.130 According 
to White: ‘Istpart was able to establish within the country a virtual monopoly on 
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materials relating to the history of the Russian revolution… Istpart 
organizations were established throughout the country to ensure that local 
histories of the revolution accorded with the interpretation approved by the 
centre’.131 Istpart was merged with the Lenin Institute in 1928, by which time it 
had established a network of around 100 local branches. Although Barber has 
argued, ‘In academic circles… Istpart’s reputation was not very high’,132 its 
success in publishing, by 1924, volumes of collected works by Lenin, Trotsky, 
Zinoviev and Kamenev, attests to its influence and commitment to presenting 
a Bolshevik interpretation of history.  
 
There is no evidence to suggest that Lenin intended to assert the kind of 
control over the historical field which was to become commonplace by the late 
1920s under Stalin. However, whilst leader of the governing Bolshevik party, 
he certainly took an active interest in the production of historical writings and 
interpretations. He felt that some party control over historical output was 
desirable. Even Barber, who counterpoised Lenin’s non-interference with 
Stalin’s activism in this field, argued that the basis of early Bolshevik policy 
towards intellectuals displayed some elements of control. The two-pronged 
approach included the belief that old, ‘bourgeois’ intellectuals would be 
gradually won over to the socialist cause, as the successes of the new regime 
became increasingly apparent. Yet crucially, the second element was, 
according to Barber, ‘… the policy of educating the new generation of 
intellectuals in the spirit of Marxism, thus eventually creating a truly ‘red’ 
intelligentsia’.133 Such a policy suggests the desire to gain considerable 
control over the actions and output of intellectuals, including historians. 
 
The degeneration of historical scholarship under Stalin is well documented.134 
The state’s interference in the historical field increased enormously on Stalin’s 
assumption of power, proving once again the importance the Communists 
attached to the subject of history. As White pointed out: 
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 More and more areas of historical study acquired a political 
significance as they were used as ideological ammunition by the 
Soviet leadership or by one or other of the political groupings. 
This situation provided the opportunity for Stalin to exert his 
influence over all historical writing between 1930 and 1934. The 
old division between subjects falling into the province of Istpart 
and the rest of historical study disappeared. From then on all 
areas of history became subject to Stalin’s control.135 
 
One of the most significant events in this process was Stalin’s 1931 letter to 
the editors of the journal Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, ‘Some Questions 
Concerning the History of Bolshevism’.136 In it, he insisted that certain 
historical matters were not open to debate or discussion since they were 
‘axioms of Bolshevism’; thus greatly curbing historians’ freedom of action. The 
culmination of an all-powerful Stalinist monopoly of historical interpretation 
was embodied in the orthodox historical textbook History of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course, published in 1938.137 
 
The study and research of history had always been of great significance to the 
Soviet state. However, alongside his own brand of Marxism, the controlled 
historical interpretations expounded by Stalin’s historians constituted the twin 
pillars of the Soviet Union’s theoretical base. Historical and Marxist theory 
formed the essence of Stalinist legitimacy. Any close investigation of 
Schlesinger’s analysis of these subjects, a previously undervalued and even 
ignored analysis, will inevitably shed new light on this vital aspect of the 
changing Soviet regime.   
 
As well as providing a new insight into these cornerstones of the CPSU and 
the Soviet Union, a close examination of Schlesinger’s writings on the study of 
history in the USSR is vital for a better understanding of Schlesinger as an 
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academic and writer. This is, not least, because the issue of historical study in 
the Soviet Union was obviously of such great interest to him. The importance 
he attached to it can be seen in the sheer volume of work he produced on the 
subject. Over the course of his academic career in the West, Schlesinger 
wrote 17 articles and papers dealing specifically with the writing of history in 
the USSR. He made reference to it in many of his other papers and books. 
Schlesinger did not publish a book on the subject. However, the series of four 
articles he published in his own journal Soviet Studies, so quickly after its 
inception, amount to a major monograph.138 The importance he attributed to 
developments in the Soviet historical field was also discernable in the fact that 
Schlesinger’s first publication on his return to the West in 1938 concerned that 
very topic.139 
 
It seems clear that from the mid 1930s onwards Schlesinger wished to be, 
amongst other things, a professional historian. Writing in his unpublished 
memoirs in 1944 Schlesinger argued that, with hindsight, he should have 
taken the job offered to him at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in 1935. He 
could then have prepared several serious historical works in order to gain a 
chair of modern German history at a Soviet university. Instead, he accepted a 
post at Comintern Headquarters.140 His interest in the subject of history and 
his desire to become a published historian are also evidenced in the number 
of historical texts he produced during his time in the UK. These included 
Russia and her Western Neighbours published jointly in 1942 with George W. 
Keeton, Professor of Law and Dean of the Faculty of Law of University 
College, London. The work concerned, in the authors’ words, an attempt, ‘… 
to interpret the policy of the Soviet Union in relation to her Western 
neighbours from the time of the Revolution in 1917 down to the Nazi attack on 
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Russia in June 1941’.141 Another early historical publication of Schlesinger’s 
concerned the evolution of federalism, in theory and practice. Entitled, 
Federalism in Central and East Europe, the monograph was published in 
1945 and took a historical approach to the subject, tracing the changing forces 
of centralisation and federalism both chronologically and geographically.142 
The work included large sections on federalist theory, including Austro-Marxist 
conceptions and the emergence of a specifically Soviet federalism. However, 
it concentrated on the changing nature and success of federalism in Germany, 
from Nineteenth Century concepts of democracy, thorough Bismarck’s empire 
and into the Nazi era; in the former Austrian territories, from the seismic 
upheavals of 1848 through to the collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy; and in 
the USSR, from Tsarist to modern times. In 1950 Schlesinger again engaged 
with the historical world of Central Europe, publishing a book on Central 
European Democracy and its Background.143 In it, he concentrated upon the 
history of the trade union movement and the development of Social 
Democracy and working-class representation. 
 
Schlesinger produced two documentary readers that can be regarded as 
historical in intent and character. Both were published by the International 
Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction founded by the sociologist Karl 
Mannheim.144 The first, The Family in the USSR, was published in 1949.145 
Although predominantly a sociological work, the book was chronological and 
source-based. Its introduction traced the changing debates and legal 
frameworks from pre-Soviet times to post-war USSR policies and 
experiences. Documents were fully annotated by Schlesinger and concerned 
Soviet attitudes towards the family, on such topics as marriage, divorce, co-
education and abortion.146 The second work, The Nationalities Problem and 
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Soviet Administration, followed a similar pattern.147 It seems clear, from this 
brief sample of Schlesinger’s historical writings, that he did consider himself to 
be a historian. This explains the interest Soviet historical output held for him 
and validates the detailed examination this thesis devotes to the subject of 
Schlesinger’s writing on Soviet historians and their work. 
 
Another reason for the concentration of this thesis upon Soviet historiography 
is because it is one of the only topics on which he wrote over time. His first 
paper on the topic was published in 1938, immediately after he left the Soviet 
Union.148 One of Schlesinger’s last publications was also on the topic of 
developments in Soviet historical sciences and appeared in 1967 in the 
Annuaire de L’U.R.S.S.149 Thus, an investigation of his writings on this 
particular topic allows for an appreciation of his work over a long time period, 
nearly thirty years, from 1938 to 1967. Whilst Schlesinger may have written on 
a huge variety of subjects during this same time frame, he did not do so with 
the same degree of regularity. The theme of Soviet historians and Soviet 
history was one to which he continually returned. The use of these papers, 
therefore, provides the degree of consistency necessary in any examination of 
one person’s writings.  
 
The fact that Schlesinger wrote about the topic of Soviet historical studies 
over a long time period allows the reader to take a comparative approach. It 
becomes possible to monitor Schlesinger’s analyses and comments over 
time. This is one of the most academically rewarding aspects of this particular 
investigation, because one is able to perceive the modifications and 
modulations of Schlesinger’s approach to, and assumptions about, the 
subject. One of the chief assertions of this thesis is that Schlesinger’s opinions 
and emphases regarding Soviet historical output did change over time. This 
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has enormous repercussions for any consideration of Schlesinger as an 
academic, commentator and memoirist and inevitably affects any examination 
of his other writings. This decisive determination would have remained 
undiscovered if not for the close examination of his historiographical writings 
over time. In short, no other study would have highlighted this extremely 
significant factor for any appreciation of Schlesinger.  
 
Schlesinger did write on one other subject regularly over the course of his 
academic career in the West, the theme of Soviet legal theory and Soviet law 
in general. However, these publications often took the form of book reviews, 
which contained little, if any, analysis or discussion of the issues of Soviet law. 
Schlesinger reviewed books containing interpretations of Soviet law by 
Western scholars,150 as well as translations of works on legal theory by 
Russian and Soviet theoreticians151 and reviews of Soviet books on the 
subject.152 He also frequently published commentaries, small articles reporting 
on contemporary events and discussions in the field of law in the Soviet 
Union. One example of this is an article entitled ‘Soviet Theories of 
International Law’ published in Soviet Studies in 1953.153 It reported on 
debates, organised by the Chair of International Law of the Academy of 
Sciences, on the character of a recently published and sharply criticised book 
on international law. Although this provided Western readers with new 
information on contemporary discussions of legal matters in the Soviet Union, 
it offered little in the way of insightful analysis. Schlesinger did not particularly 
engage with the subject, instead merely reporting the result of others’ 
engagement.154  
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Schlesinger wrote several papers and one monograph on the theme of the 
Soviet legal system and these do represent analytical scholarship. For 
example, in 1951 he published an article on ‘Court Cases as a Source of 
Information on Soviet Society’.155 The stated purpose of the paper was, ‘… to 
illustrate the way in which such materials [Supreme Court publication of cases 
and reports in legal periodicals] may be used and to indicate some specific 
problems arising in the interpretation of this type of evidence’.156 Schlesinger 
drew readers’ attention to the many problems involved with the use of court 
cases as source material on the Soviet Union, such as censorship and 
propaganda issues as well as the inevitably unrepresentative, even 
controversial, circumstances of those caught up in legal disputes. However, 
he was also keen to highlight what it was possible to learn from this material 
once all of the caveats had been considered. He argued that it was possible to 
discern what the highest courts wished to distinguish as important cases and 
decisions, as well as the ways in which lower ones were obviously failing to 
carry out their functions in a manner satisfactory to their superiors. An 
examination could, thus, help to determine judicial priorities, especially 
following a change in the law. Other examples of his scholarship on matters of 
Soviet law include two papers Schlesinger published in 1960 which 
documented the recent changes and debates surrounding social aspects of 
law.157 The first dealt specifically with the incipient ‘transfer of ordinary judicial 
functions to social organizations’.158 The second concerned issues of social 
regulation brought about by the re-codification of the labour law. 
 
It is clear that Schlesinger did not write as much about legal theory as he did 
on the subject of history in the Soviet Union. The subject of legal theory could 
not form the basis of this investigation because there is not the same wealth 
of material. Also, much of it requires a specialist understanding and 
vocabulary in order to properly engage with the material. This investigation is 
not, nor ever intended to be, a specialist legal work and so would be 
                                                
155 Schlesinger, ‘Court Cases as a Source of Information on Soviet Society’, American Slavic 
and East European Review, 10, 3, October 1951, pp. 163-176.  
156 Ibid. p. 164. 
157 Schlesinger, ‘Social Law I’, Soviet Studies, 12, 1, July 1960, pp. 56-82; Schlesinger, 
‘Social Law II’, Soviet Studies, 12, 2, October 1960, pp. 145-167. 
158 Schlesinger, ‘Social Law I’, p. 57. 
 49 
insufficiently equipped to fully critique Schlesinger’s writings on the subject.  
The Soviet legal system was constantly evolving and often reflected the 
abnormal aspects of society rather than its norms.159 This also makes it 
unsuitable as the focus of a study since it cannot translate so easily to other 
areas on which Schlesinger wrote. In contrast, an investigation of his work on 
historical writing in the Soviet Union enhances understanding of his output on 
other topics such as Marxist theory and society.  
 
No source can be understood as a whole, isolated in time and space. This is 
especially true when a consciously over-determinist approach is taken, such 
as in this investigation. The detailed reading of Schlesinger’s work on history, 
therefore, provides the context in which to understand his writings as a whole. 
A thorough examination of his works on the historical sphere in the Soviet 
Union allows for a conception of Schlesinger’s understandings, motivations 
and assumptions, both implicit and explicit; it reveals the political and 
intellectual paradigm within which he operated. The motives, values and 
assumptions it is possible to perceive in his work on historiography would 
have been an inherent aspect of his other writings. However, they would have 
remained indiscernible without this investigation. Having revealed these, his 
other writings can be better understood and appreciated. It is only through a 
detailed, thorough examination of Schlesinger’s writing on the study and 
researching of history in the Soviet Union that one is able to gain insight into 
his work as an academic. This method opens a window on to his scholarly 
career by revealing the peculiarities of his political and intellectual paradigm. 
 
 
The borders of the investigation: what the thesis is not 
As well as carefully outlining the remit of this investigation, it is also essential 
to clarify its boundaries; it is vital to identify what the thesis is not in order to 
fully comprehend what it is. As outlined in the methodology section, this thesis 
is not a biography of Schlesinger in the traditional sense, concentrating 
instead on his role as an academic and writer. It can be viewed as an 
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‘intellectual biography’, one based predominantly on his writings. In fact, the 
bulk of the investigation focuses on two particular sets of writing for the 
reasons outlined above. 
 
Nor is this a bibliography, elucidation or narration of Schlesinger’s collected 
works. He had a phenomenally wide variety of interests and wrote on a great 
many of them. He was also an expert in many academic disciplines: having 
trained as a social scientist; found employment as a professional economist 
and published as a sociologist, political theorist and historian. It would, 
therefore, be impractical to cover all of these writings and topics in the depth 
necessary for any meaningful understanding of Schlesinger’s work to emerge. 
Often his published writings appear as a running commentary on events he 
perceived as significant in the development of the Soviet Union, interspersed 
with monographs on a particular topic. 
 
 He is, perhaps, best known for his two documentary readers published by the 
International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.160 However, it is 
important to note that these were only written because of an invitation to do 
so. In the introduction to one, Schlesinger wrote: ‘In the spring of 1944 the late 
Professor Karl Mannheim suggested to me that I publish in this Library a 
number of volumes dealing with the changing attitudes prevailing in Soviet 
Russia towards specific aspects of social and political life’.161 This suggests 
that the subject and nature of the works were not Schlesinger’s free choice. 
The two volumes do contain some analysis but mainly consist of translations 
of documents and so are somewhat unusual within Schlesinger’s publication 
portfolio.  
 
On the whole, his selection of subjects for examination or publication appears 
arbitrary and even chaotic, something which is best demonstrated with 
reference to a brief sample of his published writings. In October 1949, for 
example, Schlesinger published a ‘commentary’ on the Biology discussion 
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that had been taking place in the Soviet Union.162 He had never previously 
written about biological research, but now commentated on, in his words, ‘… 
the first occasion of Party intervention in the direction of scientific research 
and teaching outside the social sciences proper’; an event that represented a, 
‘…fundamental change even in comparison with the philosophical 
discussions’.163 The report concerned the dispute between so-called orthodox 
or academic geneticists and the school of T. D. Lysenko.164 The official 
ascendancy of this latter school was confirmed by Lysenko on 7 August 1948 
in a speech in which he claimed that his opening statement for the Lenin 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the USSR, a week before, had been 
approved by the Central Committee.165 It was further evidenced with the 
publication of Yuri Zhdanov’s letter to Stalin, published in Pravda on the same 
day, in which he apologised for earlier criticism of Lysenko.166 
 
The interpretation discernible in this paper on scientific research coalesced 
with that present in his writings on historical research in the Soviet Union 
published at the same time. Despite the obvious problems concerning state 
interference in academic study, Schlesinger appeared to provide a positive 
portrayal of events. For example, when discussing the disagreement between 
the followers of Lysenko and the ‘academic geneticists’ he wrote that there 
were frequent, ‘… complaints from both sides about alleged victimization’. He 
argued: ‘None of the facts mentioned seem to indicate anything worse than an 
atmosphere of embittered struggle between academic schools, each trying to 
use its position in order to give appointments and promotion to its 
supporters’.167 Schlesinger insisted that Soviet science was seen as an 
agency of Soviet society and, thus, party principles of discipline and 
submission to the majority line had been introduced to the field. However, he 
                                                
162 Schlesinger, ‘The Biology Discussion: A Commentary’, Soviet Studies, 1, 2, October 1949, 
pp. 106-118. 
163 Schlesinger, ‘The Biology Discussion’, p. 106. 
164 Lysenko and his school were proponents of the ideas of I. Michurin and they developed a 
‘science of agriculture’ which was anti-genetic. The proactive appeal to the Soviet Union of a 
theory emphasising the possibilities man would have to alter nature and his environment are 
obvious. 
165 Schlesinger, ‘The Biology Discussion’, p. 110. 
166 Y. Zhdanov, ‘Yuri Zhdanov’s Letter to Stalin’, Soviet Studies, 1, 2, October 1949, pp. 175-
177. 
167 Schlesinger, ‘The Biology Discussion’, p. 107. 
 52 
continued, whilst this may have appeared strange to western scientists, ‘… 
the point in dispute between academic geneticists and Michurinists was not 
the legitimacy of applying Party philosophy to Science, but in the way it should 
be applied’.168 Schlesinger portrayed the discussions as lacking any overt 
hostility or of having any extreme repercussions for the losers. In other 
positive statements, Schlesinger appeared very optimistic about the likelihood 
of progress in biological and agricultural research and argued that official 
support of the Lysenko school was not unconditional.169 Whilst generally 
conforming in interpretation to Schlesinger’s other writings of the time, this 
paper on the biology discussion had little else in common with them. The 
subject matter was an atypical choice, which helps to expose the occasionally 
random character of Schlesinger’s work. 
 
Another example of Schlesinger’s eclectic publication record is shown in his 
1954 paper on developments in Soviet agriculture.170 Earlier in his research 
career Schlesinger had concentrated on the subject of agriculture and its 
development in a Marxist state.171 He had touched upon it in earlier writings 
when in the UK, especially when discussing general Soviet developments.172  
However, the attention he paid to the topic was intermittent, to say the least, in 
the latter stages of his scholarly career. This particular paper concentrated 
upon recent changes in Soviet policies regarding kolkhoz farms and the 
attempts made, since August 1953, to increase the production levels of 
livestock and vegetables, which still languished at pre-World War One levels 
despite recent improvements in grain output.173 The paper contained a 
detailed commentary and analysis of recent changes, using a combination of 
western and Soviet sources. The tone was factual in the main, although 
Schlesinger did offer some opinion. He argued that, although he had 
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previously anticipated, ‘… the transformation of kolkhoznik into a state 
employee’, he now felt that, ‘… with the private plot re-asserted as an 
important element in the kolkhoznik’s economy, the state’s control of the 
skilled labour force may become a main means of keeping the activities of the 
majority of the agricultural population within the framework of the plan’.174 He 
now felt that, instead of creeping nationalisation of kolkhoz farms, more and 
more of the specialists and managers involved in agricultural production would 
become employees of the state and thus control would be exercised in this 
manner. 
 
Once again, this publication conformed to the broader interpretations 
discerned in Schlesinger’s writings on the historical sphere in the Soviet 
Union. Consistent with his other publications after Stalin’s death, Schlesinger 
made an overt criticism of the deceased party leader, referring to ‘… the 
stubbornness with which policies, once adopted, were pursued before Stalin’s 
death’.175  He also wrote of Khrushchev’s depiction of the previous neglect in 
creating incentives for agricultural output as an ‘error’; illuminating the 
incipient de-Stalinisation process. 
 
A paper published in Economics of Planning in 1965 again illustrates the 
diverse nature of Schlesinger’s publication record, this time its subject being 
Soviet planning.176 Schlesinger had written on planning several times and in a 
paper published the year before, he spoke of ‘… a major study on the Soviet 
decision to industrialize the country and to collectivize agriculture which I hope 
to publish in the near future’.177 However, this monograph was never to 
materialise and so his articles on the subject of planning remained relatively 
isolated.  
 
The 1965 article began by asserting the importance of planning as a universal 
legacy of the October revolution: ‘As an historical phenomenon, though not in 
                                                
174 Schlesinger, ‘The Decisions on Agriculture’, pp. 244-245. 
175 Ibid. p. 237. 
176 Schlesinger, ‘Some Observations on the Historical and Social Conditions of Planning’, 
Economics of Planning, 5, 1-2, 1965, pp. 53-73.  
177 Schlesinger, ‘A Note on the Context of Early Soviet Planning’, Soviet Studies, 16, 1, July 
1964, pp. 22-44 at p. 22. 
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all its theoretical concepts, planning represents part of the impact of the 
Russian revolution on twentieth-century history’.178 He then expounded a brief 
history of Soviet planning, arguing that first efforts originated from 
technological, as well as political, considerations. As the regime stabilised, 
Lenin focused on electrification as a symbol of the power of planning before 
concentrating the efforts of Gosplan on the solution of practical problems. 
There then developed, in the mid twenties, a battle for the planning concept 
between ‘the “teleologists”, who conceived it as a conscious transformation of 
reality, against the “geneticists”, the mere forecasters of envisaged market 
developments’, before collectivisation proved to be the decisive factor 
influencing planning.179 
 
Again, the tone and emphasis of this paper was consistent with his other 
publications. For example, Schlesinger displayed the pragmatic attitude 
towards collectivisation prevalent in all of his work. There were veiled 
references to the apparent necessity of collectivisation, despite the costs, and 
seeming praise for Stalin’s technical abilities.180 However, consistent with 
another common interpretation present in his writings of this time, especially 
those concerning the historical sphere, Schlesinger also condemned aspects 
of ‘Stalinism’. In this case the ‘anti-cosmopolitan’ rejection of anything 
perceived as western or bourgeois. He argued that developments in planning 
were possible, ‘… as soon as “de-Stalinisation” had marked the removal of 
ideological obstacles to the application of modern western methods’.181 
 
The paper then sympathetically described the different, and evolving, species 
of planning present in Eastern Europe, in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, 
and the USSR. Schlesinger argued that since 1961 the Soviet Union operated 
a tentative combination of planning and elements of market economics. He 
argued that two types of economies existed in the developed world at this 
time. One in which there existed ‘… occasional interference, for socially 
                                                
178 Schlesinger, ‘Some Observations on the Historical and Social Conditions of Planning’, p. 
53. 
179 Ibid. p. 57. 
180 Ibid. p. 58. 
181 Ibid. p. 59. 
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approved purposes, with a market substantially conceived as self-regulating’, 
and another defined by ‘… the use of market institutions by a state-controlled 
economy applying “teleological” planning and using the public ownership of 
the “commanding heights” as a means to enforce the planners’ decisions’.182 
Whilst there may well have been aspects of ‘convergence’ visible between 
these two systems, different types of planning would continue to characterise 
different social formations. 
 
This very brief description of a few of Schlesinger’s publications demonstrates 
the breadth of subjects on which he wrote throughout the course of his 
academic career. His choice seems haphazard, perhaps even arbitrary, and 
his publications were often a running commentary on contemporary events 
rather than researched and analytical scholarship. It is, therefore, clear why 
an in-depth investigation necessarily had to focus on one or two particular 
topics. Schlesinger’s writings on Marxism and the subject of historical work in 
the Soviet Union were chosen for the many reasons outlined above. 
 
 
Rudolf Schlesinger: The Scholar Advocate 
This thesis describes Schlesinger as a ‘scholar advocate’ for a number of 
reasons. The ‘scholar’ label requires little explanation – Schlesinger worked 
as an academic, theorist and writer for most of his life. He was an intellectual 
of some standing and would have described himself as a scholar. However, 
Schlesinger also used his scholarship for a distinct, Marxist purpose: to 
promote and clarify understanding of, and sympathy for, the Soviet Union and 
Marxism in general. He was, thus, an ‘advocate’ in both senses of the word. 
He supported and wrote in favour of Marxism, communism and its 
embodiment, however imperfect, in the shape of the Soviet Union. He was 
also an advocate in the sense of pleading for or defending another. He 
defended the Soviet Union against its detractors, its cold war critics and 
disillusioned ex-supporters. He attempted to redress the balance against what 
                                                
182 Ibid. p. 68. 
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he viewed as the ‘cold war’ or reactionary character of Western scholarship. 
He also tried to correct the myths and misconceptions surrounding the 
subject. That is not to say that Schlesinger blindly or unthinkingly defended all 
actions of the state, all Marxist writers and variations. He was not a 
propagandist or even a member of the Communist party in the second half of 
his life. However, this thesis argues that he acted as a ‘scholar advocate’, in 
both the content and interpretation of his writings. 
 
Schlesinger’s pragmatism or utilitarianism enabled him to remain loyal to the 
idea of the Soviet experiment and Marxist methodology despite setbacks or 
the unsavoury actions of its leaders, notably Stalin. Schlesinger took a long-
term perspective. He believed that his attitude should not be swayed by 
unfortunate episodes, such as the purges, or the hard but necessary 
decisions of a party attempting to retain power in the face of hostile 
encirclement. He was, thus, a scholar advocate when many had turned their 
back on the Soviet Union. To Schlesinger, these critics were utopian and he 
derided them for their naivety and wishful thinking. He gave a description of 
utopianism in Marx His Time and Ours, writing: ‘the utopian represents an 
intrusion of the element of will into the realm of knowledge. Thus it exceeds 
the limits of a rational explanation of the work which the observer can give 
within the conditions of his social surroundings’.183 Utopians had unrealistic 
expectations and judged the Soviet Union from an unfair ideal. The scholar 
advocate, in contrast, was a realist. 
 
It is argued here that a noticeable difference exists within Schlesinger’s 
writings over time. Those written before Stalin’s death, in the period from 
Schlesinger’s return to the West until 1953, were markedly distinct from those 
written after 1953. It is possible to determine in which period a work was 
written by noting the interpretation within it. In his earlier papers, Schlesinger 
was generally very positive about the Soviet Union. He defended Soviet 
developments, events and interpretations and, whilst never ignoring the more 
negative aspects, he tended to provide an optimistic conclusion or impression. 
                                                
183 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 89. 
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This attitude was in contrast to his personal memoir reflections on life in the 
Soviet Union. In these, Schlesinger bemoaned the lack of intellectual 
opportunity and stifling academic climate and presented a negative picture of 
Soviet life under Stalin. Schlesinger’s later writings, those produced after 
1953, and especially those after 1956 were characterised by his retrospective 
condemnation of events under Stalin, particularly in Soviet historiography.   
 
There are a number of possible explanations for this apparent dichotomy. But 
it is argued the most fruitful answer is that Schlesinger was acting as ‘scholar 
advocate’. He was reacting against perceived cold-war hostility within 
Western scholarship and was defending the Soviet Union against utopian 
criticism. Thus, in the early years, Schlesinger attempted to provide a more 
positive interpretation of events in Soviet Russia to counterbalance the 
profusion of overly negative appraisals. His pragmatism allowed him to find 
achievements and cause for optimism in the dark years of Stalin’s leadership. 
The deleterious consequences of Stalin’s rule did not blind Schlesinger to the 
successes of industrialisation for example. Later, after Stalin’s death, when 
the Soviet Union itself acknowledged the excesses and extra-legal methods of 
the preceding years, Schlesinger was able to provide a more distanced 
perspective and saw much cause for optimism for the future. He felt justified 
in not letting his attitude be dictated by the short-term distortions of one man’s 
rule. He now attempted to counter what he saw as the unfair concentration of 
Western scholarship and opinion on what was, in overall terms, a few short 
years in the history of Marxism and communism.  
 
The thesis begins with an investigation of Schlesinger’s Marxism. Following 
the chronology of his own theoretical education and development, it traces 
Schlesinger’s writings on Luxemburg, Lenin, Marx and Engels and, finally, 
Stalin. Schlesinger appears an ardent Leninist but, according to his 
understanding of Marxism, recognises that Lenin’s contribution and its very 
success, now makes it obsolete. A new stage, encompassing new socio-
economic conditions is now necessary. In accordance with the timeline 
posited, in the years before 1953/6, Schlesinger appears to suggest that 
Stalin’s contribution to Marxist theory may hold the key to this next dialectical 
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stage. However, Stalin’s theoretical impact is dismissed after his death. 
Schlesinger argues that it is necessary to remove the Stalinist distortions from 
Leninism before progressing to the next stage. The examination of 
Schlesinger’s writings on Stalin provides insights into his pragmatism and 
allows for a greater understanding of his general attitude. Schlesinger’s 
writings on Marxism appear of their time: post-Leninist, post-war, European 
and have much in common with Lukács. However, they display a great deal of 
originality and provide the context for all his other scholarship. 
 
The thesis then turns to an examination of Schlesinger’s writings on Soviet 
historiography. A detailed investigation of his own experiences as an 
academic in the Soviet Union are undertaken, based on his memoir 
reflections. These provide a context for his academic work and highlight the 
discrepancies between his personal opinion of the Soviet intellectual 
environment and the seemingly positive description of it he provided in 
published work. There then follows a detailed critique of his writings on the 
subject up to 1953 and from the death of Stalin onwards. The difference in 
nuance and interpretation between these two periods is highlighted and 
possible explanations for the distinction are discussed. 
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Part One: Schlesinger and Marxism 
 
The assumption that a person’s writings and activities cannot be viewed in 
isolation, but instead, are inherently interconnected with, and overdetermined 
by many aspects of the social, political and economic setting from which they 
emerge is a view that Schlesinger would no doubt concur with. It is also one 
that this enquiry supposes as self-evident. It is thus vital to investigate, as far 
as possible, the political, theoretical or philosophical foundations which 
comprise the basis of Schlesinger’s scholarly work; remembering that with 
Schlesinger’s overtly Marxist understanding, the philosophical is the political. 
These elements form the layers of overdeterminancy that comprise the 
background, influence and constituent components of his writings. A correct 
understanding of the theoretical underpinning of Schlesinger’s work, as well 
as a determination of its consistency or otherwise, over time, allows for a 
thorough critique of his work on the writing of history in the Soviet Union in the 
second half of the thesis.  
 
Part One of the thesis, therefore, attempts to discern and explain the 
particular Marxist foundation of Schlesinger’s scholarship. It will examine his 
political and philosophical education and influences, as elucidated in his 
unpublished memoirs, before engaging with his more mature theoretical 
evolution as certain concepts of his early years were rejected. Schlesinger 
began his active political life as a strong supporter of Rosa Luxemburg, so 
some time is spent examining his writings on this topic. However, with the 
embracing of Leninist principles of organisation, Schlesinger became an 
ardent and lifelong adherent of Lenin’s writings and theories. A thorough 
investigation of his writings on Lenin will, thus, be undertaken.  Schlesinger 
believed that his appreciation of Lenin finally allowed him to fully understand 
the work of the Marxist founders, Marx and Engels. Thus, his writings on this 
topic are explored and discussed. A comparison of Schlesinger’s attitude with 
those of his contemporary Georg Lukács will also be attempted; before, 
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finally, turning to an examination of Schlesinger’s attitude towards Stalin as a 
political and philosophical theorist. Is this attitude consistent over time or does 
it change depending on the orthodoxy of the CPSU, mirroring his 
interpretation of the historical field and Soviet events in general? Does his 
analysis alter before and after Stalin’s death?  
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Chapter Two: Rosa Luxemburg 
 
In his memoirs, Schlesinger described his early philosophical influences as 
being of an academic nature. After an early affection for ‘misled patriotism’, 
demonstrated by his reading of Tolstoy, the works of Zola led him to a gradual 
non-Marxist type of socialism.1 However, under the influence of the anti-war 
atmosphere, Schlesinger was soon to take a stronger approach to politics. He 
wrote,  ‘… if the recognition of the principle of revolution (as opposed to my 
initial absolute pacifism) can be seen as fundamental, I can date the essential 
turning point from Autumn 1917 and I have my late teacher, Karl Gruenberg, 
to thank for the decisive impression of my life’.2 Schlesinger attended a series 
of his lectures on the ancestors of modern socialism whilst still at school and 
was greatly inspired.3 Later in his memoirs, Schlesinger wrote that Karl 
Grünberg provided him with excellent training in historical methods and the 
history of the labour movement at university. So much so that when, years 
later, Schlesinger was researching Central European Democracy he was still 
                                                
1 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 24. For more information on 
Leo Tolstoy  (1828-1910) the Russian literary giant, pacifist and critic of state and church see 
W. Rowe, Leo Tolstoy, (Boston, Twayne Publishers, 1986). Emile Zola (1840-1902) was a 
French novelist and journalist who wrote about working class subjects in a similar manner to 
Charles Dickens in England a generation before. Apart from his literary legacy, not least the 
series of twenty interlinked novels entitled Les Rougon-Macquart, Zola was most famous 
internationally for his role in the ‘Dreyfus Affair’ of the 1890s. Zola wrote a press article 
headlined ‘J’Accuse’ to provoke French authorities to try him for libel in order to highlight the 
wrongful imprisonment of the Jewish military officer Dreyfus and its surrounding anti-Semitism 
(F. Hemmings, The Life and Times of Emile Zola, (London, Paul Elek, 1977). 
2 Ibid. p. 24. In the English edition, Schlesinger wrote, ‘So far as the war was concerned, an 
intelligent person might get inspiration from Tolstoy but, in the prevailing conditions, one could 
not be a Tolstoyan as regards the appropriate methods of bringing it to an end. War and 
economics, however, were not separated by a Chinese wall: if the replacement of my original 
Tolstoyanism by the acceptance of revolution is regarded as the essential turning point, I owe 
my later [late] teacher, Karl Gruenberg, the decisive impression of my life’ (Schlesinger, In a 
Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 20-21). 
3 Karl Grünberg (1861-1940) was born in to an Austrian Jewish family in Romania. He moved 
to Vienna aged twenty to study law and converted to Roman Catholicism in 1892 to take up a 
university career. By the end of 1899 he was appointed a temporary Professor of Political 
Economy at the University of Vienna; a position that was not made permanent until 1912. In 
1910 he founded the journal Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der 
Arbeiterbewegung and moved to Frankfurt in 1924 to become the first director of the Frankfurt 
Institute (see chapter 6, p. 210). He played a huge role in making the study of Marxism and 
the history of the labour movement possible within official institutions. This was demonstrated 
at an academic ceremony to open the institute; in his speech, Grünberg openly expressed his 
commitment to Marxism. Grünberg stoped work in January 1928 following a stroke but 
survived for a further twelve years (R. Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, (Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 1994) trans.  M. Robertson, pp. 21 – 34). 
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able to use his doctoral thesis on Central European socialism and the trade 
union movement as source material.4 The admiration and respect that 
Schlesinger felt for Grünberg continued throughout his life. In one of 
Schlesinger’s last writings, in 1969, he spoke of Grünberg as one of the 
founders of the study of socialism and described him as ‘my revered 
teacher’.5 
 
Schlesinger argued that his theoretical training at university was not all that it 
could have been. This was especially true of his appreciation of Marxist 
theory.6 The atmosphere of his student days was entirely dominated by 
western Marxist traditions, despite the presence of Russian Mensheviks, and 
communist Yugoslavs and Bulgarians in his Students’ Association. This was 
partly explained by the fact that, in those days, according to Schlesinger, ‘… 
the majority of the early writings of Marx and Engels, and practically all of the 
writings of Lenin’s, were inaccessible: [Franz] Mehring’s writings were 
regarded as the last word in the philosophical interpretation of Marxism’.7 
Schlesinger was not to fully engage with the works of Marx and Leninism 
proper until later. 
 
Next to Marx, his other early philosophical influence was Rosa Luxemburg.8 
Schlesinger had a personal connection to his mentor, since he was close to 
                                                
4 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p.92. In the preface to the book, 
Schlesinger referred to Prof. Grünberg as the person to suggest this doctoral theme 
(Schlesinger, Central European Democracy, p. x). 
5 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. II. 
6 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p.93. 
7 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 85. In the English edition, 
Schlesinger included the writings of Georgi Plekhanov alongside Mehring’s (Schlesinger, In a 
Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p.93). Franz Mehring (1846-1919) was born to a middle 
class family in Pomerania. As a journalist and writer, Merhing opposed Bismark and became 
a Lassallean socialist in the late 1870s but soon converted to Marxism and joined the Social 
Democratic Party. Mainly writing in Neue Zeit, Mehring attacked revisionists and remained a 
staunch internationalist throughout the war, alongside Luxemburg and Liebknecht, becoming 
a founder of the Spartacus League shortly before his death (F. Mehring, Karl Marx, The Story 
of his Life, (London, John Lane, 1936) especially translator’s preface by E. Fitzgerald, pp. vii - 
x).  
8 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 89. In his memoirs, 
Schlesinger noted that he moved to Germany in February 1923 to work at a research institute 
under Eugene Varga as a sociologist specialising on agrarian problems (See above chapter 
1, p. 5). Although Schlesinger had enormous respect for Varga he did not seem to  have any 
great theoretical influence upon him (Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, 
pp. 102…). 
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Karl Liebknecht’s sons whilst at university. In 1920 they had fled Weimar 
Germany and continued their studies in Austria. They soon joined 
Schlesinger’s circle of friends and he occasionally holidayed with them and 
their stepmother, Sonya. She received many letters from Luxemburg and 
would read them aloud to the group. Schlesinger wrote in his memoirs:  
 
It is quite possible that the diverse right-wing factions in the 
German C.P [Communist Party]… appreciated more of 
Luxemburgism proper, i.e. of Rosa’s limitations. But when I 
moved amongst the people to whom a person who had been as 
good and devoted a Marxist as I ever hoped to be, had written 
such letters, who knew such aspects of her life as a model 
revolutionary would hardly remember, I became conscious of 
the whole broadness of her personality.9 
 
This, and endless discussions with the younger Liebknecht boy, gave 
Schlesinger a huge admiration for Luxemburg, something which is quite clear 
from his memoirs.  
 
Schlesinger asserted that, at this time, he was unaware Luxemburg had 
formulated many of her theories on spontaneity in polemic against Lenin; or 
that these theories were incompatible with the ideas of Leninism.10 He thus, in 
his own words, ‘… did not even become conscious of the need to make some 
choice’ between Luxemburg and Lenin.11 Schlesinger wrote in his memoirs 
that he knew the two theorists disagreed on certain matters, but ‘… everyone, 
in those days, disagreed with everyone on some issues’.12 Instead, 
Schlesinger argued, his study of German Social Democracy filled him with 
respect for this great leader who, without resorting to theories of anarchism, 
opposed the narrow bureaucratism of the established labour movement and 
recognised the revolutionary initiative of the uneducated and unorganised 
                                                
9 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 98. Schlesinger did not say so, 
but it is assumed that Liebknecht’s wife would reread old letters from Luxemburg, since the 
author was already dead at this point.  
10 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 95. 
11 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 98. 
12 Ibid. p. 99. 
 64 
masses.13 He also appreciated the attention she paid to the problems of the 
colonies, writing: ‘Her Accumulation of Capital was important mainly in that it 
broadened that concept of the oppressed masses to include all the colonial 
peoples’.14 Luxemburg’s economic treatise, first published in 1912, postulated 
that only economic imperialism could account for continuous capitalist 
accumulation, but the opportunities for this were finite as more and more of 
the globe was used up in this manner. Marxism asserted the collapse of 
capitalism due to the weight of its economic contradictions. Luxemburg sought 
the cause of this collapse from outside the individual capitalist economy, 
arguing that capitalism could continue to grow so long as there were primitive 
economies to be drawn into spheres of influence. Eventually the entire 
surface of the earth would become part of this process of capitalist 
accumulation. Capitalism could no longer grow and would, therefore, 
collapse.15 However, in these early days, Schlesinger was able to ignore the 
differences Luxemburg’s approach to the colonial question had to that of 
Lenin’s, which he also admired.  
 
Even after the KPD’s aborted revolutionary attempts of 1923, Schlesinger still 
adhered to Luxemburgist principles.16 He reiterated his commitment to the 
Luxemburg tradition as late as 1924. In his memoirs he spoke of writing a 
pamphlet in February of that year, which used Luxemburg’s theory of 
capitalist accumulation as its foundation.17 However, the KPD was now 
moving away from Luxemburg’s theories. As Schlesinger expressed it: ‘In the 
theoretical field, ‘Bolshevization of the party’ was now proclaimed as the 
                                                
13 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 89. 
14 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 99. R. Luxemburg, Gesammelte 
Werke, (Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1972), 5, pp. 5 – 411 and pp. 413-523. 
15 J. P. Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, (London, Oxford University Press, 1966), Volume I and II, p. 
530… As J. Robinson, in the introduction to the English translation of Luxemburg’s work, 
wrote, ‘Cloth from Lancashire pays for labour in America, which is used to produce wheat and 
cotton. These provide wages and raw materials to the Lancashire mills, while the profits 
acquired both on the plantations and in the mills are invested in steel rails and rolling stock, 
which open up fresh territories, so that the whole process is continually expanding’. This could 
not continue indefinitely, hence capitalist collapse (Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, 
(London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), pp. 26-27). 
16 For a description of these events by Schlesinger see Central European Democracy, p. 
212…. 
17 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 147. He also made 
reference to a 1924 article based on these same principals in Schlesinger, ‘Marxism Without 
An Organizing Party’, p. 250, footnote 34. 
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overcoming of the Luxemburgist tradition, which had proved bankrupt in the 
German events of 1923’.18 According to Schlesinger’s memoirs, the slogan 
‘bolshevisation’ was useful to the KPD because it exposed the difference 
between Lenin’s Bolshevik theory and the left-wing Menshevism of Trotsky 
and Rosa Luxemburg, something which, up to that point, few outside Russia 
fully appreciated.19 Schlesinger did point out, however, that the term was later 
misused. It came to imply the mechanical transfer of a central leadership, as 
developed over years of revolutionary struggle in a giant empire with a 
backward past, to parties in entirely different circumstances, such as those 
engaged in the fight against fascism.20  
 
Schlesinger wrote of the horror he felt when the party first began attacking 
Luxemburg and her theories in 1924.21 He wrote a long article in her defence, 
but it remained unpublished on the insistence of Karl Korsch, the then editor 
of Die Internationale and a fanatical anti-Luxemburgist according to 
Schlesinger.22 The new Central Committee of the KPD set about publishing 
translations of Lenin’s works, including What is to be Done? and on reading 
these, Schlesinger’s support of Luxemburg waned considerably.23 According 
to his memoirs, Schlesinger was now able to appreciate the irreconcilable 
antagonism between Lenin’s and Luxemburg’s approaches.24 It was, perhaps, 
possible to integrate some elements of Luxemburg’s theory of capitalist 
accumulation into a theory of imperialism based upon Leninist principles. 
However, for Schlesinger, ‘… after the experiences of 1923 one could not 
remain a Communist while siding with her against Lenin on organisational 
problems’.25 When it became clear to Schlesinger that he needed to make a 
choice between Luxemburg and Lenin he chose the latter with little hesitation.  
According to Schlesinger this alteration in his theoretical approach was to 
                                                
18 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 175. The term ‘Bolshevisation’ 
was first officially proclaimed at the Fifth Comintern Congress in June-July 1924 and later 
modified in the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI in March-April 1925 (McDermott K, and 
Agnew J., The Comintern  p. 45). 
19 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 149. 
20 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 177. 
21 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 151. 
22 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 180. 
23 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 6, pp. 1-192. 
24 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 152. 
25 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 180. Schlesinger’s underlining. 
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dictate his attitude to internal problems in the KPD and also to decide ‘… upon 
the further course of my life’.26 Such a theoretical transition cannot have been 
taken lightly. 
 
Schlesinger argued that once he fully understood Luxemburg’s complete 
system he had to oppose it; however, he believed it was still years before he 
had comprehended Marx’s scheme in full and came to the conclusion that 
Luxemburg’s economics were untenable.27 For some time he attempted to 
interpret the differing theories of Lenin and Luxemburg as reflections of the 
needs of different stages of development in the western socialist movement. 
He wrote: 
 
The first of these stages involved the breaking of the sectional 
machinery built for the achievements of improvements within the 
given state, the second the construction of a new, socialist state 
and society: the first required maximum democracy (….), the 
second discipline especially on the part of the masses whose 
upheaval created the new order. Rosa Luxemburg regarded that 
discipline as too high a price for the formation of the new 
order.28 
 
In his later version of the memoirs, Schlesinger wrote that, in British exile, he 
had come to think along remotely similar lines; ‘… in some places and in 
some stages of the historical transition process a synthesis between 
liberalism and socialism will be found’.29 However, he quickly clarified this 
uncharacteristic statement by adding the caveat that such a possibility could 
only exist under the impact of a revolutionary transition, ‘… in certain decisive 
countries, in crucial moments’.30  Schlesinger ended this particular discussion 
of his conversion from ‘Luxemburgism’ by once again reasserting his 
‘Leninist’ credentials. Referring to the possibility of a more Luxemburgist 
                                                
26 Ibid. p. 182. This sentence has been scored out on the copy of the memoirs used here, but 
remains perfectly legible nevertheless. 
27 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 152. 
28 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 181. 
29 Ibid. p. 181. 
30 Ibid. p. 182. 
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transition or revolution he concluded, ‘No intellectual equipment superior to 
Leninism had been found for such points and moments of crisis’.31 
 
Although Rosa Luxemburg was a great influence upon him, Schlesinger 
argued that, as a member of the KPD, he had attempted to help free the 
German labour movement from the limitations of her theories. With hindsight, 
he argued that if the generation preceding his had been capable of 
successfully ‘bolshevising’ the labour party, the German revolution could have 
conquered power on some occasion between 1918 and 1923. Rosa 
Luxemburg could then have become Germany’s greatest leader, having under 
these circumstances been better protected. Her theories of 1905-1913 would 
thus have been remembered only because their defeat allowed for 
revolutionary victory as well as the correction of many limitations of the 
Russian movement.32  
 
Schlesinger’s attitude towards Luxemburg altered significantly over time. It 
was clearly something over which he had thought, and suffered, a great deal. 
There appeared to be a certain amount of self-justification involved in his 
memoir writings on the subject. He felt it necessary to explain his earlier 
admiration, even devotion, to her person and theories, as well as his 
subsequent rejection of them in favour of more Leninist conceptions. 
However, it is clear that he consciously and publicly retained a great deal of 
respect for her as a Marxist and revolutionary.  
 
All of Schlesinger’s exile writings on Luxemburg are consistent and support 
the views expressed in his memoirs. They show an admiration for her theories 
and activities but a fundamental dispute with her conclusions and methods. 
For example, in Central European Democracy Schlesinger referred to 
Luxemburg several times. When discussing her attitude towards the party and 
its role, he wrote: ‘She rejected the Bolshevist idea of a party which would 
support the sectional interests of labour while continuously representing 
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before it the tasks implied in a future revolutionary situation’.33  According to 
Schlesinger, the Luxemburgist party could only assume a leading role on the 
assumption of an imminent socialist revolutionary situation. The party 
presumably stayed in the background when revolutionary circumstances were 
not present and could do little to attempt to instigate such a climate. 
Schlesinger argued that Rosa Luxemburg’s theoretical approach, ‘… was 
governed by the combination of a Menshevist attitude towards Russian 
organizational problems with a strictly anti-bureaucratic attitude to those of 
Germany’.34 Such descriptions remain consistent with the post-1924 attitudes 
he wrote about in his memoirs. 
 
Schlesinger once again emphasised Luxemburg’s devotion to ‘spontaneity’ 
and spontaneous mass action. However, he now criticised this commitment, 
arguing, ‘… she failed to see that even ‘spontaneity’ is not pure democracy, 
but is only action under ad hoc leadership’.35 For Luxemburg, the direction of 
the political mass strike, a synonym of the revolutionary process, should be 
left to the ‘revolutionary period’, to spontaneous mass action. But Schlesinger 
questioned whether it was correct to expect the proper decisions to be taken 
by ‘… an ad hoc meeting of workers in a factory’.36 This orthodox Leninist 
position differed markedly from the earlier unflinching admiration for her faith 
in the uneducated and unorganised masses he described in his memoirs. 
 
Yet Schlesinger did show some sympathy for Luxemburg’s ‘error’. He argued 
that, perhaps, she had not been aware of the gulf between the mythology of 
peoples’ ‘spontaneous’ actions in past revolutions and their actual behaviour 
in these situations. He also suggested, ‘… she was horrified by the prospect 
that a group of people who regarded themselves as competent to ‘organize a 
revolution’ on a national scale might also look upon themselves as competent 
to establish a revolutionary dictatorship’.37 Her views on, and criticisms of, the 
Bolshevik Party and its behaviour after the revolution would perhaps have 
                                                
33 Schlesinger, Central European Democracy, p. 105. 
34 Ibid. p. 105. 
35 Ibid. p. 105-6. 
36 Ibid. p. 106. 
37 Ibid. p. 106. 
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encouraged her belief in mass action over that of an organised party.38 In fact, 
it seems that Schlesinger retained some sympathy for this position, perhaps 
implying that it was not unreasonable for the time. He wrote that she had 
reason to doubt that any organisation was preferable to the initiative of some 
ad hoc body; ‘In contrast, any centralized body shouldering national 
responsibilities might be handicapped either by the shortcomings of 
information available when the movement was an underground one, as in 
Russia, or by its own bureaucratic conceptions of proper financial provisions, 
legal safeguards, etc., as in Germany’.39 
 
Schlesinger published a long paper dedicated to discussions of Luxemburg 
and her political and theoretical legacy in Soviet Studies in 1966.40 Ostensibly, 
the article formed a review of J. P. Nettl’s recently published biography of 
Rosa Luxemburg.41 However, Schlesinger conceded: ‘The following lines are 
intended as a treatment of a great figure in a specific stage in the 
development of the Marxist movement, reference to Mr. Nettl’s book being 
made where this may help to make my argument clearer’.42 In the paper 
Schlesinger clearly reiterated his profound respect for Luxemburg the ‘great 
figure’, as well as reinforcing the tremendous influence she had played in the 
development of his Marxist outlook and politics. He stated once again that it 
was through Luxemburg that he found ‘… his way to revolutionary 
socialism’.43 
 
Schlesinger’s paper coincided with and expounded upon the views expressed 
in his memoirs and previous writings. He began by declaring that, in his 
                                                
38 See, for example, ‘The Russian Revolution’ written in 1918 (Luxemburg, Gesammelte 
Werke, 4, pp. 332-365) and  ‘The Russian Tragedy’ published in Spartacus in 1918, which 
criticised the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as a capitulation to German militarism (Luxemburg, 
Gesammelte Werke, 4, pp. 385-392). 
39 Schlesinger, Central European Democracy, p. 107. 
40Schlesinger, ‘Marxism Without an Organizing Party’ 
41Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg. Schlesinger wrote positively about the publication, asserting that it 
was well rounded, due to the focus on Polish aspects of her life, her personal life, as well as 
her German and Russian activities and experiences. However, he also argued that Nettl was 
far removed from the intellectual world of his subject, seeming to suggest that he could not 
fully understand it. He also argued that some of Nettl’s factual errors were of a nature that 
suggested the author had not sufficiently familiarised himself with the material (Schlesinger, 
‘Marxism Without an Organizing Party’, p. 225).  
42 Schlesinger, ‘Marx Without an Organizing Party’, p. 225. 
43 Ibid. p. 225. 
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younger days, during the post-Great War revolutionary upheavals, he and his 
colleagues had been convinced of the orthodoxy of Luxemburg’s Marxism: 
‘Rosa Luxemburg had explained Marxism in a way which she regarded, and 
we accepted, as the orthodox one’.44 Schlesinger argued that most other 
Marxists’ rejection of her theory of accumulation had seemed irrelevant, as it 
explained to his generation the inevitability of war if the capitalist mode of 
production remained. It was only when the revolutionary defeat in Germany 
was compared with success in Russia that he felt the need to critically 
reassess ‘Luxemburgism’. He wrote: ‘It was known that Rosa had had 
disagreements with Lenin on many issues, in particular the organization 
problem, a wrong solution of which appeared to be the main cause of our 
defeats’.45 His description of the timing and motive behind his disillusionment 
also conformed to that expressed in his memoirs. 
 
He went on to discuss whether Rosa Luxemburg’s theories and influence had 
played a part in the defeat of the revolution in Germany: ‘Had the theoretical 
foundations, so far as they were specifically ‘Luxemburgist’, been 
mistaken?’.46 He answered this question in the positive, making reference to 
his 1953 Central European Democracy, in which he had argued that, had a 
Bolshevik-type party existed in Germany between January 1918 and October 
1923, there would have been many opportunities to seize power.47 
Schlesinger stated that thirteen years later he still believed the statement to 
be true. However, he added that now he felt the decisive question was 
whether the absence of such a party in the West was due to tactical errors or 
was simply an expression of the immaturity of the time for certain kinds of 
revolution.48 He did not offer an answer. In general, he wrote, ‘… the need for 
communism to overcome Rosa Luxemburg’s limitations was obvious, and 
remains obvious, if only because she failed to notice the fact, emphasised by 
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48 Schlesinger, ‘Marx Without an Organizing Party’, p. 227, footnote 3. 
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Lenin and even Hilferding, that capitalism had entered a new stage, 
economically as well as politically’.49  
 
Rudolf Hilferding’s study, first published in 1910, concerned the increasing 
concentration of capital in large corporations. This produced a growing 
number of cartels and trusts, and thus enhanced the role of banks and, 
ultimately, finance capital. His study of the economic and political 
consequences of these developments led to his theory of economic crises 
and of imperialism, the economic policy of finance capital. Monopoly prices 
inevitably stifled domestic demand and created the need for state intervention 
to ensure protectionism at home. At the same time, aid increased export 
demand for the cartels. Nationalist expansionist policies ensued, leading to an 
intensification of conflict between developed nations. Nationalism became not 
a question of national independence or cultural autonomy but the ideology of 
imperialism. Crucially, the socialisation of the economy reinforced by the 
greater role of the state, meant that the socialist movement should not aim to 
smash the bourgeois state but should instead take it over and expand its 
role.50 According to Schlesinger, Luxemburg’s failure to accommodate the 
new stage of capitalist imperialism and monopoly rendered ‘Luxemburgism’ 
obsolete, even before it was able to enter the decisive stage of revolutionary 
upheavals in the first half of the twentieth century. This was in stark contrast 
to Lenin’s correct recognition and interpretation of developments.51 
 
In terms of her long-term theoretical influence upon Germany, and the KPD in 
particular, Schlesinger believed it to be a negative one. He wrote: ‘She would 
always have been ready to fertilize with her blood the soil for a truly 
revolutionary party of the German proletariat. In the moral sense she has 
done so. But she was a theoretician, and her theoretical legacy proved to be a 
handicap for the development of the party’.52 For him, the worst aspect of her 
legacy was that she left the party unable to correct its own mistakes, without 
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50 R. Hilferding, Finance Capital (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981). 
51 See for example, Lenin’s ‘Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism’ written in 1916. 
Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 27, pp. 299 – 426. 
52 Schlesinger, ‘Marx Without an Organizing Party’, p. 245. 
 72 
moving towards the opposite extreme. The KPD thus proved incapable of 
capitalising on ‘Germany’s Kornilov’, the Kapp Putsch of March 1920. 
Schlesinger insisted 
 
The thesis that shortcomings of Rosa Luxemburg’s concepts 
formed the root, not of any particular one of the ‘deviations’ 
within our party, but of its incapacity to keep a balance and its 
ensuing propensity to fall from ‘rightist’ mistakes into ‘leftist’ 
ones, and vice versa, has been maintained by me repeatedly.53 
 
Schlesinger gave no explanation as to how Luxemburg had been responsible 
for this flaw. Perhaps her lack of organisation, her non-Leninist approach to 
party, was to blame. In any case, it was clear that Schlesinger now felt that 
his one time idol’s influence had hindered revolution in Germany. This was in 
marked contrast to the enormous admiration he had previously described 
and, according to Schlesinger, was evidence of his increasing recognition of 
the correctness of Leninist principles. 
 
Once again echoing his earlier writings on the subject, Schlesinger noted that 
these failures of ‘Luxemburgism’ had necessitated, and indeed brought about, 
the ‘Bolshevisation’ of the KPD. He noted that this term, and the policies 
surrounding it, came to be misused by some. In particular, Schlesinger 
mentioned the KPD leadership of Ruth Fischer and Maslow, who had, ‘… 
played a temporary and provocative yet completely unprincipled part’ in the 
‘Bolshevisation’ process.54  
 
Schlesinger insisted that a great deal of the anti-Luxemburgism that found 
expression in the early and mid twenties in Germany, were merely attempts 
by party members to demonstrate their loyal pro-Stalinist position. It was 
often, as Schlesinger expressed it, ‘… a mere hook on which to hang extreme 
caricatures of Stalinism, which would not have been defended by the 
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authentic Stalin’.55 However, the ‘authentic Stalin’, was not to be spared 
criticism either:  
 
Stalin himself is co-responsible because of his extreme 
simplifications of the struggle against a conglomerate described 
as ‘Trotskyism’ and, what is more substantial, because of his 
silent, and nationalist, assumption that the development of 
Russian Bolshevism was the development of revolutionary 
Marxism in the twentieth century.56  
 
Such criticism of Stalin, and his nationalism in particular, came to characterise 
Schlesinger’s later writings on Soviet Russia. He pointed out that the ‘de-
Stalinisation’ process offered a unique opportunity to reconsider the non-
Russian tradition of Marxist thought. As he put it, ‘… destalinization 
encourages looking back to those forms of Marxism which preceded the 
system described by Stalin as ‘Leninism’’.57 Rosa Luxemburg’s legacy could 
now be put into perspective, away from the vagaries of Stalinist polemics and 
factional disputes. Significantly, Schlesinger inherently criticised Stalin and his 
influence on Marxist theory; a system ‘described’ as ‘Leninism’ suggests that 
this was not, in fact, the case. Stalin must, therefore, have corrupted it. 
 
In this 1966 paper, Schlesinger provided a description of the chronological 
evolution of ‘Luxemburgism’. He examined what was unique to her philosophy 
and hypothesised as to why she seemed unable to come to terms with 
Engels’ later writing and Lenin’s in general. He compared ‘Luxemburgism’ to 
what he saw as the three basic implications of Engels’ approach in the period 
following Marx’s death, and, in particular, in his 1892 article, Socialism in 
Germany.58 He concluded that Luxemburg was only fully aware of the first 
two. Engels’ article was originally written for a French audience, to inform 
them of the history of German Social Democracy. Engels argued that, given 
the developing social and economic situation in Germany, the Socialist Party 
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would continue to garner electoral support, to such an extent that eventually 
the bourgeoisie would react, provoking a revolutionary situation. However, 
Engels argued that if war were to break out, most likely provoked by a 
belligerent Russia, then the triumph of socialism would either be immediate or 
pushed back tens of years. The German socialists would be forced to fight in 
order to defend the position they had managed to achieve. 
 
To Schlesinger, the first implication of Engels’ approach was the need to 
develop class consciousness amongst the proletariat, ‘… the social class 
called to form the basis of the new social cohesion has to be organized and 
made conscious of its task’.59 Secondly there followed the understanding that, 
in Schlesinger’s words, ‘… all partial reforms must be seen as links in a 
prolonged revolutionary process’.60 It was only through these successful 
attempts at gaining reforms, as well as temporary setbacks, that the new 
class would mature in experience and organisation, thus preparing it for the 
demands of its ultimate task. The third implication was the need to recognise 
and formulate plans for long periods without wars or depression. There could 
be no reliance on continual immiseration or cyclical economic disasters to 
increase consciousness and prepare the class for its upcoming role. As 
Schlesinger put it: ‘By now we have had two decades without major 
depressions, with an evident raising of the productive resources in both parts 
of the world, and the hope that the threat of world war may recede. What 
then?’.61 
 
As regards the first of Schlesinger’s implications, he argued that Rosa 
Luxemburg was well aware of the need to develop class consciousness 
amongst the revolutionary class. He wrote that this required the, ‘… 
development of a proletarian ‘sub culture’ within West European civilisation’.62  
Referring to Luxemburg’s Mass Strikes, the Party and Trade Unions, 
Schlesinger insisted that she understood the pivotal role of class 
consciousness as much more than an element of the ‘cultural 
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superstructure’.63 He wrote: ‘As distinct from the young Marx, yet in complete 
agreement with the mature Marx, who had appreciated trade union struggles 
as instrumental in the growing consciousness and demands of the masses, 
Rosa did not believe that mere misery creates class consciousness’.64 In fact, 
‘… in her concept (and, a fortiori, in that of Engels) there was no contradiction 
between improvement in the condition of the working class and the 
preparation of that class for the eventual fulfilment of its historical task’.65 This 
gave Luxemburg’s argument a degree of dynamism, especially when 
confronted with periods of relative stability and even prosperity. Improved 
conditions, and such reforms as the working class was able to extract from 
capital, nonetheless prepared them for the coming revolutionary struggle; 
reform was a stepping stone towards revolution, not its alternative. 
 
The second problem for ‘classical’ or pre-revolutionary Social Democracy was 
that, if the socialist movement was to avoid a splitting of the working class into 
any number of potentially opposed interest groups, these reforms had to be 
understood as linking elements within a longer revolutionary process. 
According to Schlesinger, it was this concept that the Revisionists such as 
Eduard Bernstein attacked at the turn of the century.66 Bernstein questioned 
the continual worsening of conditions for the working class and the need for a 
united movement transcending sectional aspirations. Luxemburg rose to the 
fore as a Marxist authority in German circles in defence of this second 
implication of Engels’ in her ‘Reform and Revolution’ first published in 1899.67 
She eloquently defended Marx’s labour theory of value and theory of 
economic cycles, but did so with no particular originality. She also argued that 
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democracy could only emerge from the triumph of the working class and not 
from the Liberals. However, Schlesinger insisted that Luxemburg did display 
originality in her fight against Revisionism. He wrote: ‘The strength of Rosa’s 
reply lies in the demonstration that militarism, war and domestic reaction, far 
from being distortions of the normal course of capitalist development, are 
inherent in modern capitalism’.68 Although there was no guarantee of a 
continual decline in working class conditions as a catalyst to revolutionary 
consciousness, capitalist crises, wars and eventual breakdown were 
inevitable.  
 
In fact, Schlesinger argued that it was during this struggle that Luxemburg left 
‘… the well traced path’ of Engels and began to develop ‘the specific 
‘Luxemburgist’ attitude’. According to Schlesinger, by:  
 
… arguing against all the current statements about the dangers 
of assuming power before the objective conditions have 
matured, Rosa argues that, since the organization of the 
socialist society presupposes the assumption of power by a 
class hitherto removed from current political education and 
experience, where all the objective conditions for socialist 
reconstruction are available, the assumption of power cannot 
come too early.69 
 
The working class would mature to their task through the assumption of 
power. It was the process of revolution and power that was important, not the 
determination and observation of necessary prerequisites to that seizure. 
There would be inevitable setbacks and failures, but the experience of these 
led to the maturation of the class.70 According to Schlesinger, Luxemburg’s 
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attack on Revisionism made her unpopular with the party machine. Her 
emphasis on the mass strike as a revolutionary tool from 1905 onwards 
separated her from the majority of the SPD. He wrote: ‘At first hidden, from 
1910 explicit, this differentiation turns, with the outbreak of war, into open and 
ruthless struggle, to be concluded with the foundation of the German 
Communist Party and the murder of Rosa’.71 
 
Schlesinger outlined another ‘unique’ aspect of ‘Luxemburgism’, this time 
concerning the role of the party in Social Democracy. Revolutionary parties 
were to provide guidance to the masses but could not determine the 
revolution. They were instead to provide slogans to allow the working classes 
to maximise their potential: 
 
The socialist party of each country was the element of guidance, 
not more, since Rosa did not believe that revolutions could be 
organized in the sense of determining their start and practical 
course, which had to be left to the dynamics of the revolutionary 
period. Guidance in the revolutionary period meant giving the 
struggle such slogans and direction that at every moment the 
maximum of the potential as well as the actual power of the 
working class is realized, that the decisiveness and sharpness 
of the tactics of Social Democracy never lag behind the actual 
forces but move ahead of them.72 
                                                                                                                                       
power by the labouring class appears to be a polemic absurdity derived from a mechanical 
conception of the development of society, and positing for the victory of the class struggle a  
point fixed outside and independent of the class  struggle.’ (Luxemburg, Gesammelte Werke, 
1/1, p. 435. Author’s italics). 
71 Schlesinger, ‘Marx Without an Organizing Party’, p. 236. 
72 Ibid. p. 237-8. Luxemberg made clear that she did not believe that revolutionary periods 
could be organised. In ‘The Mass Strike’ she wrote: If, therefore, the Russian Revolution 
teaches us anything, it teaches above all that the mass strike is not artificially "made," not 
"decided" at random, not  "propagated," but that it is a historical phenomenon which, at a 
given moment, results from social conditions with historical inevitability. It is not, therefore, by 
abstract speculations on the possibility or impossibility, the utility or the injuriousness of the 
mass strike, but only by an examination of those factors and social conditions out of which the 
mass strike grows in the present phase of the class struggle – in  other words, it is not by 
subjective criticism of the  mass strike from the standpoint of what is desirable, but only by  
objective investigation of the sources of the mass strike  from the standpoint of what is 
historically inevitable, that the problem can be grasped or even discussed.’ (Luxemburg, 
Gesammelte Werke, 2, p. 100). Years later, in December 1918, Luxemburg again spoke of 
her understanding of a party. She wrote in ‘What Does the Spartacus League Want?’: ‘The 
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Luxemburg’s conception of a party differed markedly to Lenin’s. Schlesinger 
argued that her theory of organisation was, in fact, a ‘… rejection of 
organization’, and he strongly disagreed with this.73 However, he insisted that 
Luxemburg recognised there were two different aspects to a party, having 
learned this from Lenin. The party had to fight for social reform whilst 
remaining the bearer of the long-term interest of the working class in its 
pursuit of a socialist society.74 It was this second aim of the party which 
Bernstein had questioned. 
 
However much Luxemburg had learned from him, she was, according to 
Schlesinger, never able, ‘… fully to come to terms with Lenin at any stage of 
her development’.75 It was this belief that led Schlesinger to reject the theories 
of Luxemburg in favour of Lenin’s. Her main failure in this respect was that 
she lacked a conception of the party based upon the experiences of all 
classes; unlike Lenin she did not take the peasantry into account. Schlesinger 
wrote,  
 
Rosa lacks one basic element of the Leninist analysis of party, 
namely his statement in What is to be Done? that the 
insufficiency of the ‘trade unionist class-consciousness’ (both 
trade unionist and reformist parliamentary) derives not only from 
its short view but also from its failure to be based upon the 
experiences and relationships of all classes in society’.76 
 
Schlesinger was, however, adamant that this difference in attitude to Lenin 
had nothing to do with any struggle of Luxemburg’s for ‘abstract democracy’, 
a cause retrospectively bestowed upon her by opponents of the Bolsheviks. 
                                                                                                                                       
Spartacus League is not a party that wants to rise to power over the mass of workers or 
through them. The Spartacus League is only the most conscious, purposeful part of the 
proletariat, which points the entire broad mass of the working toward its historical tasks at 
every step, which represents in each particular stage of the revolution the ultimate socialist 
goal, and in all national questions the interests of the proletarian world revolution.’ 
(Luxemburg, Gesammelte Werke, 4, pp. 442-451 at p. 450). 
73 Ibid. p. 249. 
74 Ibid. p. 238. 
75 Ibid. p. 238. 
76 Ibid. p. 238. Author’s italics. 
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Ultimately, Luxemburg was inferior to Lenin because the latter based his 
policies on an analysis of ‘actual’ conditions as opposed to prosaic theory. 
Luxemburg proved incapable of evolving from the ‘classical’ model. In 
Schlesinger’s words: 
 
Lenin’s specific attitude in the organization issue derived from 
his concrete analysis of the national and agrarian problems, 
which forms his world historical merit but which Rosa, 
enamoured as she was with the classical ‘model’ of ‘pure’ 
capitalism…, simply refused to appreciate.77 
 
He went so far as to ponder whether Luxemburg had chosen to devote most 
of her energies to Germany because its socio-economic, political and cultural 
environment was closer to the ‘model’ than other countries. 
 
Schlesinger now returned to the third implication he discerned in Engels’ 
approach of 1892: what should a Social Democratic party do in a period 
without wars or depression? Luxemburg had made two contributions towards 
tackling this problem. She made use of the term ‘imperialism’ in the widest 
sense of the word. This was, according to Schlesinger, ‘… certainly better 
than over-specialization, or emphasis on the mere fact of monopoly; both 
approaches would logically lead to a struggle against purely individual 
aspects of existing society’. 78  This would deprive socialism of its function as 
an alternative to capitalist society.  
 
Luxemburg’s second contribution was her ‘theory of accumulation’. As 
Schlesinger put it, this was the idea that the part of the surplus value which 
was to be used as investment could not be realised by sales to either of the 
main capitalist classes. It had to come, instead, from those pre-capitalist 
classes still remaining within capitalist centres and, more importantly, from 
colonial countries. This process would lead to the colonies becoming 
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capitalist in character. Then, he wrote: ‘With the approaching conclusion of 
the process, and even earlier with a serious reduction of scope for expansion, 
the viability of capitalism, comes to an end and it will fall, presumably in a 
chain of major depressions with revolutionary consequences’.79 Few Marxists 
agreed with Luxemburg’s analysis and her approach was in clear contrast to 
that of Hilferding and Lenin, based as they were upon monopoly capitalism.  
 
However, Schlesinger pointed out that it did have two positive aspects. Firstly, 
she questioned the stability of the value of money, a basic assumption of all 
Marxist models. Secondly, she at least approached the question of 
underdeveloped countries. Although, according to Schlesinger, ‘… she did so 
with an erroneous concept and from the wrong end, so to speak, as potential 
yet insufficient markets for the industrialized countries rather than in relation 
to economic and political processes in the colonial countries themselves’.80 
To conclude his thoughts on Luxemburg’s theory, Schlesinger argued that its 
impact upon the KPD could only ever have been transitory. This was not 
because of demands by the Russians for Leninist orthodoxy but because it 
was of no value in helping to understand the problems of real underdeveloped 
countries such as China. He once again criticised Rosa Luxemburg for the 
disparity between her theories and developing reality. 
 
That Schlesinger admired Luxemburg nonetheless was clear from his praise 
of her stance during the war: ‘She has proved herself not only a brave… but 
also a careful, … intelligent and consistent leader of the anti-war group’.81 
Whether Luxemburg, who attacked those who had betrayed German 
socialism, or Lenin, who urged defeat of one’s own bourgeoisie, was the more 
correct was irrelevant, a matter of nuance. Schlesinger insisted: ‘I am not 
willing to argue with my two great teachers on such points, after half a century 
has passed’.82  
 
Schlesinger appeared to provide a balanced portrayal of Luxemburg’s 
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attitudes and influences. He argued against the use of her writings by various 
parties and individuals who attempted to expose her supposedly inherent 
opposition to Bolshevik policies. In substance, four issues impacted upon her 
analysis of the Russian revolution. Firstly, Luxemburg’s main concern was 
Germany and she was bound to view Soviet Russia concluding a separate 
peace with that country differently to the Bolsheviks. Secondly, he wrote, ‘… 
she had in general, as we have seen, a tendency to be pessimistic on the 
prospects of first revolutionary triumphs to be consolidated, and hence to put 
greater demands on the orthodoxy of the practical policies which, in her 
opinion, would produce lessons for the future rather than consolidated 
states.’83 The example a Russian revolution could provide was more 
important than its securing any long term power. She also expected more 
‘proletarian democracy’ than the Bolsheviks could satisfy. Although, according 
to Schlesinger, she was to eventually pursue the same policies as the 
Bolsheviks in Germany but without the backing of the vast majority of the 
industrial workers and soldiers which the Bolsheviks enjoyed. Finally, 
Luxemburg disapproved of the use of terror in the Russian revolution. Once 
again, Schlesinger felt that her opposition on this point was not intractable: 
‘This is the crux of the matter: the Russian revolution has ceased to be a 
dream, it has become hard reality. If Rosa had survived and become 
responsible for a real revolution building a new order she, too, would have 
learned to do hard things’.84 According to Schlesinger, although Luxemburg 
had her reservations about the Russian revolution, some of her reasons for 
this concerned her background and others were ones she simply would not 
have held if she were in the same position. Schlesinger’s paraphrasing of Leo 
Jogiches advice to Luxemburg was arguably a justification for Bolshevik terror 
practices immediately following the revolution.85 It was also based on a 
negative assumption: Rosa Luxemburg was not in a situation where such a 
moral conundrum was placed in front of her, so there is nothing to suggest 
that she would not have done as the Bolsheviks had. However, there is no 
                                                
83 Ibid. p. 244. 
84 Ibid. p. 244. 
85 According to Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg had been distressed that her old colleague Josef 
Dzierzynski had accepted the post of head of Cheka (Russian security police) asking how he 
could be so cruel. Her longtime partner Jogiches had replied, ‘If the need arises, you can do it 
too’ (Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, Volume II, p. 731). 
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evidence to suggest that she would have either. Perhaps, Schlesinger was 
allowing his sympathies for the Bolsheviks and his oft-mentioned desire to 
counteract reactionary Western views colour his judgement in this respect. 
The ‘scholar-advocate’s’ pragmatic or utilitarian attitude was certainly 
apparent in his own attitude towards terror. 
 
In conclusion, Schlesinger argued that Lenin was by far the superior theorist 
and political figure; Rosa Luxemburg’s failure was obvious because it 
contrasted so strongly with Lenin’s success.86 For Schlesinger, Luxemburg’s 
main error was shared with most Marxism of the time: ‘Her weakness may be 
explained in terms of failure of Marxism, as developed in her days, to satisfy 
the needs of a fully developed Western industrial country’.87 Luxemburg 
proved incapable of adapting theory to the developing needs of the modern 
proletariat. Whilst Lenin did not operate in conditions of a Western industrial 
country, he was able to promote a dynamic evolution of Marxism to suit the 
needs of Russia at that time. Schlesinger was obviously a great admirer of 
such dynamism, pragmatism and, perhaps even, iconoclasm. Ultimately, it 
appears that Lenin was the greater materialist. However, Schlesinger was 
anxious to put Luxemburg’s legacy in to context, arguing that she remained 
superior to both Trotsky and Bukharin. In fact, he argued, outside Italy, she 
was the greatest Western Marxist theoretician since Engels’ death. 
 
Schlesinger provided a reasonably balanced analysis of Rosa Luxemburg’s 
theories and political legacy. His interpretation also fitted in with his earlier 
writings outlining his own theoretical evolution. It appears his onetime 
infatuation coupled with a subsequent, but not wholesale, rejection of her 
ideas led him to a realistic appraisal. Schlesinger dismissed common myths 
about ‘Luxemburgism’ as developed by her opponents and those who sought 
her authority and orthodoxy for their own cause. For example, he criticised 
suggestions that Luxemburg had represented notions of ‘abstract democracy’ 
in opposition to the undemocratic methods of the Bolsheviks.88 He also 
                                                
86 Schlesinger, ‘Marx Without an Organizing Party’, p. 247-8. 
87 Ibid, p. 248. 
88 Ibid. p. 238. 
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insisted that it was a myth that Luxemburg glorified mass strikes at the 
expense of armed insurrection.89 Finally, Schlesinger wrote that Luxemburg’s 
‘Accumulation of Capital’ could not be used to validate a theory of the 
automatic breakdown of capitalism. In fact, Schlesinger wrote, Luxemburg 
rejected such notions, ‘… in favour of a conception of a series of conflicts and 
catastrophes, the solution of which by working-class action would demand a 
maximum of consciousness’.90 Her theories were based on mass and direct 
action by the proletariat. This ‘myth breaking’ was not a new element to 
Schlesinger’s writings. He had argued in 1950 that it was unjust to reproach 
Luxemburg with a desire to delay revolution due to her advocacy of automatic 
elements; ‘… long before capitalism should come to its ‘natural’ end, the 
horrors and destitution involved in imperialist wars and colonial conquest 
would force revolution as the only alternative on peoples’.91 This role was a 
familiar one to Schlesinger and many of his writings were concerned with 
unmasking both Western and Marxist distortions of theory and history. 
 
Arguably, Schlesinger blurred Luxemburg’s differences with and criticisms of 
the Bolsheviks and the October Revolution; an understandable sentiment for 
a man attempting to evaluate his two great sources of inspiration, Lenin and 
Luxemburg. However, he consistently argued that his preference was for 
Lenin’s theories and he admitted that Luxemburg’s approach was inimical to 
them. For example, Schlesinger admitted Luxemburg could only envisage the 
breakdown of capitalism as a worldwide process. He wrote that she rejected 
the notion of a series of national revolutions, ‘… the essence of the modern 
Leninist concept.’92 Leninism would always be the superior theory, not least 
because it was formulated in regard to the development of society since 
Marx’s time. It had a genuinely materialist base and its pragmatism had 
ensured its success. 
 
Like most of Schlesinger’s writings, the paper ‘Marx Without an Organizing 
Pary’ can be dated by the attitudes towards Soviet Russia contained within it. 
                                                
89 Ibid. p. 239. 
90 Ibid. p. 250. 
91 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 188. 
92 Schlesinger, ‘Marx Without an Organizing Party’, p. 251, footnote 35. 
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It was written after Stalin’s death and the subsequent ‘de-Stalinisation’ 
process in the Soviet Union, and contained overt criticisms of Stalin and the 
vulgarisation and authoritarianism of his rule. This was combined with an 
optimist outlook for the post-Stalin future in the USSR. Schlesinger argued 
that now there were opportunities to explore the non-Russian aspects to the 
Marxist tradition. 
 
J. P. Nettl’s description of Soviet and KPD treatment of Rosa Luxemburg after 
her death appears to broadly correspond to Schlesinger’s. For example, he 
clearly accepted the notion that Rosa Luxemburg’s body of writing constituted 
a system of ideas. According to Nettl, the notion of Luxemburg’s theories as, 
‘… a coherent whole with universal application’ was first propounded by 
Georg Lukács in 1920-1921.93 From then on ‘Luxemburgism’ existed as an 
‘ism’, a system to be conflated with other deviant systems, such as 
Trotskyism, and contrasted unfavourably with the orthodox system of 
Leninism. Schlesinger undoubtedly viewed these theories in terms of differing 
systems, although he would never have reduced them to labels of abuse to 
be hung on whichever enemy was then current. He also clearly accepted the 
need for a choice between Lenin and Luxemburg, suggesting that the latter 
represented a lower stage of development and was surpassed, theoretically 
and politically, by Lenin. On the whole Schlesinger tended to agree with the 
post-World War Two official Soviet interpretation, which was now freed from 
the excesses of Stalinist control. Luxemburgism remained a system ridden 
with errors, partly due to historical circumstances but mainly because of the 
author’s intellectual failure. However, as Nettl wrote, there was a clear 
distinction between Luxemburg and Luxemburgism, ‘… the one as a shining 
example, the other as a false doctrine related to but not justified by a 
particular period of the past; in any case worthy of critical study’.94 
Schlesinger was consistent in his admiration of Luxemburg but rejected what 
he regarded as her system. 
                                                
93 Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, Volume II, p. 795. 
94 Ibid. Volume II, p. 821. 
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Chapter Three: Lenin 
 
This chapter examines Schlesinger’s attitude towards Lenin as a Marxist 
theoretician. Such an investigation provides an insight into Schlesinger both 
as a scholar of Marxism and as an adherent of that ideology. What did he 
understand by ‘Leninism’? What did he consider Lenin’s contribution to 
Marxism to be? Did he admire his work? The investigation also provides 
information on Lenin, his writings and theories. Schlesinger offers a little-read 
perspective, one which inevitably adds to the sum of work completed on the 
subject. It begins with an exploration of Schlesinger’s memoir reflections; an 
examination of how Schlesinger became acquainted with Leninism, as well as 
his initial impressions of its validity. The chapter then turns to an examination 
of Schlesinger’s published work on the topic. 
 
Following from Luxemburg, the next stage in Schlesinger’s theoretical 
development came about through his increased knowledge of Lenin and his 
writings. This led to a thorough transition in his political and theoretical 
thinking, from his acceptance of ‘Luxemburgism’ to that of the tenets of 
‘Leninism’. This evolution is clearly described in Schlesinger’s memoirs and 
has been outlined in the previous chapter. In 1919 Schlesinger read Lenin’s 
‘State and Revolution’ but felt that it was little more than a systematic 
presentation of Marxist views.1 Then, presumably around the time of its 
publication in 1920, Schlesinger read ‘’Left-wing’ Communism: an Infantile 
Disorder’.2 This was a tremendously significant event for Schlesinger; he 
wrote, ‘… to me, like many other western Socialists, this was the first 
introduction to Bolshevik theory proper’.3 However, his understanding of 
Marxism, and Bolshevism in particular, was still far from comprehensive. He 
insisted: ‘I doubt whether we grasped even all of the essentials of its 
                                                
1 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 33, pp. 1-120. Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers 
Machtübernahme, p. 63. 
2 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 41, pp. 1-104. 
3 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 63. 
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contents…’.4 Finally, from 1923 onwards, as he became more aware of 
Lenin’s work and the failure of a Luxemburg-inspired KPD became 
increasingly apparent, Schlesinger came to recognise the superiority of 
Lenin’s position over that of his previous mentor, Rosa Luxemburg. He wrote 
of the importance of reading Lenin’s What is to be Done?. The book was a 
catalyst to his dropping of Luxemburg’s economic and organisational theories 
and siding with Lenin.5 
 
The only other notable mention of Lenin in the memoirs, separate from his 
realisation of Luxemburg’s errors, concerned his demand that parties 
affiliating to the Third Communist International, Comintern, should adhere to 
the ‘Twenty One Conditions’ it developed at its Second Congress in 1920.6 
Whilst primarily a question of politics rather than Marxist theory, the issues of 
organisation, agitation and attitudes towards other groupings are matters 
necessarily connected to political theory. According to Schlesinger, the 
conditions of entry were formulated in response to centrist parties’ offers to 
negotiate the formation of a new International. Strict revolutionary criteria of 
entry would, therefore, prevent their involvement. To Schlesinger, the 
intention behind the conditions was to establish, ‘… some standard of 
sincerity in support of the Russian revolution’.7 Presumably, this would be in 
opposition to the mere rhetoric of support offered by certain sections of 
European Social Democracy. 
 
A majority of Social Democratic party leaders had argued against participating 
in the Comintern and, according to Schlesinger, their subsequent arguments 
showed that their differences with ordinary ‘social patriotic’ reformists had 
disappeared with the end of the war.8 Men such as the influential German 
theoretician Karl Kautsky had already moved to the foreground of anti-
                                                
4 Ibid. p. 63. 
5 See above chapter 2, p. 65. 
6The full text of the conditions can be found in Second Congress of the Communist 
International- Minutes of Proceedings, Volume 1 (New Park Publications, 1977) pp. 303-309. 
For more information on the Congress and the ‘Twenty One Conditions’ see McDermott K, 
and Agnew J., The Comintern pp. 17… 
7 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 52. 
8 Ibid. p. 52. 
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Bolshevik propaganda.9 It was, therefore, natural that the Bolsheviks would 
wish to remove opponents such as these from their International. Lenin was 
correct to insist upon some declaration of solidarity by participants as well as 
a commitment to fight any war of intervention. 
 
Unfortunately, the Bolsheviks demanded more than this. According to the 
early version of Schlesinger’s memoirs, their insistence that the parties who 
sought to join the new organisation must absorb the experiences and policies 
of the successful Russian party was regrettable but understandable.10 In his 
later draft Schlesinger was less conciliatory about what he regarded as the 
error of Lenin’s ‘Twenty One Conditions’. The conditions represented more 
than simply the acceptance of the value of Russian experiences and 
methods, something of undoubted use to parties such as those of Germany 
and Hungary, whose failure to apply these methods had greatly contributed to 
their recent revolutionary ‘tragedies’. Instead, according to Schlesinger, ‘… 
the Bolshevik principles of organisational centralisation and of complete 
ideological homogeneity were proclaimed as standard, the acceptance of 
which formed the preliminary condition of admission to Comintern’.11 To 
Schlesinger this appeared unnecessary and needlessly alienating. The 
conditions were ‘a very clumsy formulation’, especially when one 
remembered that European radical workers held such deep sympathies for 
Russia that the Soviet experiences would have been assimilated anyway.12 
Schlesinger doubted that many non-Russians had read Lenin’s What is to be 
Done? and hence did not understand the organisational principles for which 
                                                
9 Karl Kautsky (1854-1938) propagated and popularized ideas of Marxism in Germany, 
initially under Engels’ direction. He launched the prestigious international Marxist journal, 
Neue Zeit, and wrote the Hanfield Programme of Austrian Social Democracy in 1888 and the 
German SPD’s Erfurt Programme of 1891, in which Marxism was adopted as the official party 
ideology. He became the SPD’s ‘party professor’, leading theoretician of the Second 
International and led orthodox attacks against revisionism. However, his reputation amongst 
socialists had fallen dramatically by the outbreak of war. He advocated SPD abstention from 
the vote on war credits, his ‘centrist’ theory of ‘ultra-imperialism’ was at odds with Luxemburg 
and Lenin, and finally in 1917-1918 he wrote against the Russian revolution and the 
Bolsheviks and accused Lenin of betraying socialism. Reviled by communists, he moved to 
Vienna in 1924, fleeing from the Nazis to Amsterdam where he was to die (D Geary, Karl 
Kautsky, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1987)). 
10 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 53. 
11 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 57. 
12 Ibid. p. 60. 
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they were voting anyway.13  
 
When considering Lenin’s reasoning, Schlesinger argued: ‘It is just possible 
that Lenin, when formulating the Twenty-One Conditions, envisaged the 
possibility of a prolonged delay of socialist revolutions outside Russia’. 
However, Schlesinger wrote that even if this were true, ‘… the Conditions did 
little good yet a lot of harm.’14 In Austria, whilst the average worker’s 
sympathy for the Bolsheviks did not decrease, his/her willingness to learn 
from Russian experience did. In Germany, the conditions did not affect the 
strength of the revolutionary movement but neither did they succeed as the 
cleansing operation they were intended to be. Even in countries such as 
China or the Balkans, where successful parties seized power, they did so 
because of the application of Bolshevik principles in countries with similar 
conditions to revolutionary Russia, not because of any ‘purges’ based on the 
conditions.15 
 
If Lenin had expected prolonged isolation, he would have been better 
accepting the ‘centrists’ into the Comintern as they were, with only an 
insistence on their splitting from their right wings. According to Schlesinger, 
Lenin’s real opponents, those such as Kautsky and Hilferding, would have left 
the International anyway. Without the authoritarian tenets of the Twenty One 
Conditions, Russian efforts towards the reception of the Bolshevik experience 
internationally would have assumed the character of an honest factional 
struggle. Instead it took on the ‘… ridiculous shape of Bolshevisation’, as 
Schlesinger expressed it.16 This was to the detriment of all involved. When 
the split within the International did come, the word of the Comintern 
representative increasingly became final in internal disputes.17 
                                                
13 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 55. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie 
sochinenii, 6, pp. 1-192. 
14 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 63. 
15 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 57. 
16 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 64. 
17 However, Schlesinger argued that failures by national parties could not be blamed on 
Comintern, either because it prevented potentially successful actions within countries or 
arranged insurrections according to Soviet needs and against the will of the people 
(Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 64). For example, when discussing 
the case of the KPD he argued, ‘the statement that Comintern – in Germany in 1923 or at any 
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Although Schlesinger conceded that his understanding of the complexity of 
these issues was limited at the time, he felt that solidarity with the great 
Soviet experiment was paramount. He wrote, ‘… when the [Austrian] social 
democratic party congress declared the 21 Conditions as incompatible with 
party membership, I joined the Communist Party as an individual’.18 And so 
Schlesinger pledged his allegiance to Lenin and the Bolsheviks, a 
commitment which remained for the rest of his life. 
 
There is little else concerning Lenin, as a politician or theoretician, in the 
memoirs. Schlesinger clearly admired Lenin, enough to abandon his youthful 
idol, and remained a supporter of his writings and ideas. However, since they 
were not contemporaries and as Lenin died soon after Schlesinger began 
active party work, there was little else he could say on the topic in an 
autobiographical work. It is necessary to turn to his academic writings to 
discover further insights into Schlesinger’s thoughts on Lenin and Leninism. 
 
Schlesinger wrote a number of articles and sections in books about Lenin. His 
admiration and praise of the theoretician is one of the major elements of 
consistency throughout his writings. According to Schlesinger’s memoirs it 
was only through a correct appreciation of Leninism that he came to properly 
understand Marxism as a system. To Schlesinger, Marxism and Leninism 
were inseparable; the latter was a constituent part of, and developing stage in 
the former. Most of his writings about party, theory or Russia engaged with 
Leninism in some way, so there is an abundance of source material for an 
investigation of his attitude towards Lenin.  
 
Four themes emerge from an investigation of Schlesinger’s work on Lenin. 
Firstly, his undoubted admiration of the subject matter. That Schlesinger 
believed Lenin to be an outstanding scholar, theoretician, organiser and 
                                                                                                                                       
other occasion – destroyed hopeful revolutionary movements is nonsense, borne from the 
self-assertion of leaders who complain of miracles they would have wrought had [it] not been 
[for] that Moscow devil’ (Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p. 134). 
Schlesinger’s attitude was in stark contrast to that of Ruth Fischer, his peer and former 
colleague. She asserted that the machinations of Comintern, particularly at Stalin’s behest, 
doomed the KPD to failure. See Fischer, Stalin and German Communism. 
18 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, p. 64. 
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politician is clear from the most cursory glance at any of his writings dealing 
with Marxism and philosophy. It could be argued that this admiration went so 
far as to become a justification for all of Lenin’s writings, theories and actions. 
Perhaps he became blinded to any faults or errors; he certainly appeared 
willing to agree with Stalin’s lavish praise. Schlesinger seemed prepared to 
discuss ways in which Marx and Engels’ arguments and judgements had 
been flawed or were no longer relevant, yet he appeared more reluctant when 
it came to Lenin.  
 
The second theme is Schlesinger’s understanding of Leninism as an 
evolution of original Marxism. Marxism, as a system of ideas, a scientific 
methodology and a revolutionary ideology has an unchanging philosophical 
materialist core. However, beyond this base, it creatively evolves as 
circumstances develop – thus maintaining its materialist and dialectic 
essence. As a body of theory it is dynamic, capable of, and in fact requiring, 
change by successive generations. Leninism thus cannot be a ‘distortion’ of 
the original, true Marxism of the founders, a criticism often levelled at Lenin 
by opponents. It instead becomes its heir, the next essential evolutionary 
step; one that will ultimately be superseded by the next phase in the 
dialectical development of society. 
 
This belief of Schlesinger’s could be clearly seen with his transition from 
‘Luxemburgism’ to ‘Leninism’ in the early to mid-1920s, and represents the 
crux of any of Schlesinger’s writings concerning Lenin. Lenin was able to 
adapt his thinking and theories as socio-economic and political circumstances 
changed. He recognised the development of new class structures and 
possible alliances between these classes and adapted Marxist ideas and 
tactics accordingly. This, ultimately, allowed the Bolsheviks to affect a 
revolutionary change. In contrast, Luxemburg did not perceive any changes, 
her Marxism remained static and her party proved incapable of leading a 
revolution. 
 
Another feature of Schlesinger’s attitude was his belief that Lenin’s main 
contribution had been his theory of the party. Lenin had melded a synthesis of 
 91 
the traditions of the Russian revolutionary movement with a dynamic 
approach to Marxist theory. His application of these principles to Russian 
conditions allowed him to organise a party capable of leading a revolution. 
Marxism would always require modifications as circumstances developed. 
Lenin undertook the necessary modifications to ensure Marxism’s suitability 
for less well developed countries and its transformation in Russia allowed for 
its utility in China and elsewhere. Lenin’s success in this respect was proven 
by the existence of the Soviet state.  
 
The fourth notable element of Schlesinger’s writings on Lenin was a 
discernable feature of all of his work and was most clearly evidenced in that 
on Soviet historiography. Schlesinger’s interpretation or emphasis in writing 
about Lenin was noticeably similar to the official Soviet line at any particular 
time. In earlier writings, for example, Schlesinger seemed to concur with 
Stalinist orthodoxy in asserting the greatness of Leninism and seeing 
developments under Stalin as a natural progression from it. After the 
denunciations of 1956, however, he appeared to believe that certain of 
Stalin’s ‘excesses’ had to be purged from theory; something which would 
bring about a return to pure Leninism. After this return to a more sound 
theoretical base, further modifications could be made by later authorities such 
as Khrushchev. 
 
The key to Schlesinger’s understanding of Lenin was What is to be Done?, 
first published in 1902. The work was both a polemic against Economism and 
a call for a tightly knit, cohesive and disciplined party. Lenin argued that social 
democrats should not simply concern themselves with trade union struggles 
and the wider workers’ movement but should have a more clandestine and 
professional organisation. To Lenin, what was required was, ‘… an All-
Russian organisation of revolutionaries that stands undeviatingly on the basis 
of Marxism, that leads the entire political struggle and possesses a staff of 
professional agitators’.19 Whilst spontaneity and a loose democratic 
organisation would condemn workers to the limited aims of trade unionism, 
                                                
19 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 6, pp. 153-154. 
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the role of social democracy was to raise their consciousness. Lenin 
described the type of party necessary to fulfil this role, and Schlesinger 
believed this to be one of his main contributions to Marxist theory and the 
history of the Russian revolution. He seems to have believed that Lenin 
prescribed a party formula, which was followed by the Bolsheviks, 
successfully given the existence of the Soviet state. Schlesinger’s analysis is 
demonstrated by his attitude towards the ‘Twenty One Conditions’ of entry to 
Comintern. He argued that the conditions were erroneous and did little good, 
but that the assimilation of Bolshevik principles of organisation was essential 
for future revolutionary success. 
 
The other key text to Schlesinger’s analysis of Lenin was ‘’Left-wing 
Communism’: an Infantile Disorder’ written after the Russian revolution and 
first published in 1920. In it Lenin attempted to demonstrate that he and the 
Bolsheviks had created a party capable of seizing and maintaining power. 
Many elements of their experience were of international validity, thus foreign 
parties should centralise and assimilate that experience. They should follow 
the Bolsheviks since they had been the only party to succeed. Lenin argued, 
‘… certain fundamental features of our revolution have a significance that is 
not local, not peculiarly national, or Russian alone, but international’.20  
 
In What is to be Done? Lenin set out how a party should organise, in ‘Left-
wing Communism’ he argued that the Bolsheviks had achieved power 
because of the nature of their organisation and urged foreign parties to follow 
this lead. However, many argue that the revolution in Russia did not simply 
occur because the party was organised in the way in which Lenin had 
originally proposed or retrospectively described. In fact, even Schlesinger 
admitted that Lenin’s initial plans for the state did not come to fruition and that 
Lenin was not responsible for the timing of revolutionary events.21 As J.D. 
White has argued, Lenin insisted foreign parties adopt the principles which 
had apparently made them victorious. He continued: 
 
                                                
20 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 41, p. 3. 
21 See below p. 120. 
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Lenin maintained that some features at least of the Russia 
revolution were applicable internationally. He was not inclined to 
consider that what had brought the Bolsheviks to power in 
Russia was their promise of peace, bread and land to a people 
exhausted by war and hunger. Lenin was in effect imposing on 
foreign parties not the pattern of the Russian revolution, but of a 
mythical revolution that had not occurred anywhere.22 
 
However, instead of this more distanced analysis, Schlesinger appears to 
have concurred with Lenin’s evaluations, accepting his interpretation almost 
in its entirety. 
 
Marx His Time and Ours, published in 1950, was the first of Schlesinger’s 
works after his return to the West to engage in any great detail with Lenin. 
This was Schlesinger’s seminal philosophical work. It primarily concerned the 
development of Marxist theory up to the time of publication, in particular in the 
Soviet Union – in essence, Marxism’s applicability to the world of the 1950s. 
Schlesinger wrote in the preface: ‘I am dealing far less with the internal 
coherence of Marx’s argument in the conditions of its origin than with the 
issue of how far questions and answers conditioned by that setting are 
relevant for our, very different, days’.23 Schlesinger attempted to trace 
changes and developments in Marxist theory from its roots in Marx and 
Engels to its realisation, imperfect or otherwise, as embodied in the Soviet 
state. As Schlesinger put it: 
 
An investigation may concentrate upon the modifications of the 
Marxist system made by the further evolution of the social 
formation investigated by Marx, including attempts at realisation 
of his system. Such an approach involves inherent criticism of 
Marx’s original system but it takes the continuing relevance of the 
system for granted.24  
                                                
22 White, Lenin, The Practice and Theory of Revolution, (London, Palgrave, 2001) p. 161. 
23 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. x. 
24 Ibid. p. 1. 
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It was this investigation he was proposing.  
 
Three key concepts emerged from his work. Firstly, a major aim seemed to 
be the clarification of what Marxism was, an attempt to demystify and dispel 
common misconceptions; although given the dry, lengthy and obtuse writing 
style employed this was unlikely to be too successful. Throughout the text, 
Schlesinger made clear what Marxism was not; what were in fact the 
propositions of ‘vulgar’ variations. For example, Schlesinger went into some 
detail to explain that Marxism was not utopianism: ‘To the founders of 
Marxism, Communism was not a condition to be established nor an ideal to 
which reality must adjust itself... This seems the strongest possible rejection 
of utopianism and wishful thinking’.25 He was also at pains to separate 
Marxism from any kind of pragmatic philosophical base.26 Sometimes this 
demystifying appeared to be an attempt to ‘rescue’ Marxism from the Western 
world’s erroneous understanding.27 This is a somewhat negative motive, one 
that perhaps left the work open to criticism that it justified or apologised for 
more dubious aspects of Marxist theorising and characteristics of the Soviet 
state. 
 
Secondly, a major feature of the work was the emphasis on Marxism as 
science. It was a scientific theory that was verifiable, not as accurately as 
other sciences where experiments could be constructed artificially in 
controlled environments, but where results could be used to prove veracity 
nonetheless. To Schlesinger, Marxism’s materialist base implied the demand 
for objective truth, the very essence of ‘science’.28 Schlesinger felt the 
scientific nature of Marxism to be self-evident. For example, when discussing 
pragmatism he wrote: ‘Pragmatism is thus opposed to the basic tenet of 
Marxism and of Science in general that the World is an objective reality 
                                                
25 Ibid. p. 56. 
26 Ibid. pp. 58… and pp. 61…  
27 See for example Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 92 in which he points out that 
‘economic determinism’ was a characteristic of vulgar Marxism as opposed to Marxism 
proper. 
28 Ibid. p. 61. 
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independently of human ideas’.29 It is clear from this statement that 
Schlesinger regarded Marxism as existing within Science, obeying the same 
rules and reasoning.  
 
The third important proposition of Marx His Time and Ours followed directly 
on from the second. Science required proof. Marxist theory had been proven 
to be fundamentally correct in its approach; the proof lay in the ‘objective 
reality’ of the October Revolution and the resulting Soviet state. Schlesinger 
was at pains not to overstate his case; the state was not some idealised 
version of a Marxist model, it had problems. But for it to be otherwise would 
be utopian. The dialectical nature of social development was expressed 
through the evolution of society, parts clashed, experiments failed, but 
progress was achieved as a result. Schlesinger wrote: ‘That the system has a 
large degree of inherent truth is proved by the success of its application in 
Russia’.30 Continuing: ‘The behaviour of those Socialists who are inclined ‘to 
write off’ the Russian revolution because it fails to comply with their pet 
Utopia, which some of them prefer to describe as ‘Marxism’, is truly contrary 
to the Marxist point of view’.31 This theme, of the Soviet state as proof of the 
correctness of Marxism, is one familiar in much of Schlesinger’s writing on the 
subject.32 
 
Marx His Time and Ours adhered to the timeline proposed in this thesis. It 
was published in 1950 and can, therefore, be categorised into Schlesinger’s 
pre-1956 body of work. The unifying characteristic of all of Schlesinger’s 
writings in this period is their broad conformity with orthodox Soviet 
interpretations. So, the book praised Stalin and his contribution to Marxist 
theory, presenting him as the natural successor to Lenin – theory was 
evolving from Marxism to Marxism-Leninism to Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. 
This perhaps explains why, when turning to Schlesinger’s engagement with 
Leninism in the work, there is not as much as one might expect. The book 
                                                
29 Ibid. p. 58. 
30 Ibid. p. 4. 
31 Ibid. p. 4. 
32 See, for example, Schlesinger, ‘More Observations on Ideology’, Soviet Studies, 19, 1, July 
1967, pp. 89-99 at p. 89. 
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dealt with Marxist theory’s roots in the writing of Marx and Engels, but then 
concentrated more on developments during the Stalin era. The importance of 
Lenin’s contribution was clear but there was little written specifically about it. 
Was this, perhaps, because Schlesinger was keen to demonstrate Stalin’s 
impact on theory? Alternatively, it could be because Schlesinger was 
attempting to write about Marxism’s contemporary significance. According to 
his dialectical understanding of theory, as material circumstances developed, 
Leninism would lose its relevance. Further theoretical evolution was required 
in order for Marxist theory to remain dynamic and applicable. Lenin’s 
contribution had been enormous but this success brought about changed 
conditions, and theory had to adapt to them. 
 
When Schlesinger did write about Lenin, there were, in general, two features 
to his comments. Firstly, Schlesinger appeared, almost unquestioningly, to 
adopt Lenin’s tenets. For example, he accepted Lenin’s criticisms of the 
philosophers Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach in his polemic ‘Materialism 
and Empirio-Criticism’ seemingly at face value.33 This was in spite of the fact 
that the work, published in 1909, was a violent and sarcastic attack on a great 
number of philosophers of whom Lenin knew relatively little. As the one-time 
Bolshevik N. Valentinov wrote: ‘It is the rage that makes Lenin’s book so 
unique: it would be difficult to find another Russian work which contains so 
much crude abuse of foreign philosophers… He wanted to spit on his 
opponents’.34 Lenin argued that empirio-criticists, as positivists, did not 
believe that an object could exist independently of human consciousness. If a 
human mind could not relate to an object empirically, experience it as 
sensations, then it did not exist. Lenin countered this position by stating that 
                                                
33 Lenin, Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 18, pp. 7-384. Ernst Mach (1838-1916) was an 
Austrian physicist and philosopher who believed that science should confine itself to 
descriptions of phenomena which could be perceived by the senses and was one of the 
founders of modern positivism. Richard Avenarius (1843-1916) was a professor of philosophy 
at Leipzig and then Zurich. He attempted to discern a scientific philosophy based upon a 
critique of experience. The two scholars, more or less simultaneously, but independently, 
formulated the school of empirio-criticism. For more information see F Carstanjen, ‘Richard 
Avenarius and his General Theory of Knowledge, Empiriocriticism’, Mind, New Series, 6, 24, 
Oct. 1897, pp. 449-475 and L. Kolakowski, Postivist Philosophy, (Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Books Ltd., 1972), trans. N. Guterman, especially chapter 5. 
34 N. Valentinov (N. V. Volsky), Encounters with Lenin (London, Oxford University Press, 
1968), trans. P. Rosta and B. Pearce, p. 245. 
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the earth existed before man did, before any human mind was present to 
experience it. This fact was irrefutable. The only way the empiricists could 
resolve this problem was to ‘mentally project’ themselves in to the prehistoric 
past. However, he continued:  
 
If we ‘mentally project’ ourselves our existence will be imaginary 
– but the existence of the earth prior to man is real. Man could 
not in practice be an observer, for instance, of the earth in an 
incandescent state, and to ‘imagine’ his being present at the 
time is obscurantism, exactly as though I were to endeavour to 
prove the existence of hell by the argument that if I ‘mentally 
projected’ myself thither as an observer I could observe hell.35 
 
However, this analysis was a crude portrayal of Machist thought. The Empirio-
Criticists were concerned with epistemological questions: how could one know 
that the earth existed prior to man. It was a matter of cognition not of the 
dismissal of objective reality or otherwise.36 Whereas Lenin claimed positivism 
is the belief that if a human mind cannot engage empirically with an object 
then it does not exist, it is more accurately construed as the belief that if a 
human mind cannot relate to an object empirically, experience it sensationally, 
then it does not exist for that observer. In other words, what is is defined by 
what is observable or may be deduced from the observable. Scientists were 
able to build a picture of prehistoric earth by way of fossils and other 
evidence, allowing for empirical cognition and logical deduction. However, 
Schlesinger simply wrote of, ‘…the pertinent question in Lenin’s Empirio-
criticism, whether and how the World existed when Dinosaurian minds were 
                                                
35 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 18, p. 74. 
36 As Valentinov argued with Lenin: ‘Actually, how do you know that our planet was once 
incandescent, and that there was no life, human or otherwise, upon it? Was your knowledge 
of this provided by a mystical communication from some disembodied spirit, or is it the result 
of cognition, research on the part of a human subject, and derived from it? You are interested 
only in the fact that the earth was once incandescent: but the theory of cognition is concerned 
with the way in which such knowledge has been received, through what contact between 
object and subject it was reached, how much of it is certain, and what in it must and can be 
considered truth from the epistemological point of view’ (Valentinov, Encounters with Lenin, 
pp. 212-213). 
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the only ones available to create it’.37 As knowledgeable and experienced a 
student of philosophy as Schlesinger would surely know that this was a facile 
misrepresentation of the empiricists and positivism. Yet Schlesinger 
unquestioningly applied Lenin’s vulgar argument when describing these 
philosophical developments.  
 
The second feature of Marx His Time and Ours is the praise Schlesinger 
bestowed on Lenin and his theoretical work. He did offer some negative 
comments and pointed out where he believed Lenin to have been mistaken. 
But on the whole, Schlesinger offered a very positive portrayal. It was clear 
from Schlesinger’s memoir writings that he believed Lenin’s great impact had 
been his correct assessment of material conditions and the resultant 
application of tactics to those conditions, but he reinforced this point in Marx 
His Time and Ours. He wrote:  
 
In some instances a correct statement of facts, made possible 
by Marxist theory and inconceivable from any other standpoint, 
has been the cause of the political success of the Marxist party. 
Lenin’s correct assessment of Russia, in contradiction to the 
Narodniki, that she was undergoing transformation to capitalism, 
and of the political consequences to be drawn from that fact, is 
a foremost example.38 
 
This statement provides evidence of the kind of the esteem in which 
Schlesinger held Lenin, but it also demonstrates the orthodoxy of his 
interpretations and uncritical acceptance of Lenin’s version of events. 
 
Schlesinger did not spend a great deal of the book focussed on aspects of 
Leninism, but a brief investigation of his attitude towards Lenin’s work on 
imperialism provides a general insight. Schlesinger offered a brief but 
orthodox exposition of the topic, concentrating in particular on Lenin’s main 
writing on the subject, ‘Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism’, first 
                                                
37 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 25.  
38 Ibid. p. 66. 
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published in mid-1917.39 He revealed nothing new but displayed a 
characteristically deep knowledge of the source material. Interestingly, 
although both Lenin and Luxemburg engaged with theories of imperialism, 
Schlesinger presented no comparative analysis of the work of his two great 
teachers. He made clear in his memoirs that on realising the difference in 
their approaches he initially attempted to accommodate elements from both – 
Luxemburg’s theory had value but was applicable to an earlier stage of 
capitalist development, but he soon realised the superiority of Lenin’s 
understanding. However, here there was to be no scholarly critique of both 
theories beyond the statement that Luxemburg had not recognised the new 
stage of capitalist development identified by Lenin’s work.40 
 
Schlesinger described the influence on Lenin of J. Hobson’s explanation of 
imperialism as the export of capitals, and R. Hilferding’s analysis of monopoly 
capitalism.41 Lenin explicitly pointed to the two texts in his introduction to 
‘Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism’, arguing that no work had 
advanced beyond these comprehensive descriptions of imperialism, until now 
of course.42 Lenin adopted Hilferding’s idea of capitalism’s transition from 
competition to monopoly capitalism and the socialisation of production. This 
new stage of capitalism was finance capital and industry was now dominated 
by banks and financial oligarchies. However, these developments had not 
brought an end to conflict. As the export of capital for increased profitability 
became paramount, nations and international cartels now fought over the 
division and re-division of global spheres of influence, thus creating 
                                                
39 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 27, pp. 299-426.  
40 Schlesinger, ‘Marx Without an Organizing Party’, p. 228. 
41 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 316. The English economist A.J. Hobson was 
best known for his work Imperialism first published in 1902. According to A Brewer: ‘Hobson 
held an underconsumptionist theory, arguing that the low level of wages and the high 
proportion of profits saved led to a chronic shortage of demand. He was aware that 
investment demand could fill the gap between production capacity, on the one hand, and 
consumption spending on the other, but he argued that there would not be sufficient 
investment opportunities at home to sustain demand’. The search for investment outlets to 
absorb these surplus savings was thus the economic driving force behind colonial expansion. 
Capitalism could be preserved, however, by raising wages, thus increasing consumer 
demand and lowering the volume of savings and the pressure to find new investment outlets 
(A. Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980) p. 
112). 
42 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 27, p. 309. 
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international power struggles.43 However, finance capital was a moribund 
capitalism.44 It had at its head a parasitic class which would impede technical 
innovation if necessary in order to preserve its own position. 
 
An important feature of Lenin’s imperialism was its uneven advance; 
capitalism did not develop at a uniform pace.45 Finance capital would invest 
wherever it found it profitable to do so, be this in a developed or undeveloped 
country. An implicit corollary was, therefore, that the spread of revolution 
would be uneven too. Revolution may begin in hitherto unexpected places 
rather than amongst the most advanced states. The huge profits enjoyed by 
finance capital allowed them to bribe the upper strata of the proletariat with 
high pay.46 This produced opportunism and, presumably, explained the 
behaviour of the majority of Social Democrats on the outbreak of war. 
 
In ‘Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism’, Lenin was replying to 
Kautsky’s concept of ‘Ultra-imperialism’, whereby capitalist monopolies would 
agree worldwide organisation of production and thus bring an end to 
international conflict. According to Schlesinger, Lenin answered that since 
capitalism developed in an uneven manner, any agreement would be 
ephemeral.47 Kautsky was also mistaken in believing that imperialism was 
driven by industrial capital rather than finance capital, hence his emphasis on 
the acquisition of agrarian territories.48 
 
Lenin’s theory of imperialism, according to Schlesinger, provided a, 
‘…comprehensive picture of international relations differing from, but no less 
impressive than, the original Marxist – or pre-Marxist – scheme’.49 It was of 
continuing relevance and offered an understanding of the world which was 
now also shared by Lenin’s opponents. This attitude amply demonstrates 
                                                
43 Ibid. pp. 420.... 
44 Ibid. p. 424. 
45 Ibid. pp. 422 – 423. 
46 Ibid. p. 402. 
47 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 316. 
48 For information on Kautsky’s views on imperialism see Geary, Karl Kautsky, chapter 4, 
especially pp. 52…  
49 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 318. 
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Schlesinger’s appreciation of Lenin and ‘Leninism’. However, his 
wholehearted endorsement of Lenin’s imperialism does not hold up to 
scrutiny. Whilst Lenin may well have been prescient in his recognition of the 
uneven development of capital, as well as finance capital’s ability to impede 
technological progress where it found it advantageous to do so, his ideas 
concerning the importance of banks in a socialist assumption of power were 
proven ill founded by events in Russia. Following on from Hilferding and 
Bukharin, Lenin believed that the concentration of power and capital in a few 
hands, those of the banks, was laying the foundations of a socialist system. 
As J. D. White has pointed out, Lenin had originally thought, ‘… the big banks 
were the state institutions which were needed to bring about socialism, and 
which would be taken over as they stood from capitalism’.50 An important 
element of Lenin’s theory of imperialism was that this latest and final evolution 
of capitalism facilitated a relatively smooth transition to socialism. In fact, in 
‘Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?’ written in October 1917, Lenin 
wrote: ‘Without big banks socialism would be impossible’.51 However, on the 
assumption of power, Lenin was soon to realise that he could not simply take 
over the reins of the financial institutions; the banking system was completely 
destroyed during the revolution.52 Schlesinger was undoubtedly aware of this 
but concentrated instead on other elements of Lenin’s imperialism, such as 
international relations.  
 
Schlesinger further praised the theory of imperialism, writing, ‘Lenin’s concept 
of international relations is impressive as a general abstraction which serves 
to establish general trends’.53 Lenin was not able to describe all of the details 
of international relations as they emerged after the revolution, but he did 
provide a methodology by which to assess them. This, once again, 
demonstrated Schlesinger’s appreciation of Lenin as a thinker who 
recognised the need to evolve theory as conditions altered. Instead of a rigid 
definition of international relations, which would inevitably become obsolete 
as circumstances developed, he created ‘a general abstraction’ in order to 
                                                
50 J. D. White, Lenin, The Practice and Theory of Revolution, p. 151. 
51 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 34, pp. 287-339 at p. 307. Author’s italics. 
52 White, Lenin, The Practice and Theory of Revolution, p. 151. 
53 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 319. 
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perceive ‘general trends’. 
 
That Lenin was able to create a theoretical model or methodology that 
Marxists could use to analyse dynamic material conditions and then plan their 
actions accordingly, was a familiar theme in Schlesinger’s admiration. His 
iconoclastic adaptation of the Marxist model in opposition to a rigorous and 
dogmatic preservation of the founders’ pronouncements was what set him 
apart. For example, one of the basic principles of early Marxism regarding 
war was no longer applicable during Lenin’s time. The use of war by 
revolutionaries as an opportunity to appear as the most consistent defenders 
of the national interest and thus take power, was inappropriate when both 
warring parties were viewed as equally reactionary.54 This concept was, 
therefore, of little relevance to the twentieth century. Thus Lenin introduced 
the notion of defeatism – changing theories and tactics as material conditions 
altered over time. Schlesinger pointed out that defeatism did not mean 
collaboration with a foreign government. He wrote, ‘… [this] would contradict 
the Leninist conception of internationalism because it would counteract the 
attempt of the Socialists on the other side to defeat their imperialist 
government and would give an efficient propaganda tool to the latter.55 
Defeatism implied the defeat of one’s own leaders and bourgeoisie 
irrespective of its effect on others.56  
 
However, Lenin’s conception was now obsolete due to its successful 
application in one country – Russia. The correct Leninist line would now 
advise support of the enemy by domestic revolutionaries if that foe was from 
the Socialist camp. However, not all communists had realised that theory and 
policies had to be altered. As Schlesinger pointed out, ‘… the tactics applied 
by most of the Western Communist parties during the first stage of World War 
II resulted in that failure which is bound to crown the application of sacred 
formulas to a situation which no longer fits the basic assumptions to which 
                                                
54 Ibid. p. 320. 
55 Ibid. p. 322. 
56 See, for example, Lenin’s pamphlet ‘Socialism and War’ published in 1915. In it Lenin 
wrote: ‘A revolutionary class cannot but wish for the defeat of its own government in a 
reactionary war, and cannot fail to see that the latter’s military reverses must facilitate its 
overthrow.’ (Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 26, 307-350 at p. 327). 
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they owe their origins’.57 The ability to adapt theory to changed circumstances 
was one of the essences of Marxism-Leninism to Schlesinger. 
 
The second theme to demonstrate Schlesinger’s attitude towards Lenin in this 
work concerned revolution. To Schlesinger, Lenin’s theories on revolution and 
organisation of the revolutionary party confirmed his pre-eminence as a 
Marxist thinker. According to Schlesinger, there were three basic socialist 
attitudes towards revolution and transformation of the state. These were 
revisionism, centrism and that of Lenin. The latter involved the replacement of 
existing machinery by a new one originating from within the revolutionary 
dynamic. This third conception implied a difference between the revolutionary 
mass movement and the organised sectional movements usually operating 
within a capitalist framework. According to Schlesinger, ‘… this consequence, 
though not alien to the minds of the founders, was not clearly drawn before 
the Russian revolution of 1905 when the specific character of the 
revolutionary mass-movements was emphasized by Lenin as well as by Rosa 
Luxemburg’.58 Lenin recognised the need for a new type of revolutionary 
movement or party, one which was differentiated from the sectional workers 
organisations accommodated within the capitalist state. 
 
In the Leninist conception of revolution, ‘revolutionary situations’ occurred. 
However, unlike other theorists, Lenin provided a much more concrete 
definition of what they were and how to determine them. As Schlesinger 
wrote, these crises had not only ‘objective’ conditions but there also had to be 
‘subjective’ changes; namely, ‘… that the revolutionary class should be 
capable of revolutionary actions sufficient to overthrow the existing regime 
which, even in a period of crisis, would not automatically collapse’.59 Unless 
the working class was suitably organised and motivated, any revolutionary 
attempt would fail. There followed from this the need to organise the 
revolution. There had to be a party capable of leading the revolutionary class 
to action at the appropriate time. Lenin’s understanding of these factors, as 
                                                
57 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 323. 
58 Ibid. p. 255. 
59 Ibid. p. 257. 
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well as his realisation of the function of the party, made him unique and 
confirmed his superiority over Luxemburg. 
 
Lenin diverged from the centrists in recognising that when a ‘revolutionary 
situation’ transformed into an ‘acute revolutionary situation’, it was necessary 
for the working class to take offensive action and create a new state-
machinery.60 The bourgeoisie would be unable to accept peaceful transition to 
socialism and so civil war was inevitable. Leninism insisted that this 
anticipated conflict should be solved by offensive action. Such a position 
obviously had a decisive influence on the kind of working class organisation 
necessary to accomplish that action; a tightly knit, disciplined body would be 
vital in such circumstances. According to Schlesinger, Engels would have 
understood this but few of Lenin’s contemporaries did. 
 
Accurate appreciation of the characteristics of ‘revolutionary situations’ as 
well as the subjective factors, such as party organisation necessary to 
transform the crisis into an actual revolution, allowed Lenin to discern tactical 
laws of general validity. Thus, wrote Schlesinger, ‘… a social phenomenon is 
no longer analysed as an objectively given fact, but the rules governing the 
behaviour of those who intend to bring that phenomenon to the culmination 
point are being established as laws [,] neglect of which is bound to result in 
defeat’.61 Lenin was able to analyse correctly potential revolutionary 
situations. He also provided laws for the organisation of the party and the 
transformation of the state. It was, in fact, ‘Leninism’ which brought about the 
success of the Marxist schema. As Schlesinger expressed it: ‘The realisation 
of the Leninist scheme in a fourth of the world had made clear that socialism 
is a practical proposition’.62 
 
The essence of Schlesinger’s Leninism was its adaptation of Marxism to the 
circumstances of the time. That Lenin was able to do this successfully was 
proven by the emergence of the Soviet state. However, this very success led 
                                                
60 Ibid. p. 262. 
61 Ibid. p. 262. 
62 Ibid. p. 264. 
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to the obsolescence of many of his theories and tactics. It was necessary to 
develop new ones once the new material circumstances had been evaluated. 
Presumably Stalin had undertaken this. However, Western Communist 
parties had proven unable to adapt dialectically; hence their failure.  
 
Similar themes emerged from Schlesinger’s next work on Lenin, an 
encyclopaedia article written for Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften 
and published in West Germany in 1959.63 Once again, Schlesinger 
emphasised the transitional and progressive nature of Leninism – it was an 
evolution of original Marxist theory, adapted to changed circumstances, but 
one that itself required development as conditions continued to alter 
dialectically. For an encyclopaedia piece the article was considerably detailed 
and represented a broad and systematic presentation of Leninism with a 
considerable and varied bibliography. It was also a very orthodox exposition, 
one generally in line with Soviet interpretations.  
 
This orthodoxy was demonstrated in Schlesinger’s emphasis of 1912 as a key 
date in Bolshevik and Russian history. Schlesinger wrote that at the Prague 
Conference of January of that year, Lenin formally constituted the Bolshevik 
faction as the central organisation of Russian Social Democracy.64 Thus, 
1912 was the year the party which went on to lead the October Revolution 
and ultimately transform Russia into a modern socialist nation was truly 
separated from those who were incapable of this task. It was traditional in 
Soviet literature to point to 1912 as one of the significant periods in party 
history.65 This is easily understood when it is remembered that 1912 is the 
year in which Stalin first joined the Central Committee and became a key 
figure within the party. Soviet authorities would obviously be keen to 
demonstrate how important this time was for the development of the 
revolution. It seems that Schlesinger’s presentation corresponded to this 
timeline, for whatever reason; although, he made no reference to Stalin at this 
                                                
63 Schlesinger, ‘Lenin, W.J.’, Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften, 23, 1959, pp. 582-
587.  
64 Ibid. p. 583. 
65 See, for example, part five of chapter four of the Short Course entitled ‘Prague Party 
Conference, 1912. Bolsheviks Constitute Themselves an Independent Marxist Party’ (Short 
Course, pp. 138-143). 
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time.  
 
The article’s interpretations also coalesced with official Soviet orthodoxy in its 
emphasis on the reasons for the split between the Mensheviks and the 
Bolsheviks at the London congress of 1903. Schlesinger wrote of the split in 
terms of organisation; was the party to be the vanguard of the revolutionary 
movement or a gathering point for all with socialist sympathies.66 The 
Bolsheviks were portrayed as the only truly revolutionary party capable of 
leading the masses, through their organisational discipline, whilst the 
Mensheviks, including G. Plekhanov, were not.67 This interpretation is 
commonplace and the description of the split as emanating from a dispute 
about the famous ‘Article One of the Rules’ of party membership was 
prevalent both in Soviet orthodoxy and in the West.68 This disagreement 
betrayed much deeper divisions regarding organisation, centralisation and 
discipline and made the continuation of a unified body untenable and 
undesirable from the ever prescient Lenin’s point of view.  
 
There is certainly a great deal of truth in this presentation but it is a somewhat 
distorted and simplified version of events; something Schlesinger was likely to 
be aware of. The decisive issue of the congress concerned a more short-term 
question: how many members each group would have on the editorial board 
of Iskra, the party’s paper, and the Central Committee.69 Although divergent 
opinions did exist within the Social Democratic party about who should be 
able to call themselves a member and the level of organisational unity 
required, there was broad agreement on the need for such unity in order to 
bring about a transformation of society. As Schlesinger himself later wrote: 
 
                                                
66 Schlesinger, ‘Lenin, W.J.’, p. 583. 
67 Georgii Plekhanov (1856-1918) is seen by many as the father of Russian Marxism. Initially 
an underground revolutionary in the Emancipation of Labour group, Plekhanov spent thirty 
seven years in exile studying philosophical questions of Marxism and how best to adapt it to 
Russian conditions. Eventually arguing with Lenin and criticising ‘What is to be Done?’, 
Plekhanov rejected Bolshevism. He died the upholder of, in his view, orthodox Marxism 
against the anarchism and irresponsibility of Lenin’s push for a second, proletarian revolution. 
See, S. Baron, Plekhanov, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1963). 
68 See, for example Short Course, pp. 39-44 and J. Reshetar, A Concise History of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964). 
69 White, Lenin, The Practice and Theory of Revolution, p. 64. 
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…. we should remember that in those issues which split the 
Social Democrats and Communists, Mensheviks as well as 
Bolsheviks supported the position now associated with 
communism (precisely for this reason the Bolsheviks eventually 
carried the large majority of the Russian labour movement). At 
the Second Party Congress Lenin argued that a proletarian 
dictatorship was necessary because the Russian working-class 
might have to establish a minority government…. Plekhanov 
followed up implications of Lenin’s approach when he stated 
that every democratic principle, including universal suffrage, 
should be subordinated to the needs of the revolution.70 
 
Although the ‘trivial’ issue of composition of party bodies did bring to the fore 
disputes about what constituted a party member and what a supporter, 
interpretations of these matters are often made to appear as a contest 
between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, now unmasked as ‘Economists’ or 
Revisionists. This was not the case. Schlesinger was fully aware of this and 
yet gave this simplified version in the encyclopaedia article. 
 
Schlesinger was also orthodox in his presentation by stressing the ripeness of 
Russia for a revolution; one of a different type to that envisaged by the 
founders perhaps, but Lenin’s development of Marxist theory illuminated the 
way in which revolution could be carried out in Russia nevertheless. This 
analysis legitimised the Soviet state and the Bolshevik assumption of power. 
Were it to be otherwise, the Bolsheviks would have been usurpers who used 
an inappropriate ideology developed for industrial countries in order to 
achieve power for their own ends.  
 
His description of events in the article was often similar to Soviet sources. For 
example, Schlesinger wrote that during Lenin’s first exile in East Siberia, from 
1897 onwards, ‘Economism’ gained the upper hand amongst Social 
Democrats in St Petersburg and other cities. He described ‘Economism’ as a: 
                                                
70 Schlesinger, History of the Communist Party of the USSR, (Calcutta, Orient Longman Ltd., 
1977) p. 43. 
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‘Russian variant of west European revisionism’.71 The presentation of a 
coherent, powerful and totally erroneous theory of ‘Economism’ was common 
to all Soviet outlines of events, and was initially developed by Lenin, amongst 
others.72 However, as J. D. White has pointed out, ‘Economism’ was not an 
actual doctrine or movement – no one would admit to being an ‘Economist’ 
and no one advocated the ideas attributed to them.73 It was a label that Lenin 
would pin onto opponents, thus equating them with revisionism, 
‘Bernsteinism’, ‘Kautskyism’ and so on, in an attempt to discredit them.74 
 
The encyclopaedia article began with a brief description of Lenin’s life and the 
leading role he played in Russian and Social Democratic events; ‘From the 
creation of ‘Iskra’ until his death he was the leader of the Russian left 
socialists’.75 Schlesinger explained that Lenin’s theoretical work gave the 
party its orientation and formulated its ‘Weltanschauung’. He then outlined the 
three major problems confronted by Lenin, describing his novel and 
revolutionary solutions to them. These were the nature of Russian capitalist 
development, the necessary character of a socialist party and the question of 
socialist reconstruction in Russia.  
 
Schlesinger argued that Lenin identified capitalism in Russia with large-scale 
capitalist industry.76 Already in ‘The Development of Capitalism’, written 
between 1896 and 1899, Lenin recognised that the rural community was 
splitting into socially differentiated categories – broadly characterised as the 
proletariat and capitalists.77 As Schlesinger put it, in Russia, in contrast to 
many European countries; ‘… the urban bourgeoisie were only the tip of a 
kulak dominated pyramid’, ‘the proletariat were only the most proletarianised 
and conscious part of a much wider peasant or landless mass’.78 Under these 
                                                
71 Schlesinger, ‘Lenin, W.J.’, p. 583. 
72 See for example, Lenin, ‘A Protest by Russian Social Democrats’, Polnoe sobranie 
sochinenii, 4, pp. 163-176 and Lenin, ‘A Talk with Defenders of Economism’, Polnoe sobranie 
sochinenii, 5, pp. 360-367. 
73 White, Lenin, The Practice and Theory of Revolution, p. 48. 
74 Ibid. p. 58. 
75 Schlesinger, ‘Lenin, W.J.’, p. 583. 
76 Ibid. p. 583. 
77 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 3, pp. 1-778. 
78 Schlesinger, ‘Lenin, W.J.’, p. 583. 
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circumstances there existed the possibility that revolution could come about 
not simply from the industrial proletariat but from the development of the 
‘proletarianising’ process on the whole of society, including in the villages. 
This recognition, this development of the original Marxist suppositions was 
one of Lenin’s greatest achievements. 
 
Given the situation in Russia, a relatively backward country with developing 
revolutionary potential, Lenin went on to develop his conception of the tasks 
of the party, most notably in ‘Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the 
Democratic Revolution’ written in 1905.79 From the classical Marxist position 
that a socialist revolution would occur in an industrially developed country, the 
majority of Mensheviks thought that the liberal bourgeoisie would have a 
leading role in the revolution. The Social Democrats would then become the 
opposition party within a bourgeois democratic political system. Trotsky and 
the left-wing Mensheviks thought that the proletariat should take the leading 
role in the forthcoming revolution in order to ruthlessly pursue their own class 
goals. However, in the absence of a socialist revolution in an industrially 
developed country, they believed the Russian revolution to be destined for 
defeat due to the inevitable conflict between the victorious proletariat and the 
peasantry. In contrast, Lenin argued that a socialist party should not wait for 
the bourgeoisie to achieve democratic freedoms. It should instead try to seize 
power for itself in alliance with sections of the peasantry; thus establishing the 
‘democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry’.80 
 
According to Schlesinger, Lenin’s ideas were further developed through the 
experience of the Great War and the quarrels regarding the correct socialist 
position to it. In contrast to socialist pacifists, Lenin’s analysis of monopoly 
capitalism led him to believe that war was inevitable due to the periodic re-
division of the world amongst the leading capitalist powers.81 Peace was 
unachievable whilst capitalism prevailed, thus revolutionary socialists should 
answer the world war with systematic preparation for the seizure of power. To 
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Schlesinger, this analysis implied Lenin’s recognition that Marxism had 
originated in different economic circumstances. Up to then, the only alteration 
to the teachings of the founders had been late Engels’ revision of his position 
on the war question. Now, however, Lenin changed the traditional 
formulations so that they were appropriate to the changed economic 
conditions. 
 
Schlesinger touched upon the philosophical foundations of Leninism when 
discussing the party as a revolutionary vanguard. According to Schlesinger, 
Lenin’s ‘Materialism and Empirio-criticism’ disagreed with any notion that 
matter was not a physical concept. In fact, matter was, as Schlesinger 
expressed it, ‘…a philosophical category to describe objective reality’.82 
According to Lenin, philosophical materialism was the recognition that an 
objective reality existed outside consciousness.83 This objective reality could 
not be refuted by changes to any person’s physical conception of the world 
since it existed outside their subjective cognition. However, Lenin seemed to 
back away from such an ultra-materialist position later in his career, with the 
resurgence of the revolutionary tide during the war. He began to make 
observations on the subjective element in dialectic interactions. According to 
Schlesinger, Lenin’s 1915 ‘Questions of Dialectics’ had the most far-reaching 
recognition of subjective factors.84 He went further, arguing that Lenin had 
even partly acknowledged the legitimacy of philosophical idealism. This 
attitude does seem to contradict Schlesinger’s earlier brief engagement with 
Lenin’s materialism and his attack on empirio-criticism.85 Then he had aped 
Lenin’s inaccurate criticism of positivism: how could a world before humans 
have existed if there was no one there to experience it. However, he 
recognised the changing nature of Lenin’s stance over time. 
  
As regards the necessary character of a socialist party, Schlesinger felt that 
most Russian socialists recognised the concept of a central organisation as 
                                                
82 Ibid. p. 584. 
83 As Lenin expressed it: ‘…. historical materialism and Marx’s entire economic doctrine are 
permeated through and through by a recognition of objective truth’ (Lenin, Polnoe sobranie 
sochinenii, 18, p. 338). 
84 Schlesinger, ‘Lenin, W.J.’, p. 585. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 29, pp. 316-322, 
85 See above, p. 96… 
 111 
the ‘vanguard’ of the revolutionary movement. For Lenin this had developed 
through a combination of the Narodnik or Populist tradition and the practical 
necessity of the underground movement. However, Lenin’s peculiar 
contribution was in his distinguishing between the movements concerned with 
the daily interests of the workers; the trade union or parliamentary sections of 
social democracy, and the revolutionary-socialist one. This latter movement 
required non-proletarian intellectuals to initially organise and produce the 
ideas. However, the spontaneity of the masses remained the determining 
purpose of the organisational socialist vanguard. It was these organisational 
elements which, firstly in ‘The Urgent Tasks of Our Movement’ and then fully 
in What is to be Done?, created the foundations of the break between the 
Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.86 These ideological divisions soon 
intensified. According to Schlesinger, Lenin insisted upon the idea of, ‘… not 
just an organisationally but also an ideologically united organisation as a 
precondition for the victory of the proletariat over their much stronger 
enemies’.87  
 
In the encyclopaedia article Schlesinger described Lenin as correct and 
insightful in all respects, even where this appeared contradictory. He 
mentioned that one of Lenin’s contributions to Marxist political theory was his 
recognition of the role of intellectuals as the initial source of ideas within the 
party: the proletariat could not become conscious of its tasks alone. However, 
immediately afterwards he emphasised the significance of the masses to 
Lenin’s theory, in particular their spontaneity. This was as if to compensate for 
any dilution of the workers’ role. He was defending Lenin from criticism that 
he undermined the role of the proletariat in the proletarian revolution just as 
he pointed towards the hugely important role the non-proletarian element 
were to play within the revolutionary organisation.  
 
In much the same way, Schlesinger appeared to be fearful that he had 
presented Lenin as too enamoured with ‘spontaneity’, a Luxemburgist 
deviation. He went on to argue that, in the struggle with the widespread 
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‘theory of spontaneity’, Lenin answered the question ‘should we organise the 
revolution’ with an emphatic ‘yes’.88 Schlesinger went further insisting that, 
during the course of the revolution, Lenin underlined the decisive role of 
armed revolt, an organised aspect of the movement which ‘spontaneity’ could 
surely not be relied upon to produce. This was in opposition to the left-
socialists’ emphasis on the importance of ‘mass strikes’.  
 
The alteration in Lenin’s position only appears inconsistent when ‘Leninism’ is 
viewed as a monolithic coherent theory in which all works contributed to that 
body in a uniform manner. Yet Lenin developed his ideas throughout his 
career; he altered his viewpoint and changed his emphases, even if he did 
not explicitly acknowledge this himself. In What is to be Done? Lenin did 
argue that consciousness needed to be brought to the proletariat from the 
outside.89 However, just two years later in ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Back’, he stressed the potentially parasitic influence of intellectuals upon the 
working class and emphasised that they had a great deal to learn from the 
workers.90 J. D. White noted the difference in emphasis: ‘In the earlier work 
Lenin had extolled the part played by the intelligentsia in bringing a socialist 
consciousness to the proletariat; in the later one he maintained that the 
intelligentsia had lessons in organisation and discipline to learn from the 
workers.’91 This may have been because he changed his mind or, perhaps, 
because of more short-term practical necessities. Equally, early in his career 
Lenin reacted with great ferocity at any attempt to explore idealism or 
question the dialectic materialism he employed. Later, as Schlesinger noted 
above, he accepted that idealism did have some merit. The older Lenin thus 
seemingly mellowed in his attitude towards idealism. Schlesinger’s analysis of 
Leninism only appeared contradictory in places because of his attempt to 
present a systematic and entirely coherent account, one that glossed over 
changes in that system over time. 
 
Having discussed Lenin’s attitude towards the character of Russian 
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development and the tasks and composition of a revolutionary party, 
Schlesinger described Lenin’s views regarding socialist construction in 
Russia. However, he did not go in to any great detail; arguing that the big 
questions concerning socialist construction only truly ripened after Lenin’s 
death.92 He first approached the subject within the context of Lenin’s ‘State 
and Revolution’, written in August and September 1917. He wrote: ‘In a 
systematic exposition of classical Marxist ‘theory of the state’, the necessity of 
destroying the existing state apparatus and replacing it with organs of working 
class power, emerging from mass initiative, is emphasised’.93 Again, with an 
apparent desire to quash any potential criticism of Lenin, Schlesinger pointed 
out that despite any seeming concessions to anarchism this smashing might 
entail, there was a great emphasis on the role of the party as organisers of 
both the revolution and the new state. 
 
What was written thereafter on the topic can be seen as a robust defence of 
Lenin’s plans and policies. His initial ideas, developed in 1917 in his ‘April 
Theses’ or ‘The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution’ and ‘Can 
the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?’, concerned nationalisation of land and 
control of production.94 Control of the banks and other ‘commanding heights’ 
would be sufficient for the immediate transformation of Russia into a planned 
economy.95 Schlesinger conceded that this was not what occurred in practice. 
However, he insisted that the much more far-reaching nationalisation 
measures that were introduced in the first revolutionary period were not due 
to any theoretical considerations but, ‘…in part because of the flight of 
capitalists and in part because of the workers’ refusal to cooperate with 
them’.96 According to Schlesinger, it was not a miscalculation on Lenin’s part 
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but the circumstances of later events that meant that his earlier predictions 
did not come to fruition. That this remained a major flaw in Lenin’s plan was 
not discussed.  
 
Schlesinger briefly described Lenin’s writing concerning construction after the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk before turning to the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
instituted in 1921. According to Schlesinger, the temporary revival of free 
trade at this time was necessary due to the backwardness of lower middle-
class Russia.97 This justification was swiftly followed by an assertion that 
Lenin continued to strive towards, and write about, the transition to socialism 
up until the end of his life. Schlesinger noted that in some of his last works, 
such as ‘On Cooperation’ written in January 1923, Lenin asserted the 
importance of developing peasant cooperatives for the transition to 
socialism.98 His point was that Lenin still believed Russia had begun the 
journey towards socialism. 
 
Finally Schlesinger turned to an appreciation of Lenin: what recognition of his 
legacy existed in the modern world? He argued that in the atmosphere of the 
cold war, ‘stupid libel’ had been written about Lenin, presumably by 
commentators from the West and political opponents.99 The notion that the 
cold war blinkered many Western writers and created a hostile environment, 
which was anathema to a proper discussion of Soviet matters, was familiar to 
all of Schlesinger’s writing. The proposition that he spent much of his career 
consciously attempting to counteract this prevailing hostility and prejudice is a 
central tenet of this thesis. In contrast to those hostile to the Soviet Union, 
Lenin’s supporters had developed the cult of Leninism following his death. 
According to Schlesinger, Lenin was placed on a ‘pedestal of infallibility’.100 
His theories and writings were applied to very different situations leading to 
unhistorical expositions of his works. 
 
To Schlesinger, this myth creation developed in two distinct directions, with 
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each trying to claim Leninist heritage in their own arguments. Firstly there 
were those who disagreed with the direction of Soviet policy since Lenin’s 
death. The left opposition, for example, constructed an image of Lenin as the 
‘pioneer of workers’ democracy’ in contrast to the current suppression of that 
democracy.101 Oppositionists attempted to bolster their position by reference 
to Lenin. His successors had subverted Lenin’s intentions.  
 
The other myth construction was undertaken by Soviet authorities, an 
orthodox position was created in official books, articles and speeches. Lenin’s 
approval and authority for current actions was sought and found in his body of 
work. This was particularly true during the Stalinist period, in which, as 
Schlesinger wrote, Stalin ‘…. used every opportunity to find his own ideas 
within those of the ‘Master’’.102 In the Stalinist presentation Leninism was a 
new phase of Marxism. Lenin’s name was added to that of Marx and Engels, 
as one of the founders of the movement. Whilst Schlesinger agreed that 
Leninism was a new phase, he clearly disapproved of the use of Lenin as a 
litmus test of orthodoxy and Marxist correctness. Instead he appeared to be in 
agreement with the post-Stalin position of Soviet authorities. Stalinism had 
distorted Leninism, and it was necessary to remove these distortions so that 
further progress could be made. This analysis corresponds to the time-line 
the present thesis has posited. The encyclopaedia article was written after 
Stalin’s death and in contrast to his earlier work, in which Schlesinger 
appeared to acquiesce with the Stalinist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism-
Stalinism, he was now more critical of the Stalinist influence upon theory.103 It 
appears that it was necessary to remove Stalinist distortions, to return to 
original Leninism, before further dialectical progress could be undertaken. 
 
In Schlesinger’s opinion, Lenin had melded a higher phase of Marxism: ‘Like 
all great thinkers, who helped form the history of their time, Lenin tied a series 
of threads together to create a new unity’.104 In his case, those threads were 
Marxist theory and the traditions of the Russian revolutionary movement. 
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From an analysis of monopoly capitalism, which others shared, he drew far-
reaching consequences for the reorientation of the socialist movement. Lenin 
washed away the difficulties of a socialist revolution in Russia and created a 
Marxist theory capable of seizing power. The realisation of Lenin’s new unity 
proved to be a model for many. It provided the basic principles of the 
revolutions in China and in other backward countries.105  Schlesinger 
recognised that Lenin had altered Marxism beyond the founders’ initial 
assessment, but this was one of his strengths. According to Schlesinger, 
Lenin had positively admitted the possibility that Russia had developed a 
different revolutionary type to that of the classical Marxist schema; one ‘… 
devoted to improving the state apparatus and systematically overcoming 
cultural backwardness’.106 He referred to Lenin’s statement in ‘Better Fewer, 
But Better’, written in March 1923, in which he stated that socialist victory was 
assured: 
 
In the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle will be 
determined by the fact that Russia, India, China etc., account for 
the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. And 
during the last few years it is this majority that has been drawn 
into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity, so 
that in this respect there cannot be the slightest doubt what the 
final outcome of the world struggle will be. In this sense, the 
complete victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured. 107 
 
Whilst some would consider Lenin’s development of the original Marxist 
scheme as heretical, unprincipled or simply wrong, the application of 
revolutionary principles to an unsuitable, non-industrial climate, Schlesinger 
clearly applauded it. He maintained faith in what he saw as Lenin’s coherent 
and holistic theory of revolution and socialist construction and believed its 
victory was inevitable. 
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Schlesinger’s analysis was clear. He praised Lenin’s contribution in the 
strongest terms and defended him against criticism he seems to have 
anticipated in readers. He also defended the Soviet Union, arguing that it was 
still incomplete but progressing towards the eventual higher form of 
communist society.108 He saw the Russian revolution and the Soviet state as 
a victory for Leninism in particular, a new and higher stage in Marxist theory. 
However, writing in 1958, ‘… a lifetime after his [Lenin’s] death, as his party 
emphasises his works in reaction to the extremes of his successor, there may 
be a need for some of the main elements, although not the philosophical 
foundations, to make space for a new analysis’.109 A further theoretical 
advance, a new phase, was necessary in Marxism, one taking into account 
the changing circumstances and one in which the Stalinist ‘extremes’ were 
first removed. 
 
Schlesinger once again touched upon his own views of Lenin when writing a 
book review for Soviet Studies in April 1959.110 In it he praised Lenin and 
argued that it was his development of the theory of a revolutionary party 
which was of most importance: ‘A good case can be made for regarding 
Lenin’s political theory, and in particular his concept of the party, as his main 
contribution to Marxist theory’.111 An understanding of the historical context of 
this development was crucial to any appreciation: Lenin combined the 
Russian tradition of professional revolutionaries with Marxist theory. Similar to 
previous work, Schlesinger emphasised Lenin’s recognition of the need to 
separate the workers’ economic struggles from political ones. The party 
should aim to raise these economic wants to the higher level of a political 
struggle against Tsarism. However, as Schlesinger wrote, it was also 
necessary for the party to adapt to issues arising from: ‘(1) the predominance 
of the peasants in pre-revolutionary Russia, (2) the struggle against the War, 
(3) the transition from bourgeois-democratic to a socialist revolution and, 
finally, (4) the transition from the conquest of power to economic 
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reconstruction’.112 That Lenin was able to prepare and lead a party capable of 
these myriad tasks was taken for granted. Schlesinger again pointed out that 
Lenin played little part in the last task, that of socialist construction, due to his 
death.  
 
Key themes of Schlesinger’s writings on Lenin emerged from another review 
four years later.113 Once again, as in the encyclopaedia article in particular, 
Schlesinger emphasised the tribute Lenin paid to, ‘… the Narodnik share in 
the ancestry of Bolshevism’.114  It was Lenin’s amalgamation of the Russian 
revolutionary tradition with Marxist theory that paved the way for revolutionary 
success. Schlesinger also emphasised the significance of What is to be 
Done? as a defining text. As Schlesinger wrote, it was ‘the fundamental work 
of Bolshevism’.115 Another crucial feature that Schlesinger consistently 
pointed to was the necessarily dialectical nature of Marxist theory. It 
developed and remained an active and relevant methodology because it 
changed over time, often as a result of internal struggles. Its historical 
materialist base also ensured theory remained interwoven with the ephemeral 
economic, and wider socio-political, circumstances. Original Marxism was 
developed with West European countries in mind; modifications and 
developments were essential for it to be of any use to an underdeveloped 
state such as Russia. Schlesinger took this argument one step further. The 
dialectical alterations which took place, primarily at Lenin’s instigation, were 
now of relevance to other countries: ‘… Marxist theory, in that form in which it 
had developed in Western industrialised countries, could hardly have served 
as a pattern for countries such as China and Cuba unless it had undergone 
modifications implied in its application in a major underdeveloped country’.116 
Presumably, further modifications would be necessary to make the theory 
relevant to differing material conditions. However, Lenin’s input had ensured 
the continuing relevance of Marxist theory. 
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The value of Lenin’s fusion of the traditions of the Russian revolutionary 
movement to Marxist theory were again underlined in a paper published in 
1965 entitled ‘Lenin as a Member of the International Socialist Bureau’.117 
Schlesinger wrote, ‘… he [Lenin] turned the rather negative attitude of the 
early Russian Marxists towards the Populist inheritance into a demand for a 
synthesis of their organizational experience with the Marxist interpretation of 
the historical process’.118 Schlesinger was careful to point out that this did not 
imply an uncritical acceptance of the Populist tradition; only that which was 
useful and applicable should be restored.119 He also referred to the ‘decisive 
step’ Lenin took with his adaptation of Marxism to Russian conditions; Marxist 
theory thus became applicable to current material conditions. Demonstrating 
his commitment to the dialectical process, Schlesinger argued: ‘Still, he would 
not have claimed the outcome of the adaptations was the last word of the 
international socialist movement’.120 Marxism-Leninism was not the final, 
absolute authority. Further changes would become necessary, not least as a 
result of the correctness and success of that theory. The call for further 
changes and a rejection of any exegesis of Lenin’s texts was a consistent 
theme of Schlesinger’s writings. 
 
The final substantial piece of work Schlesinger produced on the subject of 
Leninism is the series of nine lectures, entitled Marxism-Leninism. The 
lectures were given just before Schlesinger’s retirement and constitute his 
final assessment of the political theory or ideology he dedicated his adult life 
to. They can be seen as a final analysis; the culmination of a developing body 
of work on the subject of Marxism.  
 
The lectures were typical of Schlesinger’s style of expression. They clearly 
and unflinchingly displayed his commitment and belief in the subject matter – 
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the veracity of Marxism as an ideology, intellectual methodology and political 
movement. The content was thorough, with many details and examples. 
However, the writing style and language was complicated and obtuse in 
places, with a structure that made comprehension problematic. Schlesinger 
would often change from one subject of discussion to another with no obvious 
break, introduction or conclusion. He also employed a great number of 
parentheses within sentences, often clouding his point in the process. 
 
Schlesinger displayed his usual utilitarian attitude towards events covered in 
the lectures. He combined condemnation of the excesses and terroristic 
means utilised by Stalin’s regime with a pragmatic acceptance of the 
necessity of some methods, at the expense of more humanistic concerns. 
Schlesinger expressed a clear admiration of Lenin’s achievements but 
insisted that the changes to Marxist theory which he effected were of 
ephemeral validity. He also asserted Lenin’s fallibility, a reasonably rare 
admission for Schlesinger. He twice pointed out that it was Stalin and Trotsky 
rather than Lenin who correctly timed the October insurrection to fit with 
Soviet legality. In the seventh lecture he wrote: ‘…this was one of the 
occasions when the two worked together, and showed more practical insight 
than the master’.121  And in the next he conceded: ‘Lenin admittedly proved 
occasionally wrong in tactical issues, the most important of which concerned 
the decisions, taken by the CC [Central Committee] against his volition, not to 
expel but simply to reprimand the opponents of the October insurrection 
[and], to carry out that insurrection according to a time-table preserving Soviet 
legality’.122 Schlesinger still believed that Lenin was the ‘master’ and only 
‘occasionally wrong’ but these minor admissions were greater than usual. 
 
There was a familiarity to the orthodoxy of Schlesinger’s analysis in the 
lectures. His position was similar to that of official Soviet sources on several 
issues, including the immediate pre-history of Bolshevism. He asserted: ‘From 
the struggle against Economism Russian Social Democracy in general, and 
                                                
121 Schlesinger, Lectures, 7, pp. 9-10. 
122 Ibid. 8, p. 13, footnote 1. 
 121 
Leninism in particular were born’.123 This overestimation of the coherence of 
‘Economism’ as a movement has already been discussed. However, 
Schlesinger went further in the lectures, once again unquestioningly 
reiterating Lenin’s version of events. He referred to the Credo as a manifesto 
of ‘Economism’ and argued that the group wished the Russian labour 
movement to be restricted to the defence of workers’ immediate economic 
interests and compared themselves to Western Revisionists.124 Lenin had 
referred to the Credo in such a way in 1899. He wrote:  
 
A tendency has been observed among Russian Social-
Democrats recently to depart from the fundamental principles of 
Russian Social-Democracy that were proclaimed by its founders 
and foremost fighters… The Credo… which is presumed to 
express the fundamental views of certain (‘young’) Russian 
Social-Democrats, represents an attempt at a systematic and 
definite exposition of the ‘new views’.125 
 
Schlesinger also portrayed the Credo as a ‘systematic and definite 
exposition’. His agreement with orthodox Soviet and Leninist descriptions was 
also apparent in the lectures when he described the ‘Empirio-criticists’ as 
‘supporters of semi-idealist re-interpretations of Marxist philosophy’ and ‘God 
constructors’.126 
 
The majority of the lectures concerned aspects of Leninism and Lenin’s role 
in the development of the Bolshevik party and the Soviet Union. They 
contained much that was familiar to earlier work. One of the main features of 
Schlesinger’s writings on the subject was that Lenin had uniquely synthesised 
the traditions of the Russian revolutionary movement with classical Marxist 
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theory; this blend had brought about the successful Bolshevik revolution and 
ensured Marxism’s continued relevance in changing socio-economic 
circumstances. This important theme was evident in the lectures. As 
Schlesinger put it: 
 
Leninism represented the absorption of Marxism by the Russian 
revolutionary movement as well as the partial absorption of the 
organisational traditions and moral impetus of the Russian 
revolutionaries movement: in the outside world without the first 
absorption the Russian revolutionary movement would not have 
resulted in the raising of a backward country to the position of 
one of the leading, and in some aspects the most advanced 
power of today; without the second one Marxism would have 
remained a Utopian dream, incapable of influencing the course 
of history when those who had been backward during the 
European-dominated period of modern development entered 
the great transformation process.127 
 
Without Marxism, the Russian revolutionaries could not have brought about 
the revolution and transformation of society and industry. Without the 
revolutionaries’ organisational heritage, Marxism would not have had the tools 
and structures to have any decisive impact on that society. 
 
In the lectures, Schlesinger conceded that Lenin’s organisational concepts 
may have altered Marxism, something more dogmatic Marxists would 
consider heresy. However, these alterations were a necessary and inherent 
part of Marxist theory and were what made it applicable to changing 
conditions. Lenin’s organisational concepts may have led Russia further 
towards a socialist revolution than accepted Marxist ideology of the time 
allowed for an isolated Russia. However, according to Schlesinger, this was 
because Lenin, ‘… fully grasped the needs of his own country – and of other 
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underdeveloped countries to follow’.128 Lenin recognised that conditions had 
altered from Marx’s day and developed his organisational theories to take 
account of them. He perceived the rise of monopoly capitalism and 
imperialism and sought to change revolutionary theory to fit, something he did 
with great success. 
 
Familiar interpretations could also be seen in Schlesinger’s description of the 
birth of Comintern and Lenin’s Twenty One Conditions. In a similar vein to his 
memoirs, the lectures pointed out that few would argue with the Bolsheviks 
desire to purge any new International of those who had displayed their 
consistent opposition to the agreed standards of social democracy. However, 
as Schlesinger wrote: ‘The really controversial problem concerned the 
definition of opportunism, separation from which as well as from the overt 
traitors was required’.129 Lenin’s definition of opportunism was too broad and 
Comintern was saddled with unhelpful and unwieldy conditions of 
membership as a result.130 He described the conditions as one of Lenin’s 
major errors throughout his publishing career. Again, echoing his memoirs, 
Schlesinger went on to justify or explain the actions of those, such as himself, 
who agreed to accept the Conditions in order to join Comintern. He asserted, 
‘… already in the autumn of 1920 a consciousness of the central importance 
of the Russian revolution caused many left-wing socialists who had their 
objection against the extreme centralisation of the Twenty One Conditions for 
Admission to Comintern to vote for their acceptance’.131 Solidarity with Soviet 
Russia took precedence over concerns about centralisation.  
 
Finally, the last key theme to also be present in Schlesinger’s lectures was 
the importance of What is to be Done? for an understanding of Leninism. 
Schlesinger regarded it as one of the key texts of Marxism and wrote that 
there was not, ‘… the slightest reason to assume that at any time of his life he 
                                                
128 Ibid. 5, p. 10. 
129 Schlesinger, Lectures, 8, p. 1. 
130 In fact, Schlesinger appears to have displayed a consistency of opinion on this matter 
throughout the period of investigation. In one of his first works on returning to the West, Spirit 
of Post-war Russia, Schlesinger wrote, ‘… it is extremely difficult even in retrospect to defend 
Lenin’s twenty-one conditions of 1920’ (Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-war Russia, p. 110.). 
131 Schlesinger, Lectures, 8, p. 4. Author’s underlining. 
 124 
[Lenin] departed from the concepts of the functions of the revolutionary elite 
as elaborated in What is to be Done and on the applicability of these 
principles to international socialism all over the world’.132 This work was 
fundamental to the development of Lenin’s theory of the party, although 
Schlesinger went on to point out that this theory was of only limited validity 
since conditions were dynamic. 
 
There were elements which were new in the lectures. For example, 
Schlesinger provided further analysis of Lenin’s attitude towards the state. He 
wrote that Lenin’s aims regarding Russia were initially limited, continuing: 
‘Lenin did not believe that the realisation of his suggestions would turn Russia 
socialist’.133  However, Russia could begin the socialist revolution and 
improve conditions to facilitate the entrance of socialist allies in Europe and 
the US. The immediate aims on realisation of power were also limited: 
nationalisation of the banks; worker representatives’ control of production and 
distribution; nationalisation of land alongside the preservation of large farms. 
Schlesinger argued: ‘It was on this platform that the Bolshevik party … 
assumed power’.134 In keeping with Schlesinger’s admiration of the 
Bolsheviks and Lenin’s version of events, this statement implicitly assumed 
that the Bolshevik seizure of power was consensual and that it was their 
organisational tactics and correct application of policies which brought about 
this success. This suggestion is one that was made in many of Schlesinger’s 
writings on the history of the Russian revolution. 
 
Schlesinger went on to assert that Lenin envisaged the new state in a very 
fluid manner: ‘In general, Lenin had no particular respect for institutions, 
including new ones created by the revolutionary movement itself’.135 
Institutions would rise and fall as they were needed. According to 
Schlesinger, Lenin was a ‘hard realist’ when it came to measures necessary 
to preserve the new state. Schlesinger pointed to Lenin’s report of 1918 in 
which he defended the need for unequal salaries and the use of bourgeois 
                                                
132 Ibid. 8, p. 6. Author’s underlining. 
133 Ibid. 7, p. 6. Author’s underlining. 
134 Ibid. 7, p. 7. 
135 Ibid. 7, p. 10. 
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specialists by arguing that state capitalism was essential for the salvation of 
the Russian revolution.136 There would be setbacks upon the road to 
socialism and unpopular measures may be needed, seemingly in contrast to 
long-held principles, but these would be worthwhile if the young revolutionary 
state was preserved and allowed to develop. This ‘hard realism’ or 
pragmatism is a characteristic which Schlesinger shared. He continually 
defended the fledgling Soviet state against criticism that socialist principles 
were being betrayed. He took a pragmatic stance on issues such as NEP or 
party discipline, arguing that however unsavoury, such measures were often 
necessary for survival. He would, therefore, have approved of Lenin’s attitude 
and may even have been influenced by it. 
 
Schlesinger spoke of a systematisation of Lenin’s theories in the lectures. 
This was also a new element to his analysis. He wrote that Lenin’s ‘Left-wing 
Communism’ and the Theses of the Second Congress of Comintern were: ‘… 
the nearest approach to a systematisation of Lenin’s political theories we 
have’.137 Schlesinger had explained previously that the key to understanding 
Leninism was What is to be Done?. In it Lenin had explained the need for a 
professional party of disciplined and centralised revolutionaries who could 
raise the consciousness of the proletariat above mere economic or trade 
union struggles, to their historical role as a revolutionary class. Schlesinger 
had also made clear that these developments of Marxist theory had directly 
led to the success of the Bolsheviks in Russia and had transformed that 
Marxism into something applicable to later times and non-advanced states. 
However, Schlesinger now went further. He stated that Lenin’s later writings, 
namely ‘Left-wing Communism’ and his speeches at the Second Congress, 
were a continuation of that system.  
 
In these works Lenin was passing on his successful theory to other parties. 
He was outlining how the Bolsheviks achieved their revolution and urging 
other parties to take advantage of this experience. In ‘Left-wing Communism’ 
                                                
136 Ibid. 7, p. 11. Lenin, ‘The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government’, Polnoe sobranie 
sochinenii, 36 pp. 165-208. 
137 Schlesinger, Lectures, 8, p. 7.  
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Lenin wrote:  
 
But at the present moment of history the situation is precisely 
such that the Russian model reveals to all countries something, 
and something very essential, of their near and inevitable future. 
Advanced workers in every land have long understood this… 
Herein lies the international ‘significance’ (in the narrow sense 
of the term) of Soviet power, and of the fundamentals of 
Bolshevik theory and tactics.138 
 
Many features of the Russian revolution, and Bolshevik theory in particular, 
were of international validity and should thus be assimilated. Schlesinger 
obviously agreed wholeheartedly with this interpretation. He had said as 
much from a personal perspective in his memoirs. Schlesinger accepted 
Lenin’s interpretation as expressed in ‘Left-wing Communism’, as a true 
description of the way in which the Bolshevik party had operated during the 
revolution and on gaining power. However it has already been noted that 
Lenin’s description did not directly correspond to the true nature of that party. 
 
Schlesinger argued that alongside Lenin’s treatment of immediate political 
issues in these works, he also tackled agrarian questions and problems of 
colonial emancipation. He wrote: ‘Most important, however, for the further 
development of Marxism is his systematic treatment of the agrarian and 
colonial problems, i.e. those where Lenin had made his maximum contribution 
to the further development of the classical Marxist inheritance’.139 Schlesinger 
had not previously written much about Lenin’s attitude towards these 
problems and did not go into any great detail now, yet he clearly thought them 
significant.  
 
Schlesinger argued that Lenin’s theses on the agrarian problem submitted to 
the Congress were based upon the revolutionary experience of Russia. Once 
again he asserted the primacy of Lenin’s position due to successful Bolshevik 
                                                
138 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 41, p. 4. 
139 Schlesinger, Lectures, 8, p. 7. 
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experiences in Russia. In backward countries it was necessary to divide up 
large estates in order to win the sympathies of the peasantry. In more 
advanced countries it would still be vital to provide land for peasants but 
some large estates could be preserved as state farms.140  
 
Lenin also demanded a more modern approach to colonialism. According to 
Schlesinger this manifested itself in calls to pursue close alliance with all 
emancipation movements so long as this association, ‘… does not prevent 
the struggle of the communist for independent organisation of the proletariat 
and semi-proletariat’.141 Communists were to take a more popular front 
attitude to colonial emancipation where appropriate. Lenin insisted that the 
description of colonial movements should change from ‘bourgeois democratic’ 
to ‘national revolutionary’, because, often, colonial bourgeoisie now colluded 
with the bourgeoisie of the oppressing nation.142 Schlesinger noted the 
change of emphasis and felt it concerned the possibility of avoiding the 
capitalist stage of development.143 This was something he believed was, ‘… 
alien as we know not to Marx but to the bulk of West European socialists who 
joined with what they supposed to be an orthodox-Marxist development’.144 
Lenin and Marx both believed it was possible to avoid the capitalist stage; 
less developed countries could now learn from Russia and move directly 
towards socialism. This both legitimised the Bolshevik’s seizure of power, 
Marx would have agreed with their actions, and emphasised Lenin’s role in 
adapting Marxist theory to modern conditions.  
 
Schlesinger concluded his discussion of Lenin’s political system by 
emphasising its open-ended character: ‘At the end of his life Lenin thus has 
                                                
140 Ibid. 8, pp. 7-8. Lenin wrote: ‘Sections of large estates can and must always be found, part 
of which can be turned over to the small peasants, perhaps not as their property, but on 
lease, so that even the smallest peasant may get some part of the confiscated estates. 
Otherwise, the smallest peasant will see no difference between the old order and the 
dictatorship of the Soviets. If the proletarian state authority does not act in this way, it will be 
unable to retain power’ (Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 41, p. 252).  
141 Schlesinger, Lectures, 8, p. 8. 
142 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 41, pp. 241… 
143 As Lenin put it, ‘… are we to consider as correct the assertion that the capitalist stage of 
economic development is inevitable for backward nations now on the road to emancipation 
and among whom a certain advance towards progress is to be seen since the war? We 
replied in the negative’ (Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 41, pp. 245-246. 
144 Schlesinger, Lectures, 8, p. 9. 
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left the ends of his system open’.145 He argued that NEP was the last 
contribution Lenin was able to make to Russian development. This was a 
stage in which many decisive issues were yet to be settled, not least the 
enormous task of industrialisation. 
 
The final section of Schlesinger’s lectures to concentrate on Lenin concerned 
reflections on Leninism immediately after his death. They were similar to 
observations he had previously made about Soviet and cold war 
characterisations of Lenin’s legacy and they demonstrate the historiographical 
and dialectical nature of Schlesinger’s interest. He was concerned with 
Lenin’s significance during his lifetime and later, as his theories and policies 
bore fruit and shaped further developments. He was also concerned with the 
way in which leaders and groups manipulated Lenin’s legacy for their own 
interests. He singled out two strands within Soviet Russia immediately after 
Lenin’s death to demonstrate the different ways in which his impact could be 
understood. During the struggle for Lenin’s succession, and on Stalin’s 
initiative, the party encouraged recruitment from the working bench. As 
Schlesinger noted: ‘…for their indoctrination systematic textbooks of 
‘Leninism’ were elaborated.’146 Two of these textbooks in particular exposed 
the differing attitudes. According to Schlesinger:  
 
That written by Zinoviev was dominated by emphasis on the 
peasant and colonial problems, the implication being that 
Leninism was an adaptation of classical Marxism (which 
thus was to be retained substantially unaltered for the 
leading industrial countries) for the particular problems of 
backward countries.147 
 
By concentrating on what Lenin had had to change in order to remain relevant 
to traditionally inappropriate states, industrially backward, non-capitalist ones, 
Zinoviev was arguing that any adaptations Lenin had made were temporary 
                                                
145 Ibid. 8, p. 11. 
146 Ibid. 8, p. 11. 
147 Ibid. 8, p. 11. G. Zinoviev, V. I. Lenin, (Kharkov, Put prosveshcheniia, 1924). 
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and of limited relevance. Marxism, in its traditional form, was still appropriate 
for the majority of industrial countries.  
 
Stalin, on the other hand, as early as 1921 and later in his work ‘Foundations 
of Leninism’ argued that Leninism was Marxism adapted to the later stages of 
capitalism, that of imperialism and proletarian revolution. Leninism was the 
latest version of Marxism.148 As Schlesinger explained, ‘… the specific 
conditions of Russia, plus some more ‘underdeveloped’ countries – the 
accession of which, as we have seen Lenin envisaged at the end of his life – 
far from being atypical represented the problems of actual, as distinct from 
dreamed of, socialist revolutions’.149 Leninism was Marxism for present 
conditions. Schlesinger clearly agreed with this Stalinist interpretation. He did 
not say so in the lectures but he had stated many times that he believed 
Leninism to be the next evolutionary step in the dialectical and fluid political 
theory of Marxism. He also frequently emphasised the fact that Lenin had 
altered previous theory to take account of changed circumstances and had 
thus made it relevant to less advanced countries. 
 
The lectures provided a further insight into Schlesinger’s Leninism. They 
substantiated the themes of his earlier writings as well as offering some new 
analysis. They are particularly important since they were written near the end 
of Schlesinger’s life, after his retirement from academia. They thus represent 
the culmination of his work.  
 
Schlesinger’s attitude to Lenin was largely consistent over time. There was a 
difference in emphasis between his writing whilst Stalin held power and that 
published after Stalin’s death. However, this timeline is more difficult to 
discern with works on Lenin than on other topics, noticeably Soviet 
historiography. This is because Schlesinger only published one work of note 
                                                
148 In ‘Foundations of Leninism’ Stalin wrote: ‘Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism 
and of the proletarian revolution’ (Stalin, Sochineniia, 6, pp. 69-188 at p. 71). 
149 Schlesinger, Lectures, 8, p. 12. The same argument about the differing systematisation of 
‘Leninism’ by Zinoviev and Stalin is given by Schlesinger in Schlesinger, History of the 
Communist Party of USSR, pp. 224-225 and in Schlesinger, ‘Stalin, J. W.’, Handwörterbuch 
der Sozialwissenschaften, 15, 1957, pp. 11-15 at pp. 12-13. In both cases Schlesinger clearly 
portrays Stalin’s analysis as the correct one. 
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in the West before 1956. Nevertheless, one distinct difference is apparent. In 
Schlesinger’s early work he appeared to concur with Stalin that theoretical 
developments since Lenin’s death, and undertaken by Stalin or with his 
approval, represented the natural progression of that theory. Whereas in later 
works, notably his encyclopaedia article, Schlesinger suggested a need to 
purge theory of erroneous Stalinist distortions; a return to Leninist purity was 
required before further advances could be undertaken. Once again, 
coalescence with Stalinist interpretations was apparent whilst he lived. Yet 
condemnation of many developments effected by Stalin was characteristic in 
writings after his death.   
 
Schlesinger greatly admired Lenin’s theoretical work, the advances he made 
to Marxism, and his political activities. Schlesinger committed himself to 
Lenin’s path in the early 1920s and remained on it for the rest of his life. He 
believed that Lenin’s theory of the party, his organisation of the Bolsheviks, 
led directly to the success of the Russian revolution and was a blueprint for 
parties in other countries. His amalgamation of the traditions of Russian 
revolutionaries with Marxism advanced that theory so that it was applicable to 
the changed conditions of the twentieth century. These alterations created a 
Marxism which differed from that envisaged by the founders, but these 
changes were natural; Marxism was supposed to remain bedded to dynamic 
material conditions. However, Lenin’s success had made his contribution 
obsolete. Further alterations were required as a result of changes to material 
conditions. The fact of the Russian revolution had irreversibly altered the 
socio-economic and political landscape. 
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Chapter Four: Schlesinger’s Later Theoretical 
Development – Marx and Engels, Lukács, and 
Stalin 
 
This chapter will focus upon Schlesinger’s later theoretical development. As 
Schlesinger became familiar with Leninism it led him towards a greater 
understanding of the founders of Marxism: Marx and Engels. An investigation 
of his attitude towards them is vital for an overall perspective of his Marxism. 
A brief examination of the similarities between Schlesinger’s approach and 
that of the outstanding Hungarian Marxist, Georg Lukács will then be 
undertaken. Finally, the chapter will examine Schlesinger’s attitude towards 
Stalin as a theoretician; the correct appreciation of this aspect of 
Schlesinger’s thought is vital for the second part of the thesis. 
 
The contents of this chapter, and indeed the order of the entire Marxism 
section of the thesis may appear odd at first sight. It does not conform to the 
traditional or chronological development of Marxist thought and, perhaps, 
appears to treat Marx and Engels as an afterthought, combined as they are 
with later personalities. However, there is a valid reason for the presentation. 
It instead follows Schlesinger’s personal theoretical development, his own 
chronology: from Luxemburg to Lenin, through Marx and Engels and finally to 
Stalin. 
 
Schlesinger was not particularly interested in philosophy until later in his 
career, when a full-time academic. Although he stated that he devoted the 
substantial majority of his life to the critical development of Marxist theory, it 
seems clear that, for the most part, Schlesinger meant the active aspects of 
theory – characteristics of party, tactical strategies – Marxism in the widest 
sense of the word, the world-wide movement for social justice and freedom.1 
                                                
1 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p.93. 
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To Schlesinger, Marxism was a living, breathing methodology and source of 
inspiration rather than a dry, intellectual object of study. Hence his early focus 
on contemporary debates between Leninism and Luxemburgism. Even later in 
his career, historical debates were worthy of critical investigation only if they 
were of relevance to present concerns. This attitude was demonstrated in an 
article Schlesinger published in 1964/5 concerning Marx’s Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts.2 Schlesinger made clear that he had no interest in, 
for example, ‘…. an academic dispute amongst a few German intellectuals, 
120 years ago, unless the outcome is relevant in its intellectual content’.3 
Schlesinger would only be concerned with those aspects of Marx and Engels’ 
work that were of continued importance in present times. There were, thus, 
few writings devoted to Marx and Engels alone.  
 
Equally, Schlesinger expressed no interest in what he saw as purely 
philosophical debates, such as those involving Lukács, beyond their influence 
on contemporary understanding of Marxism and the movement. He had little 
time for those who concerned themselves with philosophical, metaphysical 
enquiries at the expense of actual historical circumstances. In 1947 
Schlesinger referred to the eternal debates on the precise functioning of 
dialectics. He wrote:  
 
I think that the victories of the Red Army, although, in my 
opinion, undoubtedly due to essential forces of Marxism, are in 
no way due to some mystic force of the negation, the negation 
of the negation, and so on. Therefore, the time spent by many 
people in Cambridge and Oxford on the commendable study of 
the ‘mystery’ of the successes of the Red Army should have 
                                                
2 Schlesinger, ‘Les ‘Manuscripts économico-philosophiques’ de Marx replacés dans leur 
perspective historique’, Annalie dell’Instituto Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, 1964/65, pp. 51-72. The 
article was published in French but an earlier, English draft is available in the Schlesinger 
Papers at Glasgow University Library (Schlesinger, Marx’s Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts in the Historical Perspective (Glasgow University Library, Rudolf Schlesinger 
Papers, MS Gen 1660, 39, Unpublished, 1962)). The year the English paper is written is 
recorded on p. 32. Where references to both versions are given, translations have been taken 
directly from the English one as it is assumed that this was Schlesinger’s original meaning. 
3 Ibid. p. 51. Schlesinger, Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in the Historical 
Perspective, p. 1. 
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been devoted to the study of the driving forces and the historical 
development of the Russian Revolution rather than to the study 
of some mystical formulas understood by very few of those who 
use them.4 
 
This ‘practical’, pragmatic attitude was a common theme in Schlesinger’s 
writings. 
 
Schlesinger made clear his dislike of purely scholastic tasks in his actions as 
well as his writings. On arrival in Moscow in 1935 Schlesinger was offered a 
post at the Marx-Engels Institute. He declined the opportunity on learning that 
foreign staff members were predominantly given roles involving the critical 
revision of Marx’s manuscripts.5 Such work was of no interest to him. 
Schlesinger wished to be involved in more practical tasks, involving his own 
party if possible. This disdain for concentration on Marx’s writings remained 
with Schlesinger. The treatment of texts as received truths was anathema to 
Schlesinger’s dialectical and historico-materialist understanding. Such texts 
were inherently time bound and thus of limited value. There is not, therefore, 
many of Schlesinger’s writings which undertake textual analysis or real 
engagement with Marx’s work. 
 
Schlesinger made clear that he had taken no special interest in the publication 
of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts until they became the 
focal point of criticism of Marxism. He wrote:  
 
The Manuscripts were first published in full in 1932, on the very 
eve of Hitler’s access to power. At that time, we had other things 
to bother about. I think I represent no particular case when I 
honestly confess that, notwithstanding the part which I had 
played in the preceding years in the organisation of communist 
party education in Germany, I took notice of the very existence 
                                                
4 Schlesinger, The Sprit of Post-War Russia, p. 172. 
5 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, pp. 135-6.  
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of the Manuscripts only when, in the post-war period, they were 
broadly used by all kinds of critics of Marxism.6 
 
This quote makes clear how late Schlesinger became aware of some of 
Marx’s writings. He was conscious of Lenin and Luxemburg’s writings as part 
of his revolutionary work and life; they were read and debated within his party 
activities. However, the same was not true of the classics of Marx and Engels. 
Although he was certainly aware of the basic foundational texts, they did not 
hold the same immediate interest for him.  
 
Given the nature of Schlesinger’s theoretical education, development and 
scholarly work, one gains a greater understanding of his attitude by 
concentrating upon his writings on Leninism and Luxemburgism. There are 
more of them, and the subject matter was of greater importance to 
Schlesinger, as the issues they dealt with were of contemporary significance 
to his generation. Leninism was still exerting a profound influence on a large 
part of the world. Although Lenin’s theories should now have been 
superseded, this had been far from satisfactorily resolved by the time 
Schlesinger was writing in the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
Schlesinger understood Marxism as evolving dialectically and Leninism was 
the natural progression from the theories of Marx and Engels. This evolution 
had resulted in much of Marx and Engels’ work becoming obsolete. There 
was, thus, little to be gained from in-depth investigations of that work. 
Schlesinger became fully conversant with the works of Marx and Engels, an 
investigation of his attitude towards them is vital to fully comprehend his 
‘Marxism’, but the main emphasis has inevitably to be on his other mentors.  
 
 
                                                
6 Schlesinger, ‘Les ‘Manuscripts économico-philosophiques’ de Marx replacés dans leur 
perspective historique’, p. 66. Schlesinger, Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
in the Historical Perspective, p. 21-22. Marx and Engels, Werke, Ergänzungsband Schriften 
bis 1844, Erster Teil, pp. 465-567. For more information on The Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts see T. Bottomore, Karl Marx, Early Writings, (London, C.A. Watts and Co. Ltd., 
1963). 
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Marx and Engels 
As noted above, the works of Marx and Engels are not of primary importance 
in an investigation of Schlesinger’s Marxism. Although most of Schlesinger’s 
writings which engage with theoretical concerns or the Soviet Union refer to 
Marx and Engels, he did not devote many papers or books to that subject 
alone. So, whilst the sections on Luxemburg and Lenin went in to a detailed 
analysis of Schlesinger’s developing works upon the subject, this section will 
provide an overview of the key themes and characteristics of his attitude 
towards the founders of Marxism. 
 
Such an approach by no means attempts to diminish the influence Marx and 
Engels had upon Schlesinger. It merely suggests that he did not devote a 
great deal of scholarly attention to their individual writings. Schlesinger felt 
that Marx and Engels were men of towering intellect and genius. He dedicated 
his entire life to furthering their cause and his appreciation of their greatness 
ran throughout his work. In his memoir reflections he referred to Marx as, ‘…. 
the greatest thinker whom I knew (and know to the present day)’.7 He 
continually referred to Marx and Engels as the ‘masters’ and ‘founders’.8 So it 
is clear that Schlesinger was filled with admiration and respect for their 
contribution to social democracy. It is also clear that Schlesinger developed 
an enormous knowledge of their work and theories. His writings demonstrate 
a deep and detailed understanding of all aspects of Marx’s and Engels’ 
writings. He was able to point out errors in quotation and emphasis in others’ 
analysis, even in official publications of their texts by the Marx-Engels Institute 
in Moscow.9 
 
Whilst it is clear that Schlesinger held Marx to be ‘the greatest thinker’, it is 
necessary to define his attitude towards Engels. Did he believe Engels to be 
Marx’s equal? Were they joint partners, joint ‘founders’ of Marxism or did 
                                                
7 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, p.95. 
8 For example, in his memoirs he wrote of Marx as ‘the master’ (Schlesinger, In a Time of 
Struggle: Whither Germany?, p.96). 
9 Schlesinger, Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in the Historical Perspective, 
p. 23. See also Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 34 in which he refers to the frequent 
misquotation and misunderstanding of Marx’s comments about religion as the ‘opium of the 
people’. 
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Engels have a more junior role? Schlesinger did not give a precise answer in 
any of his writings. At no point did he set out the differing roles they played or 
write anything substantial about their relationship. His views on this subject 
must, therefore, be sought in general impressions. Schlesinger regularly 
spoke of the ‘founders’ and, more often that not, referred to both Marx and 
Engels when writing about Marxism. In an encyclopaedia article defining 
‘communism’ he wrote: ‘Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels differentiated between 
the different ‘socialists’ currents’.10 He went on to refer to Marx and Engels 
together five more times and Marx alone four times. From a very brief 
overview of this article – a broad, general description of communism, it is 
clear that Schlesinger routinely referred to both theoreticians. Both were 
obviously of importance in founding communist theory. 
 
Schlesinger assigned Engels three different roles: he assisted Marx in 
developing initial Marxist assumptions; he was responsible for the propagation 
of those theories after Marx’ death and, to some extent, he continued to 
advance elements of that theory in the post-Marx era. Schlesinger referred to 
the first role in his unpublished draft on the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts. He argued that the bridge between a philosophical and 
economic Marxist analysis was first developed in 1844. The new economic 
outlook emerged on Engels’ instigation, as Marx himself would admit.11 That 
Engels initially introduced Marx to the relevance of economics for his study of 
society and alienation is widely recognised.12 Schlesinger did not spend much 
time discussing the issue, but acknowledged it nonetheless. 
 
Schlesinger dealt with Engels’ second role in one of his last works: an 
unfinished and unpublished manuscript entitled The Marxist Movement: 
Continuity and Diversity. It was written in 1969 and presumably remained 
incomplete due to Schlesinger’s death. In the preface, Schlesinger wrote: 
‘This attempt to record the foundations of that struggle [Social Democracy] 
                                                
10 Schlesinger, ‘Kommunismus’, Handwörterbuch  der Sozial-Wissenschaften, 54, 1965, pp. 
610-625 at p. 610. My italics.  
11 Schlesinger, Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in the Historical Perspective, 
p. 12. 
12 See, for example, J. D. White, Karl Marx and the Intellectual Origins of Dialectical 
Materialism, (London, MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996) pp. 139…  
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has been written by a man who joined it slightly more than half a century after 
its inception and who, as human fates go, has to lay down his pen about half 
a century later’, suggesting that he was aware his death was imminent.13 
Schlesinger intended the manuscript to become a published book and the 
idea for it emerged from discussions he had whilst visiting Montreal in 1968.14 
Several colleagues insisted his generation’s knowledge and experience of the 
world wide Marxist movement should not be allowed to die with it. Thus, 
Schlesinger set out to write a general explanation of how and why Marxism 
continued to be, ‘…. one of the great intellectual and social movements of 
World History’, whilst remaining relevant to increasingly diverse groups of 
people.15 There were four sections to the manuscript and three were 
complete. More were probably planned if the intention was to describe the 
movement up to the time of writing. The four chapters were entitled: 
Introduction: the origins; The period of reception, 1864 – 1898; The period of 
crisis, 1898 – 1914, and The period of crisis II, 1914 – 1928. The manuscript 
represents a particularly useful insight into Schlesinger’s thought. It was 
written near the end of his life and was intended as a broad, scholarly 
examination of the Marxist movement. It can be seen as Schlesinger’s final 
analysis, one he spent a lifetime studying and developing. 
 
In the manuscript Schlesinger argued that Engels furthered both the 
understanding and popularity of Marxist theory. According to Schlesinger, 
Engels’ Anti-Dühring, first published in 1877 and 1878, definitively converted 
continental Social Democracy to Marxism.16 Later, he described Engels as a, 
‘…. generaliser of genius’.17 Engels’ ability to generalise and explain the 
concepts of Marxism were not the only, or most important, reason behind the 
conversion of thousands of activists to the Marxist cause, but it certainly 
played its part.  
 
                                                
13 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. I. 
14 Ibid. p. 1. 
15 Ibid. p. II. 
16 Marx and Engels, Werke, 20, pp. 1-303. Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 42. 
17 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 42. 
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Finally, Schlesinger suggested in various writings that Engels advanced 
Marxist theory after Marx’s death. In his encyclopaedia article on Lenin, he 
argued that until Lenin’s work, the only alteration to classical Marxism came 
about as a result of Engels’ change in attitude to the war question late in life.18 
That Schlesinger believed Engels to have continued developing Marxism is 
also clear from his treatment of Luxemburgism. Schlesinger believed that 
Rosa Luxemburg’s theoretical deficiencies emerged from her failure to deal 
with developments in theory made in Engels’ later writings and in most of 
Lenin’s. He pointed to Engels’ Socialism in Germany in particular as an 
example of work she did not adequately digest within her own.19 So, Engels 
was clearly a vital theorist in the initial development of Marxism, in its 
dissemination and in its further evolution. Schlesinger seems to have viewed 
Marx and Engels as partners. He would often refer to the both, rather than 
simply write of Marx. If there had to be a senior partner in this relationship, 
however, to Schlesinger, this was clearly Marx. He alone was the ‘greatest’ 
thinker, the ‘master’. 
 
Turning to Schlesinger’s attitude to Marx, six major themes emerge. Firstly, 
Schlesinger’s understanding of Marx and Marxism derives from Lenin’s 
interpretation. Secondly, for Schlesinger, the main purpose of any 
investigation of Marx is to determine the relevance of his writings and theories 
for modern circumstances. Following from this, Schlesinger believed that, 
whilst Marx would always be pre-eminent as the founder of the Marxist 
movement, the nature of that movement meant that the significance of the 
original leader was temporal. Marx was less important than the ‘ism’. Fourthly, 
the key to Schlesinger’s Marxism was dialectics and historical materialism; 
classical German philosophy was a vital ingredient. The fifth characteristic is 
Schlesinger’s emphasis on the active versus contemplative nature of Marx’s 
work. The final element to run through Schlesinger’s writings on the subject 
was his attempt to dispel myths about Marx and the theory he developed. This 
section will deal which each theme in turn.  
 
                                                
18 Schlesinger, Lenin, W. J., p. 585. 
19 See chapter 2, p. 73. 
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That Schlesinger’s understanding of Marx was Leninist in nature should be of 
no surprise. It has already been shown that he became fully conscious of 
Marxist theory only as a result of his recognition and adoption of Leninism. He 
viewed Leninism as the necessary development of Marxism in changed 
conditions and so would naturally be more concerned with it, over its now 
partially obsolete ancestor. However, he clearly judged the movement’s 
earlier manifestation from the perspective of this later vantage point. He 
seemed to view Marxism through the prism of Leninism. For example, in The 
Marxist Movement, Schlesinger asserted the three ingredients of Marxism: 
German classical philosophy, English political economy and the traditions of 
the French revolution, especially utopian socialism. Whilst this interpretation is 
commonplace, what demonstrates Schlesinger’s acceptance of Lenin’s 
version of Marxism is that he referred to him in order to validate the 
proposition.20 He pointed to Lenin’s 1914 article ‘Karl Marx’ in the Granat 
encyclopaedia as an authoritative voice on the sources of Marxism.21 This 
interpretation of Marx’s heritage was clearly visible throughout Schlesinger’s 
work, in Marx His Time and Ours, for example.22 
 
Lenin’s influence was also obvious in Schlesinger’s attitude towards 
materialism in Marxism. As noted earlier, Schlesinger emphasised different 
aspects of Lenin’s materialism in different writings, although he gave the 
impression that he was in agreement with whatever attitude he described. 
Sometimes, Schlesinger wrote of Lenin’s unstinting materialism in the face of 
idealistic challenges to the basis of Marxism, at others he referred to Lenin’s 
appreciation of aspects of the idealist approach. He noted the difference 
explicitly in one of his lectures on Marxism-Leninism: 
 
                                                
20 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 6. Modern texts continue to emphasise these three 
key constituents of Marxism. See, for example, P. Worsley, Marx and Marxism, (London, 
Routledge, 2002) whose first two chapters concentrate upon German philosophy, the French 
revolution and socialism, and British political economy. 
21 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 26, pp. 43-93. 
22 See, for example, Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, pp. 38… in which reference is 
made to ‘German philosophic sources’ (p. 39), ‘Utopian critics of the [French] Revolution, St. 
Simon and Fourier’ (p. 40) and ‘Ricardian economists’ (p. 41). 
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 It is not surprising that Lenin devoted particular attention to 
emphasis on the materialist, anti-idealistic aspects of Marxist 
philosophy in times when the voluntarist threat was particularly 
great, i.e. after the defeat of the first Russian revolution (the 
implications of which the party’s left-wing was not prepared to 
recognize and found consolation for in Mach’s 
‘empiriocriticism’), and after the introduction of the New 
Economic Policy, when Lenin emphasized the need for a society 
of materialist friends of Hegelian dialectics. In between, … Lenin 
put much emphasis on the positive aspects of Hegelian 
dialectics and even of philosophical idealism.23 
 
Schlesinger was aware of Lenin’s changing emphasis and the reasons for it. 
However, the important point is that Schlesinger coalesced completely with 
Lenin’s interpretation of Marxism and Marx’s philosophy. 
 
The second key theme in Schlesinger’s writings was his insistence that Marx 
was only to be investigated in order to determine issues of contemporary 
validity. Schlesinger had no real interest in locating Marx’ or Engels’ work 
within their historical context Thus, the study of classic texts, beyond the need 
for general education in Marxist method, was of use mainly to understand and 
explain why conditions had changed since the time of writing and hence to 
recognise what aspects of their theory now required alteration. Examination 
was only useful if it had a practical application. This was demonstrated in 
Schlesinger’s attitude to the publication of the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts. Although they were published in Germany as early as 1932, 
Schlesinger did not bother to become familiar with them until they were cited 
by critics of Marxism, after 1945. Now there was a practical, present day need 
to examine them and so he did. Even then, his concern was how this work 
could be understood in relation to modern events. He wrote: 
 
                                                
23 Schlesinger, Lectures, 1, p. 5. 
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 For those who accept at least the fundamental principles of 
Marxism, and even an objective approach to the history of social 
thought, it is obvious that one must place the studies of the 
young Marx in a perspective which would be that of the middle 
of the twentieth century, and not that of the 1840s; there is 
everything to be gained by situating the object of interest in its 
true perspective.24 
 
Schlesinger explicitly stated his concern with Marx’s contemporary validity 
and application in his major work on the subject, Marx His Time and Ours. In 
the preface he made clear that Marx’s work was not to be studied in regard to 
the conditions of its origin but only in terms of its continuing significance.25 
This preoccupation with the application of Marxist theory to present concerns 
was demonstrated in his choice of subject matter in articles. He published two 
separate papers in 1962 dealing with Marxist theory, both of which did so in 
relation to the new programme of the CPSU, drawing historical theory and 
present events together.26 He frequently perceived Marx’s work with a view to 
its future impact, drawing a connection between his statements and later 
events in Russia. In The Marxist Movement, for example, Schlesinger 
connected statements by Marx to those of Russian Social Democracy fifty 
years later.27 
 
Following directly from this last theme, Schlesinger’s next concept was that, 
as important as Marx and Engels were as the founders of Marxism, the 
dynamic nature of their theory meant that the significance of the original 
leaders was inherently temporal. The theory bestowed by the masters 
required continual modification, it was time constrained. This meant Marx and 
Engels could be, and in fact were, wrong on certain issues without that 
affecting their influence or any judgement of them. Schlesinger often noted 
                                                
24 Schlesinger, ‘Les ‘Manuscripts économico-philosophiques’ de Marx replacés dans leur 
perspective historique’, p. 51. 
25 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. x. See chapter 3, p. 93. 
26 Schlesinger, ‘Marxist Theory and the New Program of the Soviet Communist Party’, 
Schlesinger, ‘The CPSU Programme: The Conception of Communism’, Soviet Studies, 13, 4, 
April 1962, pp. 383-406.  
27 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 13.  
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that Marx’s nationalities policies were incorrect and unhelpful. In The Marxist 
Movement, he wrote,  
 
… the erroneous assumption that a West European socialist 
revolution was near and that the forces of counterrevolution 
would combine against it on the lines of the late Holy Alliance, 
lead to undue emphasis on the national movements of countries 
such as Poland and Hungary which, in 1848 and later, opposed 
the traditional leading powers of the Holy Alliance yet, and Marx 
and Engels knew very well – were gentry lead [led].28 
 
In Marx His Time and Ours, Schlesinger again referred to Marx and Engels’ 
failure to appreciate the national question.29  
 
To Schlesinger, another common error in Marx’s reasoning was his overly 
optimistic attitude towards the potential for bourgeois-democratic revolutions 
in his lifetime. In his lecture series Schlesinger frequently referred to Marx’s 
‘wishful thinking’ in this respect.30 However, as he wrote elsewhere: ‘The fact 
that even great men make logical mistakes is not important for us’.31 That 
Marx and Engels were wrong about certain issues, that their assumptions and 
predictions were proven fallible, did not take away from ‘Marxism’ at all. Since 
Marxism, rather than Marx, was the key, the latter’s failures were irrelevant. 
Marx and Engels may have been mistaken on certain matters but they 
elaborated a framework in which to treat concrete political situations. They 
provided the Marxist methodology, and this, rather than the exegesis of some 
or other text, was the defining characteristic of Marxism. This method was the 
essence of Marxism.  
 
To Schlesinger, Marxist methodology comprised of dialectics and historical 
materialism. Schlesinger asserted the primacy of historical materialism as 
method in Spirit of Post-War Russia. He wrote: 
                                                
28 Ibid. p. 21. 
29 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 302.  
30 Schlesinger, Lectures, 4, p. 2 and p. 3, for example.  
31 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 97.  
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But although method is not knowledge, good methods of 
approach are an essential condition for scientific success, The 
facts, including especially the development of the Russian 
Revolution, have proved dialectical materialism to be a most 
fruitful approach to social science as well as to its practical 
application, politics.32  
 
He also frequently referred to Marxism’s debt to dialectics and its Hegelian 
heritage. According to Schlesinger: 
 
 Marxism is, in substance, a synthetic approach to the diverse 
aspects of society. But there can be no doubt that of the three 
mentioned source elements the first, namely Hegelian dialectics, 
was essential, not only because it enabled the synthesis but 
also because it allowed the old Marxists to go beyond their 
sources and, after a century, still allows Marxism to proceed 
beyond its original tenets.33 
 
The creation of this method was Marx’s true legacy. The dialectical approach 
facilitated, and in fact demanded, a continually critical perspective. It allowed 
Marxism to move beyond the sometimes erroneous and inevitably ephemeral 
nature of the original conceptions as elucidated by Marx and Engels.  
 
Although Schlesinger was somewhat inconsistent on this point, he did, in 
general, emphasise the importance of the Hegelian tradition to Marx and 
Marxism, particularly in regard to dialectics. In Marx His Time and Ours he 
argued that it was possible to derive Marxism, as it was to develop in Russia 
in the twentieth century, from indigenous sources and, thus, diminish the role 
of Hegel. However, he continued: 
 
                                                
32 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-War Russia, p. 173. 
33 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 6. The three sources Schlesinger referred to were 
German classical philosophy, English political economy and French socialist thought. 
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 All this being duly recognised, we cannot get rid of the fact that 
Byelinsky and Herzen would have been impossible without the 
Hegelian background, and that Marx got from Hegel just what 
enabled him to facilitate the progress from Chernishevsky to 
Plekhanov and Lenin. Marx minus Hegel, or, to put it differently, 
Ricardo plus Robert Owen and Bakunin, could never have done 
the job.34 
 
Marx’s debt to Hegel was unmistakeable.  
 
Another key to Schlesinger’s writings on Marx and Engels was his insistence 
that the active character of their work was crucial to their success. Marx was 
significant because he choose an active approach to his materialist outlook. 
Schlesinger wrote: 
 
 In the development process conceived as human practice, Marx 
already in his abstract-philosophical stage of his development 
sees the key to the solution of the ancient dilemma of the 
relationships between the objective-contemplative and the 
subjective-active approach; at this point his ways finally part 
from Feuerbach and from those of his contemplative, descriptive 
materialism.35 
 
Marx chose the active path; mere contemplation, without a search for practical 
applications and solutions, was redundant.36 The importance of this element 
of Marxist theory ran through Schlesinger’s work. He often made reference to 
Marx’s assertion that, ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in 
                                                
34 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 44.  
35 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 12. 
36 Marx made this point explicitly in his ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ of 1845 when stating: ‘The 
question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of 
theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the 
this-worldliness of his thinking, in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of 
thinking which isolates itself from practice is a purely scholastic question’ (Marx and Engels, 
Werke, 3, p. 5). 
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various ways; the point is to change it’.37 He believed that this made Marx’s 
work significant and he attempted such a practical approach in his own life. 
 
The final theme evident in Schlesinger’s writings on Marx and Engels is his 
apparent desire to dispel myths and misconceptions surrounding the 
theoreticians. Such a motive is also evident in his work on Lenin and Stalin 
and appears as a major characteristic of all of Schlesinger’s writings. He 
believed that many critics of Marxist theory and the Soviet Union based their 
opinions on misconceptions and misunderstanding. He wished to correct 
these errors and distortions. The ‘myth’ of most significance to this thesis 
concerned Marx’s attitude to Russia. Schlesinger argued, throughout his 
writings, that Marx had not conceived of a historical system valid for all 
countries and times. He did not set out just one path along which all nations 
must proceed. Thus, Marx made clear that Russia could, potentially, take her 
own route to socialism, avoiding the pitfalls and horrors of the capitalist stage 
of development. In his paper ‘Marxist Theory and the New Program of the 
Soviet Communist Party’, published in 1962, Schlesinger wrote that many 
people, particularly in the West, erroneously believed that Marx had 
envisaged only one way to socialism, that following the Western pattern. He 
continued: 
 
 On the contrary, Marx rejected any ‘general historico-
philosophical theory the supreme virtue of which consists in its 
being supra-historical,’ and discussed the possibility of Russia’s 
avoiding the capitalist stage of development, with the village 
community possibly providing a bridge for passing directly to 
socialism if industrial support for such a transition was 
available.38 
 
Schlesinger made similar arguments in many other papers on the subject.  
                                                
37 See, for example, Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 61. The quotation is from 
Marx’s ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ (Marx and Engels, Werke, 3, p. 7). Author’s italics. 
38 Schlesinger, ‘Marxist Theory and the New Program of the Soviet Communist Party’, p. 132, 
footnote 3. Schlesinger was referring to Marx’s letter of 1877 to the editors of Otechestvennye 
Zapiski (K. Marx and E. Engels, Selected Correspondence, (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 
1965) trans. I. Lasker, pp. 311-313).  
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The motive of myth-dispelling was particularly clear in Schlesinger’s 
engagement with Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts.39 He felt 
they were seized upon by critics of Marxism in order to pitch the young Marx 
against his mature work and, thus, discredit him. In 1965 he wrote, ‘During the 
last eight years or so Marx’s early writings have become fashionable. Part of 
the reason is that the ‘eggshells’ of their Hegelian origins and their differences 
in approach from classical Marxism lend themselves readily to manifold 
abuses’.40 As shown earlier, Schlesinger became preoccupied with this 
particular work in order to counter these abuses. He published papers 
specifically dealing with it, and made reference to the distortions in many of 
his later writings.41 Whilst many authors pointed to the Manuscripts to show a 
more idealist, non-economic perspective to some of Marx’s work, Schlesinger 
believed such an analysis to be entirely erroneous. The manuscripts were not 
published before 1932 and, according to Schlesinger, were never intended for 
publication, ‘…. since Marx regarded them as a provisional and transitory 
effort in the elaboration of his theory’.42 They certainly did not represent, as 
Schlesinger thought some suggested, ‘…. some kind of ‘infantile disorder’ of 
Young Hegelian origin’.43 Marx’s early study of the concept of alienation was 
only of significance in that it developed an approach which was to become the 
materialist conception of history.44 In fact, according to Schlesinger: 
 
 To anyone who is in the sense of conceiving the historical 
process as a sequence of social formations the growth and 
potentialities of which depend on the economic conditions of the 
time, the Manuscripts as such can be no more relevant than 
they eventually became to their author, who appears to have 
                                                
39 The manuscripts were an incomplete attempt to synthesise Marx’s new philosophical, 
historical and economic outlook. They remained unfinished and represent Marxism in an early 
stage of development. However, they do contain components of Marx’s critique of political 
economy (White, Marx and the Origins of Dialectical Materialism, pp. 145…).  
40 Schlesinger, ‘The Continuity of Marx’s Thought’, Science and Society, 29, 2, Spring 1965, 
pp. 217-224 at p. 217. 
41 Schlesinger, ‘The Continuity of Marx’s Thought’, Schlesinger, ‘Les ‘Manuscripts économico-
philosophiques’ de Marx replacés dans leur perspective historique’. For examples of 
references within other works see, Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 9-10 or 
Schlesinger, ‘The CPSU Programme: The Conception of Communism’, p. 384. 
42 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 9. 
43 Schlesinger, ‘The Dispute and the Socialist Tradition’, p. 178. 
44 Schlesinger, ‘The Continuity of Marx’s Thought’, p. 220. 
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regarded them just as a link in his transition from idealistic to 
materialist dialectics, and from young Hegelian philosophy to an 
understanding of the basic importance of economic issues.45 
 
The Manuscripts did not constitute a new insight into Marx’s thinking, they 
merely helped to elucidate his theoretical development from youth to 
intellectual maturity. 
 
Two interlinked misconceptions Schlesinger spent some time attempting to 
dismiss concerned the very essence of Marxism. According to Schlesinger, 
critics argued that Marxism had been proven false because so many of its 
original tenets had been dropped or proven incorrect. A viable ideology would 
surely have remained stable and correct over time. To this, Schlesinger 
countered, ‘…. the Marxist concept of historical development, its Dialectics, 
serves as the intellectual tool by the application of which it is possible to 
eliminate and to replace obsolescent elements of the original ideology’.46 
Marxism, by its very nature, was supposed to evolve and critically reject 
elements that had become obsolete, more often than not, as a direct result of 
the theory’s impact. He argued that the movement would surely have become 
bankrupt if, over the course of one hundred years, no tangible results had 
been achieved. Some elements of the original theory would inevitably have 
been achieved whilst others were no longer appropriate.  
 
A further misconception followed from this: critics insisted that Marxism was 
no longer relevant since so many of its original aims had now become reality. 
However, Schlesinger argued:  ‘Marxism was intended as a system of 
concepts subject to continous [continuous] change – and, hence, not 
obsoleting as a system when individual elements of that system have to 
change; it also answers against the wide-spread misconception that with the 
realisation of a fair proportion of its original demands the Marxist movement 
                                                
45 Les ‘Manuscripts économico-philosophiques’ de Marx replacés dans leur perspective 
historique’, p. 66, Schlesinger, Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in the 
Historical Perspective, p. 23. 
46 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 3. 
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finds its natural end’.47 Again, the error emerged because of a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the dialectical nature of Marxism; its aims and objectives 
would evolve as circumstances did. 
 
Another myth Schlesinger was eager to counter was the reproach that 
Marxism was fatalistic and deterministic, denying the role of human ideas in 
history. Schlesinger countered this argument throughout his writings. In The 
Marxist Movement he argued that, early in his career, Marx moved away from 
a contemplative, descriptive materialism. Schlesinger referred to Marx’s third 
Theses on Feuerbach in which he asserted, just as men are products of 
circumstance and education, circumstances are changed by men, and the 
educators have to be educated.48 According to Schlesinger: ‘This is an 
advanced yet valid formulation of the argument against the reproach of 
fatalism frequently levelled against determinist philosophies’.49 Marx explicitly 
acknowledged the human factor in social development. Schlesinger drew this 
same conclusion in Sprit of Post-War Russia, insisting: 
 
 Marx and Engels, unlike some of their popularizers particularly 
in Germany, never thought of denying the fact that ‘men make 
their history themselves’. Nor did they disregard the importance 
of historical personalities and of the ideas that move them. They 
considered it the task of sociology to explain how these ideas 
and these personalities could arise in a certain period.50 
 
Again in Marx His Time and Ours, he wrote, ‘Marx’s ‘historicism’ is intended to 
mean that human actions are conditioned by the historical circumstances 
under which men have to make decisions and does not deny the importance 
of those decisions as the factor immediately shaping human history’.51 Later in 
                                                
47 Ibid. p. 2.  
48 Ibid. p. 12. The full thesis is as follows: ‘The materialist doctrine that men are products of 
circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed 
circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and 
that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society 
into two parts, one of which is superior to society’ (Marx and Engels, Werke, 3, pp. 5-6). 
49 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 12. 
50 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-War Russia, p. 137. 
51 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 2. 
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the same work, he argued: ‘The most common misapprehension about 
Marxism is the assumption that it denies the power of ideas, as distinct from 
material forces, to influence the course of history’.52 It is clear that Schlesinger 
was eager to defend Marx and Marxism against misconceptions and myths. It 
is a theme discernible in a great many of his writings concerning Marx. 
 
Lukács 
In order to fully engage with Schlesinger’s understanding of Marx and 
Marxism it is necessary to turn to another Marxist theoretician and 
contemporary of Schlesinger’s, Georg Lukács; a man described by his 
biographers, A. Arato and P. Breines as, ‘…the greatest philosopher of 
Marxism since the death of Karl Marx and the most controversial communist 
intellectual in this century’.53 A number of Schlesinger’s attitudes and 
interpretations appear reminiscent of those of the Hungarian scholar and a 
brief investigation of what influence, if any, he had on Schlesinger should 
prove fruitful in furthering an understanding of his attitude towards Marxism. 
 
Georg Lukács was born in 1885 to a wealthy Hungarian family. He converted 
to communism in 1918 and served as Commissar for Culture and Education 
in the brief-lived Hungarian Soviet government of 1919. Fleeing the ensuing 
White Terror, Lukács lived first in Vienna, then Moscow, before returning to 
Hungary in 1945, where he became a member of parliament and Professor of 
Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Culture at the University of Budapest. He 
was an active figure in the uprising of 1956, action which led to his deportation 
to Romania for a year. On his return, Lukács devoted himself to scholarly 
activities. He died in 1971. 
 
As well as developing a Marxist theory of aesthetics, Lukács is best known for 
his work History and Class Consciousness, first published in 1923.54 His 
critique of Marxist theory attempted to demonstrate the necessity of dialectical 
                                                
52 Ibid. p. 45. 
53 A. Arato and P. Breines, The Young Lukács, (Pluto Press, London, 1979), p. 3. 
54 G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1971) trans. R. 
Livingstone. 
 150 
historicism and argued that proletarian revolution was a question of 
proletarian class consciousness. The work met with immediate and sharp 
criticism from Comintern and Lukács soon recanted his theses, although its 
influence on later Marxist thinking, especially Western Marxism, remained 
significant. The German communist Karl Korsch had reached similar 
conclusions to Lukács in 1923.55 Their thinking is eloquently summarised by 
Arato and Breins: 
 
Chief among them was the conviction that, in the final analysis, 
proletarian revolution hinged upon the subjective factor, 
proletarian class consciousness, and that understanding this 
factor required recognition of the Hegelian components of 
Marx’s thought…. [They] further agreed that the outlook of the 
Second International and Marxist thought virtually as a whole 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century had been 
dominated by what Korsch called ‘Hegel amnesia’ and what 
Lukács called a ‘vulgar Marxism’. By these terms they meant to 
characterize a standpoint in which dialectical and revolutionary 
understanding was displaced by a narrowly materialist and 
positivist approach that had reduced consciousness to an 
epiphenomenonal reflection of economic structures and laws.56 
 
This vulgar materialism could never be revolutionary as it would not recognise 
and thus take part in the revolutionary process by which the proletariat 
became the conscious and active ‘maker of history’.57 Immediately, parallels 
with Schlesinger’s attitudes are apparent. Schlesinger was continually 
defending Marxism against ‘vulgar Marxism’ and ‘vulgar materialism’; it was 
                                                
55 Karl Korsch (1886-1961) was a member of the KPD from 1920. He adopted a position of 
opposition and then ultra-leftism from the mid-1920s, which was to result in his expulsion from 
the party in April 1926. Korsch continued as a Reichstag deputy for a further two years, but, 
as his political group dissolved, his active political life ceased. Fleeing Germany after 1933, 
Korsch lived the rest of his life in the US as an academic, at turns both optimistic and 
despairing of the progress and opportunities for Marxism. In Korsch’s main theoretical work, 
Marxism and Philosophy, published in 1923, he emphasised the debt Marxism owed to the 
Hegelian tradition and explored the relationship between Marxism and philosophy (K. Korsch, 
Marxism and Philosophy, (London, NLB, 1970)).  
56 Arato and Breines, The Young Lukács, p. 172. 
57 Ibid. p. 173. 
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more than simply the sum of economic factors or a lifeless, crudely 
deterministic model devoid of human personality or will. He strongly believed 
in the importance of the subjective factor and revolutionary consciousness; for 
Schlesinger, it was Lenin’s recognition of subjective elements, as well as 
objective conditions, which had led to his success. Schlesinger had also 
emphasised the importance of the Hegelian tradition to Marx and Marxism. 
 
The general thrust of Lukács’ approach concerned the active quality of 
Marxism. This was also a key theme of Schlesinger’s writings on Marx. Both 
authors emphasised ‘praxis’: what Arato and Breines have defined as a ‘…. 
philosophy of history with practical intent’.58 Marx had revealed the necessity 
of action through a revolutionary materialist approach. Lukács began one of 
the major sections of History and Class Consciousness, ‘What is Orthodox 
Marxism?’, with a quote from Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach: ‘The philosophers 
have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to 
change it’.59 He made clear from the outset that his understanding of Marxism 
was of a transformational character, a philosophy of action. Schlesinger 
would readily agree with this theme and often quoted from the same source in 
his own writing.60 Although Schlesinger did not use the term ‘praxis’ he did 
make clear that Marx’s importance was in his recognition of the human 
influence on historical development. 
 
Both Lukács and Schlesinger focussed upon the primacy of method in Marx’s 
work. Lukács wrote:  
 
Let us assume for the sake of argument that recent research 
had disproved once and for all every one of Marx’s individual 
theses. Even if this were to be proved, every serious ‘orthodox’ 
Marxist would still be able to accept all such modern findings 
without reservation and hence dismiss all of Marx’s theses in 
                                                
58 Ibid. p. 112. 
59 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 1. Marx and Engels, Werke, 3, p. 7. Author’s 
italics. 
60 For example in Marx His Time and Ours, Schlesinger argued: ‘Marx regarded an active 
approach to changing the world as a moral duty of progressive people in our time’, pointing to 
the Theses on Feuerbach as proof of this (Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 61).  
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toto – without having to renounce his orthodoxy for a single 
moment. Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the 
uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx’s investigations. It is 
not the ‘belief’ in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of a 
‘sacred’ book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to 
the method. It is the scientific conviction that dialectical 
materialism is the road to truth...61 
 
He stated elsewhere, ‘… our underlying premise here is the belief that in 
Marx’s theory and method the true method by which to understand society 
and history has finally been discovered’.62 Schlesinger agreed wholeheartedly 
with these sentiments. He continually emphasised the importance of the 
Marxist method; dialectical materialism was the key to appreciating Marx’s 
contribution. Conditions would alter, the statements and writings of 
theoreticians would become obsolete as a result, but the method would 
remain valid. Once again, both authors seemed to regard the spirit of 
Marxism along similar lines. 
 
Whilst they agreed that the dialectical method was the key to Marxism’s 
vitality, they had a different understanding of what that meant. Schlesinger 
argued: ‘It is clearly established that the Marxist outlook is objectivistic and 
deterministic. It acknowledges the existence of a world independent of the 
human mind’.63 He continued, ‘…. the other essential element in Marxist 
philosophy is the conception that the laws governing it are dialectical, i.e. non 
static, but dynamic’.64 The dialectical method explained the laws of society, 
and the world in general. To Schlesinger, it was an objective theory 
independent of man. However, Lukács argued that the dialectic was 
contingent upon human consciousness and intention; it was not objective.65  
 
                                                
61 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p.1, Author’s italics. 
62 Ibid. p. xliii. Author’s italics. 
63 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-War Russia, p. 169. 
64 Ibid. p. 169-170. 
65 Arato and Breines, The Young Lukács, p. 177. 
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R. Hudelson has noted the similarities between Lukács’ and Lenin’s approach 
to Marxism as well as their major difference and this is along the same lines 
as Schlesinger’s attitude; with Schlesinger mirroring Lenin. Hudelson wrote, 
‘…. both Lenin and Lukács criticized the Marxism of the Second International 
for its mechanistic and undialectical misconception of Marx’s theory of 
history’. Schlesinger also criticised such overly mechanistic misconceptions. 
Hudelson continued,  
 
However, in their understanding of dialectics and the proper 
method for social theory, Lenin and Lukács were in fundamental 
disagreement. Where Lenin accepted the dialectics of nature, 
Lukács restricted dialectics to processes involving conscious 
subjects. Where Lenin held a unity of science position with 
respect to the natural and social sciences, Lukács held that 
social theory required a method distinct from the method of 
natural sciences’66 
 
Schlesinger felt that dialectics of nature were somewhat problematic. In Marx 
His Time and Ours he wrote that ‘…. problems arise once the Dialectical 
approach is applied outside the sphere from whose conditions it was derived, 
especially in the analysis of Nature’.67 However, he did believe that Marxist 
dialectics involved the search for a ‘world-outlook’ of scientific validity, so, 
unsurprisingly, he would certainly have sided with Lenin and against Lukács 
in the demarcation outlined by Hudelson.68 
 
Yet there were more instances where the spirit of Lukács’ and Schlesinger’s 
analysis of Marx and Marxism coalesced. Both stressed the importance of 
Marxism for the present: Marx’s writings may have been time bound, but they 
remained significant for contemporary understanding and action because of 
the method he had developed. This chapter has already addressed 
                                                
66 R. Hudelson, ‘Marxist Science as Ordinary Science’ Noûs, 20, 1, March 1986, pp. 53-63 at 
p. 53.  
67 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, pp. 13-14. Later in the same work he wrote of the 
‘…. the limitations of the ‘dialectical’ approach to Nature’ (Schlesinger, Marx His Time and 
Ours, p. 27). 
68 Ibid. p. 14. 
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Schlesinger’s preoccupation with current applications of Marxist theory. He 
was far more concerned with present conditions than past debates, not least 
because of his belief in the active, transformational obligation of Marxism. 
Lukács expressed a similar desire, writing of the need to adopt, ‘…. a 
substantive position with regard to the urgent problems of the present; for 
according to this view of Marxist method its pre-eminent aim is knowledge of 
the present’.69 Both adamantly urged the continual reinvigoration of Marxist 
theory and hotly denied that mistakes in past Marxist texts were indications of 
overall errors, since they were of necessarily ephemeral validity. Similarly, 
Lukács argued that the Russian revolution was evidence of Marxism’s 
veracity, a frequent theme in Schlesinger’s writings. Lukács insisted, ‘…. the 
experiences of the years of revolution have provided a magnificent 
confirmation of all the essential aspects of orthodox (i.e. Communist) 
Marxism’.70 
 
A strong feature of Lukács’ work was his emphasis on the Hegelian aspects 
of Marxism; in fact, Schlesinger actually referred to him as a ‘neo-Hegelian’.71 
Lukács insisted that Marx was indebted to Hegel, an attitude perhaps natural 
for a theoretician who stressed the importance of the dialectical method. He 
wrote: ‘We cannot do justice to the concrete, historical dialectic without 
considering in some detail the founder of this method, Hegel, and his relation 
to Marx’.72  
 
As noted above, Schlesinger’s attitude to Marx’s Hegelian legacy differed 
substantially over time. His shifting stance reflected the general chronological 
divide in Schlesinger’s work. In one of his earliest works on returning to 
Europe, Spirit of Post-War Russia, Schlesinger downplayed the significance 
of Hegel, and classical German philosophy in general. He wrote: ‘Marx and 
Engels as pupils of Hegel took over his own specially developed terminology 
which he called dialectics…. Marx and Engels, to use their own expression, 
                                                
69 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. xliii. Author’s italics. 
70 Ibid. xliii. 
71 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-War Russia, p. 170, footnote 167. 
72 Lukács, History and C lass Consciousness, p. xliii. Lukács insisted that Marx had taken the 
‘progressive part of Hegelian method’, but had then advanced it, eliminating its ‘mythologising 
remnants’  and thus revealing true method (Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 17). 
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turned the teacher’s theory upside down. But they retained his terminology.’73 
However, he continued, ‘…. I should, further, like to assure my readers that, 
in many years of thorough study, I have found nothing interesting in Marxist 
theories that could not be explained without the use of Hegelian 
terminology’.74 Thus, Hegelian terminology was unnecessary for an 
understanding of Marxism.  
 
Elsewhere in the work, Schlesinger argued that the need to analyse the 
background to Nazism had led to a critical re-examination of the ‘Prussian 
State philosopher’ Hegel. This had coincided with Russia’s increasing 
recognition of the superiority of nineteenth century Russian progressives over 
their German counterparts. He continued: 
 
Consequently, these trends are bound to reduce the importance 
of Hegelian philosophies as a source of Marxism. It will become 
one of the many bourgeois attempts of the early nineteenth 
century to establish laws of historical development and to 
understand the class structure of modern society. It may be 
thought as no more important than the works of the French 
historians of the restoration or the Ricardian school of radical 
British economists.75  
 
Schlesinger supposed that if Hegel could be placed on the same level as 
other pre-Marxist theoreticians, the fact that Marx employed his terminology, 
‘…could be reduced to historical chance’.76 Henceforth, the terminology could 
be dropped, especially since it impeded the dissemination of Marxism. 
 
However, in later or more scholarly works Schlesinger gave a quite different 
interpretation, asserting the importance of Marx’s Hegelian tradition. In one of 
his last manuscripts Schlesinger wrote that of the three major sources of 
                                                
73 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-War Russia, p. 171. 
74 Ibid. p. 172. 
75 Ibid. p. 147. 
76 Ibid. p. 147. 
 156 
Marxism, ‘…. the first, namely Hegelian dialectics, was essential’.77 As 
Schlesinger pointed out: ‘Marxism found its merits precisely in the overcoming 
of the limitations of its source-material by recognising their historical 
conditioning’.78 Yet both Marx and Engels understood the importance of 
Hegelian philosophy. This emphasis on the significance of Hegel seems in 
stark contrast to his earlier dismissal of it. Again, in Marx His Time and Ours, 
Schlesinger insisted Marx had received, ‘…. his basic methodological armour 
from Hegel’.79  
 
Schlesinger consistently viewed the use of classical German terminology as 
an impediment to popular understanding; he referred to it as, ‘…. both 
recondite and mystical to the non-adept’ in Marx His Time and Ours.80 He 
also spoke of the ‘burden’ of ‘Hegelian terminology’ in later works.81 However, 
he went on to make clear that Hegel’s importance could not be 
underestimated. In all later works he distinguished between the inaccessibility 
of the language and the essential nature of the Hegelian contribution to 
Marxism. This, again, differed from his earlier work, in which he did not 
appear to differentiate between Hegelian terminology and Hegelian concepts. 
He appeared to argue both were obsolete. 
 
In Schlesinger’s earliest work his attitude was in contrast to that of Lukács, 
whereas he appeared in agreement with the significance of Marx’s Hegelian 
legacy in later writings. This alteration in emphasis is partly explained by the 
different nature of the publications. Schlesinger’s Spirit of Post-War Russia 
was intended for a popular readership, one who would find the Hegelian 
discourse extremely challenging. In his efforts to demonstrate the viability and 
contemporary significance of Marx’s work, he may have deliberately under-
represented Marx’s debt to classical German philosophy. However, in his 
more scholarly works, such as Marx His Time and Ours, Schlesinger was 
outlining Marx’s development in a serious work intended for students of the 
                                                
77 Schlesinger, The Marxist Movement, p. 6. 
78 Ibid. p. 6. 
79 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 5. 
80 Ibid. p. 27.  
81 Schlesinger, History of the Communist Party of the USSR, p. 308. 
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movement. He would inevitably include details of the Hegelian influence upon 
Marxism’s founders in such a monograph. Another reason for Schlesinger’s 
initial attitude forms the basis of the second part of the thesis. In earlier works 
Schlesinger often actively demonstrated, and indeed defended, the official 
attitudes of Stalin’s Soviet Union. This was particularly noticeable in The Spirit 
of Post-War Russia.82 Later, after Stalin’s death, Schlesinger was more 
critical and condemnatory of developments that occurred under Stalin. From 
then on, he would often be in agreement with post-Stalin Soviet orthodoxy.  
 
L. Goldmann traced the changing attitudes towards the Hegelian tradition in 
Marxist theory. He wrote: ‘… between 1890 and 1923, with the exception of 
Rosa Luxemburg and to a large extent Trotsky, nearly all the important 
theorists of Marxism took up a positivist position parallel to that of academic 
science’. This was shown in the dearth of attention paid to Hegelianism, and, 
‘…. even Lenin, in his Materialism and Empirio-criticism, wrote one of the 
most mechanistic and anti-dialectical works there is’.83 According to 
Goldmann, Lenin discovered Hegelian philosophy in 1914-1915 and 
subsequently moved to a more dialectical position. However: ‘The return to 
mechanism and Stalinist positivism was to begin round about 1922, but it 
gathered force principally after Lenin’s death’.84 Schlesinger appeared to be 
reflecting this Stalinist position regarding the Hegelian tradition in his early 
work. He also reflected and flattered Soviet patriotism in downplaying the 
German origins of Marxism. Later, however, he maintained a position closer 
to Lukács’ and this can be taken to be his final analysis, as it was represented 
consistently in his final works on the subject. 
 
Schlesinger shared much of the spirit of Lukács’ concerns. He may well have 
been influenced by Lukács’ work. But there was also a great deal of 
divergence between the two writers. This was especially true of their differing 
attitude to dialectics and the nature of historical materialism. Both argued that 
                                                
82 See chapter 6 p. 235. 
83 L. Goldmann, ‘Reflections on History and Class Consciousness’ in I. Mészáros (ed.), 
Aspects of History and Class Consciousness, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), 
pp. 65-84 at p. 66. 
84 Ibid. p. 68, 
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they were fundamental to Marxism, but disagreed about their exact character.  
They also demonstrated different perspectives on the Marxist tradition after 
Marx and Engels. Lukács wrote: ‘Rosa Luxemburg, alone among Marx’s 
disciples, has made a real advance on his life’s work in both the content and 
method of his economic doctrines. She alone has found a way to apply them 
concretely to the present state of social development’.85 Luxemburg was to be 
admired presumably, in part, because she had not fallen into the error of anti-
dialectical thinking common amongst her contemporaries. Whilst Schlesinger 
admired Luxemburg’s work and believed that she had advanced Marxist 
thought, to consider the plight of colonies for example, he would not have 
offered such wholehearted praise. He argued that she had encountered 
limited success since she had failed to properly use the historico-materialist 
method in evaluating new and changing conditions. She proved incapable of 
recognising dialectical developments. Schlesinger also disagreed with 
Lukács’ approach wherever it came into conflict with Leninism.  
 
Despite appearances suggesting Schlesinger was influenced by the work of 
Lukács, there is little in his writings that specifically touch upon the subject to 
suggest that this is the case. Schlesinger rarely mentioned Lukács in his work 
but what does exist is reasonably dismissive. Apart from one piece of writing, 
Lukács was only referred to in a few footnotes. In Marx His Time and Ours, 
Schlesinger wrote of Lukács’ work as anathema to, ‘…. the objectivist 
foundations of Marxism’.86 He went into slightly more detail in his paper on 
Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts but, again, did not appear to 
agree with Lukács. He described History and Class Consciousness as a 
collection of essays written in the aftermath of the defeated Hungarian 
revolution and the Comintern disputes of the early 1920s. According to 
Schlesinger, it concerned the question of whether communist parties should 
undertake offensive action because of the long term effect it had on workers’ 
class consciousness: Lukács, ‘in a highly refined philosophical form’, 
suggested that the revolutionary vanguard could make the leap towards 
                                                
85 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. xli.  
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freedom by the act of rallying and taking revolutionary action.87 However, 
Schlesinger was deeply sceptical of this notion. He wrote, ‘… even supposed 
for a moment that it could have lead to consciousness of the need to establish 
a socialist society, [it] would not necessarily have abolished the phenomenon 
of Alienation from the operation of such a society, which cannot live on mere 
enthusiasm’.88 Schlesinger did not believe that action intended to produce 
proletarian consciousness was, alone, enough to produce the revolutionary 
transformation of society.  
 
The only piece of work focussing on Lukács remained unfinished. A collection 
of essays concerning Lukács’ major work entitled Aspects of History and 
Class Consciousness was published in 1971 and contained an appendix by 
Schlesinger.89 The papers were based on a series of open lectures held at 
Sussex University in 1969-70. However, as a footnote to Schlesinger’s 
contribution noted, he died a few days before he was to deliver his lecture 
and, ‘Thus, his contribution remained somewhat fragmentary’, hence its 
inclusion as an appendix rather than a full chapter.90 It remains, nonetheless, 
his only substantial work available on the subject.  
 
Schlesinger’s paper was intended to investigate the historical context in which 
Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness was written, in particular, the 
debates concerning the correctness or otherwise of ‘offensive action’. 
Schlesinger referred to the ‘Bettelheim affair’ in the Austrian party in 1919 and 
the German ‘March action’ of 1921 as concrete examples of the events and 
ensuing debates that contributed to that context.91 According to Schlesinger, 
Lukács was concerned with the problem of how to define the party’s function 
in the acute stage of revolution. He agreed with Rosa Luxemburg’s 
organisational principles and belief in spontaneity in the earlier period. As 
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Schlesinger explained, Lukács thought, ‘… party activity, by inherent 
necessity, would lead the masses to a higher level of activity, well beyond the 
immediate aims’.92 However, Lukács argued that Lenin’s organisational 
concepts were correct in revolutionary situations, those described by 
Schlesinger as, ‘…. characterized by the actuality of a proletarian 
revolution’.93  
 
Apart from a few short pages of outline, there was little actual analysis within 
the appendix. Schlesinger did not express opinions or provide any in-depth 
critique of Lukács’ work, perhaps because he did not fully complete the paper. 
However, there were a few insights into Schlesinger’s thinking on the subject, 
and what there is, fits with his other references. He emphasised the idealistic 
and subjective character of Lukács’ analysis, accusing him of ‘philosophical 
Leftism’. He argued: ‘As in many analogous cases, only one side of the 
complicated dialectical relationship between the subjective and objective 
factors – that of action – is emphasized, while the other is neglected’.94 He 
reiterated the point: ‘The idealistic character of the ‘theories of offensive’ and, 
even more, of Lukács’ generalizations related to them, rested in the very 
conception that it was possible – to speak with Thalheimer – ‘to force the 
Revolution’s destiny’’.95 Once again, Schlesinger seemed sceptical of this 
prospect. However, he did make clear that Lukács’ views could not be 
equated with Blanquism since such action was not intended to achieve state 
power but was to be part of the maturation process of the working class so 
that, ultimately, they could gain power. 
 
The comments about Lukács discernible in Schlesinger’s writings were of a 
similar nature to the orthodox criticism levelled at Lukács by Comintern and 
official Soviet Marxism-Leninism. Accusations of overemphasis on the 
subjective elements and the conflation of political ultra-leftism with theoretical 
subjective idealism were common amongst critics and were developed from 
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themes Lenin and Trotsky had presented in 1920-1921.96 They were also a 
noticeable element of Schlesinger’s analysis. However, Schlesinger did clarify 
his criticisms; Lukács was not purely concerned with action and he did not 
believe that the development of proletarian class-consciousness would bring 
about revolution in and of itself, but he did place too much emphasis on this 
element.  
 
It is, perhaps, unusual that Schlesinger did not engage more with the work of 
Lukács’ or his contemporaries such as Karl Korsch. They were members of 
the communist movement of which he was an active participant. Schlesinger 
was in the Austrian Communist Party when Lukács was involved in the 
Hungarian revolution and short-lived Soviet government. He was an 
intellectual worker in Moscow when Lukács was employed at the Marx-Engels 
Institute. He was a member of the KPD at the same time as Korsch and he 
participated in the discussions about Rosa Luxemburg’s legacy and the 
‘March action’ to which he referred in his Lukács paper. However, his lack of 
interest is more explicable when it is remembered that, at this time, 
Schlesinger was not particularly interested in philosophical or scholarly 
pursuits.  Later, when he began to write about philosophical and theoretical 
matters he would be fully aware, not only of the unorthodoxy of their 
approach, this was immediately apparent to anyone with a degree of 
theoretical knowledge, but the further development and legacy of Lukács’ line 
of thought. Schlesinger would be aware that the intellectual heir of Lukács’ 
work was ‘Western Marxism’, a current in conscious opposition to Soviet 
orthodoxy. Schlesinger would inevitably disagree with this school and he may 
have retrospectively criticised the source of its inspiration as a result. 
 
Schlesinger did emphasise many of the elements of Lukács’ work in his own 
understanding of Marx and Marxism. He wished to reassert the philosophical 
base of historical materialism and dialectics. There was also a similar spirit to 
his Marxism, one concerned with action, or praxis, the primacy of method and 
Marx’s continued importance in the present day.  So, perhaps Lukács did 
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have an impact upon Schlesinger’s understanding. Schlesinger did not make 
this claim himself, and he appeared to dismiss Lukács’ contribution when he 
did refer to him. Nevertheless, Lukács was of undeniable influence upon 
Marxist thinking. He affected the intellectual environment in which Schlesinger 
developed and worked and some of the similarities in attitude between the 
two are stark. 
 
Stalin  
The final section of this chapter examines Schlesinger’s attitude towards 
Stalinism and Stalin as a Marxist theoretician. As well as reviewing his writing 
on the subject, it attempts to determine whether Schlesinger’s views changed 
over time. This thesis argues that Schlesinger’s attitude corresponded to 
Soviet orthodoxy and that he was reasonably positive about events in the 
Soviet Union before Stalin’s death but retrospectively condemned them. Did 
his writings on this subject conform to the argument and timeline? An 
investigation of Schlesinger’s attitude towards Stalin also helps illuminate vital 
aspects of Schlesinger’s work and beliefs. Recognition of his pragmatism, in 
terms of his attitude towards Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’, the purges 
and Stalin’s legacy, provides a wider insight into Schlesinger’s work. It may 
help explain the apparent inconsistency in his attitude. 
 
Whilst all scholars agree that Stalin was not a Marxist innovator or theoretical 
genius in the mould of Marx, Engels or Lenin, there is some debate regarding 
his reputation as an intellectual. According to the historian R. Conquest, 
Bukharin remarked to Kamenev in 1928 that Stalin was, ‘… eaten up with the 
vain desire to become a well-known theoretician. He feels that it is the only 
thing he lacks’.97 It seems it mattered to Stalin that he was viewed as a 
noteworthy theoretician. However, many believed that he continued to lack 
this quality throughout his career. For Conquest:  
 
Stalin had a good average grasp of Marxism, and though his 
adaptations of that flexible doctrine to suit his purposes were not 
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so elaborate or so elastic as the similar interpretations of his 
rivals and predecessors, they were adequate to his career. His 
lack of the true theoretician’s mind was noted by many, and he 
seems to have resented it.98 
 
Although, Conquest also pointed out that Stalin’s theoretical clumsiness was 
often exaggerated by commentators.  
 
More recently, E. Van Ree has investigated Stalin’s contribution to Marxist 
philosophy. He argued, ‘….the writings of Stalin that can count as 
philosophical at all are few’, continuing, ‘Most importantly, the dictator’s 
arguments were ramshackle and schematic’.99 However, Van Ree did assert 
that Stalin had provided some original contributions to Marxist theory. Whilst 
Stalin’s ‘Anarchism or Socialism?’, had been criticised by many for its lack of 
originality as a mere summation of Marxism, Van Ree pointed out, at the time 
of its publication in 1906 and 1907, there was no standard Marxism. 
Therefore, any summarising of the theory had to display originality.100 To Van 
Ree: ‘Stalin’s philosophy was a compound of Plekhanovist historical 
materialism and Bukharinist quasi-dialectics, but, the simplistic and schematic 
formulations not withstanding, with some original admixtures of his own’.101 He 
argued that Stalin had contributed distinctive formulations to historical 
materialism, with his emphasis on the significance of ideas, and the existence 
of social phenomena, e.g. language, derived from the needs of the society 
rather than from the class structure of that society.102 However, he insisted 
that both of these contributions were taken from Plekhanov.103 Stalin’s 
concept of dialectics also contributed to theory, but once again Stalin 
occupied a position very close to another theoretician, this time Bukharin.104  
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Typically, Schlesinger’s writings on the topic were mixed. Sometimes he 
seemed to assert Stalin’s theoretical and academic credentials, at others he 
dismissed them. This was, perhaps, all a matter of emphasis. Schlesinger 
may have wished to counter any hostile myth that Stalin was merely a 
bureaucratic brute, but still believed his intellectual capacities to have been 
limited. In a footnote to one of his lectures on Marxism-Leninism, Schlesinger 
referred to, ‘…. the flourishing of the myth of his [Stalin’s] alleged failure to 
develop original theoretical work’.105 So the familiar theme of myth dispelling 
was clearly important to Schlesinger in respect to this topic. He certainly did 
not admire his theoretical work as he did the other Marxist writers. Stalin was 
no ‘master’; Schlesinger did not consider Stalin one of his ‘teachers’. 
However, according to Schlesinger, Stalin did develop original theoretical 
work. 
 
In one of Schlesinger’s first Western writings to engage with Stalin as a 
theoretician he made clear that he believed this aspect of the Soviet leader’s 
personality was all too often overlooked. In a review of I. Deutscher’s 
biography of Stalin, which was published in Soviet Studies in 1950, 
Schlesinger was critical of the author for underestimating Stalin’s intellectual 
work.106 He noted that the biography was superior to many sources in that it 
did not understand Stalin from within, ‘… the current alternatives of 
Superman, Devil or average shrewd bureaucrat driven into the foreground by 
forces he failed to master’.107 However, according to Schlesinger, Deutscher 
failed to fully appreciate Lenin’s concept of the Bolshevik party. He was, thus, 
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unable to understand that Stalin was selected by his party, rather than simply 
the master of it.108  
 
In the review, Schlesinger emphasised Stalin’s significant and original 
contribution to Marxist theory: 
 
 Stalin has brought important elements into Marxist theory which 
were not there before (indeed, while the present tendency is to 
ascribe to him basic Marxist statements which he has, at the 
best, popularized, in earlier days the requirements of factional 
struggle resulted in ascribing quite a lot of his original 
statements to Lenin). Stalin’s exposition of Leninism to the 
undergraduates of Sverdlov University was the first Bolshevik 
statement in which Leninism was assessed as a definite stage 
in the development of Marxist theory clearly distinguished from 
original Marxism, and was discussed in relation to the specific 
Russian background.109 
 
Schlesinger also insisted Stalin’s ‘Dialectical and Historical Materialism’ was, 
‘... the continuation of a long line in its author’s thought as well as the first 
presentation of Marxist philosophy without Hegelian terminology and with full 
emphasis on the parts played by individuals and ideas in the historical 
process’.110 Stalin developed a new Marxist interpretation with his emphasis 
on the role of force in the transformation of society and on the continuity of 
national life. He was also original in dropping utopian elements in the concept 
of world revolution.111 Schlesinger made clear that he believed Stalin to be an 
original Marxist scholar and theoretician. He also clearly agreed with some 
aspects of Stalin’s theory. Schlesinger consistently reproached those within 
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109 Ibid. p. 246. Stalin’s ‘Foundations of Leninism’ lectures were delivered to Sverdlov 
University and published in Pravda in April and May 1924 (Stalin, Sochineniia, 6, pp. 69-188). 
110 Schlesinger, ‘Stalinism’, p. 246. Stalin’s ‘Dialectical and Historical Materialism’ was written 
in September 1938 and included as part of the Short Course (pp. 105-131) without explicit 
acknowledgement of Stalin’s authorship. It was republished in J. Stalin, Problems of 
Leninism, (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947) pp. 569-595. 
111 Schlesinger, ‘Stalinism’, pp. 246-7.  
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the party, as well as its critics, who judged Soviet Russia from a utopian 
perspective. He would, therefore, have approved of Stalin’s practical approach 
to world revolution.  
 
In his next work to broach the subject of Stalin as intellectual, Marx His Time 
and Ours, Schlesinger was more circumspect but still suggested that Stalin 
had merit in this role. Again he pointed to ‘Dialectical and Historical Marxism’ 
as evidence of Stalin’s authority. He wrote: ‘Recently, Stalin gave a summary 
of the essential characteristics of Dialectics that has the great advantage of 
avoiding the pitfalls connected with specific Hegelian language’.112 Later, he 
continued on the theme, arguing:  
 
Stalin’s description of the struggle between the past and the 
future, that which is dying away and that which is developing, 
makes impressive reading because it smacks of the struggle 
carried on in the most varied fields of the social world of today, 
with religious, philosophical, aesthetic and even mathematical 
disputes hanging upon cleavages caused by the great social 
and political issues.113 
 
Schlesinger referred to the work as ‘impressive’ but did point out that it was 
impossible to apply dialectics to all spheres of nature. Thus, Soviet ideology’s 
recent attempt to portray dialectics as the ‘new world outlook’ together with its 
emphasis on the supposed partisan nature of philosophy was, according to 
Schlesinger, to be, ‘… interpreted as elements of social mythology rather than 
as contributions to Science’.114 Yet, he again wrote positively about Stalin’s 
work when discussing ideology. He argued that Stalin was one of the first 
theoreticians to explicitly derive the correctness of historical materialism from 
methodological advantage rather than the primacy of economics over 
                                                
112 Schlesinger, Marx His Time and Ours, p. 15. He referred to ‘Dialectical and Historical 
Materialism’ in a footnote. 
113 Ibid. pp. 18-19. Stalin wrote: ‘Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal 
contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their 
negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something 
developing’ (Stalin, Problems of Leninism, p. 572). 
114 Ibid. p. 19.  
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ideas.115 Schlesinger continually emphasised the importance of ideas in 
Marxism so would inevitably approve of this development. 
 
In 1957 Schlesinger published an encyclopaedia article on Stalin in 
Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften in which he offered his views on 
the leader as a theoretician.116 Schlesinger emphasised the practical, 
pragmatic nature of Stalin’s theoretical work. He argued, approvingly, that it 
could not be separated from his political activities, referring to Marx’s Theses 
on Feuerbach and its assertion that thinking isolated from practice was purely 
scholastic; or as Schlesinger expressed it, ‘…. when the immediate tasks of 
praxis are removed, study is rejected as fruitless and scholastic’.117 According 
to Schlesinger, like Lenin’s work, every one of Stalin’s articles could easily be 
proven to have a direct connection to actual discussions within the party and, 
in his later writings, with the actual problems of the Soviet state.  
 
Schlesinger described Stalin’s theoretical work in a reasonably positive 
manner. He argued that Stalin’s ‘Anarchism or Socialism?’ was an attempt to 
explain the fundamentals of dialectic materialism by relinquishing Hegelian 
terminology and emphasising the importance of personality and human ideas. 
According to Schlesinger, this point of view had been neglected in the usual 
mechanistic exposition of Marxist philosophy.118 In other writings, Schlesinger 
made clear that he agreed with such an approach and here too Schlesinger’s 
tone seemed to be one of approval.  
 
Later in the article, Schlesinger described the difference between Zinoviev 
and Stalin’s view of Leninism. He argued that whilst Zinoviev interpreted 
Leninism as an adaptation of Marxism for the particular problems of backward 
countries, Stalin depicted it as, not only a presentation of revolutionary 
Marxism, but as a further development of it, as socialism in the epoch of 
                                                
115 Ibid. p. 46, footnote 4.  
116 Schlesinger, ‘Stalin, J.W.’, Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften, 15, 1957, pp. 11-
15.  
117 Ibid. p. 12.  
118 Ibid. p.12. 
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imperialism and proletarian revolution.119 Schlesinger had made similar 
observations in other work and his writings on Lenin make clear that he sided 
with Stalin in this debate.120 Schlesinger made other positive comments about 
Stalin, the theoretician, in the encyclopaedia article, describing Stalin’s work 
on nationalities as ‘original’, for example.121 However, he was not uncritical. 
Schlesinger pointed out that the concepts developed in many of Stalin’s later 
works were subsequently criticised.122 He also made reference to Stalin’s 
negative influence on intellectual freedom. Schlesinger argued that in the 
1930s Stalin devoted himself to the achievement of a definite conception of 
party history. He aimed to create a standard of political reliability for party 
members and, thus, provided an ideological motive for the removal of all 
dissenters.123 
 
Schlesinger argued that any assessment of Stalin’s significance in the 
development of science and knowledge was muddied by his position in party 
struggles.124 The partisanship of commentators polarised opinion. On the one 
hand there was the legacy propounded by his party machine; they claimed 
him as one of the most significant Russian statesman, a scientific genius 
equal to, and perhaps surpassing, Marx and Lenin, whose reach extended to 
all spheres of knowledge in which the party was interested. On the other 
hand, the opposition described Stalin as a mere bureaucrat and questioned 
the authorship of his public works. According to Schlesinger, under Stalin, his 
theoretical abilities were widely lauded and, indeed, exaggerated. However, 
after his death, the reaction against his dictatorial methods and the 
overestimation of his theoretical achievements led to the opposite, an 
underestimation of his theoretical significance. Neither gave an accurate 
picture. Schlesinger argued that Stalin was not a creative thinker in the ranks 
of Lenin or Marx. However, he did free Lenin’s theory of some internal 
                                                
119 Ibid. pp. 12-13. 
120 See chapter 3, p. 129. 
121 Schlesinger, ‘Stalin, J.W.’, p. 13. Stalin’s ‘Marxism and the National Question’ was first 
published in 1913 and it was to this work that Schlesinger referred (Stalin, Sochineniia, 2, pp. 
290-367. 
122 For example, Schlesinger pointed out that Stalin’s definition of the superstructure was 
criticised in the Soviet Union after his death (Schlesinger, ‘Stalin, J.W.’, p. 14). 
123 Schlesinger, ‘Stalin, J.W.’, p.14. 
124 Ibid. p.14. 
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contradictions and his simplification process made Marxism suitable as a 
basis for the schooling of a third of humanity.125 The article was, thus, 
reasonably positive in respect to Stalin’s reputation as a theoretician. 
 
In Schlesinger’s later writings he tended to be more critical of Stalin’s 
intellectual achievements and legacy. For example, in History of the 
Communist Party of the USSR Schlesinger referred to ‘intellectual Stalinism’ 
as a ‘deadweight’.126 Elsewhere in the monograph he wrote of the ‘unified 
indoctrination’ aimed at by Stalin’s later theoretical work, such as his 
presentation of dialectics in the Short Course.127 Earlier he had described this 
exposition as impressive. Schlesinger still acknowledged that Stalin was an 
important populariser of Marxism. He wrote: 
 
 The presentation of Marxist dialectics … was the first popular 
treatment of the subject which gave the essentials without 
unnecessarily burdening it with Hegelian terminology…. But 
whatever the historian may think about the correctness of the 
record, and the theoretician about the fullness with which some 
aspects of the Marxist theory have survived this popularization, 
it provided the sort of Marxism which finally reached the political 
cadres with the responsibility of leading one-third of mankind.128 
 
Marxist theory under Stalin did not emerge entirely unscathed, but its 
popularisation was immensely significant to the future course of the 
movement. 
                                                
125 Ibid. p.14.  
126 Schlesinger, History of the Communist Party of the USSR, p. 438. Schlesinger’s major 
publication on the CPSU was originally written in the years 1959 to 1961 and was published 
in an Italian translation. Schlesinger revised and updated it to include events up to 1966 for 
the English edition. However, it seems to have remained unpublished until 1977. The English 
edition was published by an Indian company and contained numerous spelling and grammar 
errors. See, for example, the misspelling of ‘desperate’ (Schlesinger, History of the 
Communist Party of the USSR, p. 289). The book charted the Russian communist party from 
its roots in nineteenth century radicalism up to Khrushchev’s fall from power. Schlesinger 
made use of his own experiences within the labour movement where he thought it appropriate 
but primarily relied on original source material. The monograph is detailed but seems to have 
anticipated a great deal of prior knowledge from readers. 
127 Ibid. p. 308. 
128 Ibid. p. 308. My italics. 
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Schlesinger believed that Stalin deserved a reputation as a scholar. He felt 
the undermining of his intellectual achievements constituted an element of the 
partisan struggle in which Stalin was involved and also represented myth 
making on the part of his opponents. Whilst certainly not uncritical, and 
recognising the negative impact Stalin had upon theory and intellectual life, he 
nevertheless believed that he contributed to theory. Schlesinger suggested 
throughout his works that Stalin was significant as a populariser of Marxism at 
the very least. This important function allowed one third of the globe to finally 
comprehend the theoretical foundation of the system under which they lived. 
 
In early works such as the popular Sprit of Post-war Russia, or the more 
scholarly Marx His Time and Ours, Schlesinger emphasised the importance of 
Stalin as a great populariser of Marxism. Stalin may have simplified, but only 
to increase general comprehension and not in a way that took away from 
theory. As was shown in the discussions on Lukács, Schlesinger almost 
entirely dismissed the importance of the Hegelian tradition to Marxism in Spirit 
of Post-war Russia.129 According to Schlesinger, the decrease in Hegelian 
influence under Stalin helped otherwise ‘perplexed people’ understand the 
fundamentals of Marxism.130 In his review of I. Deutscher’s work, published in 
1950, he referred to Stalin’s significance in developing a, ‘Marxist philosophy 
without Hegelian terminology’.131 He criticised Deutscher for labelling this a 
‘crude digest’, arguing: ‘But this is no reason to deny the importance of the 
theoretical work by which the refined product of the liberal Utopia was 
transformed into practical guidance for action, even if that transformation was 
accompanied by popularization’.132 Marxist theory was supposed to inspire 
and transform the masses; Schlesinger would not have viewed popularisation 
in a necessarily negative way.  
 
                                                
129 Van Ree has made clear that this was an action Stalin would certainly have approved of. 
He wrote: ‘Stalin’s concept of dialectics was part of the non-Hegelian tendency in Marxism. 
He never believed in ‘interpenetrating opposites’ and the ‘negation of negation’’ (‘Stalin as a 
Marxist Philosopher’, pp. 296-7). 
130 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-war Russia, p. 172. 
131 Schlesinger, ‘Stalinism’, p. 246. 
132 Ibid. p. 247. 
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In comparison, his later writings and personal reflections concerning Stalin are 
more critical. For example, in his memoirs, when discussing Stalin’s impact 
upon theoretical research within the party, Schlesinger spoke of his having 
sterilised Marxism.133 This deleterious effect was still being felt many years 
later. However, this was perhaps more to do with Stalin’s attitude towards 
theoretical and academic freedom than his personal theoretical contribution. 
Schlesinger also suggested in later writings that Stalin’s popularisation of 
Marxism could be more correctly described as ‘vulgarisation’. Stalin’s Marxist 
literature simplified theory to an extent that took away its essential elements. 
In his memoirs, Schlesinger spoke of the simplifications and vulgarisations 
inherent in the Short Course.134 Whilst these simplifications may have been 
necessary given the situation in backward Russia, it undoubtedly had a 
negative impact upon Marxist theory. In History of the Communist Party of the 
USSR Schlesinger again referred to Stalin’s simplifications and argued that it 
was self-evident that they would have been, ‘…. subject to criticism after the 
end of his ‘cult’’.135  
 
As can be seen from this brief survey of Schlesinger’s views on Stalin’s 
reputation, there was a discernable change in emphasis in his writings over 
time. Schlesinger’s earlier works were more positive about Stalin, whilst his 
later ones were more condemnatory. However, this was more a matter of tone 
than any real change in attitude. In this respect, his writings on Stalin differ to 
those on Soviet historiography or on Lenin. In the latter two the change in 
interpretation between his early work and that completed after Stalin’s death is 
marked and undeniable, whereas his writings on Stalin display more 
consistency. Whilst his later works may have stressed the vulgarising quality 
of Stalin’s theoretical output this was described alongside, and even as part 
of, the popularisation process that he referred to, and admired, in all writings. 
He also consistently concurred with Stalin’s analysis of Leninism compared 
with others propagated at the same.  
 
                                                
133 See chapter 5, p. 204. 
134 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany, p. 266. 
135 Schlesinger, History of the Communist Party of the USSR, p. 308.  
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One theme to become evident when examining Schlesinger’s attitude towards 
Stalin is the pragmatism that pervades his approach. Recognition of this 
pragmatism is necessary for a proper understanding of Schlesinger’s attitude 
to all aspects of Marxism and the Soviet Union but it is particularly apparent in 
his work on Stalinism and Stalin’s theoretical and political impact. For 
Schlesinger, Stalin was a terror who had a detrimental impact on much of the 
Soviet Union. However, at the same time, he was able to bring about the 
essential transfer of generations to continue the revolutionary tasks. As well 
as overcoming the problems of erroneous schools of thought of the previous 
Soviet period, Stalin’s leadership, in thrusting a backward country through 
industrialisation and collectivisation in a few short years, was of paramount 
importance in guaranteeing the survival of the great experiment. Whatever 
Stalin’s negative aspects and whatever the negative consequences of his 
leadership, factors which Schlesinger never denied, he took the pragmatic 
stance that they were an unfortunate consequence of necessary processes. 
This pragmatism is best illustrated with reference to Schlesinger’s attitude 
towards ‘socialism in one country’ and the purges.  
 
In the absence of the anticipated European revolutions, discussion in Russia 
inevitably turned to the fate of an isolated Soviet state. The topic became 
increasingly important after the failure of the revolutionary movement in 
Germany after 1923. The years from 1924 onwards saw much debate within 
the Soviet government on whether socialism in one country, and a backward 
one in particular, was possible. Could Soviet Russia survive in isolation and, 
even if it could, was it possible to build or complete socialism in a single 
country?136 Some, such as Trotsky, argued that capitalist restoration was 
almost inevitable without other socialist revolutions. It was necessarily 
impossible to attempt socialist reconstruction within a single country.137 In 
contrast, Stalin and Bukharin argued that a complete socialist society in an 
isolated nation was indeed viable. The discussion ended when Stalin’s theory 
                                                
136 For more information on the theory of ‘socialism in one country’ and the debates 
surrounding it see E. Van Ree, ‘Socialism in One Country: A Reassessment’, Studies in East 
European Thought, 50, 2, June 1998, pp. 77-117.  
137 Schlesinger wrote briefly about Trotsky’s attitude to an isolated Russia in his memoirs. See 
Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers Machtübernahme, pp. 217… and Schlesinger, In a 
Time of Struggle: Whither Germany?, pp. 283… 
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of ‘socialism in one country’ became the official party doctrine at the 14th Party 
Congress in April 1925. The classic exposition of the theory was presented a 
year later in Stalin’s ‘Concerning the Questions of Leninism’. Stalin argued 
that ‘socialism in one country’ was, 
 
… the possibility of solving the contradictions between the 
proletariat and the peasantry by means of the internal forces of 
our country, the possibility of the proletariat seizing power and 
using that power to build a complete socialist society in our 
country, with the sympathy and the support of the proletarians of 
other countries, but without preliminary victory of the proletarian 
revolution in other countries.138 
 
 Henceforth, the Communist party argued that the building of socialism was 
possible in Russia, whether she remained isolated or not. According to E. Van 
Ree: ‘From then on the future of an isolated bolshevik Russia was 
summarised in two possibilities: either complete socialism or collapse under 
military intervention, and the first alternative was deemed highly probable’.139  
 
Whether it was possible to achieve socialism in an isolated country or not, 
Schlesinger was certain that this had not taken place under Stalin. He wrote in 
the lectures, ‘…. when Stalin died the construction of socialism – in any sense 
acceptable to normal socialists as distinct, of course, from state ideology – 
was not yet completed [,] while Soviet Russia’s isolation had already ended 
eight years before’.140 However, he agreed that this was what a Soviet country 
should aim for. Schlesinger felt ‘socialism in one country’ had been socially 
useful and politically expedient, displaying a pragmatic appraisal of developing 
Bolshevik theory.  
 
Schlesinger’s pragmatism was in contrast to, and perhaps in reaction against, 
the utopianism he saw in many communists and commentators. He believed 
                                                
138 Stalin, Sochineniia, 8, pp. 13-90 at p. 65. See also Stalin, ‘The Results of the Work of the 
Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.).’, Sochineniia, 7, pp. 90-132 esp. pp. 109-121. 
139 Van Ree, ‘Socialism in One Country: A Reassessment’, p. 105. 
140 Schlesinger, Lectures, 9, p. 4. 
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that ‘socialism in one country’ was the correct theory for that time, in 
opposition to utopians who argued that it deviated from the classical Marxist 
perspective and insisted it was better that a capitalist restoration occurred until 
such time as the subjective conditions ripened for the final revolutionary wave. 
Schlesinger did not believe that the great socialist success should be 
abandoned simply because it deviated from the Marxist classics. More 
importantly, he believed that his great mentor, Lenin, would not have 
abandoned Russia. Schlesinger made this clear in a paper published in 1965. 
He argued that it was unlikely Lenin had thought seriously about the possibility 
of socialism in an isolated country. However, he continued, ‘…. surely he 
would not have left, as Trotsky later suggested, the Russian revolution in the 
lurch when the west European part of the revolutionary perspective failed to 
realize’.141 If Lenin could become convinced of the possibility of an isolated 
Soviet Russia’s survival, Schlesinger was likely to follow suit. 
 
Schlesinger frequently emphasised Lenin’s writings from immediately before 
his death. These works appeared to indicate Lenin’s recognition of Russia’s 
opportunity to build socialism. According to Van Ree: ‘In the last years of his 
life Lenin became even more optimistic on the perspectives of socialism in 
Russia’.142 He pointed to Lenin’s article ‘On Cooperation’ as significant in this 
respect, writing: 
 
 In his 1923 article Lenin accomplished a shift in definition. He 
defined co-operative property on land owned by a proletarian 
state as socialist, and as ‘completely socialist’ for that matter…. 
Now, once this system was defined as a fully socialist one, the 
creation of a ‘complete socialist society’ in backward Russia was 
at one stroke deemed possible.143 
 
                                                
141 Schlesinger, ‘Lenin as a Member of the International Socialist Bureau’, p. 458. 
142 Van Ree, ‘Socialism in One Country: A Reassessment’, p. 95. 
143 Ibid. p. 96. 
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Lenin would, thus, appear to have come close to the conclusion Stalin was to 
advocate.144 In fact, Stalin frequently cited this article in order to confer 
Leninist legitimacy upon his theory.145  
 
Schlesinger stated in one of his encyclopaedia articles that Lenin’s 
conceptions of the party and the development of capital in Russia had created 
the prerequisites for the development of the theory of ‘socialism in one 
country’.146 He also described ‘On Cooperation’ as significant and pointed out 
that Lenin was concerned with the development of peasant cooperatives in 
order to build towards socialism.147 
 
He made the same point in History of the Communist Party of the USSR, once 
again asserting Lenin’s later faith in the prospects for Soviet Russia. He 
argued: 
 
 Lenin believed that the State industry could not only be restored 
after the devastations of the war and hold its own in competition 
with private enterprise, but also eventually move the peasant 
economy forward on socialist lines if proper relationships 
(smychka) with the peasants were established. In his last 
articles, written during his illness, Lenin elaborated on the 
theme: with political power in the hands of the Soviets, 
agricultural co-operation might provide a transition to socialist 
forms of production accessible to the peasants’ 
understanding.148 
 
                                                
144 Lenin had argued that an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry, combined 
with state ownership of the means of production made possible the construction of socialism 
out of cooperatives: ‘Is this not all that is necessary to build a complete socialist society?’ 
(Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 45, p. 370). 
145 For example, Stalin in his 1926 defence of ‘socialism in one country’ argued, ‘… we can 
and must build a complete socialist society, for we have at our disposal all that is necessary 
and sufficient for this building’, with reference to Lenin’s article (Stalin, Sochineniia, 8, p. 70). 
146 Schlesinger, ‘Lenin, W.J.’, p. 584. 
147 See chapter 3, p. 114. 
148 Schlesinger, History of the Communist Party of the USSR, pp 209-10.  
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Schlesinger also argued in his lecture series that Lenin, by the end of his life, 
had envisaged the need for the Russian revolution to survive in isolation.149 
This focus on Lenin’s later writings and the assertion of an optimistic approach 
to Russia’s fate and the prospects for socialist development suggests that 
Schlesinger saw continuity between Lenin and Stalin. It appeared to validate 
the theory of ‘socialism in one country’ for Schlesinger and he seems to have 
been keen to demonstrate this. 
 
Schlesinger had sympathy with the theory and seems to have believed that it 
was correct for the time, but he disagreed with Stalin’s apparent confidence in 
the near certain victory of full socialist construction. Yet Schlesinger believed 
in the efficacy of ‘socialism in one country’. He understood its usefulness and 
purpose, not necessarily as a theory of intellectual and philosophical validity 
but as a motivating, positive message to a tired society facing an enormous 
task and potentially disillusioned by the absence of international support. It 
harnessed energy and focused workers on the tasks of industrialisation and 
construction that lay before them.  
 
This aspect of Schlesinger’s thought was clearly expressed in History of the 
Communist Party of the USSR. Schlesinger wrote: ‘Whatever its shortcomings 
(Stalin died before socialism was completed in his country and a second world 
power establishing socialism was in existence), it was useful in rejecting 
pessimism or adventurism caused by the temporary isolation of the Russian 
revolution’.150 ‘Socialism in one country’ inspired party members and gave 
them a purpose, one of great historical and revolutionary significance. 
According to Schlesinger, ‘... Stalin inspired the new cadres by showing them 
that the worker’s everyday job was part of a great historical process’.151 He 
went further, arguing that the theory facilitated the great leaps Soviet society 
was to make in the coming years. He insisted that Stalin’s concept, ‘… served 
as the intellectual skeleton for the earlier stages of the industrialisation 
                                                
149 Schlesinger, Lectures, 9, p. 1.  
150 Schlesinger, History of the Communist Party of the USSR, p. 225. 
151 Ibid. p. 228. 
 177 
process’.152 Similarly, in the lectures, Schlesinger emphasised the motivating 
intention behind the concept, and did so with approval. He wrote, ‘… it served 
the purpose of maintaining confidence and encouraging maximum efforts 
during the period of the temporary isolation of the Russian revolution’.153 
Schlesinger’s main concern when assessing the theory was its efficacy, its 
utility. If ‘socialism in one country’ served to encourage and motivate the 
Soviet people then it did not particularly matter if the theory was correct or not. 
Such a pragmatic stance was natural for a Marxist of Schlesinger’s type. 
Marxist theory was supposed to promote action and Schlesinger judged 
theories and policies in this respect. 
 
This same pragmatism is visible in Schlesinger’s attitude towards the purges 
and Stalin’s leadership in general. Throughout his writings, Schlesinger 
pointed to the barbarism and extra-judicial nature of the purges.154 But, in 
general, he seems to have viewed them as a necessary evil. Schlesinger 
certainly did not deny the nature or scale of the purges and his distaste was 
made clear in all of his works. He wrote of ‘Lenin’s genial idea’ becoming, ‘…. 
tainted with horror’ under Stalin.155 In the lectures, he described the purges 
thus; 
 
 When, collectivisation being in essentials secured, the XVII 
party Congress tried to call a halt, to open the way to 
reconciliation with the opposition, which now recognised that 
Stalin had been in essentials right, and to replace his individual 
by collective leadership, Stalin proceeded to terror of the most 
brutal kind and destroyed the majority of the Congress 
delegates, of the Central Committee elected by them, of the old 
party and of the army cadres by the infamous procedure known 
as the ‘great purge’’.156  
 
                                                
152 Ibid. p. 440. 
153 Schlesinger, Lectures, 8, p. 12. 
154 See, for example, chapter 1, p. 11. 
155 Schlesinger, History of the Communist Party of the USSR, p. 437. 
156 Schlesinger, Lectures, 9, p. 5. 
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Schlesinger frequently spoke of the horror and brutality of the purges. In The 
History of the Communist Party he referred to, ‘…. the horrible things that had 
happened under Stalin’ and later to, ‘…. the horrible things done by the 
highest authority in the country.157 He also spent some time discussing the 
background to the purge, its procedures, results and what Stalin’s motives 
might have been.158  
 
Yet, Schlesinger emphasised in all of his writings that no matter how terrible 
the purges were, Stalin and his brutal methods were, in some ways, 
necessary. As noted in the introductory chapter, Schlesinger gave some 
indication of this attitude in his memoirs. He wrote: 
 
The ‘purge’ was a violent and to a large extent criminal way of 
carrying out the unavoidable change of generations, to replace 
those whose ways of thought had been nurtured by the need of 
overthrowing the old society by people grown up in the new one 
and knowing no other aims than its gradual strengthening and 
development.159 
 
He indicated that the purges had a purpose; one necessary and unavoidable if 
the Soviet state was to survive. He made further reference to the necessity of 
Stalin and his methods in the lectures. Schlesinger argued that through ‘blood, 
horror and triumphs’, Stalin ‘... fulfilled his historical function’.160 This was a 
deeply pragmatic viewpoint.  
 
According to Schlesinger, the purges had two main consequences, both 
necessary for the survival of the Soviet Union. Firstly, they brought about the 
essential transfer of generations; new, younger workers and party members 
came to the fore in Soviet life in place of Old Bolsheviks who had been 
schooled in revolution but not in state preservation. Secondly, the purges also 
helped prepare the Soviet Union for the upcoming war. In 1950 Schlesinger 
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158 See, in particular, Schlesinger, History of the Communist Party of the USSR, pp. 288…. 
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 179 
wrote: ‘The purges completed Stalin’s triumph over the oppositional factions 
and at the same time created the conditions for preserving national unity even 
in the most difficult moments of the coming crisis’.161 Whilst it could be argued 
the purges decimated the experienced army command and left the nation 
weakened, Schlesinger felt that its unity was strengthened; the purges left it 
better able to survive the difficulties of war.162 In fact, Schlesinger believed 
that the threat of war allowed for the purges to take place. He argued that 
there was no vocal opposition to events because everyone wished to remain 
loyal to a state under threat from foreign countries. Schlesinger wrote, ‘… the 
victims could not even attempt to resist since it was carried out (and, perhaps, 
in Stalin’s subjective mind justified) in the atmosphere of an approaching war 
against a foe still superior in material strength’.163  
 
Although Schlesinger’s pragmatic attitude towards the purges ran through all 
of his writings, a close reading does indicate that Schlesinger believed 
different things at different times. In his earlier works, Schlesinger indicated 
that since it would not have been in the state’s interest to show the hostile 
world its problems through a series of show trials if the accusations were 
exaggerated or fictitious, they must have been, to a large extent, true.164 In his 
review article of 1950 Schlesinger also referred to the existence of at least, 
‘…. some conspiracy’, although he did add that not all of the facts were yet 
known.165 This is in stark contrast to his later works, written once the true 
nature of the purges was established. In his memoirs, Schlesinger made clear 
that his former beliefs were erroneous; the majority of the charges were, in 
fact, ‘trumped up’.166 He also stated in The History of the Communist Party 
that the Soviet Union and the party suffered as a result of the purges, not 
simply in terms of human suffering, which could be taken for granted, but in 
terms of prestige, confidence and the quality of party membership. 
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Schlesinger wrote: ‘The result was the party’s loss, not just of the hidden 
oppositionist or at least of the Belorussian Old Bolshevik…but also of the 
average worker’.167 Further in the same chapter he made a similar point: 
‘Even the supervisory – not to speak of the democratic – functions of the party 
machine, were undermined by the ‘purge’’.168 However, his final judgement on 
the purges remained pragmatic. They were a ‘tragic episode’ and 
‘unavoidable’. Schlesinger felt he was correct not to let his attitude towards 
the Soviet Union be altered or determined by such an unfortunate event.169 
 
Schlesinger displayed a pragmatic attitude towards Stalin and his rule in 
general. No matter what his negative characteristics and the detrimental 
impact he had upon the Soviet Union, his policies and leadership were 
essential for its survival and further development. Stalin’s methods may have 
been brutal but he solved problems.170 In his encyclopaedia article, 
Schlesinger insisted that Stalin enabled Russia to overcome fifty to a hundred 
years of backwardness in just ten short years. This achievement was the main 
reason for his enormous authority and made his brutal crushing of resistance 
acceptable to the party and Soviet public.171 Schlesinger repeatedly referred 
to Stalin’s achievements and the fact that he was able to do more than even 
he had set out to do. Writing about Stalin’s formulation of ‘socialism in one 
country’ in the early 1920s in The History of the Communist Party, Schlesinger 
argued: 
 
 The conditions for Soviet Russia’s security against external 
threats and fulfilling her functions as a centre of socialist 
reconstruction were formulated in very ambitious terms, which 
however are low compared with what has been achieved since: 
fifteen to twenty million industrial workers (in comparison with 
the four million available in those days), electrification of the 
main industrial regions, cooperative organisation (without further 
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specification) of agriculture, and a well-developed metal 
industry.172 
 
He repeated the sentiment in the lectures, arguing that Stalin’s plans had 
been ambitious but were far below what was actually attained before his 
death.173  
 
Schlesinger’s pragmatism allowed him to take a long-term perspective when 
judging Stalin and his legacy. Although there was suffering and brutality, 
Stalin’s successes were vital to the continued development and survival of the 
Soviet Union; in this respect he was as significant as Lenin. He summarised 
their achievements in respect of the Soviet Union thus: 
 
 … Lenin by tremendous will-power, had introduced the NEP, 
and thereby saved the Russian revolution from breaking at the 
point where the Jacobin dictatorship had fallen in 1795…Stalin, 
by a combination of soberness and brutality, had given that 
decision a content which has turned the isolated Soviet Union 
into one of the ‘big two’, and what otherwise would have been a 
gigantic Paris Commune in to the start of a new phase of human 
political and social organisation.174 
 
The two leaders may have taken decisions and developed policies that veered 
away from accepted theory and ideology but this was due to the exigencies of 
circumstance. To Schlesinger, Marxism was an active theory intended to 
transform society, its dialectical quality insisted that it change as 
circumstances did. Compromises and unpleasant but necessary decisions 
were simply part of that developing theory and methodology. Lenin and Stalin 
were doing what was necessary to maintain Marxism’s relevance and viability. 
To baulk at the more brutal consequences of Stalin’s rule or to turn away from 
the Soviet Union, as the embodiment of socialist hope, was utopian and 
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therefore erroneous. In one of his final writings, Schlesinger confirmed his 
opinion of Stalin, arguing that he was, ‘…a man whose whole political life can 
be brought under the heading that he tried to bring Utopia into the realm of 
what he deemed realistic policies’.175 
 
This apparent pragmatism of Schlesinger’s helps to explain the 
inconsistencies in his attitudes and writings over time. The preservation of the 
Soviet Union was more important than any short-term humanitarian concerns 
and Stalin was essential for that preservation. Schlesinger would inevitably 
defend him against critics if he believed in the necessity of his rule. 
Unpleasant decisions had to be made if the Soviet Union was to continue to 
develop and Schlesinger, ever practical, understood and even praised those 
decisions. Perhaps his earlier writings were positive about the Soviet Union 
for this reason. 
 
In addition, it is clear from Schlesinger’s work on Stalin that he was not fully 
aware of events during Stalin’s rule until after the leader’s death. This helps to 
explain the change in attitude noticeable in his later works. Schlesinger may 
have been shocked to hear of the scale of Stalin’s crimes and this would 
affect his judgement. Stalin was now condemned and Schlesinger was more 
negative about his leadership. However, Schlesinger may also have simply 
altered his attitude pragmatically as circumstances developed. What was now 
necessary for the Soviet Union was a ‘de-Stalinisation’, the recognition of the 
excesses and brutality of the Stalin period and the ability to learn from them 
and continue forwards. Schlesinger now supported such action. 
 
Finally, before concluding this part of the thesis, it is necessary to turn briefly 
to Schlesinger’s attitude towards that other notable personality and Marxist 
theoretician in early Soviet rule, Trotsky. Schlesinger wrote a great deal on 
Lenin and Stalin but rarely mentioned Trotsky, although it is possible to 
discern his attitude from his occasional references. For the most part, 
whenever Schlesinger did write about Trotsky it was in a negative light. This 
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was especially true when Schlesinger compared Trotsky’s actions and 
thoughts to Lenin’s. For example, when discussing the German and Russian 
peace negotiations of 1918 in The History of the Communist Party, 
Schlesinger argued that Lenin made full use of all propaganda opportunities 
available at Brest-Litovsk. He continued; ‘However, he never went as far as 
letting the Germans have an excuse for breaking the armistice, which is what 
actually happened as a result of Trotsky’s proclamation of ‘neither war nor 
peace’’.176 Later in the same work he again criticised Trotsky, this time in 
regard to international developments of Autumn 1927: ‘When the Chinese 
events were followed by the Arcos raid, the British Government’s breaking off 
of diplomatic relations and the assassination of the Soviet ambassador in 
Warsaw, a demonstration of national and communist unity was clearly 
required. But Trotsky drew the opposite conclusion’.177 Trotsky’s judgement 
was frequently flawed and Schlesinger clearly disapproved of his actions. 
 
Ultimately, Schlesinger would always disagree with Trotsky and side with 
Lenin and later Stalin. The advocate and pragmatist would concur with those 
who strove for the continued survival of the Soviet Union, even if this was at 
the expense of lofty, classical principles. Trotsky, in his dogged commitment 
to internationalism and his willingness to sacrifice all of the gains of the 
Russian revolution proved himself to be a utopian. Schlesinger would 
inevitably compare Trotsky’s attitude towards an isolated Soviet Russia 
unfavourably with Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’.178 In fact, in Marx His 
Time and Ours, Schlesinger went so far as to argue: ‘Trotskyism is the natural 
punishment for the utopian elements in Marxism’, making his views on the 
subject quite clear.179 Schlesinger argued that utopianism was necessary in 
the initial stages of a revolution; however, 
 
 … this holds true only during the preparatory stage and up to 
the culmination of a revolutionary wave; from that moment 
onwards the utopia, because it transcends not only actual but 
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also possible reality, is bound to serve as a mere pious hope, as 
an ideological explanation of the existing society, if not as a 
weapon of counter-revolutionary attack upon the actual results 
of the social transformation because they have failed to come 
up to the utopian standard. It is this mechanism that stood 
behind all the disputes between Stalinists and Trotskyists.180 
 
Trotsky was utopian and judged Soviet society from this perspective. In this 
respect he was counter-revolutionary.  
 
Schlesinger also criticised Trotsky for his part in the development of a 
particular brand of history, a Western, ‘Trotskyist’ version of events that 
distorted and even falsified. In this respect, he was similar to Stalin and the 
conscious development of his own version of events. Schlesinger argued that 
when investigating Stalin’s actions,  
 
… the historian is virtually restricted to two primary sources, the 
works of Stalin himself and his closest circle of friends, and 
those of his main antagonist, Trotsky … Both sources are 
partisan, and there is no a priori reason to ascribe to either an 
interest in establishing a historical truth above and independent 
of political implications.181 
 
Both were concerned with ensuring their historical legacy. In another work, 
Schlesinger again compared the attempts of both Stalin and Trotsky to 
monopolise history’s judgement. He argued, ‘…much of Stalin’s and Trotsky’s 
assertions about the horrible crimes committed by the other in the years 1917-
1919 belong to the realm of factional mythology’.182 Schlesinger held Trotsky 
responsible for a number of misconceptions of Soviet history prevalent in the 
West. He wrote; ‘Like everything connected with Stalin’s career, Lenin’s article 
‘Better Fewer but Better’ has been interpreted, particularly in publications 
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influenced by Trotsky’s writings, as part of a struggle allegedly waged by 
Lenin against Stalin’s ascendancy’.183 However, he was equally critical of 
official Soviet attempts to expunge Trotsky from the historical record.184 
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Part Two: Schlesinger and Soviet 
Historiography 
 
It seems quite clear from the volume of work produced by Schlesinger that the 
subject of Soviet historiography held an intense interest for him. Part two of 
the thesis concentrates upon his writings on this topic. Due to the 
overdeterminist assumptions of the investigation, such an approach throws 
light not just upon on Schlesinger’s attitude towards the subject in question 
but also his thoughts on fundamental aspects of the Soviet Union as well as 
that society itself.  
 
Schlesinger’s analyses closely corresponded to official Soviet interpretations. 
He provided a reasonably positive portrayal of Soviet historiography during 
Stalin’s time; a portrayal that was deeply at odds with his personal experience 
of intellectual life in Stalin’s Russia. However, he retrospectively condemned 
the academic atmosphere following Stalin’s death. He appeared to wholly 
endorse, and in fact performed his own, de-Stalinisation.  
 
The first chapter of the section appraises Schlesinger’s own experience of life 
as an intellectual in the Soviet Union. An examination of his unpublished 
memoirs provides a detailed insight into his activities as well as his opinions, 
both at the time and later when writing about them. The next chapter provides 
an outline of Schlesinger’s writing on Soviet historiography up to Stalin’s 
death in 1953. Finally, the attitudes and interpretations discerned in his earlier 
works are compared to those in his later papers concerning Soviet 
historiography, those written and published after Stalin’s death. 
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Chapter Five: Schlesinger’s personal 
experiences as an academic in Stalin’s Soviet 
Union 
 
Schlesinger visited the Soviet Union on three occasions, from 1926 to 1927, 
in the summer of 1931 and finally from early 1935 to the winter of 1936/7. His 
first and last stays in Russia were for extended periods during which 
Schlesinger was employed in an academic or intellectual capacity. In 1926 
Schlesinger moved to Moscow in order to work as the German representative 
for the newly established International Agrarian Institute on the 
recommendation of Eugene Varga. Like many of his comrades Schlesinger 
was induced to move to Russia by the KPD in order to ‘sit out his uklon’, 
deviation from the part line of the majority.1 Deviationists were sent to Russia 
to be schooled by the Bolsheviks and to correct their theoretical positions or 
await a time when their own position became that of the party majority. He 
returned to Germany in April 1927 having made the necessary adjustments to 
his theoretical line on agrarian matters. In 1935 Schlesinger again returned to 
the Soviet Union and found work as the editor of the German edition of the 
official Comintern publication Communist International.  He remained 
employed by Comintern headquarters until his investigation and subsequent 
branding as ‘alien to the party’ in summer 1936. 
 
Schlesinger wrote extensively of his experience of working in Russia in his 
unfinished memoirs. He described in detail the nature of his work, the kind of 
atmosphere in which it was undertaken and his own feelings about the events 
that he witnessed or participated in. His memoirs, therefore, comprise a new 
and insightful source for the better understanding of the intellectual climate in 
Russia at those times. They also provide a much more personal context from 
which Schlesinger’s academic writings on Soviet historiography can be 
understood. As well as contextualising his work, they offer an opportunity to 
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compare his personal reflections and experiences as an intellectual in the 
Soviet Union with his later academic works on Soviet intellectual life and 
progress. One can contrast the ‘objective’ approach of his later writings on 
Soviet historiography with the inherently ‘subjective’ nature of his personal 
autobiographical reflections; something which will allow for a deeper 
understanding and critique of both. 
 
Schlesinger was not involved in historical research in any capacity whilst in 
the Soviet Union. His memoir reflections do not, therefore, involve the same 
intellectual climate of which he was to write when describing Soviet 
historiography. However, Schlesinger was involved in academic or intellectual 
work in both of his extended visits to the Soviet Union and can, thus, offer 
broad insights into the general intellectual atmosphere of the time. His 
memoirs offer the opportunity to compare the constraints placed upon 
intellectuals working for the Party and those nominally outside its sphere. In 
addition, Schlesinger provided information in his unfinished memoirs on the 
influence of the Soviet Union, and its attitude towards research and 
intellectual activities, upon communist parties in the West, the KPD in 
particular.  
 
Schlesinger could have been a historian in Stalin’s Russia. He was offered a 
post at the Marx-Engels Institute on arrival in Moscow in 1935 on the 
recommendation of the KPD Central Committee. Schlesinger declined the 
offer in favour of work at Comintern headquarters after being informed by the 
Institute that his work there would have predominantly involved critical 
revisions of Marx’s manuscripts, something Schlesinger was most 
unenthusiastic about. However, he later argued, 
 
… if gifted with the art of prophecy (as regards the ‘great purge’ 
as well as regards the future position of research workers)… I 
would have accepted the job, would have somehow fulfilled my 
obligations to Marx’s manuscript, and divided my spare time 
between some literary work for the German C.P and the writing 
of some serious historical book in Russian, to prepare for my 
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desertion from the Marx-Engels Institute to a chair for modern 
German history at some Soviet university.2 
 
This statement suggests that Schlesinger believed, with hindsight, that the 
historian’s life was not quite so controlled as that of the party academic’s. He 
believed he could have maintained his KPD role and a research post if the 
Institute, as opposed to Comintern, had initially employed him. His 
disillusionment with the limited intellectual work granted to him as a Comintern 
editor and his subsequent investigation and dismissal would not, in these 
circumstances, have occurred. In fact, later in his memoirs Schlesinger wrote 
that the historical field was ‘remote from the field of actual political struggle’.3  
 
This attitude perhaps helps to decipher the apparent inconsistency between 
Schlesinger’s personal memoir reflections upon the stifling intellectual 
environment existing within Stalin’s Soviet Union during his visits, and the 
arguably positive perception of research within the historical field that he 
wrote about immediately after his expulsion. If Schlesinger regarded the two 
working environments as very different he would not view his personal 
experience of one as providing a great deal of information about the other. 
Condemnation of one would not necessarily involve the censure of all work 
completed in the other. Yet one is able to perceive broad trends within the 
intellectual world of the Soviet Union in Schlesinger’s personal writings. If 
nothing else, his reflections help to create an understanding of the nature of 
the society in which the Soviet historians’ research was undertaken.4 It is 
argued here that Schlesinger’s memoir observations do throw significant light 
on the intellectual and cultural environment in which the historians whom he 
later wrote about undertook their research. This creates a problematic 
contradiction between his positive comments on the kind of work these 
historians were able to successfully complete and the not too severe 
restraints on freedom placed upon them by the state and the party, and his 
own personal experience of curtailment of academic freedom and a speedy 
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realisation of the very limited opportunity for real intellectual activities.  
 
Whilst working for the International Agrarian Institute (IAI) Schlesinger gained 
his first experiences of Soviet life as an intellectual. The Institute was founded 
in 1926 in Moscow and was envisaged as the research centre for the Peasant 
International. According to the historian of Soviet agricultural research, S. 
Gross Solomon: ‘The new Institute had a broad mandate: the study of social 
relations in agriculture throughout the world. In keeping with that mandate, the 
membership of the Institute included many specialists of foreign agriculture’.5 
Although the IAI was officially attached to the Peasants’ International, 
Schlesinger described this institution as being more a fiction than a reality and 
his only relationship to it was restricted to participation in the meetings of its 
party nucleus.6 Yet, Schlesinger insisted that the IAI was a ‘proper’ scientific 
institution that conducted research it found necessary and useful. Its work 
often overlapped with that of the Communist Academy whose superiority was 
evident in ‘…purely theoretical issues and, also later in the practical problems 
of Russian collectivisation’.7 Despite this theoretical superiority and the very 
different conditions within Russian and German agriculture, Schlesinger found 
discussions between the two institutions to be convivial and academically 
fruitful.  
 
His memoirs praised the openness and comradeship pervading many of the 
scholarly discussions he was involved in, including those organised by 
Comintern. Schlesinger was able to attend the talks of the Commission of 
Agrarian Policies in the VIII Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the ECCI in 
December 1927. These talks centred on whether to support the establishment 
of peasant parties in capitalist countries.8 Yet despite the open nature of these 
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talks, Schlesinger made clear that he, and many others, preferred to debate 
agrarian problems in private talks connected to their work rather than in 
official party meetings, since most of their opinions differed somewhat from 
the party line. Whilst suggesting that differences of opinion were tolerated 
within the party and discussions of these differences did take place, 
Schlesinger’s assertion also seems to indicate a reluctance to air openly 
many of these debates and perhaps suggests a fear of reprisals. In fact, 
Schlesinger explained that shortly after these discussions, party orthodoxy 
was transformed into a, ‘…catechism published as a pamphlet’.9 Everyone 
learned the appropriate answers in order to recite them if their party nucleus 
was ever investigated for unorthodoxy. This was done to facilitate the smooth 
playing of everyone’s parts in the ‘required comedy’ since hardly anyone 
would have met the catechism’s demands if they were to answer sincerely.10 
This episode suggests a requirement, by the party, of uniformity of opinion 
and severe limitation of genuine discussion. Schlesinger did point out that 
even those people who were in general agreement with the party majority, as 
regards the agrarian question, strongly disagreed with this kind of discipline, 
yet he gave no evidence of the numbers that felt this or how their disapproval 
was expressed. 
 
Schlesinger’s own work at this time focused on the agrarian problems of 
Central and Western Europe, and in particular the agrarian problems within 
the German labour movement. He had his own sub-department within the IAI 
and his own librarian, Stalin’s wife Allilueva. Schlesinger noted positively in his 
memoirs, ‘… not withstanding all political differences, the impression was in 
favour not only of her but also of her husband and of the Russian party’s 
general setting’.11  The main body of the work Schlesinger produced in 
Moscow became a book entitled The Agrarian Problem in German Social 
Democracy. It was published in Russia two years after Schlesinger’s return to 
Germany. Schlesinger described the difficulties he faced in securing the 
royalties owed to him from the IAI after his book’s publication. He had to 
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involve his former Soviet trade union and allow them to sue the Institute on his 
behalf. This in no way altered his relationship to the IAI. As Schlesinger wrote, 
‘... lawsuits were regarded as a means of pressure necessary to get from the 
State Bank the foreign currency necessary to pay royalties to Germany’.12 
 
There was, however, a more serious political dispute which arose during the 
process of publication. The IAI, whom Schlesinger described as being near to 
the Russian right wing, chose the KPD member August Thalheimer as one of 
the book’s critics.13 According to Schlesinger, Thalheimer was ‘… the main 
theorist of Brandler’s group and hence one of my most outspoken factional 
opponent[s]’.14 The other reviewer was Fritz Platten, Lenin’s friend from the 
Zimmerwald days, who wrote a favourable critique of the book.15 When the 
Institute published the book they did so together with a preface repeating 
many of Thalheimer’s general criticisms. Schlesinger understood these 
criticisms to be that he had failed to side unreservedly with ‘orthodox 
Marxism’. He felt that the IAI were being overly cautious in their treatment of 
his publication since Thalheimer had already been expelled from the KPD at 
this point, but unfortunately ‘… such incidents were unavoidable by-products 
of the prevailing confusion between scholarly and factional activities’.16  This 
incident can serve as an example of the kind of difficulty that scholars and 
intellectuals could encounter in the publication of their research; orthodoxy 
was of paramount importance. Schlesinger admitted that factionalism 
increasingly played a part in academic activities. However, whatever criticism, 
fair or unfair, Schlesinger’s book was subjected to, it was eventually 
published, suggesting that any atmosphere of intellectual repression was not 
at this point all pervasive.  
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The drafts of Schlesinger’s memoirs contain many general observations on 
the nature of Soviet society during his first visit to the region. As a keen 
sociologist Schlesinger consciously endeavoured to establish a picture of 
society, including the attitudes and educational levels of average workers. His 
party links with the German Club provided him access to the KPD group 
involved in studying factory relations. This ‘circle’ was attached to a Moscow 
textile factory and allowed for his participation in regular ‘triangle meetings’ in 
the factory between the manager, the party organiser and the trade union 
organiser.17 Schlesinger believed that these experiences, amongst others, 
enabled him to create a relatively sound understanding of Soviet society. He 
wrote: ‘I would definitely say that, in those days, party members, even 
foreigners, of a certain experience and standing got an honest and fairly 
complete picture of the problems and difficulties arising in Soviet life’.18 It is 
clear that Schlesinger was assured of his reasonably accurate portrayal of the 
Soviet Union. However, this strong assertion should perhaps be questioned, 
especially since Schlesinger admitted that he could not say whether his 
experience within the textile factory had been typical, or particularly 
representative of Soviet industrial life.19  
 
Schlesinger claimed that the average Russian industrial worker was 
overwhelmingly superior to the average Western working class activist in 
terms of intellectual development. Yet many in the Soviet Union remained at a 
very poor educational level. This fact determined some of the developments in 
the tone of Soviet literature in the previous years. As Schlesinger argued:  
 
It is ridiculous to put Stalin’s Short Course on the History of the 
CPSU (quite apart from its factual errors and distortions), and a 
whole lot of other publications which preceded and followed it, 
on a level with the classics of Marxist literature – but if one has 
seen Russia before and during the collectivisation, one 
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understands how and why Marxism was simplified – and, of 
course, vulgarised – to such an extent as was done.20  
 
An atmosphere in which it was necessary, and perhaps a state priority, to 
‘vulgarise’ literature could indeed appear to be stifling for an intellectual. 
Certain constraints were placed on publications and these would inevitably 
limit vocabulary and the sophistication of argument. However, whilst admitting 
the ‘distortions’ in much of the literature, Schlesinger’s pragmatic justification 
of the need to simplify helps to explain his initially more positive assessment 
of Soviet historiography once exiled from the Soviet Union. 
 
Schlesinger’s memoir observations provide evidence of the influence the 
intellectual environment in the Soviet Union had on western communist 
parties. In late 1931 Schlesinger and Mila became very active within an 
educational circle they had helped to establish in Berlin. The circle was 
composed of teachers from the higher party schools: members of the KPD’s 
Education Department; people such as Schlesinger and Fritz David, whose 
party work was mainly editorial, and educationalists such as Johannes 
Schmidt, head of the Berlin ‘Marxist Workers’ High School’.21 The circle spent 
its time formulating party school programmes, airing theoretical debates within 
a relatively free environment and planning for the publication of annotated 
Marxist classics. However, Schlesinger admitted in his memoirs: ‘An 
institution such as our circle was bound to become a victim of the 
authoritarian trends within the party’.22 The Party Secretariat closed down the 
circle immediately after the publication of Stalin’s famous letter to 
Proletarskaia revoliutsiia in 1931.23 It was in this letter that Stalin insisted 
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certain matters were not open to historical debate but were, in fact, axiomatic. 
Schlesinger pointed out that the circle was not involved in the immediate 
subject of the letter. Yet, Schlesinger observed, ‘… beyond its immediate 
subject Stalin’s letter was intended to prevent theoretical research from being 
carried out otherwise than under the immediate control of the political 
leadership – and from this standpoint our circle surely left much to be 
desired’.24 Schlesinger recognised the great impact Stalin’s letter and attitude 
had had upon his own opportunity to create theoretical work and debate 
contentious issues. It placed limitations upon the kind of work that could 
henceforth be undertaken and upon the appropriate channels through which 
research could be conducted. Schlesinger argued that Stalin’s influence was 
felt strongly and immediately within the KPD. He noted: ‘Stalin…by his letter 
to the Editor of Proletskaya Revolutsia had opened his ‘offensive on the 
theoretical front’ against hidden Trotskyites. The party’s internal life was 
already Russified to such an extent that no one was astonished about the 
example being followed by the leader of the German party’.25 Thälmann 
instantly launched his own ‘theoretical offensive’ within the party, curbing 
debate and closing discussion groups such as Schlesinger’s educational 
circle.  
 
Schlesinger’s portrayal of the ‘russification’ of the German party at this time as 
well as the subservience of Thälmann to his Soviet masters is substantiated 
by many other sources. As the wife of Eugene Leviné and later Ernst Meyer, 
two key figures within the party, Rosa Leviné-Meyer was in a good position 
from which to report on German affairs. Concerning his assumption of the 
KPD leadership in 1926 she wrote: ‘Thaelmann was much better suited to the 
role of puppet. In a private talk with Ernst, he said he would surround himself 
with a set of secretaries, including Ernst, to work for him. ‘The policy will come 
from Moscow anyhow’, he concluded wisely’.26 Later in her memoirs, referring 
                                                
24 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany, p. 440. 
25 Ibid. p. 454. Author’s transliteration. 
26 R. Leviné-Meyer, Inside German Communism, (Pluto Press, London, 1977) p. 93. Leviné-
Meyer’s second husband Ernst Meyer (1887-1930) was a member of the KPD politburo from 
1920 until January 1923. He was re-elected in 1927 but due to his anti-Thälmann position he 
was removed from all party functions in June 1929, shortly before his death from tuberculosis 
(Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, pp. 312-3). She was 
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to the KPD leaders of 1928, including Thälmann, she observed: ‘They soon 
learned to repeat Stalin’s orders with automatic precision’.27 What the CPSU, 
Comintern and Stalin, in particular, declared, became the final word. 
 
Such statements confirm what Schlesinger had reported of the increasingly 
Soviet controlled and intellectually stifled environment within the party. If 
Stalin’s initiative had had such an impact within the KPD, Schlesinger must 
have been well aware that its repercussions would have been felt even more 
fundamentally within the Soviet Union, thus having a dramatic influence upon 
Soviet historians and their freedom to research and publish. 
 
In 1935 Schlesinger became the editor of the German edition of Comintern’s 
official publication Communist International.28 Fritz David had been the 
German editor but on his promotion to the General Editorial Board he had 
secured his old position for Schlesinger. Although David’s motives for offering 
Schlesinger the job were later questioned on his arrest and trial for terrorism, 
it came as no surprise to Schlesinger that he should be offered the role. There 
were very few Germans in Moscow with both Russian language and editing 
skills. In fact, when political opponents tried to block Schlesinger’s 
appointment, they could find no suitable replacement to suggest.29  
 
According to Schlesinger, the importance of precise formulations within 
Communist International was so great that the Russians were bound to see 
themselves as superior in such matters. The General Editorial Board, 
therefore, comprised of an all-Russian membership, with the exception of 
David who was granted his privileged position due to his great experience in 
Russian matters. This editorial board directly edited the Russian version of 
                                                                                                                                       
also married to Eugen Leviné (1883-1919) a founding member of the KPD and participant in 
the short lived Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919, for which part he was tried and condemned 
to death by the Weimar authorities (Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the 
Comintern, p. 260). 
27 Leviné-Meyer, Inside German Communism, p. 145. Another KPD memoirist, Oskar Hippe, 
wrote of the Stalinisation of the party, viewing the 10th Party Congress of 1925 as the decisive 
turning point away from Leninism and towards Stalinism (O. Hippe, …And Red is the Colour 
of Our Flag (Index Books, London, 1991) trans. A Drummond, p. 92). 
28 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 137. 
29 Ibid. p. 138. 
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Communist International and also undertook all of the political editing. The 
foreign edition editors would then select appropriate material for inclusion in 
their country’s version. Their choice, however, was subject to the General 
Editorial Board’s approval.30 
 
Under these circumstances, Schlesinger very quickly became disillusioned 
with his work at Comintern. As he conceded in his memoirs, there was little 
room for initiative or indeed much real thought on his part at all. He found that 
for weeks on end he might, ‘… have little more to do in my job than to read 
the German newspapers, to check the correctness of the translations from 
Russian’,31 or to give the Board information on some factual German 
questions.32 Schlesinger had taken the post on the assumption that it would 
offer him the opportunity to learn about communist parties in other countries 
and, most importantly, to write articles for the German underground and 
thereby aid clarification of party disputes. On first taking the post at Comintern 
it was still theoretically possible for him to contribute an article to the Russian 
edition, yet as the publication increasingly became seen as the organ for the 
unequivocal exposition of Comintern and the Soviet Union’s official views this 
possibility was gradually reduced to nil.  
 
In the 1920s Schlesinger had written many articles for publication in 
Comintern periodicals. In his memoirs, he argued that he had frequently 
contributed, ‘… on most important questions, without holding any party office 
more senior than that of the chief editor of a Provincial daily and of a member 
of the Provincial Party Secretariat’.33 For example, in early 1929, Schlesinger 
wrote an article on the theoretical foundations of ‘social fascism’, published in 
Communist International.34 In late 1930, Schlesinger was able to offer another 
                                                
30 Ibid. p. 152. 
31 Ibid. p. 153. 
32 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 153. 
33 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 154 and Schlesinger, In a Time of 
Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 152, footnote.  
34 Schlesinger, ‘The Face of German Social Fascism’. In the article Schlesinger argued that 
Germany was becoming characteristic of a fascist state because of monopoly capitalism’s 
tendency to control the state machine directly. The SPD had become a tool of this 
‘fascisation’ and the SPD workers needed to be persuaded that their leaders would turn 
against them in the decisive hour. He argued that the phrase ‘left-wing social fascist’ should 
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contribution to Communist International on the conditions of political mass 
strikes.35 Yet he discovered that, by 1935, there were to be no more 
opportunities for him to publish any named articles, despite having a more 
responsible party post at Comintern headquarters. National party leaders 
were now regarded as the main contributors. However, even the articles of 
major leaders of foreign parties were subject to a great deal of editing. 
According to Schlesinger, there was a tendency, ‘… to regard original work of 
authors – in particular prominent ones – as hooks on which statements, 
regarded as necessary from Comintern’s standpoint, had to be hanged’.36 
This would inevitably create a somewhat stifled intellectual atmosphere and 
would certainly curb inter-party debate. 
 
One feature of Schlesinger’s work as editor was the attention required when 
checking the translation of Russian articles into German. Overlooking a 
mistake that had potential political implications could cost one’s party ticket. 
No mistake was regarded as accidental; an inattentive editor might aid an 
intentionally anti-party translator in distorting the party line.37  
 
A lack of fulfilment in his Comintern work led Schlesinger to seek intellectual 
satisfaction in part-time activities for the German party and in other 
publications. Shortly after his arrival in Moscow, Schlesinger was asked by the 
party publishers to write a book on Nazism, ‘… a systematic critique of the 
social demagogy of the Nazis, for the benefit of the workers who had to fight it 
within the diverse organisations of the ‘Third Empire’’.38 Schlesinger made 
clear in his memoirs that he was not suggesting that his effort was a, ‘…work 
of genius’.39 However, it was the first systematic analysis of Nazi demagogy, 
                                                                                                                                       
be used in terms of insincere Social Democratic leaders but was very much against the 
generalisation of the term. See also Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers 
Machtübernahme, p. 271. 
35 ‘Putting all my emphasis on the distinction between the present economic strikes and the 
political strikes to come I found the former’s main importance in their preparing the way for the 
latter and in the shaping of those mass organs which would be needed in the following and 
more decisive, stages of the German revolution’. Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Bis zu Hitlers 
Machtübernahme, p 318. 
36 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 153. 
37 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 153. 
38 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 156. 
39 Ibid. p. 156. 
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and remained the only one to emerge from within the Marxist camp as far as 
he was aware. According to Schlesinger, had this treatment of the subject 
been published it would have been read four years in advance of the critiques 
of the non-Marxist opponents of Nazism, who inevitably failed to analyse the 
class character of Nazi ideology; such as the fact that Nazi racial theories 
were expressions of class subordination within Germany. Schlesinger 
continued: ‘Yet while our theoretical standpoint allowed us to come out with 
an earlier and more thorough critique of Nazi theories than available to the 
bourgeois anti-Nazis, the publicist setting which was available for the defence 
of this standpoint defeated that theoretical advantage’.40 The intellectual and 
publishing atmosphere was such that a work of tremendous value to the 
German workers and the Marxist camp as a whole remained unpublished. 
 
Schlesinger had finished the manuscript by 1 May 1936 and received a report 
from the party publishers in mid-July. They were not wholly against publishing 
the work but did raise several issues. In October 1936 the manuscript was 
returned, with the comment, ‘… you will understand that its publication is 
impossible in your present circumstances’.41 The publishers were referring to 
the fact that, by now, Schlesinger was under investigation by the party 
because of his connections with David. Schlesinger had already received the 
majority of his payment for the work and he willingly recognised that the party 
publishers had settled the matter on fair terms whilst they could still deal with 
him as a comrade. However, he had not yet been expelled from the party and 
the proceedings against him may have only resulted in a reprimand, yet the 
publishers already felt it necessary to sever their ties with him. Schlesinger 
argued, even if he had been subject to a mere reprimand, the prevailing 
atmosphere would have made it very difficult for the publishers to issue a 
book of his. Schlesinger criticised the environment, ‘… in which the literary 
treatment of a most important issue depended on quite extraneous 
circumstances’.42 This series of events and Schlesinger’s reactions to them 
                                                
40 Ibid. p. 156. 
41 Ibid. p. 157. 
42 Ibid. p. 157 In the first edition of his memoirs Schlesinger did not recount this particular 
incident but did mention that a number of Unter dem Banner des Maxismus was withdrawn 
after just a few copies were distributed in the summer of 1935. It contained an article he had 
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certainly suggest a stifled and intrusive intellectual environment; one that 
would inevitably have impacted upon the quality and academic integrity of 
Soviet historiography. Schlesinger witnessed and was himself subject to the 
state’s increasing control over intellectual life within the Soviet Union. The 
mere instigation of an investigation by the party precluded Schlesinger from 
publishing again.  
 
Schlesinger did, in fact, write a great deal in his memoirs about the negative 
atmosphere that existed for intellectuals and academics in the Soviet Union 
during the times in which he lived there. From a wider perspective, 
Schlesinger understood his private discomfort as the by-product of a certain 
development within the party. This manifested itself in the disappearance of a 
particular kind of intellectual from the political stage: 
 
 Since Rosa Luxemburg’s, and earlier, days a certain type of party 
intellectual, to which I counted myself with pride, had written on the 
assumption that they were responsible for the scholarly qualities of 
their contributions and for their usefulness as incentives to fruitful 
argument: the party as a whole, in which the author played his part as 
one comrade amongst many, had to organise these discussions and 
then to draw the lessons from the exchange of opinions; there was 
nothing inherently wrong in remaining in a minority43 
 
The increasing demand for ideological homogeneity and the limitations 
imposed upon criticism differed starkly with Schlesinger’s conceptions of how 
a Marxist party should operate. In his view, if an author took responsibility for 
the academic integrity of his/her work as well as its efficacy in engendering 
discussion, isolation upon a particular theoretical issue was not a matter for 
investigation or even of much party concern. In a similar way Schlesinger had 
argued, in another section of his unfinished memoirs, that it was the duty of 
                                                                                                                                       
written and Schlesinger wondered if the withdrawal had anything to do with him (Schlesinger, 
Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 156). 
43 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 154. In the first edition of the 
memoirs, Schlesinger makes a similar statement but does not mention Luxemburg 
(Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 154). 
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every Communist to follow unhesitatingly the orders of the Communist world 
party. However, it was also, ‘... every Communist’s obligation to make his 
maximal contribution towards those decisions’, that is: ‘It is the obligation of 
ruthless expression of one’s own opinion and ruthless criticism of one’s own 
as well as of other comrades’ mistakes’.44  
 
If one compares Schlesinger’s own descriptions of what he expected from a 
Marxist party and its state, with his observations on what actually occurred in 
the Soviet Union one can easily understand Schlesinger’s disillusionment with 
the kind of intellectual opportunities available to him. As mentioned earlier, 
Schlesinger may have separated his own experiences from those of people 
working within the historical field but he can hardly have denied that the party, 
and in particular Stalin’s, increasingly total opposition to dissent of any kind 
was inevitably to have huge repercussions on all sections of Soviet society. 
The party and state exercised significant control over all academic subjects 
and the study of history, necessarily of great importance to a state with 
Marxist-Leninist aspirations, would, therefore, be particularly heavily 
regulated. This was increasingly so after Stalin’s personal intervention in the 
historical debate in 1931.45 It is difficult to accept that someone with the 
insight and intelligence of Schlesinger could fail to comprehend that his own 
experiences and difficulties regarding his intellectual and academic integrity 
whilst in the Soviet Union may well have been mirrored in some way within 
the historical field. 
 
Schlesinger was actually acquainted with a Russian KPD member, Emel 
Lurye, who worked in the University of Moscow History Faculty during his final 
visit to the Soviet Union.46 Schlesinger had first known Emel through their 
                                                
44 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany, p. 229. 
45 See, Barber, Soviet Historians in Crisis, 1928-1932, especially Chapter 10. 
46 There does appear to be some inconsistency regarding his name. Earlier in the memoirs 
when referring to Emel, Schlesinger wrote Alexander Lurie in brackets beside the name 
(Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany, p. 290) In other sources he is known 
as Moses Lurye or Moishe Lurie and appears to have also worked under the name of 
Alexander Emel (L. Sedov, The Red Book on the Moscow Trials, Marxists Internet Archive, 
http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/sedov/works/red/ch05.htm as at 03/10/05). 
In the reported court proceedings of the 1936 Moscow Trial, Emel was listed as ‘Lurye, 
Moissei Ilyich (alias Alexander Emel), born in 1897’. Peoples Commissariat of Justice of the 
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KPD work and they became friendly during Schlesinger’s 1926 visit to 
Moscow, since they shared a mutual friendship with Ruth Fischer. Emel had 
sometimes taken Schlesinger along to Russian oppositionist meetings at this 
time.47 In early July 1936 the German party representative in Comintern 
informed Schlesinger of Emel’s arrest. Schlesinger immediately spoke frankly 
with the representative about his and Mila’s relationship to the arrested man. 
This had been purely social since they disagreed over internal KPD matters.48 
However, he had later appeared sincere in his submission to the majority and, 
according to Schlesinger, ‘… had given us good reasons to regard himself as 
convinced of the basic correctness (though not, of course, of the details) of 
Stalin’s line’.49 Schlesinger was, therefore, astonished at his arrest, admission 
to charges of terrorism and conspiracy to murder Stalin and eventual 
execution in the first ‘purge’ trial of 1936.50  
 
This surprise at Emel’s arrest and trial may have led Schlesinger to doubt the 
charges made against him. If this were the case, he could well have 
developed a negative attitude towards the study of history in the Soviet Union. 
There would appear to be little freedom for intellectual expression if one could 
be ‘purged’ at any time. However, Schlesinger explained that when first 
writing his memoirs in 1944 and The Spirit of Post-war Russia soon after, he 
was fully convinced of the existence of an actual conspiracy against Stalin.51 
An anonymous paper to the journal Pacific Affairs written by Schlesinger the 
year after he left the Soviet Union substantiates this attitude.52 Under these 
circumstances Schlesinger may well have believed that Emel was guilty of 
conspiracy and terrorism and would, therefore, regard the intellectual 
environment as being hazardous only if one were involved in anti-state 
activities. 
                                                                                                                                       
USSR, The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre, Marxists Internet Archive 
http://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/law/1936/moscow-trials/24/verdict.htm as at 
12/11/05. 
47 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: Whither Germany, p. 290. 
48 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 202. 
49 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 214. 
50 For more information about the trial and the purges in general see R Conquest, The Great 
Terror: A Reassessment (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990) especially chapter 4. 
51 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 190. 
52 Schlesinger, ‘The ‘War Potential’ of the Soviet Union’, p. 41.  
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However, this explanation loses a little of its credibility when other 
observations Schlesinger made about Emel’s fate elsewhere in his unfinished 
memoirs are taken into consideration. Schlesinger wrote that, after Emel’s 
trial, the party authorities claimed that a whole group of terrorists existed 
within the history faculty of Moscow University; it was, in fact, ‘…a seat of 
conspiracy’.53 Historian R. Conquest confirmed this, writing: ‘Historians were 
particularly vulnerable. The whole school of Party historians which had 
followed Pokrovsky were arrested. They were often labelled terrorists. In fact, 
it is quite extraordinary how many of the leading terrorist bands were headed 
by historians’.54 Yet Schlesinger also wrote in his memoirs: ‘I must assume 
that nothing worse than an organised discussion group to oppose the party 
line in the historical field was in existence’.55 He assumed that the history 
faculty had done nothing more than form an academic clique, an act which 
had resulted in their arrest and execution. If Schlesinger did believe that the 
historians at Moscow University were executed by the Soviet Union for 
establishing a group to oppose a certain historical interpretation, an 
understanding of his attitude towards Soviet historiography immediately after 
his return to the West becomes problematic. 
 
After describing his expulsion, Schlesinger reflected upon authoritarianism 
within a Marxist party, how a party should operate and how its relationship to 
theory should best be developed. In the second draft of his memoirs 
Schlesinger explained that the argument was, ‘… in substance developed 
already in the first version of these memoirs; I cannot however assert that in 
1944 I was as detached from my personal experiences as I am now’.56 This 
statement suggests that in the earlier version of the memoirs and around the 
time that Schlesinger was writing many of his articles on Soviet 
historiography, he was still very personally affected by his expulsion from the 
party. One would imagine this would engender feelings of anger and 
frustration and yet these emotions do not correspond with the clinical, perhaps 
                                                
53 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 187. 
54 Conquest, The Great Terror, p. 291. 
55 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 188, footnote xx. 
56 Ibid. p. 231, footnote x. For the less well-formed argument in the German edition see 
Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 225… 
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even apologetic, tone in which he was to write about the Soviet Union in the 
1940s. Instead, it is likely Schlesinger was attempting to prove his continued 
loyalty to the Soviet regime after his expulsion. Again there would appear to 
be a paradox between how Schlesinger expressed his feelings about events, 
both at the time and with hindsight, and the way in which he was to write 
about them in his academic works. 
 
Schlesinger argued that a certain degree of intellectual freedom was vital for 
the healthy growth of theory. However, this still did not exist in the Soviet 
Union in any satisfactory way at the time of his memoir writing: 
 
Long after Stalin, his ‘purges’ and the assertion that any lack of 
uniformity in the communist camp presented a weapon for the 
bourgeoisie has gone, his concept of theory as an outlook 
authoritatively fixed and developed by the party leadership (and 
necessarily by the party leadership, for otherwise it could not 
claim authority) continues to sterilise Marxism.57 
 
He went on to question the efficacy of one of the main ‘achievements’ of the 
Stalin period, namely the concept of Marxism as a necessarily authoritarian 
symbol of party unity. Schlesinger argued that Marxism had been at its most 
effective when it was promoted not simply as a systematic presentation and 
propaganda of accepted tenets, but rather as a system or method of thought 
applied to discover ‘gaps’ in theory and elaborate ways in which to fill them, 
thereby moving that theory forward. Such action would continually alter theory 
in a dialectical progression. Theory would be advanced ‘… not necessarily by 
the correctness of the suggested solutions but by the result of the argument 
induced by them’.58 The very act of debate and the freedom to make 
theoretical errors gave Schlesinger’s Marxism its vitality. His approach was 
based on the assumption that Marxist principles would be the foundation of 
party activities and that majority decisions on practical issues would be 
obeyed but that, ‘…no statement on matters of theory, by whomever it was 
                                                
57 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 237. 
58 Ibid. p. 237. 
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issued, could claim authoritarian validity’.59 Schlesinger admitted that this 
assumption was rejected in the course of the purges. Stalin did indeed claim 
total ‘authoritarian validity’ for his theoretical statements, including those he 
made on the historical front. How was it possible for Schlesinger not to 
condemn the atmosphere in which historians were working in the 1930s and 
1940s when the conditions in which they had to research were those very 
ones he claimed were most dangerous and stifling for theoretical progress? 
 
Schlesinger’s unpublished memoir writings do contain several positive 
comments about the intellectual environment of Stalin’s Soviet Union. 
Schlesinger insisted theoretical advancements were made under, and 
perhaps because of, Stalin. He wrote: ‘I find it difficult for anyone except very 
narrow-minded dogmatics to deny that the overcoming of the schematic 
economist interpretation of the Marxist theory of history implied a major 
progress in sociological analysis’.60 Schlesinger argued that the repudiation of 
what he regarded as Pokrovskii’s historical theories represented a great 
advance in the study of history in the Soviet Union, a thesis he had elaborated 
consistently in his academic writings upon the subject. However, there were 
negative aspects in the progress of historical writing. He did concede, ‘…there 
is room for argument about the correctness of some of the statements made 
since 1935 by Soviet historians in order to emphasise the importance of 
national struggles for independence in 1612 and 1812’.61 There were no 
grounds for Marxist historians to combine an appreciation of the national 
struggle with any positive assessment of the Russian regime of those times. 
Schlesinger recognised the increased politicisation of the historical arena and 
yet emphasised the few positive benefits of research under Stalin. 
 
Schlesinger compared advances in historiography with those he regarded as 
having occurred in the arts. He wrote of Sholokhov’s And Quiet Flows the 
Don:62 
                                                
59 Ibid. p. 239. 
60 Ibid. pp. 185-186. 
61 Ibid. p. 186. 
62 M. Sholokov, Quiet Flows the Done, Volumes 1 and 2 (Raduga, USSR, 1984) trans. R. 
Daglish. 
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I always regarded Sholokhov’s achievement, and his final 
success when the leftist trends in art were overcome and his 
was praised as one of the masterpieces of ‘socialist realism’… 
as a warning against the tendency to regard the rise of 
‘Stalinism’ in the intellectual fields as an unmitigated evil: it was, 
indeed, the agency through which much of the narrow-
mindedness grown during the first revolutionary period was 
overcome.63 
 
For Schlesinger, the Stalinist period of Soviet history overcame earlier, 
erroneous movements and trends. He argued that to regard the Stalinist 
period as devoid of any intellectual achievement was naïve and short-sighted. 
Many problems and setbacks may have occurred within the academic fields 
but progress was made nonetheless. In the overcoming of certain intellectual 
and theoretical trends, the party and the intellectuals may have ‘swung’ too far 
in the other direction but it was this debate and continuous dynamic that 
constituted progress. It was clear to Schlesinger that, ‘…the Russian 
revolutionaries had never proved able to correct an error without falling into 
the opposite one’, but theoretical advancement was still achieved.64 Whilst 
other commentators, such as the sociologist Nicholas Timasheff, viewed the 
Stalinist 1930s as a time of ‘great retreat’ from the revolutionary values in 
cultural and social policy developed after the revolution, Schlesinger saw the 
changes in a positive light.65 S. Fitzpatrick described the ‘retreat’ as, 
                                                
63 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 180-181 The book was later 
made into an opera, but Schlesinger felt that this was far more populist than the original work. 
Schlesinger did describe the book and opera in the first version of his memoirs, but 
concentrated more on its contemporary impact than this historical perspective (Erinnerungen: 
Illegalität und Emigration, p. 181-182). 
64 Ibid. p. 185. 
65 N. S. Timasheff, The Great Retreat The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia, 
(New York, Arno Press, 1972). The first edition of the work was published in the US in 1946. 
Timasheff argued that, contrary to popular opinion, pre-revolutionary Russia was not 
stagnant, but showed signs of overcoming her backwardness and developing towards an 
industrialised democracy. The Bolshevik revolution was thus, ‘… a shock inflicted on a rapidly 
advancing society compelling it to depart from its historical ways’. The revolution was, ‘… a 
violent disruption of continuity, a conflict between a Utopian idea and historical tradition’, 
continued by way of an organised dictatorship, (p. 71). The ‘Great Retreat’ from the 
‘Communist Experiment’ from 1934 onwards involved the restoration of certain national 
traditions and some adjustment of society towards its original line of development; although 
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‘…exemplified by the return to the classics in literature, the reevaluation of the 
Russian national heritage and history, and the repudiation of progressive 
methods in education’.66 Whilst Schlesinger conceded that many of these new 
emphases went too far, he did believe they were a necessary step in 
overcoming past mistakes made in the heady atmosphere of the 1920s. 
 
When discussing disillusionment with his Comintern work, something that 
Schlesinger regarded as symptomatic of the party’s more authoritarian stance 
on intellectual activities, he wrote that his feelings on this matter had altered 
over time. He explained that immediately after leaving the Soviet Union he 
had felt quite negative about the climate there. However, now, in the mid-
1950s, he felt much more optimistic about intellectual freedom: 
 
…. in the USSR there is now a fair freedom of argument even 
on major issues, if conducted in scholarly journals in the 
economic, legal and even philosophical field; a person’s being 
‘wrong’ at some occasion does not preclude him from uttering 
his opinion at some following one. It may be hoped that this 
habit will eventually expand to the CPSU’s clearly political 
publications.67 
 
If Schlesinger was becoming optimistic about the freedom of debate in the 
second half of the 1950s he could not have been so before then. One can 
logically deduce that Schlesinger believed the opportunity for debate, even 
within a scholarly context, to be minimal in the 1930s and 1940s. As he had 
pointed out earlier, the party was increasingly claiming a monopoly over 
theoretical validity at this time. There is, therefore, a great deal of 
inconsistency in Schlesinger’s memoir writing about the intellectual 
environment existing within the Soviet Union during his visits to the region. At 
                                                                                                                                       
this by no means implied a break with political dictatorship or the rejection of the materialist 
philosophy of Marxism. Instead an amalgamation of traditional and communist values had 
taken place. So: ‘The Russian Orthodox Church is once more a recognized, even partly 
privileged body; this is in accordance with historical tradition. But the State teaches 
antireligion in schools; this is in accordance with Communist principles’, (p. 355). 
66 Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front, p. 197. 
67 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 154. 
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some points he seemed to suggest that the atmosphere was stifling, 
especially as regards his own experiences, and at others he would claim that 
certain freedoms did exist and that numerous intellectual advances were 
achieved during the period. 
 
Taking the memoirs as a whole, the impression that Schlesinger gives of the 
intellectual environment in which he found himself working when in the Soviet 
Union was a stifled, harsh and dissatisfying one. Schlesinger clearly 
described this as regards his own personal circumstances. The opportunities 
for initiative and creativity were massively curbed whilst he worked for 
Comintern and there was a tremendous emphasis on precision and accuracy, 
producing a somewhat paranoid and creatively infertile atmosphere. As early 
as 1926 Schlesinger encountered the difficulties of publishing in the Soviet 
Union and the problems of factionalism taking precedence over intellectual 
integrity. In 1936 he again faced the now insurmountable political obstacles to 
publication. He was eventually expelled from the party and forced to leave the 
USSR because of his willingness to debate theoretical concerns openly and 
because of his lack of vigilance. In his memoirs Schlesinger wrote that he was 
chosen as a suitable candidate for expulsion because of his ‘liberalism’, ‘…not 
in the ordinary sense, of course, but in that of a readiness frankly to air 
disagreements within the communist party’.68 It is, therefore, plausible to 
assume that he would regard an intellectual environment that could not 
tolerate his methodological beliefs as one that was itself intolerable for the 
undertaking of Marxist theoretical work.  
                                                
68 Ibid. p. 222.  
 209 
 
Chapter Six: Schlesinger’s writings on history in 
Stalin’s Soviet Union 
Writings from 1938-1947 
This chapter describes and appraises those writings produced before Stalin’s 
death in 1953. The first part deals with his writings immediately after leaving 
the Soviet Union, and the second those articles he produced when settled as 
an academic in Glasgow. Taken together they represent a coherent, if 
developing, expression of Schlesinger’s views on historiography in Stalin’s 
Soviet Union. 
It is argued here that throughout his writings of the period, Schlesinger 
attempted to portray the research of history in the Soviet Union in a positive 
light. Whilst never ignoring the more difficult and impeding aspects of the 
intellectual environment in which historians worked, Schlesinger’s overall 
analysis was almost predominantly one of praise, at least for progress made 
under difficult circumstances. He often defended historians’ work against what 
he seems to have perceived as unfair Western criticism, taking on the role of 
advocate for Soviet scholarship. Another distinctive feature of these writings 
was his reiteration of many of the arguments used in ongoing campaigns in 
the Soviet Union. For example, in many of the papers of this period he 
reproduced various elements of the anti-Pokrovskii campaign; his criticisms of 
Bolshevik historian M. N. Pokrovskii and his so-called ‘school’ mirrored those 
made by representatives of the state. Schlesinger’s interpretations often 
coalesced with official Soviet orthodoxy. This may have been because he was 
in agreement with the emphases current at that time, but Schlesinger could 
also have been consciously interpreting Soviet events in a positive light. This 
contrasts sharply with his personal experiences of life as a scholar in the 
Soviet Union and with his later writing on the subject, in which he was far 
more condemnatory of the atmosphere and ensuing scholarly production 
under Stalin. 
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The first of Schlesinger’s articles to deal specifically with the subject of Soviet 
historiography was entitled ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur 
Sozialforschung’ (‘New Soviet Russian Literature on Social Research’) and 
was published in 1938. Schlesinger had been invited to submit this report by 
the Institut fur Sozialforschung based in Frankfurt, and the article was printed 
in their publication.1 The work represented the main focus of Schlesinger’s 
research and income whilst in Prague in 1938. It concerned general 
ideological developments in the Soviet Union and contained a section on ‘The 
provisional results of the historical discussion’.2 In his unpublished memoir 
reflections, Schlesinger explained that the article concerned recent 
historiographical discussions, which he believed had led to the overcoming of 
the Pokrovskiian approach, that of the historian M. N. Pokrovskii, an 
achievement of some note in Schlesinger’s eyes.  
 
 Schlesinger wrote:  
 
My general intention in writing these reports was the 
demonstration of the actual progress made in the development 
of Marxist theory during the overcoming of the diverse schools 
which had held a monopoly position during the twenties and 
early thirties, quite independently from the paraphernalia with 
which this progress was surrounded in the atmosphere of the 
‘great purge’ and its immediate antecedents. Without knowing 
anything definitive about the amount of truth or otherwise which 
stood behind those paraphernalia I believed that it was possible 
to define the social and intellectual developments the road for 
which was opened by the Stalinist methods.3 
 
This statement seems to entirely substantiate the thesis that Schlesinger 
intentionally and consciously conveyed a positive description of Soviet 
                                                
1 Schlesinger, Erinnerungen: Illegalität und Emigration, p. 273. The Institut was later to be 
known as the ‘Frankfurt School’ and was instrumental in the development of critical theory. 
For more information on the school see M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination (London, 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1973), esp. pp. 3-40. 
2 Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, p. 186. 
3 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches, p. 249. 
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historiographical developments in his writings. His aim was to demonstrate 
the achievements made in intellectual fields, something perhaps denied by 
other commentators. This progress had come about because Stalinist Russia 
was able to overcome the erroneous theories and interpretations that had 
enjoyed monopoly status in the earlier period of Soviet rule. Schlesinger 
argued that, not knowing anything substantial about the ‘paraphernalia’ of the 
‘great purge’, he had believed it possible to observe ideological progress as a 
result of it. Ignorance of the scale, brutality and extra-judicial nature of much 
of the ‘purges’ had apparently allowed Schlesinger to view developments 
purely in terms of intellectual progress. His use of the past tense in this 
sentence may well have been significant. Writing after Stalin’s death, and now 
knowing more about that ‘paraphernalia’ he perhaps no longer agreed with his 
earlier, deeply pragmatic, approach. However, he did not say so. 
 
The historiographical section of the article began with a short explanation of 
the background to the recent historical discussions. On 16 May 1934 a 
Government decree on the defects of historical teaching in primary and 
middle schools was published.4 This attack on the inadequacies and errors of 
current school textbooks was the starting point of the ensuing debate. The 
decree argued that historical teaching had simply provided abstract definitions 
of socio-economic formations, as opposed to a living description of the course 
of history. The Soviet authorities called for a new set of textbooks to facilitate 
the teaching of history. Unfortunately, the drafts of the new books still 
appeared to suffer from errors of, what Schlesinger described as, the 
‘Pokrovskii school’. The Party leadership thus made clear in pronouncements 
of 8 and 9 August 1934 that the main task in the historical field was the 
overcoming of this school.5 Schlesinger explained that this was originally to be 
                                                
4 For the text of the decree see M. Pundeff, History in the USSR, Selected Readings (San 
Francisco, Chandler Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 98-99. For more information on Soviet 
textbooks see D. L. Brandenberger and A. M. Dubrovsky, ‘The People Need a Tsar: The 
Emergence of National Bolshevism as Stalinist Ideology, 1931-1941’, Europe-Asia Studies, 
50, 5, July 1998, pp. 873-892. For another Western account contemporaneous to 
Schlesinger, see A. Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, (Princeton, D. Van Nostrand 
Co., Inc., 1958), pp. 196… 
5 For the text of the decree see Pundeff, History in the USSR,  pp. 100-105.The original 
statements were only known to a small group of historians. They became known to Soviet 
society at large after their publication in Pravda on January 27, 1936. The Pravda article 
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achieved by way of self-criticism and open discussion. However, new drafts 
reproduced many of the same errors and it became clear the ‘school’ was not 
prepared to undertake a revision voluntarily. According to Schlesinger, it thus 
became necessary to publicly bring the authority of the State and Party 
leadership into the matter, and this was done on 26 January 1936 with the 
publication of the comments of Stalin, Kirov and Zhdanov.6 A committee was 
to be established, chaired by Zhdanov and consisting of historians and 
politicians, which would publish a report on the drafting of new textbooks. 
 
In September 1937 The Soviet of Peoples’ Deputies, on the advice of a 
published report by this committee, authorised the publication of a history 
textbook by A. V. Shestakov.7 Schlesinger argued that this marked the end of 
the three-year debate on conceptions of history and its proper presentation. 
According to Schlesinger, this debate had arisen out of the practical need for 
recognised and authoritative guidelines, ‘…. on the question of history 
teaching and its methods in general’.8 Such definitive guidelines were 
necessary because of recent political developments. Many new social strata 
had entered political life and there was a need for clarification of their 
relationship to the historical tradition. It was essential that the ‘vulgar Marxism’ 
of these groups be overcome if they were to fulfil their roles within Soviet 
intellectual life. In other words, rising social mobility and the influx of peasants 
into industrial areas required an increase in educational standards. 
Schlesinger made no attempt to suggest other, perhaps more disingenuous, 
reasons for the change in historical emphasis and teaching now deemed 
                                                                                                                                       
began with an explanatory introduction which included a denunciation of the works of 
Pokrovskii; ‘the first public repudiation’. (Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat, p. 190.) 
6 Schlesinger was presumably referring to the Pravda article mentioned above. 
7 A. V. Shestakov, (ed.) Istoriia SSSR: kratkii kurs (Moscow, Uchebno-Pedagogicheskoe 
Uzdatel’stvo, 1938). According to Pundeff, in 1937 Professor A. V. Shestakov’s manuscript 
was awarded second prize in the competition and was issued as a textbook for USSR history 
in the third and fourth grades. The committee argued that it was unable to award a first prize. 
(Pundeff, History in the USSR, pp. 105-6.)  Enteen wrote: ‘Only in 1937 did the party judge 
one of the new textbooks prepared in the competition reasonably acceptable for its purposes’. 
(Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat, p. 190.) Schlesinger was either unaware or omitted 
to mention that the Party only deemed the Shestakov textbook ‘acceptable’. The full text of 
the judging committee’s report can be found in K izucheniiu istorii, (Moscow, Partizdat, 1937), 
pp. 32-38. 
8 Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, p. 187. 
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necessary. He appeared to be in complete accord with the state on the 
reasons for, and the necessity of, this change. 
 
Schlesinger argued that Stalin, Kirov and Zhdanovs’ theses had criticised the 
draft textbooks because they reflected the abstract nature and incorrectness 
of the Pokrovskii ‘school’.9 He went on to detail exactly what the objections to 
Pokrovskii were. It seems clear from his narrative style that Schlesinger was 
again in complete agreement with the Party as to both the existence and the 
erroneous nature of the Pokrovskii ‘school’. For example, Schlesinger wrote 
that it was necessary for the party to publicly assert its authority in the matter 
of new textbooks since the ‘school’ had proven itself unwilling to ‘undertake a 
revision of its views’.10 That the ‘school’ existed, a revision of its views was 
required and that this would not be accomplished voluntarily was stated as 
fact.  
 
At this point it is worth examining Schlesinger’s attitude towards Pokrovksii in 
more detail as it illuminates how closely his own writings mirrored Soviet 
orthodoxy in the Stalin period. M. N. Pokrovskii (1868 – 1932) was the first 
Bolshevik historian of note and has been described as ‘the founder of Soviet 
historiography’ by the Western commentator A. Mazour.11 He rose to pre-
eminence in the 1920s and trained a new generation of scholars to develop a 
specifically Marxist approach to history.12 Pokrovskii attempted to explain 
historical developments with reference to what he saw as their underlying 
economic causes and introduced the concept of ‘merchant capitalism’ to 
explain Russia’s development from feudalism to capitalism proper.13 He held 
                                                
9 Ibid. p. 188. 
10 Ibid. p. 187. 
11 A. Mazour, The Writing of History in the Soviet Union, (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 
1975) p. 14. 
12 For further information on Pokrovksii’s life, career and reputation see, Enteen, The Soviet 
Scholar-Bureaucrat, Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, pp. 186-202, Mazour, The 
Writing of History in the Soviet Union, pp. 7-23, J. D. White, ‘The Origins, Development and 
Demise of M. N. Pokrovskii’s Interpretation of Russian History’ in I. D. Thatcher (ed.) Late 
Imperial Russia, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005) pp. 167-188, H. Asher, 
‘The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of M. N. Pokrovsky’, Russian Review, 31, 1, Jan. 1972, pp. 
49-63. 
13 See, for example, M. N. Pokrovskii, Brief History of Russia, Volume 1, (London, Martin 
Lawrence Limited, 1933), trans. D. S. Mirsky, pp. 103-117. 
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numerous party positions and was elected to the All-Russian and then All-
Union Congress of Soviets. He was also immensely active academically, at 
various times he edited journals, headed Istpart and chaired the State Council 
of Scholars as well as continually publishing his own work. However, 
Pokrovskii fell out of favour with the Soviet authorities from the mid-1930s. 
The Party and the historical profession in general, including many of his 
former pupils and supporters, criticised the scholar and heaped condemnation 
on his work. As K. Mehnert wrote, ‘Pokrovsky died twice’; once in 1932 when 
he was given a State funeral with full military honours and once in 1934 when 
the official anti-Pokrovskii campaign began.14 This continued until his slow 
rehabilitation from 1956 onwards. During this time, Pokrovksii was accused of 
anti-Leninism, schematic bourgeois methodology, vulgar economic 
materialism and historical falsifications. 
 
Schlesinger referred to Pokrovskii and the ‘overcoming’ of his work in most of 
his writings concerned with Soviet historiography. He appeared to be 
producing independent examinations of Pokrovskii’s approach to history but 
was, in fact, aping the Soviet line as decreed by Stalin. In many ways 
Schlesinger was simply retreading ground thoroughly covered by Soviet 
historians and party orthodoxy. This may well have been because his opinion 
coalesced with that of the Soviet authorities; he consistently argued that the 
Stalin era advanced the study of history because it overcame Pokrovksii’s 
erroneous theories; and he was not alone in the West in thinking this.15 
However, it also strengthens the thesis that Schlesinger consciously painted a 
positive picture of developments in the Soviet Union and confirms that he 
frequently followed the orthodox line in matters of interpretation.  
 
The official anti-Pokrovskii campaign began with the publication in 1936 of the 
directive establishing a committee to organise the production of new history 
textbooks announced in 1934. Pokrovskii was an obstacle in Stalin’s path to 
                                                
14 K. Mehnert, Stalin Versus Marx (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1952), pp. 11-12.  
15 For example D. F. White pointed out the negative effect Pokrovskii’s theories had on Soviet 
historical scholarship and argued that the fall of his school had a positive impact on the 
profession (D. F. White, ‘Protiv Istoriceskoi Koncepcii M. N. Pokrovskogo (Against M. N. 
Pokrovksi’s Concept of History)’ Review, Slavonic and East European Review, 2, 1, March 
1943, pp 257-263 at pp. 262-263). 
 215 
the role of historical arbiter. Stalin may well have seen his chance to discredit 
his rival when the issue of new textbooks arose.16 As J. D. White has argued, 
the campaign was launched in a subtle way; it involved the juxtaposing of a 
number of items under the general heading of ‘On the Historical Front’. 
Pravda and Izvestiia published the directive in full as well as details of the 
subject groups tasked with the provision of the new texts, ‘None of this had 
anything to do with Pokrovskii. However, this was not the impression the 
newspapers conveyed’.17 Alongside the details concerning the schematic 
nature of school history texts were articles condemning Pokrovksii and his 
errors.18 These articles accused Pokrovskii of being schematic and ignoring 
true facts and events. According to J. D. White, the newspapers consciously 
created the impression that the directive on school textbooks had condemned 
Pokrovksii, this was how historians referred to it at the time.19 The myth 
conflating the textbook criticisms with Pokrovksii’s supposed schematic errors 
continued thereafter, including in Schlesinger’s analysis. Henceforth 
Pokrovksii and his ‘school’ were routinely criticised by the authorities, his 
former pupils and all other historians. This culminated in a two-volume 
collection of essays, published in 1939-40, on the subject of Pokrovskii.20 As 
G. M. Enteen, a biographer of Pokrovskii, has asserted, these volumes were, 
‘…. great monuments of Stalinist culture, two works of monumental 
distemper’.21  
 
Schlesinger’s criticisms of Pokrovksii were remarkably similar to the official 
Soviet version, even using the same language. He referred to schematicism, 
                                                
16 White, ‘M. N. Pokrovskii’s interpretation of Russian history’, p. 183. D. Brandenberger has 
argued that the impetus for the anti-Pokrovskii campaign involved a number of parties 
including Zhdanov and Bukharin. However, he does not dispute Stalin’s role in this, merely 
the notion of a monolithic totalitarian structure with Stalin at its centre making every decision. 
(D. Brandenberger, ‘Who Killed Pokrovskii? (the second time): The Prelude to the 
Denunciation of the Father of Soviet Marxist Historiography, January 1936’, Revolutionary 
Russia, 11, 1, June 1998, pp. 67-73). 
17 White, ‘M. N. Pokrovskii’s interpretation of Russian history’, p. 184. 
18 N. Bukharin, ‘Nuzhna li nam marksistskaia istoricheskaia nauka? (O nekotorykh 
sushchestvenno vazhnykh, no nesostoiatel’nykh vzgliadakh M. N. Pokrovskogo)’, Istvestiia, 
27 January 1936 and K. Radek, ‘Znachenie istorii dlia revoliutsionnogo proletariata’, Pravda, 
27 January 1936. 
19 White, ‘M. N. Pokrovskii’s interpretation of Russian history’, p. 184. 
20 Protiv istoricheskoi kontseptsii M. N. Pokrovskogo; Protiv antimarksistskih kontseptsii M. N. 
Pokrovskogo (Moscow-Leningrad, Izatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1939-40).  
21 Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat, p. 190. 
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vulgarity, projection of modern concepts into the past. A. Mazour outlined the 
Soviet perspective and the similarities between this and Schlesinger’s 
accusations are stark: 
 
 Pokrovskii was now charged with advocating a too subjective 
conception of Marxism and held responsible for its infiltration 
into the writings of others; he was blamed for the arbitrary 
attributions of modern social and economic ideas to bygone 
generations utterly ignorant of them; ululations were raised 
against his doctrine that Communism needed no objective 
science; he was ridiculed for forcing the course of history into a 
Procrustean bed of materialism; and finally, he was charged 
with the advocacy of a rigid conception of Imperial Russia now 
regarded as the worst historical blunder of them all.22 
 
Schlesinger apparently agreed with the vast majority of official criticisms. 
However, he was certainly not alone in this. Much of Soviet and Western 
writing of the time took a similar approach to Pokrovskii. Mazour himself 
argued: ‘The entire architectonic system of Pokrovsky is somewhat flimsily 
mechanistic’.23 He went on to accuse Pokrovskii of writing history as a record 
of one inevitable continuum, ‘a lifeless mechanistic process’, ‘a purposeless 
play of economic factors’. This appeared to coincide with the orthodox Soviet 
interpretation as espoused in the criticism of school textbooks. 
 
The campaign against Pokrovskii was launched for a number of reasons and 
resulted in a one-sided and unfair portrayal of his writing. The biggest reason 
for the removal of his influence was because Pokrovskii’s theories were in 
contradiction to the ideology underpinning Stalin’s rule; they threatened his 
authority. For example, Pokrovksii’s analysis countered the supraclass theory 
of the state, the idea that state transcended class rather than developing out 
of the interests of the leading class. Enteen has suggested that this betrayed 
an underlining hostility towards the state, something that would inevitably 
                                                
22 Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, pp. 200-201. 
23 Ibid. p. 192. 
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conflict with a government advocating a policy of ‘socialism in one country’.24 
Pokrovksii was also anti-individualist, refusing to celebrate or revere the acts 
of key individuals. This would contradict Stalin’s cult of personality and 
emphasis on the power of transforming personalities.25 He was also an 
internationalist whose ‘cosmopolitanism’ was unacceptable to the Soviet 
Union’s new emphasis on patriotism.26 
 
Many of the errors the anti-Pokrovskii campaign imputed to the historian were 
distortions of his writing or complete falsifications. Schlesinger followed many 
of these myths seemingly to the letter. For example, as Enteen has pointed 
out: 
 
The extreme formulation of his [Pokrovskii’s] view – ‘history is 
politics retrojected into the past’ – is a statement attributed to 
Pokrovskii by virtually all his Soviet critics before the 1960s, and 
by some Western critics, They suggest that it imparts the 
essence of his views on historical scholarship.27 
 
Schlesinger frequently referred to the erroneous nature of this concept.28 Yet 
the statement did not occur in any of Pokrovskii’s writings. In fact, according 
to Enteen, it is something of which he accused non-Marxist historians. 
Pokrovskii’s followers did use the phrase, but to seek to vulgarise his work 
with such an accusation is somewhat distorting. J. D. White has also argued 
that to accuse Pokrovskii of being schematic and dismissing concrete facts is 
totally unjust.29 It is clear that the labelling of Pokrovksii as a vulgar or extreme 
economic determinist was a distortion, and again was something that 
Schlesinger frequently did. As Enteen has explained: 
 
With regard to the relative significance of substructual and 
superstructural elements in the historical process, Pokrovskii 
                                                
24 Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat, p. 48. 
25 Asher, ‘The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of M. N. Pokrovsky’, pp. 52-53. 
26 Mazour, The Writing of History in the Soviet Union, p. 18. 
27 Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat, p. 33. 
28 For example, see below p. 228 and p. 233. 
29 White, ‘M. N. Pokrovskii’s interpretation of Russian history’, p. 184. 
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was clearly an economic determinist, but he eschewed and 
actually polemicized against the most extreme formulations of 
that position and sought to give some weight to superstructural 
elements.30 
 
In fact, Enteen argued that Pokrovskii often sought to combat what he 
regarded as the vulgarisation of economic determinism.31  
 
Pokrovskii’s Soviet critics castigated him for crimes he did not commit and 
developed and propagated a myth of his errors that continued for several 
decades. Schlesinger seems to have been party to this misrepresentation 
despite his knowledge of the original Pokrovskiian sources. He followed the 
Soviet interpretation throughout his writings of this time, arguing that the 
overcoming of his school was one of the main achievements of Stalinist 
historiography and giving limited credence to the positive effect Pokrovksii 
had on the development of a Marxist study of history.  
 
In Schlesinger’s report the positive role Pokrovskii had played in the evolution 
of historiography was partially recognised. Schlesinger quoted a Pravda 
article of 21 January 1936 which stated that Pokrovskii had developed in the 
struggle with the subjectivism of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois historians, 
who saw in the Tsars and their actions the most important motive forces of 
history.32 In opposition, Pokrovskii had postulated the theory that the 
development of economic relations was a fundamental factor in history. Whilst 
this represented an advance in the study of history, Pokrovskii’s work also 
had the negative effect of transforming dialectic materialism into ‘economic 
automatism’. His formulations were schematic and overly abstract, replacing 
the living history of the class struggle with dry social formations. The same 
Pravda article compared Pokrovskii’s treatment of Tsardom, merely a weapon 
of merchant capital, to Lenin’s, which supposedly stressed the extremely 
elastic, dialectic character of Tsardom and its slow transformation from a 
                                                
30 Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat, p. 35. 
31 Ibid. pp. 33-34. 
32 Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, p. 189. It seems likely 
that Schlesinger was, in fact, referring to the article of 27 January 1936 mentioned above. 
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monarchy of the nobility to one of capitalism; in order to expose the weakness 
and oversimplification of Pokrovskii’s analysis. 
 
Another ‘flawed’ characteristic of Pokrovskii’s work was that of his ‘anti-
historicism’.33 Schlesinger argued that Pokrovskii had forced complicated and 
contradictory historical processes into his pre-prepared sociological scheme, 
or Procrustean bed, and replaced living classes with abstract sociological 
categories. His ‘anti-historicism’ also manifested itself in his indifference to 
concrete events and their chronological presentation; actual events were only 
referred to in order to illustrate his schema, to further elaborate his views on 
feudalism, religion, etc. These errors had been reproduced in the works of 
those from his ‘school’ and were visible in the draft textbooks. 
 
By far the most important element in the thought of the Pokrovskii ‘school’ 
was the concept of ‘merchant capital’; Schlesinger wrote that Pokrovskii had 
felt it to be the most significant component to any understanding of Russian 
history.34 This too was criticised by the Soviet authorities. Schlesinger did not 
go into any great detail as to what this most important concept consisted of: 
Pokrovskii had asserted that capital had ruled Russia autocratically from Ivan 
the Terrible until the last Nicholas, ‘merchant capital’ had, in fact, created the 
Russian Empire and serfdom.  Schlesinger believed that its genesis lay in 
response to the nineteenth century Slavophil presentation of history which 
attempted to dispute the existence of capitalism in Russia. In Pokrovskii’s 
attempt to prove this wrong he reflected the existence of capitalist features 
into the past. The theory had also originated from Pokrovskii’s polemic against 
the cult of personality inherent in bourgeois historiography. However, with his 
conception, the concrete questions central to historical scholarship 
disappeared since all causes were presupposed. Schlesinger argued: ‘The 
acting people were reduced to mere puppets of economic driving forces’; this 
would once again create a schematic, abstract presentation of history. 35 
 
                                                
33 Ibid. p. 190. 
34 Ibid. p. 190-191. 
35 Ibid. p. 191. 
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Schlesinger argued that Pokrovskii’s theory of ‘merchant capitalism’ 
represented the projection of the modern day class struggle into the past, ‘… 
the present-day class struggle appears as the single reality and this leads to 
any past repression being conceived of as ‘capitalist’’.36 Schlesinger insisted 
that the use of the concept of ‘merchant capitalism’ involved the application of 
modern political concepts, such as Bolshevism or ‘democratic peoples’ 
revolution’, to unsuitable periods of the past. The projection of modern political 
concerns backwards also led Pokrovskii to conclude that historians who were 
active in the class struggle should concentrate entirely on specific themes 
connected to matters of modern proletarian praxis. 
 
In his report Schlesinger also took issue with what he regarded as 
Pokrovskii’s incorrect philosophical viewpoint, accusing him of ‘idealistic 
relativism’.37 He argued that Pokrovskii’s pragmatic epistemological approach 
led him to believe that every ideology, including Marxism, had the effect of a 
‘distorting mirror’ through which reality could never be entirely accurately 
reflected. Such an interpretation perhaps inevitably concluded that the goal of 
an ‘objective description of history’ was a bourgeois illusion. Pokrovskii had 
argued against the theory that laws of nature are objective and hence exist 
independently from consciousness. This justified the overtly political role that 
Pokrovskii granted the field of historical study.  Whilst the Soviet authorities of 
the 1930s accepted the connection between historical knowledge and politics, 
and the principle that history represented a weapon of the class struggle in a 
class society, it was argued that Pokrovskii was labelling Leninism as a form 
of ‘class based subjectivism’ and hence placing it on the same level as 
reactionary bourgeois ideologies such as positivism or subjective idealism. 
This could not be tolerated and was also at odds with Schlesinger’s own belief 
in Marxism’s objective quality.38 
 
Schlesinger’s report next attempted an appreciation of the Shestakov 
textbook approved for publication by the judging committee. Schlesinger 
                                                
36 Ibid. p. 191. 
37 Ibid. p. 192. 
38 See chapter 4, p. 152. 
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argued that whilst it would be ludicrous to expect any methodological 
definitions in a schoolbook, ‘… it is worthy of note what a popular book, 
worked out by the Party leadership, has to say on the significance of 
history’.39 He provided a description of its contents as well as a positive 
impression of the book’s interpretation on various matters. Schlesinger 
emphasised the fact that the book began with a brief section on the 
emergence of the classes and states that comprised the history of the USSR. 
The textbook’s exposition was opened by a presentation of the oldest states 
in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, with small sections on the Scythens 
and Black Sea Greeks.40 Schlesinger’s point was that from the outset it was 
not merely the Slavs who were represented as the central bearers of history. 
He conceded that, after this initial section, the Shestakov text was concerned 
almost exclusively with the Slavs, especially the Great Russians. However, 
Schlesinger pointed out that this ethnic chauvinism had, in fact, been a 
criticism of the judging committee.41   
 
Schlesinger provided an enthusiastic description of Shestakov’s textbook. He 
included many expressions of praise and noted the depth and detail to which 
it often went. Schlesinger wrote: ‘The emergence of the class divisions and of 
the Slav states was well presented’;42 ‘The activities of the ‘Tsar-reformer’ 
were fully described’43 and ‘The struggle for freedom of the oppressed 
peoples’ was appreciated in a purely positive and detailed manner’.44 He also 
argued that the textbook presented a balanced approach, especially in regard 
to its treatment of Peter I; both the negative and positive aspects of Peter’s 
reign were described. The book dealt fully with the oppression of the 
peasantry, the ensuing uprisings and the terror with which these revolts were 
subdued.  Schlesinger quoted from the book in order to substantiate his 
argument:  
                                                
39 Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, p. 194. 
40 Shestakov, Istoriia SSSRI, p. 8. 
41 Brandenberger and Dubrovksy have pointed out the extent to which Shestakov’s textbook 
was redrafted to the detriment of non-Russian minorities so it seems that this ‘ethnic 
chauvinism’ was actually officially approved of (Brandenberger and Dubrovsky, ‘The People 
Need a Tsar’, p. 879). 
42Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, p. 194. 
43 Ibid. p. 195. 
44 Ibid. p. 196. 
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Under Peter I Russia made considerable progress, but 
remained a land in which everyone lived under the yoke of 
serfdom and Tsarist arbitrary use of power. The strength of the 
Russian Empire under Peter I was achieved at the cost of 
100,000 workers, and the cost of the plundering of the people. 
Peter I did a great deal for the creation and consolidation of the 
state of nobility and merchants.45 
 
It seems that Schlesinger agreed with this analysis of the reign and legacy of 
Peter I. 
 
One criticism of Shestakov’s text was broached in the report. Schlesinger felt 
that it adequately described the harsh yoke of the Mongol conquerors and the 
eventual divorce of the Moscow Princes from them. However, he added, this 
was not achieved without a certain ‘prettification’, resulting in the past being 
described in purely heroic terms.46 Yet, in general, Schlesinger provided a 
positive description of the textbook and offered praise for many of its sections. 
He did not present any overall conclusions on its content or efficacy as an 
educational tool, but the lack of any real criticism did suggest that the book 
was suitable for its task. 
 
Schlesinger utilised a variety of contemporary Soviet sources for the report, 
such as official party statements, articles from newspapers such as Pravda 
and academic journals like Istorik Marksist, to illustrate current debates within 
the historical field, centring upon the issue of education and school textbooks. 
What comment he did make, besides his general narrative, seemed to 
correspond to the stance of the Soviet Union at the time. This can be seen in 
his support of the anti-Pokrovskii campaign and his praising of the Shestakov 
textbook. His analysis of the faults of the Pokrovskii ‘school’ represented his 
                                                
45 Ibid. p. 195. Shestakov, Istoriia SSSR, p.66. For a modern work on Peter and his legacy 
see E. V. Anisimov, The Reforms of Peter the Great, (London, M. E. Sharpe, 1993) trans. J. 
T. Alexander. 
46 Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, p. 195. 
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general thinking on this matter and various elements of his interpretation were 
expanded on in his later writings on the subject. Schlesinger offered no overall 
conclusions or analysis, even though the paper was to provide a summary of 
recent developments. Without this final summation it is difficult to perceive 
Schlesinger’s opinion, yet what little he did offer in the way of analysis was 
predominantly positive. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that 
Schlesinger intended to convey these latest developments in Soviet historical 
teaching as progressive. 
 
Schlesinger again addressed the topic of Russian historiography in an 
unpublished discussion entitled The Problems of Commercial Capitalism in 
17th and 18th Century Russia.47 The draft was not a final version and 
contained many hand-written corrections. Perhaps it cannot truly represent 
Schlesinger’s thinking on the subject since his ideas required a certain 
clarification. In fact, another, probably later draft of the article was turned 
down for publication in The Economic History Review.48 However, it does 
contain a great deal of relevant material and allows for an understanding of 
the development of Schlesinger’s opinion of historiography under Stalin. The 
article provides a bridge between his first work on leaving the Soviet Union 
and his later writing. Many of the themes touched upon in The Problems of 
Commercial Capitalism in 17th and 18th Century Russia were further 
elaborated in The Spirit of Post-war Russia published in 1947. In the 
manuscript, Schlesinger traced the historical debate in Russia concerning the 
causes, character and success of the Petrine reforms, as well as discussing 
the concept of ‘commercial capitalism’ or ‘merchant capitalism’.49 He 
                                                
47 Schlesinger, The Problems of Commercial Capitalism in 17th and 18th Century Russia 
(Glasgow University Library, Rudolf Schlesinger Papers, MS Gen 1660 41 8, Unpublished, 
1941-1943). The manuscript can be roughly dated to between 1941 and 1943 when it is 
known that Schlesinger was living in Cambridge, the place of writing noted on the manuscript, 
but before the later draft was posted to journals (see footnote below). 
48 See letter to Schlesinger from the editor of the journal, M. M. Postan, (Schlesinger, The 
Problems of Commercial Capitalism, (Glasgow University Library, Rudolf Schlesinger Papers, 
MS Gen 1660 48 2, Unpublished, 1943). The date is taken from that attached letter from the 
editor of The Economic History Review dated 27 June 1943.) The editor wrote that it would 
require ‘drastic revision of both substance and form’ and criticised the paper for its lack of 
material. The earlier draft of the manuscript is used here because it is complete, in 
comparison to the copy of the draft sent to the journal which finishes mid sentence and 
appears to have pages missing. 
49 Although in this manuscript Schlesinger used the phrase ‘commercial capitalism’, it is clear 
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introduced the general background to these problems and evaluated what 
‘capitalist’ elements, if any, existed in seventeenth and eighteenth century 
society. 
 
This work is somewhat unique because it offered Schlesinger’s own opinions 
upon historiographical problems. Schlesinger did not simply follow the debate 
but actually participated in it as a historian. Having no opportunity to engage 
with any of the primary material, he relied upon the secondary literature to 
examine the questions and formulate his own conclusions. This had several 
disadvantages, not least that Schlesinger was forced to rely upon those very 
sources, such as Pokrovskii, which he was casting doubt upon.50 Since he 
had no new information and did not have access to the materials that other 
historians had based their judgements on, one could argue that he would 
inevitably have very little that was new to offer. Yet the manuscript provides 
an insight into Schlesinger’s thoughts on the subject, even if no new historical 
ground is broken. 
 
Schlesinger argued that a capitalist interpretation of Russian history had long 
been predominant, if erroneous: ‘On the first glance it seems somewhat 
astonishing that in Russia the capitalist interpretation of early history has so 
much influenced historiography, already since the 18th Century. For Russian 
history seems, prima facie, to suggest everything but a capitalist interpretation 
of feudalism’.51 Russian development, at least in its successful forms, had not 
known municipal autonomy and had also never witnessed the breaking up of 
the manor, two classic characteristics of the evolution of feudal into capitalist 
society in Schlesinger’s view. Schlesinger argued that it would make more 
sense to describe Russia as the classic country of feudalism, one that had 
passed through four periods of crisis, developing new forms of feudalism in 
response to each until finally it was forced to make some compromise with 
capitalism in the 1860s. 52  
                                                                                                                                       
that the two terms were synonymous in his thinking.  
50 For example, Schlesinger cited Pokrovskii as a source of information but subsequently 
criticised him, Schlesinger, The Problems of Commercial Capitalism, p2. 
51 Schlesinger, The Problems of Commercial Capitalism, p. 3. 
52 The four periods were: ‘The introduction of Christianity and the so-called Olga reforms (in 
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To Schlesinger, there were two reasons why students of history had tried to 
interpret Russia’s past from a capitalist perspective, despite the overwhelming 
evidence against it. The first was that, from the formation of the Kiev state 
until the 1917 revolution, the Russian aristocracy had been involved in 
commercial discourse with economically more developed countries. This was 
necessary to protect themselves from becoming instruments of ‘indirect’ 
colonial rule and it explained the strong impression that Westerners visiting 
Moscow in the 16th and 17th Ccntury had of the commercial interests 
prevailing there. He wrote: ‘Once one is ready to suppose that a man mainly 
interested in money profits is, therefore, a capitalist, it is not difficult to support 
a ‘commercial capitalist’ interpretation of Russian history with plenty of 
documentary proof’.53 However, Russia’s communication with capitalists was 
not proof of their own capitalism and could be explained by needs of self-
preservation. This need to prevent colonisation from nearby centralised 
Western states, such as the Polish-Lithuanian state in the middle of the 
fifteenth century, resulted in a strong centralisation of government. Such a 
necessity saved the country from feudal dispersal and did lead to a strong 
development of the money economy. However, according to Schlesinger, if 
capitalism was understood as a system of production, 
 
 …. it is problematic whether the hastened strengthening of 
money economics did accelerate at all the growth of capitalism. 
Just the other way round it even might be concluded that the 
huge costs of centralisation and of the attempts, during the 16th, 
17th and 18th Centuries to open for Russia an independent outlet 
to the West, retarded the evolution of the conditions for a truly 
capitalist development.54 
 
                                                                                                                                       
the second half of the 10th Century), the rise of the Northern princedoms (12th/13th century), 
the ‘Oprichina’ under Ivan IV and the following ‘Time of Troubles’, and the Petrine reforms 
with the following reactions up to 1762’. (Schlesinger, The Problems of Commercial 
Capitalism, p. 4.) 
53 Schlesinger, The Problems of Commercial Capitalism, p. 6. 
54 Ibid. pp. 6-7. 
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Again, what at first might appear to be a capitalist advancement, strong 
centralisation and active intervention in the economy, could be explained by 
other needs and developments within the state.  
 
Schlesinger went on to outline the broad historiographical trends in pre-
modern Russian history. Liberal historians of the nineteenth and twentieth 
century sought the thread of Russian development in the increased binding of 
individuals and groups to the state.55 They wrote reasonably favourably of the 
westernisation of Russia, but criticised the fact that, after the reign of Peter I, 
the state only loosened the obligations of the nobility. In contrast, wrote 
Schlesinger, Pokrovskii’s main achievement had been his ability to criticise 
the Petrine reforms, ‘…. not from the point of view of an idealisation of the 
‘autocht[h]one’ feudal Russia, as the Slavophils had done… but under the 
point of view whether Peter’s way was really the best and most effective way 
to realise capitalist progress and to render Russia a country up to 
contemporary standards’.56 He recognised the correctness of Peter’s aims but 
questioned his methods. Modern Soviet historiography, written in the 1930s 
and 1940s, returned to the rather positive attitude of the Liberals, whilst 
criticising the general feudal framework of Petrine and post-Petrine Russia. 
Schlesinger argued that Russian attitudes to the country’s past and future 
were determined by interpretations of the turning point in Russian history, ‘… 
the period when the great decision for the Western way of development had 
definitely been made’.57 It was understandable that the Bolsheviks, having 
gained political power under the aegis of a Western theory, should claim 
Peter’s inheritance. Schlesinger argued that there was a certain pragmatism 
to the Bolsheviks’ historical interpretation, one that he understood and 
perhaps even approved of. 
                                                
55 Schlesinger was presumably referring to historians such as V. O. Kliuchevskii (1841-1911). 
For more information on the great master of nineteenth century historiography see, Mazour, 
Modern Russian Historiography, pp. 112-121. He also referred to M. I. Tugan-Baronovsky 
and his major work The Russian Factory in the Nineteenth Century (Homewood, Illinois, 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc, 1970) trans. A Levin and C. S. Levin. Tugan-Baranovskii (1865-1919) 
was one of a group of Russian ‘Legal’ Marxists (Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, pp. 
182-183). 
56 Schlesinger, The Problems of Commercial Capitalism, p. 8. 
57 Ibid. p. 8. 
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Schlesinger next tried to discern if any ‘capitalist’ elements could be 
discovered in seventeenth and eighteenth century Russian society: ‘It is the 
question whether the dynamic tendency of such ‘capitals’ as existed during 
the 16th and 17th Centuries was to create a capitalist society’.58 Did these 
earlier elements of ‘capital’ lead society towards capitalism? Schlesinger 
argued that within a Marxist system of sociology one could not say ‘capital’ 
when referring to money accumulations that did not provide employment for 
industrial workers and showed no tendency towards such an employment as 
the normal method of yielding profits. Examples of money accumulation alone 
did not provide evidence of a transition away from feudalism. Instead, 
Schlesinger introduced his own criterion for assessing the nature of the 
Russian state at this time. One had to prove a causal chain between the 
instances of ‘commercial capitalism’ and a capitalist tendency of development.  
 
According to Schlesinger the theory of ‘commercial capitalism’ did not stand 
up to serious academic scrutiny and seventeenth and eighteenth century 
Russian society could not be characterised as developing towards capitalism. 
This was because only two of Schlesinger’s six criteria were present. There 
were numerous and sizeable ‘commercial capitals’ and the ideologies and 
foreign policies of the time did have a capitalist element.59 However, the social 
and economic mechanisms to further develop these did not exist and what 
‘commercial capitalisms’ were present were not gaining control over the 
manufacture of small handicrafts.60 Also, ‘commercial capitalism’ played no 
role in shaping large-scale industry and its representatives, the merchants, 
had very little, if any, political power.61   
 
According to Schlesinger, Pokrovskii had insisted that all the pre-requisites for 
capitalism had existed at the end of the seventeenth century and would have 
come fully to fruition had it not been for the political framework of a state that 
                                                
58 Ibid. p. 10. 
59 Ibid. p. 11 and p. 13. 
60 Ibid. p. 18 and p. 20. 
61 Ibid. p. 30. 
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was controlled by the nobles.62 However, Schlesinger disputed this claim 
arguing that at least two, if not more, of Pokrovskii’s preconditions were 
absent. Schlesinger argued:  
 
There were no sufficient working-hands apart from the serfs, 
whose inclusion into industrial production was just to result in 
the ‘feudalisation’ of Russian industry. And, in consequence of 
the rule of serfdom, there was not a sufficient domestic market – 
apart from the enormous military needs of the state, and some 
luxury consumption of the rich, certainly not just the most 
suitable field for developing a young industry63 
 
Schlesinger argued that a capitalist interpretation of Russian history and the 
success of the ‘fallacious’ theory of ‘commercial capitalism’ had come about 
because the past had been judged by the needs and possibilities of another 
generation instead of its own. Present beliefs and social systems had been 
reflected backwards into the past creating a seriously mistaken impression of 
seventeenth and eighteenth century society. 
 
The Problems of Commercial Capitalism in 17th and 18th Century Russia is an 
interesting manuscript which provides some information on Soviet 
historiography but perhaps, more importantly, elaborates Schlesinger’s 
personal thinking on the nature of pre-1917 Russian society. He analysed 
various Russian schools of thought such as Pokrovskii’s and then offered a 
lucid explanation as to why he disagreed with these theories. His criticisms of 
Pokrovskii were of an academic character, perhaps lending them more 
legitimacy than his more polemical attacks. Schlesinger questioned his 
concept of ‘commercial capital’ and found it wanting. It seems clear that 
Schlesinger was in agreement with and, in some ways, was reproducing the 
arguments of the Soviet anti-Pokrovskii campaign. He provided little evidence 
                                                
62 Ibid. p. 35. See Pokrovskii, Brief History of Russia, Volume 1, p. 100. 
63 Schlesinger, The Problems of Commercial Capitalism, p. 36. 
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to substantiate his claims regarding Russian development. He also failed to 
provide explanations of his terms. Schlesinger referred to concepts such as 
‘commercial capitalism’, ‘merchants’ and ‘ideologies’, terms with various and 
often value-laden meanings, but did not provide an exposition of the precise 
way in which he was using them. It is important to remember, however, that 
the manuscript was not a final draft.  
 
Schlesinger’s next writing on Soviet historiography was as part of a book, The 
Spirit of Post-war Russia. Whilst in exile in Prague in 1938 Schlesinger had 
written a large manuscript on recent developments in the Soviet Union. It was 
lost for some time between his London and New York publishers and, when 
Schlesinger did have it returned, he found it to be too outdated for publication. 
Most of the research he had undertaken was put to use in The Spirit of Post-
war Russia and so the main body of work for the book was produced 
immediately after Schlesinger’s expulsion from the USSR.64 The book was 
based on observations that Schlesinger had made in the USSR before the 
Second World War. He argued, however, that he was, ‘…. quite justified in 
altering the detail and calling it a book on the spirit of post-war Russia, 
because I believe that the trends observable in pre-war Russia have 
continued, and are continuing to dominate Soviet life’.65 The correctness of 
this statement is open to debate. Certainly, in the historical sphere, post-war 
social and political conditions were dramatically different to earlier ones; 
leading inevitably to different historical interpretations. Perhaps the most 
significant feature of post-war historiography was the ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ 
campaign; a movement introduced purportedly to purge Soviet society of the 
accommodation of the bourgeois world that had occurred during wartime.66 
This obviously would have led to the manifestation of different trends before 
and after the war.  
 
Schlesinger asserted that his intention in writing the book was to study the 
Soviet social system: the internal development of a revolutionary state, from 
                                                
64 Schlesinger, In a Time of Struggle: The War Approaches p. 250. 
65 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-war Russia, pp. 7-8. 
66 See below pp. 246… 
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the point of view of the needs and standards of the state under 
consideration.67 He believed that this made his study unique, since many 
other discussions simply applied the standards of one state in order to criticise 
another. This unique, academic and impartial strategy was, presumably, in 
contrast to many Western works, which merely criticised the Soviet system 
through the prism of inappropriate Western standards. Schlesinger observed 
various aspects of Soviet social life and attempted to discern general Soviet 
attitudes. He explored the Marxist ‘ideological superstructures’ constructed by 
the Soviet state, such as legislation and culture.  
 
The book had an entire chapter dealing with the historical field in the Soviet 
Union, ‘The Conception of History’.68 In it, Schlesinger attempted to deduce 
the impact that recent developments in Soviet thought, namely the evolution 
of Soviet patriotism, had had upon approaches to the fundamental problems 
of history. He began by explaining that Soviet historical studies were 
necessarily undertaken within a Marxist framework. Marxism stressed the 
importance of the objective structure of society, the material conditions from 
which men produced their livelihoods. This Marxist conception was, according 
to Schlesinger, ‘…. in opposition to the traditional ‘explanation’ of historical 
development by the enumeration of the feats of ‘great men’ and by the 
description of the ideas influencing their actions’.69 Marxism emphasised 
objective social constructions, the causal factors influencing man’s ideas and 
setting limits to the realisation of these ideas. As in his Marxist writings, 
Schlesinger insisted that Marx and Engels had never denied that men 
produce their own history or tried to reduce the significance of personalities 
and ideas. However, the task of Marxist sociology and historical research was 
to explain how these particular personalities and ideas had arisen at that 
particular time. Any historical study undertaken in the Soviet Union would 
inevitably begin from these assumptions; Marxism was the theoretical 
paradigm from which all research was born. Schlesinger believed this to be 
                                                
67 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-war Russia, p. 8. 
68 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-war Russia, Chapter 6, pp. 137-148. 
69 Ibid. p. 137. 
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one of the most positive aspects of Soviet historiography, since he considered 
the use of Marxist methodology to be the basis of sound scholarship. 
 
It would, perhaps, be natural to expect great advances in sociological and 
historical research given that any work was produced from theoretically sound 
roots. However, according to Schlesinger, a distortion of Marxism had been 
introduced to Russia prior to the revolution and this had had a profound 
impact upon subsequent work. Schlesinger wrote: 
 
  …. a vulgar travesty of Marxism was propagated in 
Russia before and during the first years after 1917 under the 
title of ‘economic materialism’. Marxist theory was misused to 
imply the existence of some automatism by which economic 
conditions produce ‘history’ of their own accord, with the men 
and their ideas acting as mere marionettes.70 
 
This theory of ‘economic materialism’ had various undesirable ramifications 
for the Bolsheviks. Schlesinger identified two major disadvantages to the 
theory. Firstly it had a tendency to produce amongst revolutionaries a fatalistic 
attitude and willingness to seek out inevitable causes of defeat rather than 
solutions to avert it: ‘objective conditions’ were the determining factor in 
society and if the ones necessary for revolution were not present there was 
nothing one could do. It could thus be a pretext for avoiding revolutionary 
action. Schlesinger believed that the theory had fulfilled such a function both 
in German and Russian right-wing Socialism, singling out Kautsky as 
someone who strove to find pretexts for avoiding decisive revolutionary 
action. He argued that ‘economic materialism’ could well serve as the 
theoretical basis for ‘right-wing deviations’ on the eve of a revolution. 
However, it could also become a pretext for ‘left-wing deviations’ after the 
event; the society that had emerged from the revolution had done so in 
contradiction to Marxist precepts and could not, therefore, be socialism. 
Further radical and revolutionary action would in this case be necessary. 
                                                
70 Ibid. p. 137. 
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According to Schlesinger: ‘The fact that economic materialism lent itself to 
these heterodox interpretations, most of them in the Trotskyist sense, was a 
sufficient reason for the Stalinists to wage an energetic war ‘on the historical 
front’’.71 Schlesinger rejected the ‘economic automatism’ and ‘vulgar Marxism’ 
he attributed to Pokrovskii and his school. He also appeared to advocate 
Stalin’s actions. 
 
The second major problem the theory held for the Bolsheviks was that if one 
accepted that men and ideas were simply figureheads, what was the point in 
studying them?  Schlesinger argued that for fifteen years after the revolution 
Soviet youth were only taught of ‘empty sociological boxes’. This allowed 
children to gain a vivid impression of the general conditions of life in a certain 
period without having to worry about examinations based on ‘dry facts’. Yet 
the major disadvantage of this form of historical education was that it would 
very often result in total ignorance of the basic events of history. In provincial 
schools, even the positive aspect was likely to be distorted into caricatures, 
and so the children would learn nothing except meaningless phrases. This 
major criticism of ‘economic materialism’ was familiar throughout 
Schlesinger’s writings of this time. He accused Soviet education, based on 
what he perceived to be ‘Pokrovskiian’ concepts, of teaching only a vulgar 
and overly schematic version of history. This judgement appeared to 
correspond directly to that of the Soviet authorities and their anti-Pokrovskii 
campaign. 
 
According to Schlesinger, the most popular ‘sociological box’ used 
immediately after the revolution, under the auspices of ‘economic 
materialism’, was the theory of Russian ‘merchant capitalism’. This had been 
developed forty years previously and had proven to be especially dangerous 
to an understanding of Russian history. Schlesinger argued that the theory 
was, ‘…. as old as the Marxist fashion among Russian intellectuals’ and 
pointed to Kautsky as the originator of this ‘‘economic’ vulgarisation’.72  
Building upon his previous work, Schlesinger argued that if, at around 1900, 
                                                
71 Ibid. p. 138. 
72 Ibid. p. 139, footnote 134. 
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any states in Europe were feudal or semi-feudal it was surely Russia that best 
fitted the description. However, he continued: 
 
…. for good reasons…, the struggle against Tsarist Russia had 
to be fought under the leadership of a party, working class at 
least according to its own theory, and under the banner of the 
Marxist ideology which had been originally developed to satisfy 
the needs of the class struggle between industrial workers and 
capitalists.73 
 
There was, therefore, a tendency amongst progressive historians to interpret 
the feudal past in light of present circumstances, and to seek economic 
explanations for all phenomena. Added to these errors was an inability 
amongst most historians to fully comprehend the Marxist conception of 
productive relations. This produced a great number of very ‘primitive 
travesties of history’ in the years immediately before and after the October 
revolution.74  
 
In Schlesinger’s earlier and later writings he accused Pokrovskii of utilising the 
false theory of ‘merchant capitalism’, but he made little reference to him in this 
work. Schlesinger did write, ‘…. the tendency arose among Russian 
progressive historians to interpret the purely feudal past in the light of the 
present, ‘to reflect the proletarian class struggle into the past’, as one 
extremist representative of this tendency declared’.75 It seems clear that 
Schlesinger believed Pokrovskii to be the ‘extreme representative’; he had 
previously argued that Pokrovskii reflected modern circumstances 
backwards.76 It is unclear why Schlesinger would choose not to name him 
directly at this point. Yet it seems certain that Schlesinger was once again 
                                                
73 Ibid. p. 139. 
74 Ibid. p. 139. 
75 Ibid. p. 139. 
76 See, for example, Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, 
p192….. 
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criticising Pokrovskii and his followers, in agreement with official Soviet 
attitudes of the time. 
 
In order to substantiate the fallacious theory of ‘merchant capitalism’ it was 
necessary to find some characteristics of capitalism in ancient feudal Russia. 
As elsewhere, Russian landlords had allied with merchants since the 
sixteenth century in order to facilitate development from feudal anarchy to an 
absolutist state. Schlesinger proposed that it was a relatively simple matter to 
overemphasise this point in order to assert that commercial capital had 
shaped the laws of serfdom and that the crown was merely an ornament 
covering the merchants’ rule. However, this interpretation of Russian history 
led to numerous logical difficulties. If Russia had already become capitalist, 
what had progressives been fighting for in the two hundred years preceding 
the 1917 revolution? Was it worthwhile to fight against overwhelming odds 
merely to change the existing type of capitalism into its more modern form of 
industrial capitalism? Schlesinger also emphasised the politically expedient 
need for the Soviet state to reject such an interpretation. As soon as the 
Bolsheviks wished to stress their historical links to all Russian progressive 
thought, with the rise of Soviet patriotism under Stalin, the description of the 
former ruling pattern as ‘merchant capitalism’ had to be removed, along with 
other simplifications, since they described various aspects of Russian history 
as non-progressive. Such vulgar manifestations of capital were no longer 
appropriate for a state wishing to shine a light on the historically progressive 
character of the Russian people. Schlesinger suggested that the state had its 
own reasons for progressing beyond the theory of ‘merchant capitalism’; 
however, he agreed with the outcome. 
 
The other major weakness of the theory of ‘merchant capitalism’ was that, 
according to Schlesinger, aside from political motives, ‘…. what remained of 
Marxism as a sociological theory of history, if the standard of the present were 
simply to be applied to the past’?77 It distorted Marxism to the point of 
                                                
77 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-war Russia, p. 140. 
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absurdity, and so the concept of ‘merchant capitalism’ was dropped in the late 
1920s. Schlesinger wrote that it had, ‘…. contradicted the fundamental 
Marxist thesis that various stages of social development are characterized by 
the various forms in which men produce their livelihood’.78 According to 
Schlesinger, in 1930-1 even Pokrovskii had to concede that the concept of 
‘merchant capitalism’ was meaningless since capitalism was a system of 
production and yet ‘merchant capitalism’ did not produce anything. 
 
As the distortions of this vulgar Marxism became ever more visible, Soviet 
historians made a concerted move away from those theories emanating from 
‘economic materialism’. Thus, according to Schlesinger, ‘…. the past was 
reinstated – in so far as this past had been progressive by the standards of its 
own times and had contributed to forming the present outlook of the Soviet 
fatherland’.79 Historical interpretations were now freed from the constraints of 
an erroneous methodology. There was to be no more reflecting the present 
backwards and a correction of previous mechanistic statements ensued, 
although emphases were often determined by propagandistic requirements 
and some Soviet historians went too far in ‘correcting’ past mistakes. As well 
as perceiving these changes in a progressive manner, Schlesinger argued 
that some of the necessary changes in historical research and teaching were 
instigated by Stalin personally. He cited the drive against perceived ‘economic 
materialism’ in school textbooks, begun by the Party authorities in 1934, as an 
example. 
 
Schlesinger described the changes in Soviet historiography in a very positive 
light. He used the differing interpretations of Peter I over time as an example 
of how the changes made in historical theory under Stalin had led to 
improvements in its study and teaching. His analysis was very similar to The 
Problems of Commercial Capitalism in 17th and 18th Century Russia. In pre-
revolutionary Russia, historians had tended to treat Peter I in one of two ways. 
Either, as Westernisers, they celebrated him as a kind of liberal reformer or, 
                                                
78 Ibid. pp. 143-4. Author’s italics. 
79 Ibid. p. 140. 
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as Slavophils, they criticised him for the destruction of old-Russian mysticism 
and for killing many thousands for the sake of introducing modern technique 
and economics. The first generation of Soviet historians, i.e. Pokrovskii’s 
school, attempted to criticise him from a more progressive perspective. They 
pointed to Peter’s failure to achieve his own aim of capitalist industrialisation 
and blamed him for the suffering of the masses, the fruit of which only the 
exploiters would be in a position to enjoy. However, Schlesinger continued, 
‘…. the Pokrovskiian historians themselves, in their polemics against the 
former official cult of Peter, relapsed into the Slavophil tendency of defending 
all his antagonists, including such obvious reactionaries as his son and 
grandson’.80 Although the first Soviet historians had made progress in 
historical interpretation, more was clearly required. 
 
Schlesinger believed that the official Soviet textbook edited by Shestakov best 
illustrated the Soviet attitude at the time of his writing.81 It acknowledged that 
Peter had done much to shape and strengthen the state. Now Soviet 
historians expressed sympathy with him in his struggle against ecclesiastical 
and other reactionaries and against the peasant uprisings directed at the 
Petrine state.  They acknowledged his achievements in introducing reform 
within the existing system and his recognition of the need to eventually 
overthrow that system. Schlesinger concluded that, ‘… this result seems to be 
reasonable from the historical as well as from the methodological point of 
view, it may be regarded as characteristic of the attitude of Stalinist Russia 
towards the Russian past’.82 Schlesinger also praised Stalinist Soviet 
historiography for returning to sound Marxist principles: ‘As to the theoretical 
interpretation of facts, I do not think that recent developments of Soviet 
historiography are exposed to serious criticism from the Marxist point of view: 
at least in essentials it seems that the claims of the Soviet writers to have 
restored original Marxian concepts is justified’.83 
                                                
80 Ibid. p. 142. 
81 It is the same textbook to which Schlesinger referred in his report for Zeitschrift für 
Sozialforschung. 
82 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-war Russia, p. 142 
83 Ibid. p. 143. 
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When writing about Soviet attitudes to Peter I, Schlesinger pointed out that 
any discussion inevitably had to confront questions of the price paid, in human 
costs, for speedy reconstruction, and the moral implications of a ‘revolution 
from above’ which would necessarily have little regard for freedom of criticism. 
There are obvious parallels between issues surrounding the rule of Peter and 
those of the Bolshevik state. Schlesinger wrote: ‘So when reading historical 
writings ‘on Peter’, one must sometimes ask whether it is really about Peter 
that post-1917 Soviet historians were writing’.84 Schlesinger believed that 
personal ethics decided the stance individuals would take on these issues. It 
was unsurprising that both Lenin and Stalin had expressed the opinion that, 
without the work of Peter, they could not have undertaken theirs. However, he 
strongly rejected the notion that this had led modern Soviet historians to 
uncritically lavish praise upon the Petrine reforms.  
 
This section of the chapter is particularly interesting because it displays 
Schlesinger’s keen awareness of the political nature of the historical and 
sociological work he was exploring. He believed this political dimension was 
characteristic not only of work undertaken within the Soviet Union but of 
academic work in general. As a Marxist, attempting not simply to interpret the 
world but to change it, Schlesinger would not have condemned Soviet 
historiography for its political character; it was an inherent part of the research 
process, and one he explicitly recognised. All academic work had its political 
implications and assumptions and that which was produced in the Soviet 
Union was simply more self-conscious.  
 
Countering any potential assertion that Soviet historiography was overtly 
politicised by the state, or simply followed the needs of short-term 
propaganda, Schlesinger argued that there was little doubt that at certain 
times certain aspects of Russian history were emphasised. However, he 
countered: 
 
                                                
84 Ibid. p. 141. 
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To emphasise, for needs of popular propaganda, certain topical 
aspects of national history is one thing, to ‘correct’ history for 
propagandist aims is another. I do not think that present Soviet 
writing of history deserves the latter reproach, at least in so far 
as it deals with issues outside the field of factional struggles 
within the Bolshevik party.85 
 
Soviet historiography did no more than any other state would find necessary 
in order to mobilise its society against perceived dangers. Schlesinger argued 
that Marxism, the very cornerstone of Soviet historical and sociological theory, 
rejected any adaptation of historical teaching for propagandist aims as 
belonging to a pragmatic philosophy. Soviet philosophy had strictly adhered to 
this policy; any manipulation of historical facts would be inadequate according 
to those standards. Schlesinger admitted that there still existed certain 
inconsistencies between historical teaching and its ‘selection’ of facts, and the 
standards established by Soviet philosophy. Further advances towards the 
complete rejection of pragmatism were thus necessary; he wrote, ‘…. the 
future of Marxism, as a scientific theory, in the USSR as well as in any country 
where it might conquer political power, implies the rejection of pragmatism…. 
and the exclusion of political expediency from arguments used in scientific 
discussion’.86 However, Soviet historiography could not be condemned 
because it was not yet theoretically or methodologically perfect. 
 
In order to counter the frequent reproach that Marxist and subsequently 
Soviet theory neglected the historical importance of human thought, 
Schlesinger used quotations from a state textbook: ‘New social ideas and 
theories arise only after the development of the material life of society has set 
new tasks before society.’  But they arise, ‘…precisely because they are 
necessary to society, because it is impossible to carry out the urgent tasks of 
development of the material life of society without their organising, mobilising, 
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and transforming action’.87 He was attempting to demonstrate the state’s 
endorsement of the view that social ideas and theories were vital to the 
evolution of society. Schlesinger argued that it was unjust of detractors to 
forget that the Soviet Union was fully occupied in changing the world. Any 
people or group that were bound to action could hardly deny the significance 
of the spiritual source of this action. Schlesinger may also have believed the 
overcoming of the theory of ‘economic materialism’ was proof that the Soviet 
Union respected the historical role of men and ideas; it replaced a 
mechanistic world view with a much more vibrant, organic Marxist analysis. 
 
Schlesinger’s Spirit of Post-war Russia clearly and eloquently described much 
of what Schlesinger appeared to believe about the position of Soviet 
historiography at that time. He expressed a deep approval for its theoretical 
source of Marxism, before asserting that significant problems had developed 
within historical research and teaching immediately before and after the 1917 
revolution. Schlesinger’s understanding of the distorted theory of ‘economic 
materialism’ and its concept of ‘merchant capitalism’ were elucidated. Their 
eventual overcoming under Stalin was briefly described and it was clear that 
Schlesinger believed this to be a major achievement in the Soviet intellectual 
field. He also attacked several common reproaches against Soviet 
historiography arguing that they were exaggerated or simply untrue; once 
more taking on the role of ‘scholar advocate’. On the whole, Schlesinger gave 
a very positive, one-dimensional, description of recent developments within 
the study of history in the Soviet Union. He approved of these developments 
arguing that state textbooks were good examples of the quality of scholarship 
and teaching available in the Soviet Union. It seems clear that the book was 
intended to be of a popular character; in his preface, Schlesinger argued that 
he wished to describe Soviet ideology in ‘plain language’ without ‘special 
jargon’.88 This may explain the rather one-sided, appreciative tone 
Schlesinger gave to his analysis of Soviet historiography. However, it is also 
                                                
87 Ibid. p. 144. The quotation is taken from the notorious Shot Course edited by the Central 
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88 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-war Russia, p. 8. 
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good evidence to suggest the emphasis Schlesinger wished to convey to his 
readers. Without the caveats necessary in strictly academic writing, 
Schlesinger was able to wholeheartedly praise the historical field. 
 
Writings from 1950-1952 
The most significant work Schlesinger completed on the subject of Soviet 
historiography was a set of four articles published in 1950 and 1951 in the 
periodical Soviet Studies, the scholarly journal that he had co-founded and co-
edited. The fact that Schlesinger wrote these major articles and published 
them in his own journal so quickly after its inception proves the deep interest 
that historiography held for him.89  Taking the four articles together, the 
general impression Schlesinger gave of the Soviet historiography he outlined 
is positive. He described a great deal of active and critical debate amongst 
Soviet historians and charted many theoretical advances. However, at the 
same time, he was often deeply critical of individual works of scholarship and 
certain trends within historiography. Quite how these two polar attitudes are 
somehow to be married together is indicative of the general paradox 
Schlesinger displayed in his attitude to the subject. He gave a very favourable 
overall analysis of the study of history in the Soviet Union under Stalin and, 
whilst not ignoring the flaws apparent in its study, never seemed to 
incorporate them into his general analysis.  
 
The articles used contemporary Russian historical publications to decipher 
currents and trends in Soviet historiography. There were obviously some 
limitations to this approach, since Schlesinger’s analysis depended on the 
material that he was able to procure as an academic living in Britain. This 
would necessarily leave some gaps in his knowledge of the literature but this 
was a problem for all students of the Soviet Union in the West and 
Schlesinger could at least add his own personal experiences to any 
investigation. He acknowledged these limitations, proving that he was 
certainly conscious of them. For example, he was not able to follow the 
                                                
89 The first article was printed in the fourth publication of the journal. 
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debate on Russian historiography, occurring in Soviet academic publications 
of the late 1940s, to its conclusion. Schlesinger admitted: ‘Unfortunately, we 
have no detailed knowledge of the persons and events; therefore the 
conditions of the next move are matters of speculation’.90  
 
Schlesinger was very clear about the aims of the Soviet Studies articles. He 
wrote: ‘We are not here discussing Soviet history as specialists in that field; 
our interest is a sociological one, and we are dealing with the subject in so far 
as it reflects the life of Soviet society’.91 Being a student of many academic 
disciplines, history and sociology included, Schlesinger perhaps inevitably 
took a multi-disciplinary approach to the subject. This would allow for a 
Marxist perspective, studying one aspect of society in recognition of the 
determinist relationship it had to other elements. Such an approach may also 
have recognised the peculiarly political and social influence the study of 
history often had, and nowhere more so than in an overtly Marxist state.  
 
He conducted his analysis of Soviet historiography by tracing the debates and 
changes in emphasis, as well as possible social, political or cultural reasons 
for these, in the academic journal Voprosy Istorii. Schlesinger justified his use 
of this particular journal by explaining that it predominantly concerned itself 
with questions of Marxist fundamentals; he wrote: ‘Although this journal is not 
the principle vehicle for original research, it is the central organ of the Soviet 
historical profession and the main vehicle for generalizing the application of 
Marxist ideology to Soviet historiography’.92 A. L. Litvin has described the 
periodical as being ‘the principle historical journal’ at that time.93 It does, 
therefore, appear to have been a good source for information on historical 
developments. The new journal, which had supplanted Istorik Marksist by 
special order of the Party’s Central Committee, was to be serious, scholarly 
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93 A. Litvin, Writing History in Twentieth-Century Russia (London, Palgrave, 2001), trans 
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and non-populist. According to Schlesinger, the editorial of the first issue of 
Volume 1945 promised to describe and influence the direction of historical 
research. It also announced the intention to offer a channel of communication 
with non-Soviet historians and to invite collaborative work with those foreign 
academics who shared the basic approach of Soviet historiography.94 This 
never materialised. However, Schlesinger insisted its reviews of foreign 
publications were, ‘…. fair and in many cases not unfriendly’.95  
 
Despite the journal’s professed aspirations, just four years later the second 
issue of 1949 announced a change in the editorial board and policy of 
Voprosy Istorii.96 This was as a result of criticism of the historical profession 
by the Central Committee. Schlesinger argued that the journal had 
recognised, 
 
…. it has for some time past ceased to be a fighting organ of 
Marxist-Leninist historiography, that it has not confronted Soviet 
historians with their topical tasks, that it refrained from creative 
discussion of the most important problems of historiography and 
did not conduct a consistent and decisive struggle against 
expressions of bourgeois ideology in Soviet historiography.97  
 
Schlesinger explained that the journal also admitted to having expressed a 
liberal attitude to distortions of ideology instead of unmasking falsifiers of 
history. Each issue had been a casual collection of articles that had failed to 
pose theoretical problems or elaborate questions of social thought or the 
history of Soviet society and the state. However, the new editorial board was 
committed to correcting these errors. Schlesinger used issues from the few 
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years before and after this self-criticism in his examination of Soviet 
historiography. He made no comment on it or the change in editorial 
personnel and so one is unable to ascertain Schlesinger’s opinion on the 
matter. This does appear to be a rather strange omission in his articles. He 
was basing his entire analysis on the contents of a periodical in the midst of 
major editorial changes as well as enduring harsh and public denigration. This 
would inevitably have affected the contents of the journal. Schlesinger could, 
perhaps, have made some distinction between articles and interpretations 
popular before and after this shift or described any alteration in tone as a 
result, but he did not. 
 
The series of articles began with an insistence that debate existed within the 
historical field in the Soviet Union. Marxism-Leninism was the basis of all 
historical research but this in no way impeded debate or discussion. 
Schlesinger argued, ‘…. the general framework of interpretation is given to 
Soviet historians, but the Marxist-Leninist theory is open to diverse 
interpretations. Controversy about these interpretations is one aspect of 
historiographical activities’.98 Contrary to what many Western commentators 
thought, a strict Marxist methodology did not limit intellectual freedom or 
debate.  
 
Schlesinger gave a brief outline of the background to recent historiographical 
discussions, giving a short summary of pre-1917 liberal historians and 
outlining the work of Pokrovskii; ‘…. the most prominent figure in Soviet 
historiography during the first fifteen years after the October Revolution’.99  He 
insisted Pokrovskii’s theory of ‘economic materialism’ was inherently anti-
Marxist since an attempt to interpret history in solely economic terms 
contradicted the Marxist conception of history as a succession of different 
forms of social life, determined by the nature of production in each. 
Schlesinger had written previously on what he perceived to be the problematic 
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nature of Pokrovskii’s theory but he now added another criticism of it. Namely 
that: 
 
Pokrovsky’s concept of Merchant Capitalism had very definite 
implications for the interpretation of Russian history. This 
concept confirmed the tendency of pre-Marxist Russian 
historiographers, such as Klyuchevsky, to emphasize basic 
differences, distinguishing early Russian history, with its alleged 
absence of Feudalism, from the West.100 
 
Such a theory denied the importance of the Slav peasants and the existence 
of autonomous development in mediaeval society parallel to the West. Such 
an interpretation was now at odds with the state priority of emphasising 
independent, yet typical, Slavic development. Schlesinger argued that Soviet 
historians were conscious of the fact that their brand of Marxism demanded a 
certain universality of historical experience. The acceptance of separate yet 
analogous development to the West would, therefore, be necessary. Although 
Schlesinger did not say so, there was also perhaps an intentional appeal to 
national pride within the campaign against so-called Pokrovskiian concepts. 
Schlesinger’s assertion that Pokrovksii’s theory denied the parallel nature of 
Russia’s development was disingenuous since Pokrovskii consistently denied 
the particularity of the Russian experience. Schlesinger actually stated this in 
a later unpublished paper.101 
 
Schlesinger described the overcoming of Pokrovskii’s school within Soviet 
historiography. His historical concepts were attacked in the early 1930s 
mainly due to the immediate needs of education. As Schlesinger had argued 
in The Spirit of Post-War Russia and Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung, 
Pokrovskii’s scheme had reduced the facts of national history to illustrations of 
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‘… after all, Russia’s development was not so particular’ (Schlesinger, Social Institutions, p. 
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general trends and had created a tendency to merge the teaching of history 
with that of sociology.102 The party thus sought to replace his analysis and 
theory of history. According to Schlesinger: ‘Pokrovsky’s theories were 
emphatically rejected as ‘empty sociological boxes’’.103 Pokrovskii continued 
to be the subject of criticism as late as 1942 for his, ‘…anti-histori[ci]sm’; 
applying structures derived from present conditions to entirely different 
systems of the past and offering a negative perspective on national history.104 
 
There were various consequences to the overcoming of ‘economic 
materialism’, not least that those historians, such as E. V. Tarle, who had 
been eclipsed by Pokrovskii, could now come to the fore.105 A younger 
generation of historians emerged and began to work on definite and distinct 
time periods. However, Schlesinger argued, ‘…. the defeat of Pokrovsky’s 
school caused also a lot of loose, unsystematic and propagandist talk of a 
traditional, nationalist character’.106 Soviet historians reacted against 
Pokrovskii’s erroneously negative approach to the nation by describing it in 
too positive a manner. This chauvinist tendency increased during World War 
Two and was, perhaps, inevitable as the Soviet Union tried to unite and 
motivate its people against a foreign foe. Yet Schlesinger made no direct 
reference to possible reasons for this nationalist, blinkered approach to 
history.  
 
According to Schlesinger, the 1948 volume of Voprosy Istorii contained 
reactions to A. Zhdanov’s famous speech to a conference of philosophers on 
24 June 1947. The speech formed part of a general restatement by the party 
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of the functions of intellectual specialists in the Soviet Union.107 The 
conference had been organised to lead criticism of G. G. Aleksandrov’s book 
on the history of philosophy. Stalin argued that the book overestimated the 
importance of Western, in particular German, philosophy and failed to note 
the decisive break Marx’s work had created in the evolution of philosophy. 
Criticism was thus essential.108 Zhdanov took the lead in this second 
conference, the first having been deemed too cautious in its condemnation. 
He insisted on the need for greater appreciation of Russian achievements and 
the rejection of ideological ties to the West.109 According to Schlesinger, the 
speech implied a shift in ideological interpretations, fitting theory to the 
changed circumstances of post-war Soviet life.110 However, he argued that 
Zhdanov’s speech did not have the enormous impact upon history that was 
noticeable in other academic subjects, ‘…. there was no special break in the 
historical field because, as we have just seen, the basic concepts of post-war 
ideology were elaborated in the historical field rather earlier than 
elsewhere’.111 
 
Schlesinger went on to describe the ensuing ideological campaign commonly 
referred to as ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’. In a paper in 1949 he had made clear 
the significance of this new focus in intellectual life. He referred to, ‘…. the 
general importance of the attacks on ‘cosmopolitanism’ as the general 
heading under which all the ideological discussions in the USSR have now 
been brought’.112 In the Soviet Studies article, Schlesinger claimed that from 
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April onwards the 1949 volume of Voprosy Istorii had been dominated by the 
movement.113 The ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ drive was concerned with many 
arenas of Soviet culture and had several themes. It seems generally to have 
been aimed at purging any perceived bourgeois or western elements from 
Soviet intellectual achievement or from historical interpretations. The 
supposed past accommodation of the bourgeois world had developed during 
the war, due to an inevitable reduction in antagonism towards the U.S and 
other Western states, whilst fighting as allies.  Yet now, cosmopolitanism was 
synonymous with American imperialism and was the antithesis of Soviet 
patriotism. There, thus, began a relentless campaign, directed at all strata of 
society and every sphere of Soviet intellectual life, aimed at the removal of 
any vestiges of tolerance towards western scientific or philosophical values.114 
As K Shtepa wrote: 
 
Defined in the painful course of many ‘discussions’ and 
‘criticisms’ in 1948 and 1949, cosmopolitanism came to mean 
the extolling or even the use of Western authorities – ‘fawning’ 
before the West and, conversely, the belittling of Russian 
historians and traditions. In accord with the dictates of foreign 
policy, the use of Western sources came to mean reliance on 
the tools of American imperialism.115 
 
The distinctly anti-Semitic character of the campaign has been widely 
recognised. K Tomoff, for example, has written: ‘Anticosmopolitanism has 
long been seen as thinly veiled anti-Semitism’.116 There was more to the 
crusade than simple anti-Semitism but few denied the undertones and 
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implications.117 However, Schlesinger made no reference to this in his articles. 
This does seem a strange omission, particularly from someone of Jewish 
descent who had experienced anti-Semitism in his childhood. Schlesinger 
may have deliberately avoided mention of this sinister aspect of the campaign 
in his effort to emphasise the positive aspects of Soviet historiography. 
However, this is merely speculation. Schlesinger may also have been 
unaware of these implications; although, given his background, this is 
doubtful.118 
 
Schlesinger felt the campaign was a reaction to the rapprochement of 
Marxism to its bourgeois-democratic ancestors, and in particular of Soviet 
Marxism to all broadly progressive tendencies in the national past; both trends 
had flourished in the war years.  The campaign also reacted against attempts 
to diminish the differences between Soviet Marxism and the social forces in 
the West to which the wartime alliance had appealed. According to 
Schlesinger, in the historical field, the ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ drive manifested 
itself in, ‘…. a polemic against the minimizing of differences with the West’.119 
Another element to the campaign involved a critique of pre-Revolutionary 
historians. They were criticised in terms of their supposed embellishment of 
the Russian past. In order to enhance national prestige, Russian development 
had to be seen as independent of the West; although this did not go so far as 
to suggest that Russia evolved upon entirely separate lines. In addition, 
considerations of the specific achievements of the Soviet state and party 
made it necessary to rid previous times of embellishments; making 
developments since all the greater.120 
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Schlesinger argued that ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ was of a more severe 
character than previous ideological campaigns.121 For example, it resulted in 
the change in Voprosy Istorrii’s Editorial Board.122 However, it is arguable 
whether the loss of position or reputation of several scholars on the Editorial 
Board was a ‘more severe’ punishment than that which had occurred in 
previous ideological campaigns. The campaign against bourgeois historians 
at the beginning of the first five year plan resulted in elderly academics such 
as M. K. Lyubavsky and N. P. Likhachev being imprisoned and exiled. 
According J. Barber: ‘On one calculation, 130 historians were arrested during 
1930 and 1931’.123  
 
The ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ campaign had a major impact upon Soviet 
historiography, affecting the selection, tone and content of articles in Voprosy 
Istorii. The drive resurrected theories of Russia’s unique, independent 
development whilst insisting that the Bolshevik takeover of power represented 
a decisive break with the past. There was to be no accommodation of the 
western world into analyses of Russian development. This new emphasis was 
to be followed in all spheres of academic research, including the study of 
Russian history. This party-instituted drive had enormous repercussions for 
Soviet historians and yet Schlesinger only described it in brief terms and failed 
to note the intentionally anti-Semitic implications of the new approach.  
 
In the paper, Schlesinger offered very little of his own opinion on the post-war 
historiographical developments he described. This appears to be a strange 
exclusion since in other writings on the subject Schlesinger was rarely reticent 
in offering his own judgements. There were implicit criticisms of the Soviet 
regime’s historiographical formulae within the introductory article; several 
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footnotes seem to covertly disparage new trends or semi-official criticisms.124 
However, the positioning of this criticism was bound to reduce its impact and, 
in general, the paper was very positive about developments.  
 
The second article began with a discussion of Soviet interpretations of ancient 
history, as reflected in the journal Voprosy Istorii. Non-Russian or Slav history 
appeared to have been primarily focused upon the Roman Empire. The decay 
of the ancient world had always been a major area of research in the West but 
now, Schlesinger asserted, ‘… the topicality of the issue is felt equally strongly 
by Soviet historians and publicists who are rejecting the theories of their 
Western colleagues and beginning to formulate their own’.125 He argued that 
Engels, in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, written in 
1884, produced the classic Marxist perspective on the subject.126 Engels’ aim 
was to explain why the modern proletariat could overthrow capitalist society 
and replace it with a non-exploitative one, whilst oppressed classes of the 
past only succeeded in replacing decaying societies with other exploitative 
forms. Schlesinger then referred to Stalin’s speech to a meeting of kolkhoz-
activists in February 1933, at the First All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm 
Shock Brigaders. According to Schlesinger, Stalin illustrated, 
 
…. the superiority of the modern working class over all the 
earlier revolutionary classes by saying that the former could end 
exploitation for good, while the revolutions of the slaves which 
had overthrown slave-holding, and those of the serfs which had 
overthrown feudal society, had only been able to substitute one 
form of exploitation for another.127 
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serious, thereby invites the reproach of having erroneously described them as at least very 
near to Marxism’. This would inevitably impede research and discussion. (Schlesinger, 
‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 1, p. 309, footnote 26). 
125 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 2, p. 3. 
126 Marx and Engels, Werke, 21, pp. 25-173. 
127 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 2, p. 4. Stalin insisted: ‘The history of nations 
knows not a few revolutions. But those revolutions differ from the October Revolution in that 
 251 
This appears to have been very near to the tone of Engels’ statements, 
suggesting a continuation of Marxist interpretation into the Soviet era. 
However, Schlesinger argued that more recently there had been a renewed 
tendency to reflect backwards, if not the modern class struggle, at least 
contemporary Bolshevik concepts about the social dynamics of change. 
Whereas Engels was satisfied to show the necessity of a socio-economic 
interpretation of the fall of Rome, modern Soviet historians wished to stress 
the decisive role of popular movements in the transformation of social 
formations. In this new interpretation, external conquest became only a 
secondary phenomenon. Schlesinger asserted: ‘It is obvious that this 
represents a methodological attempt to apply the Marxist theory concerning 
the mechanisms of social transformations to the national sections of the 
international process’.128 He cited an article by M. Alpatov on the transition 
from the ancient to the mediaeval world as an example of it.129 
 
Soviet interpretations of Roman history increasingly differed from those in the 
West at this time. Schlesinger cited A. Dopsch as an example of Western 
historiography.130 He argued that Dopsch’s theory of the ‘barbarians’ merely 
‘taking over’ the Roman estate, assumed that the estate must have already 
contained manifestations of semi-feudal forms. Early mediaeval society must, 
therefore, have featured a well-developed money economy in which 
prosperous farmers were producing for the market alongside the slave-
holding manors.  Such an interpretation differed substantially to Soviet 
historiography. As Schlesinger explained: ‘This concept is sharply rejected by 
Soviet historians because it does not regard feudalism as a natural and serf-
holding economy and because it does not recognise the changes which took 
                                                                                                                                       
all of them were one-sided revolutions. One form of exploitation of the working people was 
replaced by another form of exploitation, but exploitation itself remained’ (Stalin, Sochinennia, 
13, pp. 236-256 at. p. 239). 
128 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 2, p. 5, footnote 8  
129 See M. Alpatov, ‘Novyi etap b razrabotke problemy perekhoda ot dvernego mira k srednim 
vekam’, Voprosy Istorii, 7, 1949, pp. 28-39 (Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 2, p. 
4, footnote 3 and p. 5). 
130 Schlesinger was referring to Alfons Dopsch (1866-1937) the Austrian scholar and historian 
of the origins of medieval civilisation. A. Dopsch, The Economic and Social Foundations of 
European Civilization (New York, Howard Fertig, 1969). 
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place in the ancient world as revolutionary’.131 Dopsch’s scheme ran counter 
to the classic Marxist explanation of Western history and periodisation.  
 
Schlesinger argued that the articles in Voprosy Istorii concerned with ancient 
history represented a new, independent, stage in Soviet historiography. Soviet 
historians were developing their own theories on the Roman Empire and its 
fall and these theories diverged greatly from those in the West. Soviet 
theories evolved from the classic Marxist interpretation and enjoyed the full 
support of Stalin. He pointed that Alpatov’s article contained statements to the 
effect that the slaves were incapable of defeating the Empire alone and thus 
required class allies.132 Schlesinger wrote: ‘Such statements are clearly 
ideological; whether they can be helpful to Science, as earlier ideological 
constructions have occasionally been, depends upon their suitability as 
incentives to specialist research’.133 The fact that allies were required to 
destroy the decaying empire may have been a reflection of the experiences of 
the Russian Revolution and the decisive role given to the peasantry, rather 
than the thoughtful analysis of evidence. It was to be seen whether this 
interpretation would prove fruitful for scholars. Schlesinger also pointed out 
that Alpatov was keen to prove the continuity of Marxist thought on the 
subject, traceable to Marx himself; this again would be for ideological 
purposes.134  However, new advances in the historiography of this period had 
been made and Schlesinger described them in a positive light. 
 
Schlesinger wrote briefly about the debates on the nature of the Petrine 
period to be found in Voprosy Istorii. The discussion was, in the main, on 
whether Petrine Russia had a generally feudal character, or if capitalist 
formations had already begun to take shape. According to Schlesinger, N. L. 
Rubinstein held the leadership of the dominant interpretation. He argued that 
                                                
131 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 2, p. 6. 
132 Alpatov, ‘Novyi etap v razrabotke problemy perekhoda ot dvernego mira k srednim vekam’, 
pp. 33-34. 
133 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 2, pp. 5-6. 
134 Ibid. p. 5, footnote 10. 
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the Petrine period was of a primarily feudal character.135 Schlesinger wrote 
that he assumed, ‘…. a transformation from a predominantly feudal to a 
predominantly capitalist pattern during the 1740s and 1750s’.136 This matter 
seems to have been one of quite open debate. In fact, Schlesinger referred to 
one article which contributed to the discussion despite its apparently obvious 
unorthodoxy.137 Schlesinger argued that P. Lyashchenko enjoyed official 
recognition for his interpretation of the nature of Petrine Russia in his book 
History of the National Economy of the Russia; ‘The Stalin prize awarded to 
Lyashchenko may be regarded as an approval at least of the principles of his 
approach’.138 His interpretation was of a Petrine Russia featuring both feudal 
and capitalist characteristics. Yet a year later Voprosy Istorii contained a 
critical review of Lyashchenko’s book written by I. Bak. It argued that the era 
had remained predominantly feudal.139 Again, the publication of this review 
would seem to suggest that a certain freedom of debate existed within the 
historical field, in spite of the heated climate of the prevailing ‘anti-
cosmopolitanism’ campaign.  This open historiographical discussion appears 
to strengthen the case for some of Schlesinger’s most positive comments 
about the historical field in the Soviet Union, such as those made in The Spirit 
of Post-war Russia, for example.140  Yet one year later the contents and 
editing of Voprosy Istorii were heavily criticised and the majority of the 
editorial board were replaced. This may well have been due to the publishing 
of debates and heterodox articles such as those described above. 
 
Lyashchenko had described the Petrine regime as representing both feudal 
nobility and the evolving bourgeoisie. According to the historian, the era 
witnessed a strengthening of serfdom at the same time as an increase in 
                                                
135 N. Rubinshtein, ‘O manufakturnom periode russkoi promyshlennosti i skladyvanii 
kapitalisticheskogo uklada v Rossii XVIII veka’, Voprosy Istorii, 12, 1947, pp. 74-79.  
136 ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 2, p. 18. 
137 Ibid. p. 19. The article in question was S. Strumilin, ‘Ekonomicheskaia priroda pervykh 
russkikh manufaktur’, Voprosy Istorii, 6, 1948, pp. 60-70, and concerned the economic 
conditions of the first Russian manufactures.  
138 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 2, p. 19. P. I. Lyashchenko, History of the 
National Economy of Russia, (New York, The MacMillan Company, 1949) trans. L. M. 
Herman. 
139 I. Bak, ‘Istoriia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR’, Voprosy Istorii, 6, 1948, pp. 82-89. 
140 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-war Russia. 
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investment from large merchant capitalists and a great deal of development of 
the internal market. As Schlesinger wrote: ‘Thus the elements of capitalism 
grew within a still predominantly feudal society’.141 Lyashchenko’s 
interpretation of the Petrine era differs markedly from writings of Schlesinger’s 
on the same subject. In the unpublished The Problems of Commercial 
Capitalism in 17th and 18th Century Russia, Schlesinger argued that there 
were no particularly significant developed capitalist features in seventeenth or 
eighteenth century Russia.142 Again, in The Spirit of Post-war Russia, he 
insisted: ‘If, about 1900, there were any feudal of semi-feudal states in 
Europe, it was certainly Tsarist Russia’.143 Despite having written upon the 
subject, Schlesinger failed to offer his own opinion on the debate. He did not 
comment on the fact that this ‘semi-official interpretation’ was at odds with one 
he had himself written, or that Lyashchenko’s theory was very similar to that 
which Schlesinger had previously attributed to Pokrovskii in his repudiation of 
him.144  
 
Schlesinger did write: ‘There can be little dispute amongst Marxist historians 
about the appearance of at least some elements of capitalism from the 
sixteenth century onward’.145 Whilst it is true that in his earlier writings he had 
not argued that there were no capitalist elements in the Petrine era, this 
statement does appear to change the tone of Schlesinger’s analysis regarding 
the extent of capitalist development from that in The Problems of Commercial 
Capitalism in 17th and 18th Century Russia. Perhaps Schlesinger had over-
emphasised the feudal nature of Petrine Russia in earlier work in order to 
discredit Pokrovskii and the theory of merchant or commercial capitalism 
attributed to him. However, this would make those writings of Schlesinger’s 
somewhat polemical. His interpretation would also coincide with state 
                                                
141 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 2, p. 19. For example, Lyashchenko wrote: 
‘On the whole, then, serf labor played a prominent role in the industry of the eighteenth 
century. In contrast with western Europe, therefore, the first growth of Russian manufacturing 
industry came within the milieu of serfdom’ (Lyashchenko, History of the National Economy of 
Russia, p. 287). 
142 See above, pp. 227… 
143 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-war Russia, p. 139 
144 Schlesinger, The Problems of Commercial Capitalism, p. 35… 
145 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 2, p. 21. Author’s italics 
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endorsed historiographical objectives of the time, as well as now endorsing 
changed contemporary ones. 
 
Schlesinger conjectured that the change in Soviet historiography on this issue 
had taken place because,  
 
…. with the increasing ‘anti-cosmopolitan’ tendency to 
emphasize the autochthonous development of their own 
country, Soviet historians may be expected to devote more 
attention to Russia’s share in the development of early 
capitalism than they did during the anti-Pokrovsky drive, when 
they were merely interested in demonstrating the still largely 
feudal character of the regime overthrown by the twentieth 
century revolutions.146 
 
This certainly appears to be a convincing explanation for the alteration of 
official historiography. However, it could be argued that Schlesinger’s own 
interpretations followed the same pattern. Concurrent with the anti-Pokrovskii 
campaign in the USSR he was arguing for the, ‘largely feudal character’ of 
pre-revolutionary Russia. Yet now, contemporaneously with the ‘anti-
cosmopolitan’ drive, he appeared to be, at least implicitly, accepting ‘Russia’s 
share in the development of early capitalism’.  
 
The third of Schlesinger’s series of articles on Soviet historiography 
concentrated upon the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and began with a 
discussion of the revolutions of 1848 and their connection to the nationalities 
problem. 1948 represented the centenary of the Communist Manifesto and 
the European revolutions and was, therefore, a great catalyst for the 
publication of research on these subjects. The article went in to some detail 
regarding Soviet historical work on Marx and Engels’ attitude towards 
                                                
146 Ibid. p. 21. 
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nationalities. However, it is perhaps most interesting because it led 
Schlesinger to comment upon the controversy surrounding the publication, by 
the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in 1948, of correspondence between Marx 
and certain Russian political figures.147 His comments shed light not only on 
Soviet attitudes to the topic, but also on Schlesinger’s.  
 
In his famous letters to Vera Zasulich and the editor of Otechestvennye 
Zapiski, Marx appeared to question having created a theory that was ‘both 
universal and supra-historical’.148  He also implied that Capital might have 
been written from a Western perspective only. The editors responsible for the 
printing of these letters were heavily criticised for not having emphasised the 
fact that, within this particular context, the classics had deviated from Marxist 
orthodoxy as established by Lenin. Schlesinger cited a review by A. 
Khan’kovsky inVoprosy Istorii as an example of this criticism.149 Khan’kovsky 
had censured the editors for failing to include the appropriate references to 
writings of Lenin and Stalin alongside Marx’s letters.  
 
This seems to be proof of a trend within the historical field at this time towards 
a lessening of reliance on the Marxist classics. It would certainly be necessary 
if Soviet historians were to prove the typical character of Russian 
development, something they were at pains to do in all fields of historical 
research, but which was severely contradicted by the latest revelations about 
Marx’s Russian thinking. Schlesinger appeared sceptical of the approach 
Soviet historians had taken to the publication of Marx’s letters, writing: ‘In view 
of the great care taken by Marx in drafting the theoretical formulations in the 
letter to Vera Zasulich, the current method of explaining ‘unorthodox’ 
statements made by Marx by his practical interest in encouraging the most 
active group amongst the Russian revolutionaries can hardly be defended’.150 
Schlesinger also wrote that it was obvious, ‘… nobody has faced the 
                                                
147 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 3, p. 144. 
148 See above, pp. 145… 
149 A. Khan’kovskii, ‘Perepiska K. Marksa I F. Engel’sa s russkimi politicheskimi deiateliami’, 
Voprosy Istorii, 8, 1948, pp. 105-120. 
150 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 3, p. 144, footnote 15. 
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possibility that Marx’s temporary doubts about the succession of definite 
stages of social development typical for all civilisations may have been 
something more than an expression of opportunism in his dealings with the 
Russian factions’.151 Schlesinger’s approach was consistent with the attitude 
he took in all other writings on this subject. Although he did not devote a great 
deal of attention to the subject of Marx’s attitude towards Russia he 
consistently mentioned it when dealing with other work. Schlesinger always 
insisted that Marx had not posited the Western framework as the only path to 
socialism. Russia could potentially avoid the capitalist stage of development 
and transfer directly to socialism if the there was sufficient industrial support 
externally.152 
 
It seems clear Schlesinger disapproved of ignoring, or undermining, Marx’s 
later writings about Russia simply because they did not easily fit into the 
orthodox successive stages theory of historical development.153 He, therefore, 
made a significant criticism of Soviet historiography as reflected in the journal 
Voprosy Istorii. However, he did not devote a great deal of attention to the 
subject and much of his analysis was contained within a footnote, away from 
the main body of the text. This would inevitably reduce its impact upon 
readers. It is important to note that a party institute published Marx’s 
correspondence despite the fact that their contents clearly differed from the 
orthodoxy of the time. This would seem to indicate that at least a certain 
openness of discussion was tolerated, even encouraged, on such a 
fundamental matter of Marxist principles.  
 
Schlesinger expressed concern about the lack of publications on the 
immediate pre-history and history of the October revolution. There was more 
                                                
151 Ibid. p. 144. 
152 See, for example, Schlesinger, ‘Marxist Theory and the New Programme of the Soviet 
Communist Party’, p. 132; Schlesinger, ‘The Preparatory Period of the Revolutionary Party’, 
p. 451; Schlesinger, ‘The Dispute and the Socialist Tradition’, p. 177; Schlesinger, Lectures, 
2, p. 9. 
153 For a very similar but more recent approach to the subject see T. Shanin, ‘Late Marx: gods 
and craftsmen’ in T. Shanin (ed.), Late Marx and the Russian Road (London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul Ltd., 1984), pp3-39. 
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work completed upon the first period of Soviet power. However, Schlesinger 
implied that much of it had an overtly political role to play in reflecting 
contemporary attitudes backwards or proving the orthodox heritage of certain 
policies; ‘All these contributions emphasize those trends of the very earliest 
days of the Soviet republic which are predominant at the moment’.154 What 
research was published in Voprosy Istorii at this time only illuminated small 
details of more complex questions or served to legitimise current policies and 
denigrate those people and ideas that were now out of favour. He argued that 
one paper, ‘…. describes the resistance against centralisation almost only in 
terms of the treachery of the factions which were later defeated’.155 He 
suggested that the article was a polemical work with little intrinsically new to 
offer on the subject.  
 
Political exigencies impacted upon the efficacy and quality of scholarship 
concerned with the Civil War period too. Historians were forced to explain the 
establishment of the Red Army without reference to Trotsky’s decisive role.156 
Schlesinger argued that the requirements of state enforced historical axioms 
were, in these cases, anathema to the rigours of sound scholarship and 
coherent presentation. 
 
The last section of Schlesinger’s third article detailed historical work 
undertaken on the themes of imperialism and the German revolution. 
Schlesinger provided a condemnatory evaluation of new trends, 
interpretations and individual works by Soviet scholars in these fields. He 
reviewed most of the articles within the context of the ongoing campaign 
against ‘objectivism’; ‘The struggle against ‘objectivism’ forms the main theme 
                                                
154 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 3, p. 149. 
155 Ibid. p. 149. The paper in question was B. Morozov, ‘Bor’ba partii bol’shevikov za 
ukreplenie sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo aparata’, Vosprosy Istorii, 11, 1949, pp. 13-36.  
156 For example, Schlesinger described an article by D. Osnobishin thus,‘…. the factional 
interpretation of all operational problems of the civil war according to which all army leaders 
who disagreed with Stalin and Budenny are regarded as traitors, is driven to such lengths 
that the bewildered reader is left wondering how, if this were true, the triumph of the Red 
Army in the Civil War could be explained’ (Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 3, p. 
149. D. Osnobishin, ‘K istorii pervoi konnoi armii’, Voprosy Istorii, 12, 1949, pp. 109-126). 
 259 
of all the present Soviet historiographical discussions’.157 This latest 
ideological crusade on the historical front can best be understood alongside or 
as part of the ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ campaign. It was directed against those 
historians who were regarded as uncritically accepting bourgeois sources, 
both foreign and pre-Revolutionary Russian.158  According to Schlesinger, the 
party felt that, ‘…. under the influence of the rapprochement to bourgeois 
liberal and progressive thought during the second world war’, certain 
historians had blindly followed non-Communist sources and thus produced a 
liberal-western interpretation of events as opposed to the correct Communist 
critique.159  This criticism assumed that utilising bourgeois sources would 
necessarily entail the assimilation of any interpretation or emphasis the 
foreign source may have had. However, Schlesinger argued that it was the 
task of historians to discuss facts rather than sociological attitudes to the 
subject; sources could, therefore, be used as a means to gather facts only. He 
was deeply critical of the campaign against perceived ‘objectivism’ and 
insisted that any omission in research caused by a one-dimensional 
theoretical approach would lead to a decline in scholarship. Schlesinger also 
suggested that the campaign would have a negative impact upon the 
perception of Soviet historical research abroad: ‘To the Western historian, the 
Soviet drive against ‘objectivism’… is bound to appear as a revival of 
Pokrovsky’s demand for the reflection of topical politics into the past, if not as 
a demand for subjectivism in the worst sense of the word’.160 This represented 
a damning indictment of current trends. 
 
The fact that all discussions, conclusions and interpretations of the German 
revolution had to be adjusted to match those of state orthodoxy as enshrined 
within the History of the CPSU(b) or Short Course, was another feature of 
                                                
157 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 3, p. 157. 
158 In fact, K. Shtepa pointed out the difficulty historians faced in complying with the demands 
of both ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ and the campaign against ‘bourgeois objectivism. He wrote: 
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accusations of bourgeois objectivism in the case of an insufficiently critical attitude toward 
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159 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 3, p. 155. 
160 Ibid. p. 156-157. 
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Soviet scholarship which Schlesinger criticised. The orthodox interpretation of 
events in Germany in 1918/1919 found the revolution to have been a 
‘bourgeois’ one and it seems that no other analysis could be tolerated.161 
Schlesinger argued that this particular criticism was of ‘a dogmatic 
character’.162 Once again dogmatism in matters of interpretation was 
hindering scholarly progress, although it is important to note that Schlesinger 
did not make this conclusion himself. 
 
In general, Schlesinger provided a negative appraisal of Soviet historical 
research concerning the period from 1848 up to the Second World War. He 
objected to the vehement campaign against ‘objectivism’, a current which 
appeared to distort Soviet historical research. The campaign limited the use of 
sources and assumed that a historian always accepted the interpretation of 
that source, something Schlesinger felt to be methodologically erroneous. 
Progress had been achieved in the study of Marx and Engels’ attitudes 
towards the nationalities question. However, he castigated Soviet analysis of 
Marx’s writings upon the revolutionary potential of Russia in the nineteenth 
century. He argued that Marx’s contribution to the debate about Russia could 
not be ignored simply because it did not concur with official interpretations. 
Schlesinger bemoaned the lack of research produced on the history of the 
October revolution in Russia and argued that the majority of publications 
concerning the first Soviet period were of a tangibly propagandist or polemical 
character, focusing on issues relevant to the current needs of the state. He 
also criticised the scarcity and quality of work produced on the rise of 
imperialism and fascism in Europe. 
 
Schlesinger began his final article of the Soviet historiography series with a 
discussion of recent Soviet interpretations of post-1918 diplomatic history. He 
argued that the majority of work on the topic consisted of reviews of foreign 
documentary publications, many of which were viewed with hostility by the 
                                                
161 ‘…. the revolution in Germany was not a Socialist but a bourgeois revolution’. Short 
Course, p. 231. 
162 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 3, p. 159. 
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Soviet writers. These reviews formed part of the ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ and 
‘objectivism’ campaigns. They involved a somewhat polemical rejection of all 
perceived bourgeois sources and interpretations and also attempted to infer, if 
not simply state, that an anti-Soviet bias was common to all Western 
powers.163 Reviewers were also keen to expose the ‘objectivist’ idealisation of 
bourgeois foreign policies, believed to be held by some erring Soviet 
historians. Schlesinger seemed to regard many of the reviews and articles 
unfavourably; reviews of documentary collections published about British and 
German inter-war foreign policies were evaluated with unnecessary hostility in 
the Soviet Union. He argued that they were attacked for supposed omissions 
in the collections rather than from the point of view of questioning authenticity. 
Often the documentary collections were also criticised for the inclusion of 
certain documents that the reviewers perceived to be in the interests of the 
publishing country. Schlesinger wrote: ‘The Soviet reviewers seem to take it 
for granted that the editors of British publications look only for political effects 
in Germany’.164  
 
Only very recently had articles concerning US foreign policy in the pre-war 
and Second World War years began to emerge. Schlesinger argued that they 
involved a major re-assessment of the Roosevelt period and represented a 
serious shift in Soviet ideology. Once again this alteration of interpretation can 
be understood from the wider context of other post-1945 ideological 
developments, most importantly the ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ campaign. There 
was now a tendency amongst Soviet historians to extend their very negative 
analysis of post-war USA back into the interwar period. According to 
Schlesinger, this new orthodox analysis was very significant since, ‘… many 
of the recent Soviet attempts to avoid encirclement were based upon appeals 
to the Roosevelt tradition against that now predominating in American 
                                                
163 For example, Schlesinger described an article by V. M. Turok on the Anglo-French 
negotiations for a western bloc in February-June 1925 thus; ‘This latter article emphasizes the 
anti-Soviet trend in French no less than in British policies’. This paper was apparently of a 
typical character. (Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 4, p. 267, footnote 8.) V. 
Turok, ‘Ot plana Dauesa k garantiinomu pactu’, Voprosy Istorii, 6, 1948, pp. 22-41. 
164 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 4, p. 267, footnote 8. 
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politics’.165 Such an appeal would no longer be possible. This perhaps 
heralded a more militant stance in international affairs; instead of appealing to 
the US’s more moderate past Soviet historians projected their current notion 
of its aggression backwards.166 Schlesinger argued that a simple projection of 
current notions into the past was potentially erroneous; it was in fact a 
vulgarity of which he had accused Pokrovski. 
 
Schlesinger’s fourth article, completing his summary of Soviet historiography 
up to the post-war period, was in general very critical of the kind of research 
and reviews published in Voprosy Istorii. He argued that many of the reviews 
of foreign documentary publications were overtly polemical and often deeply 
unfair in their criticisms. He also pointed out that the exposition of events in 
China was occurring in the Soviet Union around a decade after the fact. He 
argued that, perhaps, this would persuade Soviet historians to view the state’s 
dominant position, as regards the publication of research work, as having 
certain negative consequences.167 He drew attention to the propagandist 
value of much of the work completed on the inter-war years and Allied policies 
before and during the Second World War. He did not, however, conclude that 
this was a major motivational factor in the evolution of interpretations.  
 
Schlesinger’s major articles on Soviet historiography offer a great deal of 
information on the subject. It seems clear that he was particularly 
knowledgeable and interested in this field and, therefore, had much of value 
to write. With limited access to information on the historical profession in the 
Soviet Union, a critical analysis of the contents of an important scholarly 
journal allowed Schlesinger to gain an impression of the kind of work being 
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166 See for example, I. Kadomskii, ‘Formirovanie anglo-amerikanskogo bloka posle 
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argued that it represented ‘an intelligent compilation of the sources’ as well as an 
‘interpretation which goes beyond what we have already read in official Soviet publications’. 
However, he also argued that whilst the Soviet government may have viewed the Roosevelt 
period through the perspective of their own era, the government of the 1930s was unlikely to 
have judged events on what US policy might be by the 1950s (.Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet 
Historiography’, 4, p. 274-5). 
167 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 4, p. 272. 
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published there. He summarised historiographical trends of the recent Soviet 
past, elaborated the broad shifts in interpretation and analysis that had 
occurred since the Second World War and described the ideological 
campaigns which formed the wider context for these changes. However, the 
information that he provided on this latter theme was limited. He wrote 
comparatively little on the course and impact of the major post-war ideological 
campaign of ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’, despite asserting its significance and 
intensity. It was left to the reader to link his analysis and description of 
individual works of scholarship to the broader ideological environment of the 
Soviet Union. Schlesinger rarely explained any relationship between the 
articles he described and the general historical front. 
 
In general, it seems that Schlesinger wished to convey a positive analysis of 
Soviet historiography in the articles. He began by insisting on the freedom of 
debate which existed in the historical field, within the consensual Marxist-
Leninist framework. He demonstrated the evolution of Soviet historiography, 
often asserting the progress achieved by successive interpretations in 
overcoming the limitations of their predecessors. Schlesinger also praised 
works of individual scholarship. It seems clear that he regarded work carried 
out on earlier historical periods as of a generally higher quality than Soviet 
research on more modern issues. He did draw attention to the political 
efficacy and even necessity of certain historical interpretations but did not 
write any conclusions on how this may have affected freedom of discussion or 
scholarly credibility. He even pointed to individual cases of what appeared to 
be total censorship, wholly polemical purges and huge state interference in 
the practice of history in the Soviet Union; all without comment. At times the 
articles seemed entirely narrative, offering no real analysis or judgement upon 
the matters described.  
 
Schlesinger was condemnatory of individual works of scholarship, reviews 
and interpretations. Parts three and four contained almost entirely critical 
observations of Soviet work. However, he did not seem to incorporate these 
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critiques into what little overall, and almost entirely positive, summation he 
had. For example, in the first of the series of articles, Schlesinger argued that 
reviews of foreign publications were conducted with fairness and often 
friendliness in Voprosy Istorii.168 However, when describing actual reviews, 
Schlesinger clearly gave the impression that foreign works were, on the 
whole, viewed with much hostility. Schlesinger had not incorporated his 
descriptions of the actual character of the reviews into his general analysis. In 
fact, in this instance, his general and specific comments were in direct 
contradiction to each other. Schlesinger’s criticisims of Soviet historiography 
were often introduced only in the footnotes of his articles; this would 
necessarily lessen their impact on a reader.169 
 
There was no general conclusion to the series of articles and there appears to 
have been a reluctance on Schlesinger’s part to make one. His stated aim 
was sociological, to observe how the study of history reflected the life of 
Soviet society. Yet Schlesinger did not fulfil this aim. His articles lacked any 
real analysis linking historiographical developments to events in other 
sections of society. To have ended the series of articles with an overall 
assessment or conclusion is the usual method of bringing a discussion to a 
close and Schlesinger did so in the vast majority of his other writings. There 
could have been various reasons for this omission. One possibility is that 
Schlesinger did not wish to make the necessarily more pessimistic 
characterisation of the study of history in the Soviet Union that followed from 
his many criticisms. Such a motive would support the thesis that Schlesinger 
wished to convey a good impression of Soviet historical work.  
 
Schlesinger’s study of historiography was continued in a publication 
appearing just a few years after his major series of articles.170 ‘Recent 
                                                
168 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 1, p. 303. 
169 See, for example, Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 1, p. 309, footnote 26. 
170 One other article touching upon Soviet history was published before this. However, it was 
merely a small introduction followed by a translation of reports by a Soviet school inspector. 
.Schlesinger, ‘On the Results of School Examinations in Modern History’, Soviet Studies, 2, 4, 
April 1951, pp. 422-432. 
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Discussions on the Periodization of History’ was published in the journal 
Soviet Studies in 1952.171  It was entirely concerned with developments within 
Soviet historiography and, as the title suggests, focused on the continuing 
debate surrounding the correct periodisation of history.172 It can be considered 
a continuation of the previous set of articles Schlesinger produced on the 
topic. It had the same tone and general analysis and utilised the same 
sources: Soviet scholarly journals such as Voprosy Istorii and Bolshevik. 
Similarly, this article appeared to defend the study and research of history 
within the Soviet Union from arguments that nothing of worth was produced. 
 
The article was one of Schlesinger’s most optimistic writings on the subject, 
alongside The Spirit of Post-War Russia, written five years earlier. 
Schlesinger insisted that scholarly work of meritorious value was undertaken 
within the Soviet Union and also argued that major controversies on issues of 
Marxist fundamentals were frequent at the time of his writing. However, it is 
important to note that he did not deny there were problematic and harmful 
aspects to historical research, factors that inevitably impacted on the quality of 
scholarly output and teaching.  
 
Schlesinger began the article by admitting the ‘politico-propagandist’ 
character of much of Soviet historiographical literature’.173 Sometimes re-
evaluations of historical events occurred according to the political needs of the 
state. Schlesinger wrote: ‘In such instances Soviet academic institutions work 
as political agency pure and simple: on the basis only of some inspired 
articles in Pravda they reject theories hitherto accepted, annul academic 
degrees awarded years before, and so forth’. However, Schlesinger argued 
                                                
171 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Discussions on the Periodization of History’, Soviet Studies, 4, 2, 
October 1952, pp. 152-169. 
172 For more information on the periodisation debates see Shtepa, Russian Historians and the 
Soviet State, chapter 10 and L. Yaresh, ‘The Problem of Periodization’ in C. Black (ed.) 
Rewriting Russian History (Vintage Books, New York, 1962), pp. 34-77. The latter paper, 
although much more critical of the atmosphere in which Soviet historians worked than 
Schlesinger, did agree that good quality work was produced during the periodisation 
discussions. Yaresh wrote: On the whole the discussion of 1946-1954 was extremely 
interesting, and was conducted on a considerably higher plan than the discussion of 1929-34’ 
(p. 76). 
173 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Discussions on the Periodization of History’, p. 152. 
 266 
that, in such cases, ‘…. the victims themselves are not the more scholarly 
writers (as Western critics of the USSR tend, after their fall, to depict them), 
but are themselves political propagandists who quite enjoyed the game as 
long as they were on the winning side.’174 Schlesinger suggested there were 
two sides to the historical field in the Soviet Union, with only one of these, the 
less ‘scholarly’, being involved in the propagandist type of research and 
publication. The suggestion that some historians were playing a game and 
were actively involved in the developing state control of academia has been 
substantiated by modern scholars. A. Litvin has argued that some historians 
were active in their support of Stalin’s 1931 letter to Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia. 
He wrote: ‘The archives show that Stalin’s letter was discussed by historians 
before it appeared, and that members of the profession actually backed the 
new line; they were more than just its victims’.175 S. Fitzpatrick has referred to 
the advantages the cultural intelligentsia could gain from their position in 
Stalin’s Russia, so there were certainly prizes for those who were successful 
in the game.176 
 
Despite these overtly political activities, Schlesinger insisted real arguments 
took place within Soviet historiography. Some of these debates involved 
matters of general principle, hugely significant to the ideology of a state with a 
Marxist framework. Schlesinger went further, ‘…. there are plenty of 
theoretical discussions amongst Soviet historians and there are very few 
theoretical tenets which – in fact, though not in form – are uncontested’.177 He 
used as an example Stalin’s statement during the linguistics discussion of 
May to July 1950 in which he asserted that there were spheres of mental 
activity, in this case language, which did not belong to the superstructure.178 
                                                
174 Ibid. p. 152. 
175 Litvin, Writing History in Twentieth-Century Russia, p. 13. 
176 S. Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front, p. 246. 
177 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Discussions on the Periodization of History’, p. 153. 
178 In reply to a group of Soviet students, in July 1950 Stalin wrote in Pravda: ‘In this respect 
language radically differs from the superstructure. Language is not a product of one or 
another base, old or new, within the given society, but of the whole course of the history of the 
society and of the history of the bases for many centuries. It was created not by some one 
class, but by the entire society, by all the classes of the society, by the efforts of hundreds of 
generations. It was created for the satisfaction of the needs not of one particular class, but of 
the entire society, of all the classes of the society. Precisely for this reason it was created as a 
 267 
These spheres were products of the whole of society not the rule of one 
class.179 This statement was readily taken up by academics in a number of 
fields and provoked widespread debate and discussion on what other 
elements of life might be products of the whole of society.  
 
Schlesinger argued that discussion and disagreement were necessary in a 
Marxist state in order to further science; it was only through debate that Soviet 
state tenets were elaborated. He wrote:  
 
In a society which has an organizational repository of orthodoxy, 
any individual dispute may come to an end by formal decision 
but, as intellectual life in a period of social change will never 
come to a standstill, no conclusion of any individual dispute can 
prevent, or is even intended to prevent, the re-opening of the 
basic argument in new forms. In fact, such arguments provide 
the actual source from which ‘authoritative’ statements are fed, 
to provide a fertile soil for new argument about their 
interpretation.180 
 
                                                                                                                                       
single language for the society, common to all members of that society, as the common 
language of the whole people. Hence the functional role of language, as a means of 
intercourse between people, consists not in serving one class to the detriment of other 
classes, but in equally serving the entire society, all the classes of society. This in fact 
explains why a language may equally serve both the old, moribund system and the new, 
rising system; both the old base and the new base; both the exploiters and the exploited.’ 
(Stalin, Marxism and Problems of Linguistics, (Hawaii, University Press of the Pacific 
Honolulu, 2003) pp. 5-6). For a contemporary account of the linguistics debate and Stalin’s 
statements upon it see J. Ellis and R.W. Davies, ‘The Crisis in Soviet Linguistics’, especially 
p241…. Schlesinger actually cited this article so it would seem to be a source of information 
he used. See also, K. Mehnert, Stalin Versus Marx, pp. 51… Mehnert saw this change in 
attitude towards language as part of the wider assertion of Russian nationalism and 
celebration of Russian tradition. 
179 In a later unpublished work Schlesinger outlined exactly what he understood by Stalin’s 
speech, ‘…he defined superstructures as institutions created by ruling classes for the purpose 
of the preservation of the existing social order: it followed that language, being created by the 
whole of society and serving all classes of society, can be no superstructure. Nor is it a 
means of production, as it serves purposes more broader than the production process. It 
follows that at least this social institution falls outside the traditional Marxist framework: it is 
created not by the peculiar classes of society, but by society as a whole’ (Schlesinger, Social 
Institutions, p. 212). 
180 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Discussions on the Periodization of History’, p. 154. 
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Disputes were the framework from which progressive theoretical consensuses 
were reached; in an ever-changing society, dialectical development of ideas 
and theories were inevitable and necessary. Schlesinger seemed to suggest 
that although the Party was the medium through which theoretical authority 
was bestowed it was, perhaps, merely a channel rather than the absolute 
judge of that authority. The state could act as arbiter precisely because critical 
debate raged in the Soviet Union.  He cited a statement of Stalin’s in order to 
substantiate his claim of the necessity of debate, ‘…. no science can develop 
and succeed without struggle of opinions and freedom of criticism’.181 That 
Stalin would argue freedom of debate was essential to intellectual and 
theoretical progress perhaps suggests that it existed. However, it does not 
necessarily prove that it was something he believed or that it was a state of 
affairs in existence. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that Stalin 
wished to stifle debate. His proclamation that certain interpretations of 
Bolshevik theory were ‘axiomatic’ is, perhaps, only the most infamous 
example.182 Yet Schlesinger wished to prove that intellectual disputes 
provided the ingredients for state orthodoxy. This was the purpose of the 
entire article. He explicitly stated that his analysis of the periodisation debate 
was useful in order to illustrate that point.183 Schlesinger’s desire to portray 
the study of history in the Soviet Union as one involving freedom of debate 
over fundamental principles seems clear. 
 
According to Schlesinger the discussion on periodisation began with two 
articles in the journal Voprosy Istorii in 1949 and proceeded for more than a 
year without reaching any definite conclusions.184 Over 30 discussion articles 
were received by the publication in response to the initial papers, with 21 
being published. Debates on the subject also took place at various academic 
institutions. 
                                                
181 Ibid. p. 155. Stalin wrote, in his 1950 article in Pravda, ‘…no science can develop and 
flourish without a battle of opinions, without freedom of criticism.’ (Stalin, Marxism and 
Problems of Linguistics, p. 29). 
182 See chapter 1, p. 43. 
183 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Discussions on the Periodization of History’, p. 154. 
184 Ibid. p. 154. The two articles were K. Bazilevich, ‘Opyt periodizatsii SSSR feodal’nogo 
nerioda’, Voprosy Istorii, 11, 1949, pp. 65-90 and N. Druzhinin, ‘O periodizatsii istorii 
kapitalisticheskikh otnoshenii v Rossii’, Voproy Istorii, 11, 1949, pp. 90-106.  
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Schlesinger began his discussion of the debate by, once again, suggesting 
reasons for Pokrovskii’s fall from pre-eminence within Soviet historiography. 
He argued that there were three main points that contributed to the overthrow 
of the ‘school’. Firstly, 
 
…. it interpreted both Russian and Western mediaeval history in 
terms of ‘merchant capitalism’, i.e. a social formation which 
does not differ fundamentally from the formation against which 
modern socialist revolutions are directed; this precluded an 
interpretation of earlier Russian history as a succession of non-
capitalist periods.185 
 
Schlesinger argued that such an analysis had now been definitely rejected in 
favour of an interpretation of the Russian past in terms of feudalism. 
Secondly, Pokrovskii had demanded partisanship in historiography. 
Schlesinger did not object to this in principle. He wrote: ‘Interpretation of the 
past in terms of modern political issues is not alien even to contemporary 
Soviet historiography’.186 His problem with Pokrovskii’s particular partisanship 
was that an interpretation of the Russian past in terms of ‘merchant 
capitalism’ led to attempts to find manifestations of the proletarian class 
struggle throughout Russia’s history. He disputed the basis for Pokrovskii’s 
partisanship rather than the phenomenon itself.  Finally, Schlesinger rejected 
Pokrovskii’s so-called ‘a-historicism’, the utilising of a general description of 
socio-economic systems, as opposed to the evaluation of individual historical 
events, personalities and ideas. This last point remained unresolved and was, 
in essence, the basis of the periodisation debate; how were historians to 
relate individual events to more general systems? As Schlesinger wrote, it 
was ‘…. the problem of defining, in the specific Marxist terms, the 
relationships which exist between the individual events described by the 
historiography and the general laws which are said to dominate them’.187 
                                                
185 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Discussions on the Periodization of History’, p. 156. 
186 Ibid. p. 156. 
187 Ibid. p. 156. 
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Pokrovksii was incorrect to focus exclusively on general laws, but there had, 
as yet, been no solution of how to fit the individual events and the general 
laws together. 
 
Three interpretations or resolutions to this methodological problem had 
emerged from the ensuing periodisation discussion. The first Schlesinger 
described as the economic interpretation; ‘According to the traditional 
concepts of nineteenth-century Marxism … the socio-economic formations 
provide the framework in which the individual events proceed according to the 
specific laws governing each formation’.188 The fall of the Pokrovskii ‘school’ 
meant that the framework used to explain Russia’s past was now to be a 
feudal one. Schlesinger was critical of this economic interpretation. However, 
despite his criticism, he pointed out that Soviet historians could not be found 
guilty of the vulgar economic materialism of the past: ‘No modern Soviet 
author…. would attempt a periodization based upon economic events only’.189 
Soviet historians now attempted to include all political events in their analysis. 
One is left to draw the conclusion that this surely represented an advance on 
Pokrovskii’s days. 
 
The second approach Schlesinger labelled the ‘political interpretation’, and 
involved the assertion of the primacy of politics over economics. He described 
some instances of individual political approaches but argued that only I. 
Smirnov elaborated this viewpoint with any consistency.190 Smirnov 
suggested that a sound scheme of periodisation already existed in the basic 
documents of the anti-Pokrovskii struggle, such as Shestakov’s textbook and 
the Short Course. According to Smirnov, the development of productive 
relations was the cornerstone of Marxist analysis, but this evolution 
proceeded only very gradually and so it was necessary to base periodisation, 
the division of history into specific and successive stages, on definite events 
within this development. These important events were produced by political 
                                                
188 Ibid. p. 156. 
189 Ibid. pp. 157-8. 
190 I. Smirnov, ‘Obshchie voprosy periodizatsii istorii SSSR’, Voprosy Istorii, 12, 1950, pp. 77-
99. 
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history and, thus, historical stages could best be divined with reference to 
politics. Schlesinger pointed out that Smirnov had a marked bias towards 
those political groupings that proved successful within each historical stage: 
‘He recognizes as ‘real, and all-national’ class struggles only those which lead 
to a struggle of political power’.191 Schlesinger made no comment as to the 
efficacy of this approach or to the patriotic, overly positive and fatalistic 
interpretation such a method may provoke.  
 
When writing about Smirnov, Schlesinger described the nature of Shestakov’s 
state-approved school textbook. This exposed his attitude towards official 
Soviet historiography, something the book certainly represented for a period. 
He wrote: ‘It is patriotic, without being nationalist, and it is in sympathy with 
oppressed classes and peoples throughout the course of Russian history. It 
also supplies full and sympathetic information according to the standards of 
an elementary school textbook on the general conditions of life and of cultural 
developments’.192 This could certainly be regarded as praise for the book and 
corresponds to his earlier judgement in Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung.193 In a 
footnote to the discussion, Schlesinger drew his readers’ attention to certain 
constraints of Soviet scholarship. He argued that the textbook was much more 
sympathetic towards the victims of Tsarist expansion or those who suffered 
during the realisation of Peter I’s achievements than was possible in a modern 
Soviet publication.194 This could again be regarded as praise for Shestakov’s 
book, as well as criticism for more modern works. Yet Schlesinger provided 
no unequivocal comment on the subject and, as noted, this information was 
only given within a footnote. 
 
According to Schlesinger’s paper the first two methods of periodisation only 
ever enjoyed limited success: ‘From the very start, the bulk of opinion rallied 
round the principle of periodization according to the development of class 
                                                
191 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Discussions on the Periodization of History’, p. 160. 
192 Ibid. p. 159. 
193 Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, pp. 194-198. 
194 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Discussions on the Periodization of History’, p. 159, footnote 14. 
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struggles’.195 N. Druzhinin had originally espoused this third interpretation, 
arguing that class struggles were the key to understanding economic 
developments, as well as changes to the political or ideological 
superstructures. Periodisation according to class struggle did not necessarily 
follow a pattern of successful class actions or social movements, since this 
would differ little from a scheme based on significant political events. As most 
class struggles were defeated it would make little sense to align periodisation 
to the practical outcomes of these movements. Druzhinin argued that the 
class struggle always had historical significance and placed the beginnings of 
capitalism at the emerging social movements of the 1760s. 
 
Following the publication of the discussion articles, the editors of Voprosy 
Istorii noted their own conclusions. Schlesinger described their stance as 
‘eclectic’. It could also be seen as a compromise or synthesis of the three 
main interpretations.196 Schlesinger argued that, even though the editors fully 
rejected Smirnov’s ‘political’ interpretation, this meant little more than their 
refusal to accept any one general or universal standard of periodisation. 
There was no real conclusion to the debate, but equally, no definitive 
orthodoxy had henceforth to be adhered to. Discussions on the matter could 
and should continue. Schlesinger wrote: ‘The results achieved by the 
discussion in Voprosy Istorii were recommended as a starting point for further 
argument, on the basis of further research, within the individual institutions’.197 
Such a proposition was presumably intended to promote debate and 
discussion. 
 
Schlesinger seemed keen to show the fruitfulness of the debate as well as the 
open manner in which new a consensus was to be achieved. He described 
the evolution of consensual historical interpretations. The Voprosy Istorii 
editors argued that, whilst the line taken during the anti-Pokrovskii struggle 
represented a major advancement within Soviet historiographical scholarship, 
                                                
195 Ibid. p. 160. 
196 Ibid. p. 162. ‘Ob itogakh o periodizatsii istorii SSSR’, Voprosy Istorii, 2, 1951, pp. 53-60 
esp. pp. 55-56.  
197 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Discussions on the Periodization of History’, p. 155. 
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this consensus had now also been superseded.  Schlesinger wrote, ‘…. not a 
single supporter of the periodization still accepted in Soviet textbooks was 
found in the course of this last discussion’.198 Later in the paper, Schlesinger 
declared, ‘…. the editors noted that the only point on which all the participants 
in the discussion were agreed was the rejection of 1800 (footnote 25: Which, 
until now, was the accepted dividing point in textbooks) as the year which 
marked an important change in Russian life’.199 Whilst there was no real 
agreement on what the new interpretation should be, there was a general 
accord that previously accepted notions were no longer of scholarly or 
pedagogical value. Schlesinger gave the impression that there was friendly 
and open agreement that more research and discussion was necessary 
before the subject of periodisation could be satisfactorily resolved. This 
discussion would, therefore, serve as an example of critical debate on a 
matter of fundamentals; an impression Schlesinger almost certainly intended 
to convey. 
 
Schlesinger concluded his paper in a somewhat restrained manner, insisting: 
‘No premature conclusions should be drawn from the comparative freedom, in 
which a discussion about rather fundamental issues of the Marxist 
interpretation of history was carried on’.200 The insinuation that the freedom 
enjoyed by historians during this particular discussion may only have been 
temporary seemed to contradict his earlier more positive statements. Use of 
the phrase ‘comparative freedom’ also indicated that the prevailing intellectual 
atmosphere was not one that non-Soviet historians would describe as free. 
Again, such a statement would appear to oppose earlier ones in which 
Schlesinger stated that there were very few matters of principle which were 
not open to dispute.201 He did draw attention to what he described as the 
‘achievements’ of the anti-Pokrovskiian and anti-‘cosmopolitanism’ 
campaigns, and reiterated the point that the orthodoxy to which all historians 
were obliged to comply was established through the process of debate. 
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However, in general, there did appear to be a significant anomaly between the 
apparent praise which Schlesinger expressed in the introduction to his paper 
and the somewhat muted, even pessimistic, conclusions he offered. This 
could be seen as further proof that Schlesinger consciously wished to convey 
a more positive portrayal of Soviet historiography than his own empirical study 
of it warranted. One vital caveat to that thesis is the fact that, at no point, did 
Schlesinger ever deny the political exigencies and orthodox historical 
interpretations it was necessary for all scholars to conform to.  
 
There are several themes that run throughout Schlesinger’s writings on 
historiography up to Stalin’s death. Firstly, he gave a positive portrayal of 
events in the historical sphere. He insisted on the freedom of debate that 
existed, the quality of scholarship produced and the integrity of the historical 
profession in general. He also consistently argued that the defeat of the 
Pokrovskii school in this era was an enormously progressive step. 
Schlesinger was an advocate of Soviet historiography in this period – he 
defended it against what he believed was unfair and excessive criticism and 
he seemed to want to inform the West of the valuable work that was being 
produced. Schlesinger’s views seemed to coalesce with the Soviet textbooks 
of the era, something that was especially apparent in relation to attitudes 
towards Pokrovskii. However, another major theme was Schlesinger’s 
negative appraisal of individual works of scholarship. He recognised the 
censorship apparent in many, the erroneous impact of political expediency in 
others and pointed towards the political effects of party campaigns such as 
anti-objectivism or anti-cosmopolitanism. This created a tension between his 
individual critiques and his overall conclusions.  
 
Finally, it is necessary to note how at odds with other writers Schlesinger was 
in his praise of Soviet historiography at this time, both in terms of his 
contemporaries and later scholars.  A. Mazour wrote of: 
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The stifling intellectual climate of this period, in which revising 
history to suit political needs became standard practice… 
Everyone had to be a propagandist first and a historian second. 
A travesty of truth came to pass for history. To many historians 
research lost validity or importance, the main purpose being to 
prove a chosen conclusion even in the face of incontrovertible 
evidence.202 
 
Writing much later, in 1989, R. Medvedev drew similar conclusions about the 
character of Soviet scholarship under Stalin. He wrote: 
 
There was no room for free discussion and the contest of 
various opinions. Instead, dogmatism, rote learning 
(nachetnichestvo), stagnation, and inertia prevailed. The truth 
was not what corresponded to facts, to empirical research, but 
what Comrade Stalin had declared to be true…. Inconvenient 
facts were juggled, distorted, or simply ignored.203 
 
Schlesinger’s views and his insistence on positive aspects of Soviet 
historiography may be a welcome counterbalance to such total condemnation 
of a whole profession over a reasonably lengthy time period. Yet the contrast 
in emphasis remains stark and requires explanation. 
                                                
202 Mazour, The Writing of History in the Soviet Union, p. 21. 
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Chapter Seven: Schlesinger’s Writings on 
History after Stalin’s Death 
 
Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953 brought about seismic changes in Soviet 
government and society. Nikita Khrushchev was eventually to seize the reigns 
of power after several years of collective leadership by Stalin’s lieutenants, 
and a gradual transformation of Soviet life ensued, with denunciations of the 
‘cult of personality’ Stalin had propagated.1 The impact of these changes was 
felt in the historical field as keenly as elsewhere, especially after the Twentieth 
Party Congress of 1956. As historian J. Keep wrote: 
 
In Soviet historiography, as in other fields of Soviet intellectual 
life, the year 1956 was something of a turning-point. The 
twentieth congress of the CPSU called upon Soviet historians, 
and particularly upon those concerned with the history of the 
party itself, to bring their studies ‘closer to life’, and to intensify 
their efforts to promote ‘the building of communism’. The 
campaign was intimately linked with what was euphemistically 
called ‘overcoming the consequences of the cult of the 
individual’’.2 
 
There followed a period of examination and critical self-reflection by Soviet 
historians as they slowly moved away from Stalinist dogma. Stalin’s reputation 
was dealt one final blow in October 1961, at the Twenty-Second Congress, 
when his remains were moved from Lenin’s tomb to the Kremlin wall. His 
control over Soviet intellectual life was firmly ended and there followed 
                                                
1 For Schlesinger’s description of the events following Stalin’s death see History of the 
Communist Party of the USSR, chapter VIII. 
2 J. Keep, ‘Introduction’ in J. Keep (ed.) Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror (George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1964) pp. 9-18 at p. 10. 
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another party appeal for historians to remove erroneous Stalinist distortions 
from their work.3 
 
Alongside the dramatic changes to the official historical orthodoxy, there was 
a significant alteration in the tone of Schlesinger’s writing on the subject. After 
1953, and in particular after the congress in 1956, Schlesinger became far 
more condemnatory and critical of Soviet historiography under Stalin. He 
expressed optimism for the future of the historical sciences but argued that 
much of the previous work was poor. He also condemned the previous 
orthodoxy as distorting and politically motivated. Clearly this was a dramatic 
change from his early writing in which he emphasised the positive aspects of 
Soviet historiography. His attitude was now more in keeping with his personal 
memoir reflections of life as an intellectual in Stalin’s Russia. 
 
This chapter will examine Schlesinger’s post-1953 writing in detail, to 
determine in what ways and to what extent Schlesinger’s attitude changed. It 
will then turn to a discussion of possible reasons for this transformation: were 
the events of 1956 revelatory to Schlesinger, leading to a reassessment of his 
earlier opinion; was he now switching to the new party orthodoxy; had he 
been defending the Soviet Union against the perceived ‘cold war’ bias of 
Western commentators but now felt able to express his discomfort with 
Stalin’s leadership? Whatever his motives, recognition of this change in 
attitude must inevitably impact upon any judgement or critical assessment of 
Schlesinger as a scholar. It is argued that an assessment of Schlesinger as 
the ‘scholar advocate’ represents the most fruitful appreciation of his life and 
work in regard to Soviet historiography. 
 
Writings from 1953 
Schlesinger’s attitude to Soviet historiography changed following Stalin’s 
death and the ensuing ‘de-Stalinisation’. However, there is one piece of 
writing that can be seen to span the two stages of his work. His unpublished 
                                                
3 J. Keep, ‘Introduction’. For further information on post-Stalin Soviet historiography see N. 
Heer, Politics and History in the Soviet Union, (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971). 
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Social Institutions seems to bridge the gap between the praise and defence of 
Soviet historical studies apparent in his early work and his later attitude of 
retrospective condemnation. The incomplete manuscript was a corrected draft 
that seems to have been intended for eventual publication. It was divided into 
two parts: the first entitled ‘The Family and Education’ contained chapters on 
the development of Soviet family policies, education and organised religion; 
the second, ‘The Arts and Science’, had chapters on the social sciences, the 
natural sciences and the artist and the party. The chapter on social sciences 
contained information on Soviet historiography.4 
 
The manuscript appears to have been written between Stalin’s death in 1953 
and the beginning of official ‘de-Stalinisation’ in the Soviet Union as signalled 
by the Twentieth Party Congress. The latest reference in Social Institutions is 
to an article published on January 24, 1955.5 However, it makes no mention 
of the Congress or its extensive preparations. These events were of critical 
importance to the further development of Soviet social sciences and it seems 
unlikely that Schlesinger would have omitted mention had he known of them 
at the time of writing. Therefore, it seems reasonable to date the manuscript 
sometime between January 1955 and early 1956. 
 
The transitional period between Stalin’s death and the Twentieth Congress is 
reflected in Schlesinger’s manuscript. He was presumably unable to 
determine the direction of future events in the Soviet Union and his analysis of 
the historical field is mixed and somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, he 
continued to be as positive about the value of historical work completed under 
Stalin and the freedom of debate available to scholars. Yet, at the same time, 
he was now undoubtedly more condemning of Soviet scholarship. 
 
When discussing Soviet historiography, Schlesinger seemed to emphasise 
continuity between the Stalinist and post-Stalinist landscape. He argued that 
Stalin was consciously loosening his grip on academic freedom towards the 
                                                
4 Schlesinger, Social Institutions, pp. 165-240.  
5 Ibid. p. 240d. 
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end of his life.6 Schlesinger insisted there was a transition, ‘… from the 
dogmatic generalisations of The Short History of the CPSU and of the 
struggle against Pokrovksy’s school to more emphasis on the particularities of 
historical processes’.7 This liberation continued after Stalin’s death, when 
historians were invited to concentrate on the part played by the masses as the 
creators of cultural and revolutionary transformation.8 That such 
developments were necessary does indicate an implicit acknowledgement by 
Schlesinger of the existence of a hostile and ‘dogmatic’ environment 
beforehand. This was something he never denied, despite his positive 
portrayal of Soviet historiography. 
 
Schlesinger argued that in the previous decades historians enjoyed 
reasonable access to archives and produced positive work on subjects such 
as periodisation and economic relations in early Russia.9 He also pointed to 
the degree of intellectual freedom that existed. Discussions of periodisation 
engaged differing definitions of the motive forces of history and questions of 
Russia’s distinctiveness. As Schlesinger noted: 
 
 In view of the whole of Russia’s intellectual development it is 
difficult to imagine academic issues of greater weight in the 
Communist Party’s outlook: the fact that they could frankly be 
discussed without consequences worse than a very mild 
criticism of the editor’s failure to take sides shows the extent to 
which freedom to discuss theoretical issues (as distinct from 
political issues circumscribed in historical terms) existed during 
the last years of Stalin’s life.10 
 
This approach is consistent with Schlesinger’s attitude in his earlier writings. 
 
                                                
6 Ibid. p. 235. 
7 Ibid. p. 238. 
8 Ibid. p. 239. 
9 Ibid. p. 183. 
10 Ibid. pp. 228-229.  
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Equally familiar is Schlesinger’s attack on Pokrovksii and his school. He 
pointed to Pokrovksii’s positivist errors: his confusing of dialectic materialism 
with ‘class subjectivism’; his erroneous conception of Marxism as an ideology 
like any other and thus, ‘… incapable of properly reflecting reality’.11 He also 
argued that Pokrovskii’s theories hindered state education and suggested that 
the defeat of his school was a major achievement of the Stalin era.12 
However, Schlesinger went further in his criticism than in his previous work. 
He now suggested that Pokrovksii was more of a propagandist than an 
historian. He wrote,  
 
 … to the propagandist who search[e]s the past for quotations 
useful in commemoration speeches, the task of the present is 
the point of reference for the past. To him, history is ‘politics 
applied to the past’, and historiography aims at ‘reflecting the 
proletarian class-struggle into the past’. Pokrovksy applied this 
principle.13 
 
As an example, Schlesinger argued that Pokrovskii adopted Lenin’s appeal for 
the defeat of one’s own bourgeoisie during World War One and applied it to 
inappropriate periods of the past, thus expressing sympathy with the 
Napoleonic invasion of 1812. 
 
However, there was a noticeable shift in Schlesinger’s attitude in Social 
Institutions. Despite all of the positive features he emphasised, Schlesinger 
was more condemning of the quality of work and highlighted many of the 
problems encountered in its production. Schlesinger argued: 
 
There is an enormous amount of publications on the 
revolutionary democrats of the mid-nineteenth century, but 
already in the study of this period the party’s demands for 
confirmation of given political formulae is strongly felt: the 
                                                
11 Ibid. p. 178 and p. 172. 
12 Ibid. p. 172 and p. 183.  
13 Ibid. pp.  171-172. 
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history of the Bolshevik party itself is either left alone by the real 
scholars or dealt with in popular books.14 
 
In fact, Schlesinger continued: ‘With World War I and the October revolution, 
the sphere of possible detachment ends for Soviet historians’.15 Whilst some 
work was of a very high quality, others, such as much of the writing on the 
Civil War, were merely vulgar propagandist devices.16 Schlesinger 
differentiated quite clearly between serious research and propaganda; whilst 
the latter writer may unearth material of value to the historian, such a person 
did not write history.17 Yet, despite this caveat, Schlesinger displayed a more 
hostile attitude towards Soviet historiography under Stalin than he had done 
previously. 
 
The first published writing of Schlesinger’s to actively engage with the 
intellectual world and historiography in the Soviet Union after the death of 
Stalin on 5 March 1953 was published in July 1956. Schlesinger wrote a 
report for Soviet Studies on the Twentieth Party Congress, which ran from 14 
to 25 February 1956.18 It was at this congress that Khrushchev delivered his 
so-called ‘secret speech’, promoting the thesis of collectivity of leadership, 
whilst denouncing Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’.19 From Schlesinger’s paper one 
is able to ascertain what he knew of events in the USSR at this time, as well 
as his initial reaction to them. The report described the pre-Congress 
                                                
14 Ibid. pp. 183-4. 
15 Ibid. p. 184. 
16 Ibid. p. 187. 
17 Ibid. p. 187. This differentiation between professional historians and propagandists was 
common to Schlesinger’s work and recognised by other writers. See, for example, Black, 
‘History and Politics in the Soviet Union’, p. 25. 
18 Schlesinger, ‘From the XIX to the XX Party Congress’, Soviet Studies, 8, 1, July 1956, pp. 
1-26. Schlesinger had written a few papers that touched upon the subject of intellectual life in 
Soviet Russia before this but they were only tangentially connected to Soviet historiography. 
They hinted at a move away from Stalin’s ‘cult of the individual’ but also demonstrated 
continuity in theoretical life. See Schlesinger, ‘Pravda on the Role of the Party and of the 
Individual’, Soviet Studies, 5, 2, October 1953, pp. 208-212, Schlesinger, ‘Objectivity of Truth 
and the Social Sciences’, Soviet Studies, 7, 3, January 1956, pp. 345-349, Schlesinger, 
‘Preparing for the XX Congress: Theoretical’, Soviet Studies, 7, 4, April 1956, pp. 430-435. 
19 The ‘secret speech’ was delivered to a closed session of the Congress on February 25th 
1956. It was intended as guidance for the party leadership of Communist Parties outside the 
Soviet Union. The text of the speech was released by the US Department of State in June of 
the same year. (L Gruliaw, (ed.), Current Soviet Policies II (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 
Inc., 1957), pp 172-188).  
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discussions as well as the events of the actual Congress, its debates and 
decisions and their likely implications. Schlesinger’s article did not exclusively 
deal with the issue of historiography, a major aspect of the Congress, but it 
did provide a great deal of information and opinion on the matter. 
 
Schlesinger was certainly aware of the ‘secret speech’. He cited an article in 
The Times in March 1956 that seems likely to have been the source of his 
information.20 The newspaper article concerned Walter Ulbricht’s report to 
East Berlin party officials on his return from the Congress.21 According to the 
newspaper, the First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party, described Stalin as 
‘a despot’ who had turned the State security services loose on his own party 
comrades and had made a, ‘…mockery of Soviet democracy’.22 It went on to 
describe the content of Ulbricht’s speech in some detail. He had argued that 
East German Communists, like their Soviet counterparts, had to realise that 
Stalin’s personality cult had led to erroneous foreign policy decisions. His 
personal despotism had damaged Soviet justice and produced mistaken 
decisions on agricultural and economic matters. Whilst praising Stalin’s work 
concerning the construction of socialism and the fight against Trotskyism, 
Ulbricht argued that in later life he had, ‘…. shown a growing tendency 
towards personal tyranny’.23 This had resulted in fewer and fewer meetings of 
the Central Committee and even the Politburo; inevitably leading to wrong 
decisions being taken.  
 
The report continued:  
 
As a direct result of Stalin’s false premise that the class struggle 
was bound to grow more in intensity as Socialism was built up 
had been the persecution of leading Communists between 1936 
and 1938 (the great purges). Since the hostile classes had by 
                                                
20 Schlesinger, ‘From the XIX to the XX Party Congress’, p. 8, footnote 18a. The footnote 
number is recorded as 18a within the text but as 19 in the footnote section. 
21 ‘Herr Ulbricht Swells the Anti-Stalin Chorus’ in The Times, 19 March, 1956, p. 10.  
22 The Times, 19 March, 1956, p. 10. 
23 Ibid. p. 10. 
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then been all but eliminated, where else could Stalin’s security 
police have turned?24 
 
Stalin had given orders which infringed Soviet laws and had led to the arrest 
of innocent people. As regards the ‘myth’ of Stalin’s military genius, Ulbricht 
was reported as insisting its genesis was the work of Stalin himself, through 
passages in his biography and the Short Course. Contrary to the claim in his 
biography that the history book was written by Stalin and then revised by the 
Central Committee, it had in fact been the product of collective work on the 
part of the Committee. Stalin had then revised it to suit his personal taste.  
 
According to the report, Ulbricht argued, ‘…. it has become known that Stalin 
did not prepare the country for war in an adequate manner, although the 
impending aggression by Hitler’s Germany was plain to see’.25 Three separate 
sources warning of the attack were ignored, as was a German deserter who 
crossed the Soviet line on the eve of the invasion. Finally it was reported that 
Ulbricht had informed the East Berlin party that Stalin had repeatedly refused 
the ‘correct advice’ of military advisors. The Times article corresponded 
closely with the available reports on the contents of Khrushchev’s speech at 
the Twentieth Party Congress. Reference was made to the errors and terrible 
conclusions inevitably resulting from Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’, his reputation 
as a military expert was repudiated and his part in violating Soviet justice and 
arresting many innocent party members was exposed. 
 
According to Schlesinger:  
 
Such reports about Khrushchev’s speech at the private session 
as are available indicate that under this heading were included 
problems such as Stalin’s thesis that the class struggle would 
be intensified after the expropriation of hostile classes, in 
reflection of the capitalist encirclement. This thesis was the 
                                                
24 Ibid. p. 10. 
25 Ibid. p. 10. 
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basis on which he let loose the political police against 
oppositionists within the party.26 
 
It seems clear that this information was taken directly from the article in the 
Times, as it mirrors so consistently information contained therein. However, 
Schlesinger made no reference to criticisms of Stalin’s leadership style and 
military capabilities. The validity of Khrushchev’s, and subsequently Ulbricht’s, 
speeches seems to have been taken for granted by Schlesinger in his July 
1956 article. At no point did he declare any doubts as to their authenticity or 
the correctness of their portrayal of Stalin’s rule. This seems to contradict his 
earlier stance on events within the Soviet Union, when he made very little 
comment on negative aspects of the Soviet regime. 
 
Schlesinger argued that the significance of the ‘secret speech’ and of the 
entire Congress was in its denouncing Stalinism as a method of leadership 
and its attempt to establish a new orthodoxy. He wrote: ‘Stalinism was 
rejected not as a set of theoretical views, but as an authoritarian method of 
leading the party and the nation, opposed to the development of the work and 
responsibility of all the participants in socialist construction’.27 The repudiation 
of the ‘cult of the individual’ was a necessary complement to the now sought 
after ideal of collectivity in leadership, the new method of rule which the Party 
authorities were attempting to found.  
 
There were three main reasons why the Party leaders had decided the 
denunciation was necessary. The first and, according to Schlesinger, ‘…. 
possibly the most powerful reason for making a clear break with the Stalinist 
framework was the realization that party theory must be adapted to the 
changed international conditions’.28 Such a statement suggests Schlesinger 
believed Stalinism was necessary under previous international conditions. If 
so, this would be one more instance of Schlesinger’s pragmatism: Stalin was 
                                                
26 Schlesinger, ‘From the XIX to the XX Party Congress’, p. 8. 
27 Ibid. p. 8. 
28 Ibid. p. 16. 
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a necessary evil for the Soviet Union at a time of hostile encirclement when 
rapid social and industrial transformation was necessary.  
 
The second reason Schlesinger cited was the, ‘…. widespread demand for 
the settlement of accounts with the whole method which made use of the 
nation’s need for protection against external enemies and their agents in order 
to suppress internal dissent, and even to get rid of anyone who happened to 
attract the displeasure of the political police’.29 Simply put, this second reason 
for the change in attitudes heralded by the Twentieth Party Congress was due 
to the perceived need for security of law or primacy of Soviet justice. It was 
necessary to prevent a return to the extra-judicial terror of the Stalin period. 
 
The third motive force, and the one of most relevance to this study, was, as 
Schlesinger expressed it, the, ‘…. fight for a critical and realistic approach to 
the past and the present’.30 A new attitude towards Russia and the Soviet 
state’s history was required. The main points of criticism of historical work 
mentioned at the Congress were given in a speech by A. I. Mikoyan.31 
According to Schlesinger, these points had already been elaborated at the 
readers’ conference of the journal Voprosy Istorii earlier that same year.32 He 
pointed out that A. Pankratova, the editor of Voprosy Istorii and Central 
Committee member, in her summation at the conference on 28 January 1956, 
was eager to explain that no ‘revolution in historiography’ was intended; 
instead merely an improvement in existing scholarly work. In fact, according to 
Schlesinger: ‘The rejection of the embellishments and nationalist distortions of 
the history of the Russian Revolution which had developed during the Stalin 
                                                
29 Ibid. p. 13. 
30 Ibid. p. 15. 
31 The text of Mikoyan’s speech can be found in Gruliaw, Current Soviet Policies II, pp, 80-89. 
Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan (1895-1978) joined the party in 1915 and enjoyed positions of 
responsibility under Stalin, Krushchev and Brezhnev. At various times Mikoyan had 
responsibility for internal and external trade, the party purges in Armenia and the rehabilitation 
commissions.He became President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1964-965 (H. 
Rappaport, Joseph Stalin, A Biographical Companion, pp. 183-185). 
32 A report on the conference proceedings can be found at ‘Konferentsiia chitatelei zhurnal 
‘Voprosy Istorii’’, Voprosy Istorii, 2, 1956, pp. 199-213. The main reports and 26 of the main 
contributions to the discussion were reported. The readers’ conference is also described in 
Heer, Politics and History in the Soviet Union, pp. 69-73 and M. Fainsod, ‘Historiography and 
Change’, in J. Keep (ed.) Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror (George Allen and Unwin 
Ltd., London, 1964), pp. 19-42 at p. 20. 
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period had been treated as an achievement of the new course as early as 
January 1955’.33 This would seem to suggest that whilst the Congress and its 
‘de-Stalinising’ policy certainly impacted upon Soviet historiography, its effects 
were not leviathan; there was no ‘revolution’, as Schlesinger put it. Was this 
perhaps an attempt by Schlesinger to present a degree of continuity between 
the study of history before and after Stalin’s death? He may simply have been 
stating that the de-Stalinisation process in the historical sphere was begun 
before the Congress but few would deny that the Congress had an enormous 
impact upon the study of history. 
 
During the Twentieth Party Congress, Pankratova declared the Party’s 
opposition to attempts at embellishing contemporary events, arguing that 
many historians had proven themselves unable to deal with the shortcomings 
in their earlier work.34 Mikoyan, in turn, demanded the writing of a history of 
the October Revolution and of the Soviet state, which would, as Schlesinger 
recorded it, ‘…. show without embellishment not only the surface but all of the 
manifold aspects of the life of our Soviet land’.35 Schlesinger argued that 
Mikoyan had, ‘…. hit at the political root of the evil’ when he attacked the 
Short Course, a book which Stalin had taken responsibility for.36 Mikoyan 
argued: 
 
…. if our historians were to make a genuine and profound study 
of the facts and events in the history of our party in the Soviet 
period…..if they were to delve properly into the archives and 
historical documents, and not only into the back issues of 
newspapers, they would be able to give a better explanation, 
from the position of Leninism, of many of the facts and events 
dealt with in the ‘Short Course’.37 
                                                
33 Schlesinger, ‘From the XIX to the XX Party Congress’, p. 9. 
34 The text of Pankratova’s speech is translated in Gruliaw, Current Soviet Policies II, pp. 146-
149. 
35 Schlesinger, ‘From the XIX to the XX Party Congress’, p. 15. In Gruliaw, Current Soviet 
Policies II, the statement is translated as follows ‘one that presents without embellishment not 
only the facade but the whole many-sided life of the Soviet fatherland’ (p. 88.). 
36 Schlesinger, ‘From the XIX to the XX Party Congress’, p. 15. 
37 Gruliaw, Current Soviet Policies II, p. 88. 
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This statement appeared to be in direct contradiction to views which 
Schlesinger had expressed in the period of Stalin’s rule. Although never 
having written about the Short Course specifically, Schlesinger had praised 
officially endorsed state textbooks in the Stalin era.38 He had quoted from the 
Short Course in his Spirit of Post-war Russia. However, he did not name the 
text, referring to it instead as an ‘official document’. The quotation was used 
as proof against reproaches that Marxism neglected the importance of human 
thought.39 So it was certainly meant to demonstrate an authoritative and, 
presumably, correct text. 
 
As well as providing a coherent and reasonably detailed description of the 
events of the Twentieth Party Congress, Schlesinger seemed to argue in his 
article that the changes in party policy, and their subsequent impact on 
historiography, were both justified and necessary.  He also criticised works of 
historical scholarship produced in the period before Stalin’s death and 
supported the Party’s denunciation of the intellectual atmosphere which he 
had created. There does, therefore, seem to be a degree of inconsistency 
between Schlesinger’s contemporary and retrospective evaluation of historical 
works. 
 
Schlesinger published an article in Soviet Studies in October 1956 which dealt 
specifically with post-Stalinist Soviet historiography.40 His earlier writings had 
broached the subject but now Schlesinger investigated, in some detail, the 
changes which took place in the sphere of historical scholarship as a result of 
the alteration of official party policies since Stalin’s death, in particular as a 
result of the Twentieth Party Congress. The publication of the paper once 
again demonstrated the interest Soviet historiography held for Schlesinger. 
 
                                                
38 See, for example, Schlesinger’s praise of the Shestakov textbook in Schlesinger, ‘Neue 
sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’, pp. 194-195.  
39 Schlesinger, Spirit of Post-war Russia, p. 144. 
40 Schlesinger, ‘Soviet Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, Soviet Studies, 8, 2, 
October. 1956, pp.157-172. 
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The Congress proceedings were heavily utilised as source material. In a 
footnote, Schlesinger indicated that he had used the U.S. State Department’s 
translation of the proceedings, including Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’, for the 
purposes of the article.41  He also used a great deal of material, including 
reports from the readers’ conference, editorials and individual articles, from 
the theoretical journal Voprosy Istorii. Schlesinger had made much use of the 
journal in his previous writings about Soviet historiography and had already 
convincingly argued that the publication was an effective window on to the 
activities of historians in the Soviet Union. This latest paper was, thus, 
methodologically very similar to his earlier work on the subject, and allows for 
a great degree of comparison between them.  
 
In general, Schlesinger expressed an optimistic attitude towards the future of 
historical scholarship in the Soviet Union. He argued that historical output was 
already improving as a result of recent events. He described E. Burdzhalov’s 
article on Bolshevik tactics before Lenin’s return in 1917.42 Schlesinger wrote, 
with praise: 
 
This article seems to be a serious effort to present the facts, 
based on well-known contemporary documents printed in the 
‘twenties which have been widely used by Western scholars. 
Burdzhalov criticizes himself and others because recent 
publications on the period misrepresented events in Stalin’s 
favour – even to the extent of omitting Stalin’s own admission of 
error in 1924.43 
 
Burdzhalov argued that, prior to Lenin’s April theses in 1917, Stalin and 
Kamenev advocated a policy of conditional support for the provisional 
government in opposition to Lenin’s stance. Stalin decided to support Lenin 
after the April conference but Kamenev continued his opposition. This 
portrayal differed substantially from the previous depiction of a universally 
                                                
41 Ibid. p. 170, footnote 14.  
42 E. Burdzhalov, ‘O taktike bol’shevikov v marte-aprele 1917 goda’, Voprosy Istorii, 4, 1956, 
pp. 38-56. 
43 Schlesinger, ‘Soviet Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, p. 164. 
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consensual party under Lenin in the lead up to the Bolshevik revolution. It also 
suggested fallibility on Stalin’s part. Schlesinger argued that although 
Burdzhalov was admitting to distortions in previous presentations of events 
and was now in the process of correcting them, he did not attempt to analyse 
or explain why the truth had been distorted in the past. Thus, Schlesinger 
conceded that problems and errors would continue for a time in Soviet 
historical work. 
 
Schlesinger was not alone in expressing optimism about the future of the 
historical profession after the Twentieth Congress. There were plenty of 
reasons to think this. N. Heer wrote: 
 
The Twentieth Party Congress was a landmark for both the 
CPSU and its chroniclers. Many hopeful signals pointed to the 
invigoration, reorganization, and rededication of the party and 
its historians toward a more effective and rational fulfilment of 
their tasks in the Soviet system. Not only was the party to be 
revitalized and the substance of its history to be reworked at 
Khrushchev’s direction, but at the behest of two authoritative 
party figures there would be a drastic improvement in historians’ 
methodology and scholarship.44 
 
Burdzhalov, in his articles and editorials in Voprosy Istorii, was one of a 
number of revisionists who began to explore the opportunities they thought 
were now open to the historical profession. They demanded the critical 
examination of sources and the publication of memoirs and other materials.45 
They were sufficiently emboldened to continue their demand for new 
standards of scholarship in the face of authoritative criticism of this revisionism 
in July 1956.46 
 
                                                
44 Heer, Politics and History in the Soviet Union, p. 75. Heer was referring to the speeches by 
Pankratova and Mikoyan. 
45 See, for example, I. Smirnov, ‘Ob istochnikovedenii istorii KPSS’, Voprosy Istorii, 4, 1956, 
pp. 194-201. 
46 Heer, Politics and History in the Soviet Union, p. 87. 
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However, by June 1957, Burdzhalov had been removed from the editorial 
board of Voprosy Istorii, a thorough shake up of the remaining personnel and 
organisation had taken place, and a hostile attack upon the ‘revisionists’, and 
Burdzhalov’s contribution in particular, formed the basis of the journal’s 
editorial.47 These measures were accompanied by official decrees from the 
Central Committee defining the boundaries of acceptable discussion and 
criticising the recent actions of the journal.48 Those historians who had 
attempted to open debate were officially silenced and the incipient broadening 
of scholarship was quashed as the state took a more conservative stance, 
perhaps as a result of events in Poland and Hungary.  
 
Schlesinger was obviously unaware of these later developments when writing 
his article. His optimism may well have been premature. However, most 
commentators agree that the post-1956 period represented a more open, free 
atmosphere for the historical profession. Whilst the first tentative steps of the 
revisionists may have strayed beyond the party’s tolerance, a new era was 
beginning. Schlesinger was not isolated in his positive attitude regarding the 
future of Soviet scholarship. H. Rogger, writing in 1965, argued: 
 
 Historians are no longer compelled (they are told) to write the 
history of the thirties as an unbroken parade of victories and 
triumphs; they can write about the non-Bolshevik opponents of 
Tsarism with greater fairness… The hero-worship of Stalin, Ivan 
IV and Peter I as nearly coequal gods of the national Pantheon, 
has ended. In short, there has been a refinement of method, a 
greater subtlety of language and approach, a resumption of 
contacts with foreign scholarship. Historians have been allowed, 
and even urged, to look differently at the past.49 
 
Rogger conceded that historians still faced many impediments to free 
                                                
47  ‘Za leniniskuiu partiinost v istoricheskoi nauke’, Voprosy Istorii, 3, 1957, pp. 3-19. See 
Heer, Politics and History in the Soviet Union, pp. 91… 
48 Heer, Politics and History in the Soviet Union, p. 90. 
49 H. Rogger, ‘Politics, Ideology and History in the USSR: The Search for Coexistence’, Soviet 
Studies, 16, 3, January 1965, pp. 253-275 at pp 272-273. 
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scholarship and pointed out that the sphere of their activities remained 
determined by the party. However, there had clearly been progress. 
 
An important feature of Schlesinger’s article is the criticism which he directed 
at earlier Soviet historiography, in particular that of the late Stalin period. 
When referring to work published up to 1956 he pointed out, ‘…. the extent to 
which the selective approach to history had been entrenched, and to which its 
advocates took it for granted that its objective basis in the semi-literacy of a 
large part of the reading public still remained’.50 His negative attitude towards 
earlier scholarship was also discernible in his evaluation of the changes which 
had occurred in this field. Schlesinger insisted: 
 
The main facts of party history are available once the taboos 
are lifted. Historians can now begin to rearrange them in the 
light of the experience acquired since NEP – the last period in 
which free argument about these things was possible among 
the rank and file of the party. This work has indeed presumably 
begun, at least in the minds of those who all this time were 
confident that the authoritarian degeneration of Soviet 
intellectual life would come to an end owing to the laws of 
motion of the socialist revolution.51 
 
Schlesinger was arguing that since the NEP period an ‘authoritarian 
degeneration’ had occurred in the intellectual sphere; ‘free argument’ had 
been impossible until the recent reorganisation of academic work.  He may 
have been suggesting that only work concerning party history was conducted 
in such a stifling, intellectually impotent atmosphere. In his writings before 
Stalin’s death, Schlesinger had implied that work on later periods and on party 
history was generally of a lesser quality to other spheres of research. Yet he 
did not explicitly indicate this caveat. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to 
assume this was how he evaluated the academic atmosphere for all historians 
in the recent Soviet past. This would correspond with the way he described 
                                                
50 Schlesinger, ‘Soviet Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, p. 159. 
51 Ibid. p. 167.  
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the environment under which he worked whilst in Soviet Russia. Perhaps this 
was a recent conclusion, based on the potentially revelatory information 
provided at the Congress, especially in Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’. 
However, it represents a dramatic shift in emphasis from Schlesinger’s earlier 
writings on Soviet historiography. In them Schlesinger conceded the hostile 
and problematic elements to the study of history in the Soviet Union, yet he 
offered a generally positive evaluation of the quality of work undertaken. 
 
According to Schlesinger, the revision of conventional attitudes was made 
clear in the first edition of Voprosy Istorii of 1956, which appealed for a re-
examination of Pokrovskii.52 Historians were asked to appreciate Pokrovskii’s 
merits in relation to the general level of historical science at that time, as well 
as to consider the shortcomings of his work. To Schlesinger:  
 
Compared with the intellectual climate prevailing quite recently, 
and manifested in contributions to the same issue, this 
indicated a basic change: the editors took up an attitude which 
was not entirely negative to the historian in opposition to whom 
Soviet historical studies of the ‘thirties and ‘forties had 
developed, and they found merits in a person denounced as an 
enemy after the 1937-8 purges.53 
 
Schlesinger argued such a turn of events could signify the first public 
rehabilitation of a falsely accused old Bolshevik or the refutation of the 
convention that any early virtues or successes of those who went on to 
become ‘enemies’ should be ignored. Either way, Schlesinger was convinced 
that this, ‘explicit recognition’ of Pokrovskii’s achievements as a historian was 
a significant and new development.54  Expressing his personal opinion, 
Schlesinger argued,   
 
                                                
52 Schlesinger, ‘Soviet Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, p. 157. ‘Ob izuchenii 
istorii istoricheskoi nauki’, Voprosy Istorii, 1, 1956, pp. 3-12. See also, Heer, Politics and 
History in the Soviet Union, p. 73.  
53 Schlesinger, ‘Soviet Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, p. 157. 
54 Ibid. p. 157. 
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…. there can be no Soviet historian who wishes to return to 
Pokrovsky’s ‘economic materialism’ and to the concept of 
‘merchant capitalism’, but ever since 1950 there has been some 
recognition of Russia’s especial backwardness and, on the 
other hand, of the part played by the urban guilds and by 
wealthy peasants in the formation of capitalism.55 
 
It appears Schlesinger was once again mirroring the official views of the 
Soviet Union. He too now reluctantly accepted that Pokrovskii had merits as 
an historian. However, Schlesinger remained consistent with his earlier views 
about the weakness of what he perceived Pokrovskii’s system to be. He still 
criticised the models of ‘economic materialism’ and ‘merchant capitalism’ he 
attributed to Pokrovskii. In a footnote later in the article, Schlesinger was 
again critical: ‘Every Soviet historian knows that one of the main, and most 
justified, criticisms levelled against Pokrovskii was based upon his demand 
that Marxist historiography should ‘reflect the proletarian class-struggle into 
the past’.56 
 
The revision of the orthodox historical paradigm and the problems associated 
with it were also evidenced by Schlesinger in Soviet historians’ treatment of 
Stalin. Schlesinger felt that when dealing with recent history there arose a 
contradiction between what he described as ‘historical truth’ and the way in 
which the Central Committee was administering ‘re-education’: ‘For a long 
time Stalin had been held up as an ideal model; he is now treated as a 
‘negative hero’ whose negative features, however, can be disclosed only by 
stages, as the policies associated with his name are dispensed with’.57 In a 
footnote, Schlesinger pointed out the inconsistencies between what the Soviet 
public were told about the recent past and the objective ‘historical truth’. He 
argued, ‘…. readers [of Voprosy Istorii] may be expected to be aware that 
what they are now being told is still not the whole truth but a transitional stage 
between the former embellishment and a future stage when the nation will be 
                                                
55 Ibid. pp. 157-8.  
56 Ibid p. 169, footnote 12. 
57 Ibid. p. 164. 
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regarded as ripe to face all the facts’.58 Such a statement constituted an 
explicit recognition of the falsity of past historical work as well as the merely 
partial truth of what was now being published. 
 
According to Schlesinger, the current official treatment of the question argued 
that Stalin’s historical function had been mixed.  Stalin had initially promoted 
the progress of Soviet society; however, with the evolution of his personality 
and working methods, he became divorced from the mass of the people. This 
created a division between his correctly formulated theory and his erroneous 
practice. In Schlesinger’s opinion,  
 
…. the Stalin thus depicted by his closest collaborators is not 
necessarily identical with the Stalin of the objective historian: 
this is rather a picture of the provincial or Central Committee 
secretary as he should not be at a time when Stalinist methods 
of leadership have become obsolete. Stalin is distorted, in his 
favour when criminal violations of accepted party standards are 
omitted, but greatly to his detriment when the negative side of 
characteristics which carried the USSR through grave crises are 
treated on the level of Ovechkina’s Borzov.59 
 
The correct historical interpretation of Stalin had still to be reached in the 
Soviet Union. An application of Marxist principles would facilitate this. 
According to Schlesinger, ‘…. the contradictions in Stalin’s work must be 
explained by the contradictions inherent in the historical setting which shaped 
him’.60 It seems clear that, whilst Schlesinger was optimistic about the future 
of historical scholarship in the Soviet Union, he nevertheless felt that, at this 
                                                
58 Ibid. p. 170, footnote 16. 
59 Ibid. p. 165, Author’s italics. Borzov is a literary character taken from a short story by 
Valentin Ovechkin, which was published in the monthly magazine Novy Mir in September 
1952. It was entitled Rayonniye Budny or ‘District Routine’. It portrayed the senior party 
secretary, Borzov, as a jealous, bullying character who thoughtlessly fulfilled quotas and party 
instructions without real initiative or understanding of the needs of his district. This was in 
contrast to the more democratic, constructive approach of his deputy, Martynov. The sketch is 
available in translation in Miller, ‘A Contrast in Types of Party Leadership’, Soviet Studies, 4, 
4, April 1953, pp. 447-468. 
60 Schlesinger, ‘Soviet Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, p. 165. 
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stage, historians were impeded in their work by the prerequisites of political 
expediency, as judged by the Party. He argued that, although still imperfect, 
Soviet historiography was making great progress. Whereas in the 
historiography of the 1930s and 1940s Stalin had been portrayed as the great 
leader, he was now considered to have had a mixed legacy. There is 
obviously a contradiction between this evaluation of Soviet historical work and 
Schlesinger’s previous analysis.  
 
In this paper Schlesinger went into greater detail concerning the proceedings 
of the Voprosy Istorii readers’ conference, held in late January 1956.61 The 
conference lasted for three days and was attended by 600 teachers and 
research workers from Moscow. The main reports, given by Pankratova and 
the journal’s deputy editor Burdzhalov, fully anticipated the official objections 
to current historical scholarship proclaimed by Mikoyan at the Twentieth Party 
Congress. Schlesinger listed a number of criticisms made by Burdzhalov. 
Party history had been falsified to better display the merits of a few leaders at 
the expense of other individuals and the rank and file as a whole. The inner 
party struggles of the 1920s had been presented as an unmasking of spies 
and wreckers, rather than as a political and ideological battle against anti-
Leninist elements. According to Schlesinger, Burdzhalov also argued that the 
Short Course was obsolete as a version of party history. 62  Some dissent 
towards the editors’ criticism was to be heard at the conference, but 
Schlesinger was critical of these oppositionists and insisted that any 
opposition was weak and came almost exclusively from the institutional 
strongholds of the established tradition. He thus indicated his approval of the 
changes being sought in Soviet historiography. 
 
The paper described the contents of the edition of Voprosy Istorii which went 
to press a month after the Twentieth Party Congress. The editorial concerned 
                                                
61 Schlesinger noted that his information had come from the report of the readers’ conference 
given in Voprosy Istorii. See above p. 292. 
62 Schlesinger wrote that he directed criticism towards: ‘…. The embellishment of the foreign 
and colonial policies of tsarism, and the denunciation of the liberation struggles of the 
Caucasian and other peoples against tsarist Russia as allegedly reactionary and inspired 
from abroad’. Such excesses of patriotism were now unacceptable (Schlesinger, ‘Soviet 
Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, p. 158). 
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the lessons of the Congress for the historical profession and party history. 63 
Stalin appeared to be principally blamed for the misrepresentation of party 
history and the Short Course was heavily criticised. The text’s pre-eminence 
as the touchstone of historical truth had prevented the undertaking of any 
critical studies of party historiography, since any work written earlier had been 
seen as valueless. Yet now, Schlesinger wrote: 
 
The Short Course is recognized as having some merits in 
systematizing and popularizing party history, and in ‘explaining 
some important issues of the history and theory of Bolshevism’. 
But the treatment of the post-1917 period in particular is 
denounced as being permeated by the’ idealist standpoint of 
the cult of the individual’.64 
 
According to Schlesinger, the Short Course was criticised for neglecting the 
role played by Lenin and the masses, to the benefit of Stalin. It also 
underestimated, or even ignored, the difficulties the party had faced. The book 
was dogmatic and ahistorical, reflecting political attitudes of Stalin’s days to 
the past. Its presentation of the party’s position on the eve of Lenin’s return to 
Russia was incorrect and Stalin’s role in the October revolution had been 
overemphasized in party history. This was in direct comparison to treatment of 
the Petrograd military revolutionary committee and its role in organizing the 
insurrection, which was hardly mentioned. Schlesinger made no comment 
above a simple description of these criticisms. This can, perhaps, be taken to 
indicate his agreement with them. He did write of the ‘current falsification of 
history’ as a statement of fact and criticised those who opposed the new 
editorial line so this would seem to be the case.65 
 
According to Schlesinger the editorial also criticised the state of the material 
with which historians had to work.66 Verbatim reports of conferences and 
congresses were now a bibliographical rarity and important documents were 
                                                
63 ‘XX S”ezd KPSS I zadachi issledovaniia istorii partii’, Voprosy Istorii, 3, 1956, pp. 3-12. 
64 Schlesinger, ‘Soviet Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, p. 160. 
65 Ibid. p. 161. 
66 Ibid. p. 162. 
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still withheld from research workers. The issue also appealed for a critical re-
examination of all books on party history, so that the kind of mistakes and 
falsifications being discussed could be eliminated. The study of Soviet history 
and the revolutionary movement could then be placed on to a truly Marxist-
Leninist foundation. Schlesinger speculated as to whether this appeal could 
be successful, arguing: ‘There is an obvious political interest in establishing 
the truth, for if all the assertions about the party’s past successes were true, it 
would be impossible to discuss present difficulties frankly without encouraging 
unfavourable comparisons with the past’.67 He argued that a great deal of 
material was now being republished and this would aid historians in their 
analysis, but felt that historiography remained in a transitional stage. Whilst 
undoubtedly progressing away from the falsification of history which 
categorised the period of Stalin’s rule, historians were nevertheless 
constricted by political orthodoxy and expediency, especially in regard to 
whom they could and could not name. Schlesinger felt that Burdzhalov’s 
already mentioned article on Bolshevik party organisations after the February 
revolution, which named everyone involved in party activities, including those 
who were later to become ‘enemies of the people’, was a significant and 
positive step.  
 
Schlesinger argued, although progress was being made in the fields of 
modern and party history, the situation was much more complicated when it 
came to the study of earlier periods of Russian history. He wrote that it was 
necessary to correct the, ‘…. misinterpretation of past stages of Russian 
history which followed from the far-going identification, in the historical writing 
of the late Stalin period, of the present Russian national self-assertion with the 
past’.68 Present concerns and priorities had once again been reflected into 
older, inappropriate periods. Disputes in this sphere centred upon the method 
of historical interpretation and research required to bridge gaps in knowledge, 
since omission of well-known facts did not generally occur. 
 
Schlesinger described the changing investigations concerning Shamil and the 
                                                
67 Ibid. p. 163. 
68 Schlesinger, ‘Soviet Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, p. 167. 
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Caucasian uprising of the mid nineteenth century to illustrate the dynamics of 
pre-modern historiography.69 He felt that the defeat of the Pokrovskii school 
still represented an achievement in this arena, thus retaining a degree of 
consistency with his earlier writings, but felt that the post-war period had led 
to, ‘…. harmful excrescences on that approach’.70 Shestakov’s 1937 textbook 
was the first to systematise the post-Pokrovskiian interpretation that 
Schlesinger admired.71 The textbook assumed that Shamil’s movement was 
progressive in character, as with all earlier Russian revolutionary traditions. 
Schlesinger argued that it was only in the late Stalin period that this 
interpretation was superseded by the official characterisation of the movement 
as a comparatively narrow group of local feudal lords and ‘bandits’. He felt 
Soviet historians should have known that this was merely a repetition of 
Pokrovskii’s mistaken reflection of the present struggle into the past; the need 
for a strengthened Russian state was being reflected backwards. Thus, wrote 
Schlesinger: 
 
Without the assumption, at least tacitly, that tsarist Russia was 
the nucleus of the USSR, this new interpretation was 
senseless. In any case, it involved a series of falsifications. The 
supporters of the new interpretation falsified the statements of 
Marx and the Russian progressives (who critically welcomed 
Shamil’s struggle against tsarism) and they distorted the reports 
of tsarist officials and generals.72 
 
In the late Stalin period, a commonplace historical truth was repressed 
                                                
69 Shamil was the leader of Muridism, an extreme Muslim sect in the Caucasus. From 1834 to 
1859 he led the resistance movement against Russian annexation. As L. Tillett wrote: ‘Up to 
1950 most Soviet historians considered him to be the greatest of several leaders of ‘national-
liberation’ movements against Tsarist colonialism… After World War II this concept of Shamil 
came into conflict with party-inspired doctrines of Soviet patriotism and Great Russian 
leadership. As a result an opposing version of the ‘national liberation’ movements and their 
leaders was introduced into Soviet historiography, Shamil, who had been the most lionized of 
these leaders, was now the most condemned’ (L. Tillett, ‘Shamil and Muridism in Recent 
Soviet Historiography’, American Slavic and East European Review, 20, 2, April 1961, pp. 
253-269 at p. 253). 
70 Schlesinger, ‘Soviet Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, p. 168. Soviet orthodoxy 
of the Stalin era also held Pokrovskii responsible for the former positive portrayal of Shamil (L. 
Tillett, ‘Shamil and Muridism in Recent Soviet Historiography’, p. 258). 
71 Shestakov, Istoriia SSSR, p. 90. 
72 Schlesinger, ‘Soviet Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, p. 168. 
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because it was politically harmful and Schlesinger argued that historians were 
willing to provide the necessary interpretations. This is a hugely damning 
evaluation of the state’s control of the historical sphere. Schlesinger, however, 
added the caveat that there were only a ‘few’ historians willing to write such 
falsifications and ‘none of the outstanding ones’.73  He asserted that, since 
Stalin’s death, debate on this issue was now moving in a progressive direction 
and some historians were beginning to argue against the previous nationalist 
interpretation. Whilst the post-Stalin era did witness a more open attitude 
towards research on Shamil, there was a party reaction against the more 
forceful revisionists.74 Once again, Schlesinger may have been overly 
optimistic about the prospects for free academic publication and debate. He 
ended the article on an entirely positive note: ‘This removal of taboos and 
standing judgments from the past is clearing the way for historians who are 
seeking new lines of approach’.75 This included an implicit criticism of the 
norms of historical method in Stalin’s times.  
 
Schlesinger provided a great deal of information upon the effects of the 
Twentieth Party Congress on the historical profession. He offered a review of 
likely shifts in the historiographical paradigm, as well as reporting what was 
written in the Soviet historical press immediately after. However, the paper 
does not correspond to the general interpretation of events Schlesinger had 
constructed in his earlier writings. The inconsistency between his positive 
evaluation of historiographical work in the USSR under Stalin and his 
retrospective condemnation of it following his death are clear. When not 
explicitly criticising historical work of the Stalin period, Schlesinger was writing 
so enthusiastically and with such obvious agreement with the official changes 
heralded by the Congress that a negative appraisal of the previous orthodoxy 
can be assumed.  It is important to note that Schlesinger’s writings of the 
Stalin period were not without negative remarks and criticisms of Soviet 
historical work; the contrast between them and his post-Stalin writings should 
not, therefore, be exaggerated.  This paper also makes clear that there were 
                                                
73 Ibid. p. 168. 
74 L. Tillett, ‘Shamil and Muridism in Recent Soviet Historiography’, p. 266. 
75 Schlesinger, ‘Soviet Historians Before and After the XX Congress’, p. 169. 
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elements of continuity in Schlesinger’s writings. He continued to denigrate 
what he perceived as Pokrovskii’s historiographical ‘school’; however, akin to 
the official Soviet interpretation, he now offered a much more conciliatory 
appraisal of his individual achievements.  In general, Schlesinger’s attitude 
towards Soviet historiography did appear to change at around the time of the 
Twentieth Congress. It could, perhaps, be argued that he was once again 
mirroring the official views of Soviet orthodoxy, adapting his interpretation just 
as it changed within the Soviet Union. 
 
Soviet historiography was again the subject of Schlesinger’s published 
writings in April 1958 with a short report on a conference in the USSR dealing 
with the methodology of source critiquing.76  A conference for research 
workers had been held by the Moscow State Institute for Historical Archive 
Work (MGIAI) in 1957 and Schlesinger reported on as much of the 
proceedings as he was able to glean from Soviet journals. According to 
Schlesinger, many Soviet historians felt that discussions on critical source 
evaluation had been totally neglected in the Soviet Union and, thus, pre-
revolutionary concepts were often simply reproduced. In recent years, 
however, there had been a revival of interest in the subject, involving a search 
for a Marxist perspective. The partiinost attitude towards sources was still 
correct, so there was to be no return to ‘objectivism’, but all methods of textual 
criticism developed by traditional historiography were to be utilised.77 
 
According to Schlesinger, editors had displayed an uncritical approach to 
documents and in some cases the selection of documents for inclusion in 
published collections had been carried out in an obviously arbitrary fashion. It 
was felt by many that even Lenin’s works required investigation into the 
circumstances of their provenance and any emphasis the author may have 
had, due to time-conditioned necessity. Offering his own opinion, Schlesinger 
argued: ‘It is obvious that the very assumption of this function by the historian 
implies a rejection of the propagandist’s claim to use the ‘quotations bag’ in 
                                                
76 Schlesinger, ‘Textual Criticism of Soviet Historical Documents’, Soviet Studies, 9, 4, April 
1958, pp. 449-451. 
77 Ibid. pp. 449-450. 
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order to back by Lenin’s authority every statement regarded as correct in 
present circumstances’.78 Schlesinger indicated that the majority of historians 
approved of the changes introduced into historiography since the Twentieth 
Congress. He pointed out that there was no reference in the conference 
report to Stalin, ‘…. whose letter to the Editor of Proletarskaya Revolutsia in 
1931 signified the triumph of those applications of the concept of partiinost to 
the study of the past, the overcoming of which – though not, of course, of the 
concept as a definition of their general approach – at present occupies the 
minds of Soviet historians’.79 Schlesinger made very little reference to Stalin’s 
letter in his earlier writings, in spite of his acknowledgement of its decisive 
impact on Stalinist historiography. Yet he was now clearly emphasising its 
influence on the researching and writing of history. He argued that the main 
concern of Soviet historians was how to overcome its insidious influence.  
 
The paper was little more than a report upon a conference report. It did, 
however, show that Schlesinger remained concerned with the topic of Soviet 
historiography, as well as giving some indication as to the concerns and 
priorities of Soviet historians. Schlesinger used Soviet terms such ‘partiinost’ 
without offering a definition of them. One cannot, therefore, know what exactly 
Schlesinger understood by it, and little of his own opinion was provided. 
However, the paper is written with a tone of approval and the fact that he 
chose to write about the conference, perhaps suggests he regarded it as a 
significant event. The paper also provides additional evidence to support the 
thesis that Schlesinger’s writings on historiography underwent a dramatic shift 
in emphasis, coinciding with ‘de-Stalinisation’ in the USSR.  
 
In January 1960 Schlesinger published a brief report in Soviet Studies on the 
debates concerning a new history curriculum in the Soviet Union.80 The 
reorganisation of Soviet primary and secondary education, which occurred 
after discussions of autumn 1958, had resulted in the need for a new history 
                                                
78 Ibid. p. 450. 
79 Ibid. p. 451.  
80 Schlesinger, ‘The New Secondary School History Curriculum’, Soviet Studies, 11, 3, 
January 1960, pp. 341-348. 
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syllabus.81 Before the proposed reform, history courses were administered on 
a ‘linear’ basis. Lower grades were taught the earliest stages of history, 
gradually moving to the modern era as they progressed through the years. As 
Schlesinger pointed out, however, those who did not intend to complete the 
full term of secondary education left school with no knowledge, except for 
selected episodes, of their own country’s history. It was felt that it was 
necessary to give those with an eight-year education a more rounded and 
complete historical knowledge; the ensuing debate centred upon how best to 
do this.  
 
According to Schlesinger’s report, one of the main themes to emerge from the 
discussion, and one of relevance to Soviet historiography in general, was the 
extreme unease felt by many historians towards changes to the curriculum. It 
was feared that they could inadvertently revert to the ‘sociological schemas’ 
taught in the past. This was a reference to the party’s criticism of history 
education in 1934, directed primarily against Pokrovskii and his school for 
their alleged schematic approach to the past. Schlesinger wrote: ‘Not for 
nothing did M. V. Nechkina reproach the majority of her colleagues with 
unwillingly gliding into the treatment of history in terms of abstract sociological 
schemes, condemned a quarter of a century ago, since with the condensed 
course of modern general history no time would be left for anything else’.82 
Similarly Schlesinger argued that, at a conference convened by the History 
faculty of Moscow University: ‘It was left to [E. M] Chermenski…to bring home 
the obvious truth that the danger of a return to abstract sociological schemes 
was implied in the very burdening of the curriculum with enormous amounts of 
materials which simply could not be dealt with in other than schematic 
ways’.83 Schlesinger clearly shared this unease, since it was both an ‘obvious 
truth’ and a ‘danger’, in his opinion.  
                                                
81 For more information on developments in post-Stalinist history education, see N. H. 
Garowek, ‘Education, Ideology, and Politics: History in Soviet Primary and Secondary 
Schools’, The History Teacher, 11, 1, Nov. 1977, pp. 55-74. 
82 Schlesinger – ‘The New Secondary History Curriculum’, p. 344. The reproach was recorded 
in A. M. Sinitsin ‘O structure i soderzhanii istoricheskogo obrazivaniia I srednii shkole’, 
Voprosy Istorii, 8, 1959, pp. 193-200 at p. 199. 
83 Schlesinger – ‘The New Secondary History Curriculum’, p. 345. The conference was 
reported in N. A. Nikolaev, ‘O postanovke istoricheskogo obrazovaniia v srednoi shkole’, 
Voprosy Istorii, 5, 1959, pp. 207-221. Chermenski’s contribution was noted on pp. 219-220. 
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Another feature of the debate was the apparent alarm of some historians at 
what they perceived as a tendency to fully rehabilitate the Pokrovskii ‘school’ 
of historiography. Schlesinger offered his own opinion in a footnote to the text. 
Schlesinger argued that, as a defamed old Bolshevik, Pokrovskii had been 
rehabilitated by the Twentieth Party Congress. As a philosopher of history, he 
could be no more rehabilitated than any sociologist whose theory was now 
proven obsolete. As an organiser of an education system, it was impossible to 
rehabilitate him. Schlesinger continued:  
 
The basic confusion had been produced by Stalin, who 
combined the criticism of Pokrovski’s ‘economic materialism’ 
and of his concept of history as ‘political struggle looking 
backward’ (a criticism in which Stalin was certainly right, though 
he shared in fact at least the second of Pokrovski’s concepts) 
with an, equally necessary, request for a return to a systemic 
teaching of history based upon the facts, and with a barbaric 
calumniation of Pokrovski and his pupils as alleged counter-
revolutionary conspirators.84  
 
Schlesinger was once again condemning Stalin, both in terms of his 
behaviour towards Pokrovskii as a person and in his guilt for reflecting present 
day politics into the past. He also remained a staunch critic of Pokrovskii’s 
historical work and theory. Schlesinger, alongside many Soviet historians, still 
regarded ‘overcoming’ Pokrovskii’s ‘school’ as a major intellectual 
achievement of the Stalin era. He offered a consistent view over time, on this 
issue at least.  
 
In April 1965 Schlesinger published what was ostensibly a review of the 
publication of pre-1914 correspondence between Lenin and Camille 
Huysmans, the then Secretary of the Second International.85 As well as 
                                                
84 Schlesinger, ‘The New Secondary History Curriculum’, p. 348, footnote 16. 
85 Schlesinger, ‘Lenin as a Member of the International Socialist Bureau’, Soviet Studies, 16, 
4, April 1965, pp. 448-458. Camille Huysmans (1871-1968) was the Secretary of the 
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providing an insight into Lenin’s attitude towards international Social 
Democracy in the pre-war years, Schlesinger’s review also concerned the 
incipient debate upon this issue, a debate which Stalin had so firmly crushed 
in his letter to the editors of Proletarskaia revoliutsiia in 1931. The article, 
therefore, deals with one of the most crucial incidents in the development of 
Soviet historiography.  
 
It was in this article that Schlesinger was the most critical of Soviet 
historiography and Stalin’s impact upon it in particular. He described how, in 
the summer of 1930, the leading Soviet historical journal Proletarskaia 
revoliutsiia published an article by the historian A. Slutskii in which he argued 
that before 1914 Lenin may well have underestimated the danger of 
‘Centrism’ amongst international Social Democratic groups.86 Slutskii felt that 
Lenin’s behaviour was explicable since he required international sympathy for 
the reconstruction of the Russian Social Democratic Party under Bolshevik 
leadership. However, he criticised Lenin for not having encouraged a 
breakaway of the left-wings of European parties. Under the influence of what 
Schlesinger described as ‘apparently internal’ criticism by the Central 
Committee Secretariat, the journal’s editors admitted on 20 October to having 
committed an error in publishing Slutskii’s article.87 However, they also added 
that it would be expedient of historians to concentrate upon the relationship of 
the Bolsheviks to the Second International. According to Schlesinger:  
 
 This provoked Stalin’s rage: in an article….he attacked the 
editors - which meant primarily Pokrovsky - for permitting 
discussions on issues affecting the very essence of 
Bolshevism; Slutsky’s ideas were denounced as hidden 
Trotskyism; a lot of not immediately connected observations 
were added about Trotskyism allegedly hidden in other 
publications on party history; ‘rotten liberalism’, which had 
                                                                                                                                       
International Socialist Bureau, the permanent executive committee of the Second 
International, from 1904 until its dissolution. See J. Joll, The Second International 1889-1914 
(London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955). 
86 A. Slutskii, ‘Bol’sheviki o Germanskoi S.-D. v period ee predvoennogo krizisa’, 
Proletarskaia revoliutsiia 6, 1930, pp. 38-72.  
87 Schlesinger, ‘Lenin as a Member of the International Socialist Bureau’, p. 448.  
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caused the editors to enter into discussion even with enemies 
of the party, and basic weaknesses contained in the work even 
of historians as close to Stalin’s political standpoint as E. 
Yaroslavsky, were condemned.88 
 
In damning terms, Schlesinger described the impact of Stalin’s letter on 
subsequent historical work: ‘…. by his solemn proclamation the task of party 
history as searching not for the truth but for constructs fitting the needs of the 
party leadership was firmly established, and has left its traces up to the 
present day’.89 Schlesinger may have believed that the letter only impacted 
upon party historiography, as opposed to the study of more general historical 
problems. In his earlier writings Schlesinger had frequently conceded that it 
was party history that was the most influenced by the vagaries of party policy. 
Whilst this may be true, it seems unlikely that he would believe all other 
spheres of historical work remained unaffected. Later in the article, 
Schlesinger actually wrote in terms of general historiography and the changes 
which resulted from Stalin’s letter. 
 
Schlesinger insisted that he, and other communists, well understood the 
implications of the letter:  ‘In the German communist movement, in which I 
worked at the time, we could have no doubt whatever that such a 
reinterpretation of the tasks of historiography rather than the struggle against 
certain incorrect statements had been Stalin’s major motive in writing this 
article and in drawing the appropriate ‘organizational consequences’ from it’.90 
Stalin meant to delineate the boundaries of acceptable historiographical 
debate; as Schlesinger understood it this was a drive for the establishment of 
theoretical homogeneity. If anyone had been in doubt, the ensuing ‘theoretical 
offensive’ conducted by the leaders of the Comintern national sections would 
                                                
88 Ibid. p. 448. Schlesinger was referring to Stalin’s infamous letter to the editors of 
Proletarskaia revolutsiia published on 28 October 1931. See J. Barber, ‘Stalin’s Letter to the 
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supremacy. He wrote: ‘Moreover, Stalin’s intervention marked a further step in the 
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soon have clarified matters. Such an account of Schlesinger’s thinking on the 
issue at the time coincides with his description of events in his unpublished 
memoirs.91 Both items were written retrospectively and at around the same 
time. The fact that they support each other displays a consistency which helps 
to validate Schlesinger’s statements on his contemporary understanding.  
 
A certain amount of justification appears to have been written by Schlesinger 
concerning his, and others, reaction, or lack of it, to this ‘theoretical offensive’. 
He was keen to point out that not all official statements, or all aspects of 
problematic ones, were incorrect; he argued, ‘…. the occurrence of quite 
sensible and necessary statements in such documents prevented anyone 
except those directly harmed from criticizing them’.92 Somewhat 
unconvincingly, Schlesinger argued that these drives could well be used to 
mobilize party workers against theoretical errors advocated by certain factions 
within the leadership of the parties, so there may have been a positive 
element to them. Ultimately however, he wrote: ‘Faced with an extremely 
critical situation in Germany as well as in the USSR, none of us was eager to 
raise controversial issues’.93 External factors demanded that party loyalty took 
precedence.  
 
One could argue that these justifications help to explain Schlesinger’s 
attitudes and written emphases up to the 1950s: he did not wish to damage 
the unity of the party in the face of external danger; there were elements of 
truth in the new orthodoxy and mobilisation against theoretical errors could be 
a positive force. Was this why Schlesinger did not publicly denounce what he 
retrospectively denigrated? Schlesinger’s attitude once again evidenced his 
pragmatism and desire to play the role of advocate for the Soviet system. 
 
One interesting feature of Schlesinger’s attitude towards Stalin’s letter to the 
editor’s of Proletarskaia revoliutsiia is that he appears to have seen the attack 
as directed principally towards Pokrovskii. He stated this explicitly in the 
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introduction to his review, ‘…. he [Stalin] attacked the editors – which meant 
primarily Pokrovsky’.94 Later, when discussing the impact the availability of the 
Lenin and Huysmans correspondence would have on research, he wrote: 
‘The publication of this volume may offer an opportunity to resume the 
discussion which Pokrovsky was prevented from opening in 1930 by Stalin’s 
intervention’.95 Schlesinger believed Stalin and Pokrovskii to be the main 
protagonists in the affair. Perhaps this helps to explain Schlesinger’s relatively 
passive reaction to Stalin’s interference in the historical sphere, both at the 
time and later in the 1930s and 1940s when engaged in writing about Soviet 
historiography. It may have been another justification for his inactivity, despite 
his full awareness of the wider implications for theoretical and academic work. 
Schlesinger consistently made his evaluation of Pokrovskii’s contribution to 
the historical sciences known. He felt Pokrovskii’s theoretical constructs and 
methodology to be fatally flawed and seriously detrimental to both the 
development of historiography and the teaching of history in the Soviet Union. 
Throughout his writings he argued that the overcoming of the Pokrovskii 
‘school’ was a major intellectual achievement of the Stalin era. If Schlesinger 
believed Stalin’s attack to be fundamentally directed against Pokrovskii’s 
theories, teachings and students, then he might have taken a pragmatic 
approach to events; believing the outcome of the attack worthwhile despite 
the high costs. Of course, in order to substantiate this argument one would 
have to prove that Schlesinger held this negative interpretation of Pokrovskii 
already in 1931. There are no articles or papers from this time dealing with 
Soviet historiography. Yet it is certain that Schlesinger heavily criticised what 
he perceived as ‘Pokrovskiism’ in his first known writing to cover the subject in 
1938.96  
 
Schlesinger was somewhat isolated on this issue. Many academics have 
argued that, rather than the letter being an attack directed specifically at 
Pokrovskii, no historians emerged from the affair unscathed. Barber, for 
example, argued that very few escaped criticism, dismissal from post or 
                                                
94 Ibid p. 448.  
95 Ibid. p. 450. 
96 Schlesinger, ‘Neue sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung’. 
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expulsion from the party. He insisted: ‘M. N. Pokrovsky, was spared, but he in 
any case was a dying man. His closest followers … were all attacked and 
forced to acknowledge mistakes’.97 It seems that Stalin intended to signal a 
warning to the historical profession in general, rather than to attack one 
particular leading school at this time.  
 
Schlesinger’s review contained an interesting and relatively unique evaluation 
of Lenin’s role in international Social Democracy in the years before the First 
World War and immediately after the Revolution. He argued that, were it not 
for Allied intervention leading to civil war on a massive scale, the Bolsheviks 
may well have dealt with the split from the Menshevik-Internationalists in an 
analogous way to the conflict with the right-wing communists. Moreover: 
‘Lenin, if not involved in a desperate war, might indeed, instead of organizing 
the centralized Comintern, have found some means broader and more 
propagandist in character to advocate his views within the international labour 
movement’.98 Schlesinger argued that Lenin was pushed, unwillingly, towards 
an authoritarian, centralized leadership style. Speculating on what Lenin’s 
attitude to events, occurring after his death, might have been. Schlesinger 
wrote:  
 
I very much doubt whether he even thought, as Stalin later 
asserted, of the possibility of socialism in one country, but 
surely he would not have left, as Trotsky later suggested, the 
Russian revolution in the lurch when the west European part of 
the revolutionary perspective failed to realize. Still, he would not 
have claimed that the outcome of the adaptations was the last 
word of the international socialist movement99 
 
He argued that both Trotsky and Stalin were wrong in claiming Lenin’s 
authority for their actions after his death. Lenin would not have envisaged the 
isolated position of the Soviet Union as desirable and would not have altered 
                                                
97 Barber, ‘Stalin’s Letter to the Editors of Proletarskaya Revolutsiya’, p. 22. This view is 
mirrored in Enteen, The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat, p. 153. 
98 Schlesinger, ‘Lenin as a Member of the International Socialist Bureau’, p. 452. 
99 Ibid. p. 457-458. 
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theoretical doctrine to match such a state of affairs. However, equally, he 
would not have abandoned the Soviet experiment when the west European 
revolution did not immediately come to fruition. Schlesinger once again 
advocated the actions taken by the Soviet Union, insisting that its detractors 
were simply utopian. 
 
This review appears to have been an honest, frank and relatively independent 
analysis of events in the historical sphere in the Soviet Union in the early 
1930s, as well as a brief analysis of Lenin’s international role immediately 
before and after the Revolution. One of the most striking aspects of the paper 
is how sympathetic Schlesinger was to Lenin. He praised his abilities and the 
role he played in international communism, as well as staunchly defending his 
actions against critics such as Slutskii, and what he clearly perceived as slurs 
upon his reputation by Trotsky and others. Schlesinger had made clear his 
admiration in writings concerning Lenin and Maxism and this was continued in 
his historical works and papers on historiography.   
 
In contrast, another striking feature of this review is Schlesinger’s near total 
condemnation of Stalin. The only non-critical statement Schlesinger made 
about Stalin was that he had been correct to disagree with Slutskii; however 
his reasons for this were erroneous.100 Stalin’s attack on the editors of 
Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, which aimed at achieving theoretical homogeneity 
as he dictated, led to the search not for truth but for convenient constructs to 
suit the needs of the party. The effects of this offensive were still discernible in 
academic work on party history as late as 1965 when Schlesinger published 
his review.  
 
The review conforms to the general problem of Schlesinger’s writings on 
Soviet historiography. How is one to marry his apparently differing attitudes to 
the same issues? In this paper Schlesinger is at his most vociferously critical 
                                                
100 Schlesinger wrote: ‘In his attack on Slutsky, Stalin was right in so far as it was indeed 
impossible for the Bolsheviks to combine, in 1913-1914, with Rosa Luxemburg. He was, 
however, completely mistaken in describing Lenin’s attitude to his duties as a member of the 
International Socialist Bureau as one of basic opposition’ (Schlesinger, ‘Lenin as a Member of 
the International Socialist Bureau’, p. 454). 
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of Stalin and his impact upon the study of history in the Soviet Union. This 
increases the contrast between the negative evaluation of Stalin discernible in 
all of his writings in the post-1953 period and his much more positive portrayal 
of events published before. In this paper, just as in his report on Soviet 
attitudes towards the treatment of historical sources, Schlesinger insisted 
upon the enormous significance of Stalin’s letter for Soviet historiography and 
communist intellectual life in general.101 Yet he had made no real reference to 
it in his writings before 1953, despite writing a series of articles and a chapter 
in a book specifically on developments within the area. Although his earlier 
work concentrated upon the later evolution of historical research, in the late 
1930s and 1940s, the omission of details on state interference of such 
seismic proportions seems incredible. The 1931 letter created the intellectual 
terrain from which any later developments would have emerged and 
Schlesinger’s later writings and personal reflections prove he was only too 
aware of this. 
 
Schlesinger published a report on recent developments in Soviet social 
sciences in 1967 in the French periodical Annuaire de L’U.R.S.S.102 Its scope, 
intention and methodology were very similar to his earlier report for Zeitschrift 
fur Sozialforschung published in 1938; both used contemporary Soviet journal 
publications to attempt a general analysis of developments within the sphere 
of social science. In general, Schlesinger felt that after the necessarily 
negative process of ‘de-Stalinisation’ the social sciences were now moving in 
a more positive and progressive direction. He wrote, ‘…. explicit ‘de-
Stalinization’, i.e. a condemnation of dogma and attitudes established during 
the two tragical decades, has fairly submerged: in the space thereby opened 
the search for new, scientifically based approaches not only to practical but 
also to basic theoretical problems is in full swing’.103 In a style typical of his 
post-1953 writings, Schlesinger displayed an intensely critical attitude towards 
the Stalin era; he wrote as if this interpretation was to be taken for granted.  
His treatment of contemporary developments and research was, however, 
                                                
101 Schlesinger, ‘Textual Criticism of Soviet Historical Documents’, p. 451. 
102 Schlesinger, ‘Some Recent Developments in the Social Sciences in the USSR’. 
103 Ibid. p. 19. 
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undertaken in a much more optimistic and appreciative manner. 
 
The discussion consisted of three separate topics. Schlesinger described the 
progress made within Marxist theory, especially in what he labelled ‘Marxist 
historical sociology’.104 He also described theoretical work on the problems of 
‘nation’ as a concept. Both matters were widely debated in 1966. The 
remaining section of the article concerned developments within the field of 
Soviet historiography. 
 
Schlesinger began by pointing out the new positive approach to history which 
he was able to discern:  
 
I may, at first, denote the truly ingenious way in which, without 
sacrificing anything of the necessary clarity, they have achieved 
a ‘de-dramatization’ of de-Stalinization so as to get their hands 
free for more urgent tasks. The Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal – 
in my opinion, the best of the group – got the issue settled by 
publishing now, from issue to issue, not just necrologues for the 
victims of the army purge which would be bound to make a 
sombre impression.... but by reprinting the citations from their 
earlier, and happier years, of the heroic deeds for which they 
got their medals.105 
 
Evidently Schlesinger felt Soviet historiography could now move on from the 
‘sombre’ task of ‘de-Stalinisation’. He approved of the more optimistic and 
celebratory approach of the military history journal he cited. The generally 
positive tone of Schlesinger’s report was also visible in his appraisal of works 
on the origin of the Soviet state.106 
 
The main issue of ‘de-Stalinisation’ for Soviet historians, according to 
Schlesinger, had been the need to discover the correct attitude towards the 
                                                
104 Ibid. p. 27. 
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Pokrovskii ‘school’. This was necessary because of the ‘legend’ established 
since 1934 of the, ‘…anti-historical, if not counterrevolutionary’ character of 
Pokrovskii and his students.107 Schlesinger gave no details as to the origin of 
this ‘legend’ but the use of such a term implied his antipathy towards it. This 
was disingenuous since in his earlier writings, at the time in which the ‘legend’ 
was still the orthodox Soviet interpretation, he appeared to concur with this 
very negative evaluation.  
 
In order to demonstrate the kind of work published on the issue, Schlesinger 
described and analysed an article by O.L. Vainshtein entitled ‘The Formation 
of Soviet Historical Sciences in the 1920s’ and published in 1966.108 He 
argued that, whilst Vainshtein did not deny Pokrovskii’s deviation from the 
correct path of historical materialism, he also showed his relationship to 
earlier historians. He compared the Pokrovksii ‘school’ to the liberal 
historiography from whence it had emerged. Historians such as Kliuchevsky 
had placed more importance upon social formations and class interests than 
individuals and ideas. However, they were still far from developing a proper 
Marxist perspective. As Schlesinger pointed out, ‘…. against this state of 
historical science before, and immediately after, the October revolution the 
approach of Pokrovsky, and of the school of Soviet historians trained by it, 
appear in a more proper perspective’.109 Throughout the 1920s, Pokrovskii 
and his students developed by fighting those bourgeois trends inevitably still 
present in Soviet historiography. They also played a vital role in the 
construction of Soviet historical institutions such as the Institute of Red 
Professors and RANION (the Russian Association of Research Institutions in 
the Social Sciences).110 This was another achievement for which Pokrovskii 
was now to be recognized by both Vainshtein and Schlesinger. 
 
This positive appreciation of Pokrovskii’s legacy was not accompanied by any 
                                                
107 Ibid. p. 22. 
108 O. L. Vainshtein, ‘Stanovlenie sovetskoi istoricheskoi nauki (20-e gody), Voprosy Istorii, 7, 
1966, pp. 32-47. Schlesinger stated in error that the paper was published in number 9 of 
1966. 
109 Schlesinger, ‘Some Recent Developments in the Social Sciences in the USSR’, p. 22. 
110 For more information on the establishment of these academic institutions see Barber, 
Soviet Historians in Crisis, chapter 3. 
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minimising of the errors committed by his ‘school’. Schlesinger pointed out 
that the article criticised Pokrovskii’s misuse of sociological schemata, his 
continued acceptance of certain concepts of bourgeois science and his 
tendency to ‘modernise’ the class struggles of the past, amongst other errors. 
In fact, Schlesinger continued: ‘All the essential elements of Stalin’s criticism 
of Pokrovsky are thus upheld’.111 Yet, it was also accepted that these errors 
were indicative of the general level of historical studies in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s. As Schlesinger argued, ‘…. the Pokrovskeans, in this respect, 
hardly committed mistakes much surpassing Stalin’s elaboration of a ‘slaves 
revolution’ which allegedly overcame ancient society’.112  
 
Schlesinger argued that Vainshtein did not deal with the overtly nationalist 
elements to Stalin’s anti-Pokrovskii campaign. Apart from this, however, 
Schlesinger appeared to be in agreement with his interpretation. This 
approach contrasts remarkably with the continuing attacks on Pokrovskii that 
Schlesinger reported immediately before the Twentieth Congress. However, it 
is typical of the change in historians’ attitudes heralded by the Congress; they 
now proclaimed Pokrovskii’s merits as an historian as well as writing of his 
theoretical and practical errors. Schlesinger appeared to concur with such an 
interpretation. He was keen to point out that Pokrovskii had advanced 
historiography well beyond the legacy left by his predecessors and insisted 
that his errors were no greater than those of his contemporaries. However, 
Schlesinger did retain some consistency with his earlier writings. He 
maintained that Pokrovskii’s system was deeply flawed or at best obsolete. 
 
It seems clear that there was a change in the tone of Schlesinger’s writings 
before and after Stalin’s death. Up to 1953 Schlesinger wrote a great deal on 
                                                
111 Schlesinger, ‘Some Recent Developments in the Social Sciences in the USSR’, p. 23. 
112 Ibid. p. 23. Schlesinger had written about the ‘slaves revolution’ in his publications of the 
early 1950s. In ambivalent, if not approving, language, Schlesinger argued that Stalin 
illustrated the superiority of the working class with reference to their ability to end exploitation; 
the slaves’ revolution had merely substituted one form of exploitation for another. Schlesinger 
added that Stalin’s observations, ‘…. Made without any claim to specialist knowledge, served 
their purpose as historical parallels drawn by an intelligent politician, and they were received 
as illustrations to statements about the interpretation of contemporary history’ (Schlesinger, 
‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, 2, pp. 4-5). This can be seen as yet another example of the 
difference in emphasis discernible in Schlesinger’s earlier writings when compared with his 
later ones. 
 314 
the subject and some elements of continuity were visible. He always 
generalised the study of history in the Soviet Union in a positive manner. 
Whilst never denying the political and censorial impediments necessarily 
constituting a significant part of a historian’s work, Schlesinger praised the 
kind of publications appearing. He argued that enough intellectual freedom 
and historiographical debate existed to ensure vigorous scholarship. At this 
time, Schlesinger also frequently criticised what he perceived as the 
Pokrovskii ‘school’ of history; he argued that its defeat was a major 
achievement of the historical field. After 1953 Schlesinger’s general attitude, 
as expressed in his publications, altered radically. He now denigrated Soviet 
historical scholarship of the Stalin era for its poor quality and condemned the 
intellectual atmosphere from whence it originated. He argued that significant 
improvements could now be expected as a result of ‘de-Stalinisation’. This 
later attitude is mirrored in his unpublished memoirs. 
 
 
Schlesinger’s Change in Emphasis and Potential 
Explanations 
There can be little doubt that a distinct difference in the tone of Schlesinger’s 
emphases and arguments are visible in his writings on historiography before 
and after Stalin’s death. As the previous chapters have elucidated, 
Schlesinger demonstrated a generally positive attitude towards the quality of 
historical scholarship in the period before 1953. However, in his later writings, 
he criticised that very same output. His analysis had altered from one of 
conditional praise to almost wholesale condemnation. The paradox between 
these two positions is increased further on consideration of Schlesinger’s 
memoir reflections. Schlesinger wrote a great deal on his perception of 
intellectual work in pre-war Soviet Russia. He argued that his freedom to 
produce academic or intellectual work was severely impeded by the state, to 
the point where his own commitment to that freedom was in such contrast to 
the official position, that his expulsion from the party became inevitable. This 
interpretation would substantiate Schlesinger’s later writings, in which he 
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referred to the intellectually impotent atmosphere created by Stalin, yet 
contradicts his earlier work and its more positive tone.  
 
These alterations in interpretation may well affect judgements of Schlesinger 
as a historian and writer on Soviet historiography. They perhaps inevitably 
impact upon the value of his publications to students of the Soviet Union. It is, 
therefore, vital to fully comprehend and attempt to explain this dichotomy. The 
remainder of this chapter will explore the changing nature of Schlesinger’s 
interpretations and their relationship to the dynamics of official Soviet 
orthodoxy; seeking to determine to what extent, if any, Schlesinger’s views on 
historiography mirrored the party line. Could Schlesinger be correctly 
identified as a Stalinist during his early academic career on leaving the 
USSR? Did the apparent vacillations and contradictions in his analysis 
coincide with similar changes in the Soviet Union and, if so, what effect does 
this have on the value of Schlesinger’s writings and reputation as an 
academic? Schlesinger’s attitude towards three things in particular will be 
highlighted: the Short Course and its interpretation of Russian history; 
Shestakov’s textbook, and Pokrovksii’s legacy and ‘school’. The chapter will 
then examine possible motives or explanations for the evident inconsistencies 
in Schlesinger’s work; before, once again, considering how this influences any 
critique of that work. It will be possible to discern in what way his 
understanding of Marxist thought, his study of Soviet historiography, and the 
inherent contradiction in his analyses over time, impacted upon his writing. 
It seems beyond doubt that Schlesinger advanced a comparatively positive 
portrayal of historical scholarship in the Soviet Union in his papers, articles, 
etc written from the late 1930s up to the death of Stalin in 1953. It is also 
possible to recognise parallels in Schlesinger’s analysis with those of 
orthodox Soviet interpretations. These were elaborated in officially endorsed 
state textbooks which were, according to Markwick, granted ‘biblical status’; 
they, ‘…. established the paradigm within which all other historical writing was 
confined’.113 The most notorious of these texts was the History of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course, which 
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established the axioms of party history from its publication in 1938 until its 
denunciation at the Twentieth Congress. It is, therefore, essential to 
determine Schlesinger’s attitude towards it. The textbook was edited by a 
commission of the CPSU Central Committee and was granted official CC 
endorsement. However, Stalin was popularly regarded as its principal author. 
As Markwick pointed out: ‘Hailed as  ‘the encyclopaedia of Marxism-Leninism’ 
by Kaganovich, the Short Course was the codified culmination of the 
merciless ‘auto-da-fé’ against the historians set in train in 1931 by Stalin’s 
letter to the editors of Proletarskaya revolyutsiya’.114 On 14 November 1938 
the CC passed a resolution declaring the Short Course the only ‘official’ guide 
to Marxism-Leninism and party history, thus ending any opportunity for 
speculation or debate on matters contained therein.115  
 
Schlesinger did not write a great deal about the Short Course or the period of 
history it covered in his pre-1953 papers. It is, therefore, a little difficult to 
ascertain his opinion of it. However, Schlesinger did quote from the text, 
referring to it as an ‘official source’, in Spirit of Post-war Russia.116 The citation 
was to prove that Marxist and Soviet theory did not neglect the historical 
importance of human thought. Schlesinger felt, at this point, that he could use 
the Short Course as a legitimate and respectable source for the presentation 
of Soviet interpretations. He utilised it as a source to substantiate his own 
argument, an argument that advocated a positive portrayal of Soviet historical 
writing.  
 
There are two elements of Schlesinger’s analysis of Russian history and 
historiography, which coalesce with the official Soviet interpretation as 
represented by the Short Course. Firstly, Schlesinger was in agreement with 
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the text about the nature of pre-twentieth century Russian society. The Short 
Course argued, ‘Tsarist Russia entered the path of capitalist development 
later than other countries. Prior to the sixties of the past century there were 
very few mills and factories in Russia. Manorial estates based on serfdom 
constituted the prevailing from of economy. There could be no real 
development of industry under serfdom’.117 It seems that the 1860s were 
regarded as the key decade in Russia’s emergence from its feudal economy. 
In Schlesinger’s The Problems of Commercial Capital, he wholeheartedly 
agreed with this analysis. Insisting that anything but a capitalist interpretation 
of Russia’s feudalist past could be considered, Schlesinger argued: ‘Russian 
history knows no breaking up of the manor’.118 This was in direct accord with 
the Short Course’s statement on the ubiquity and significance of manorial 
estates. Schlesinger continued: ‘It would seem much more promising to 
describe Russia as the classical country of feudalism which, through at least 
four big crises… developed new and again new forms of society until the fifth 
(that during the 60ties of the 19th Century) forced upon it at least some 
compromise with capitalism’.119 Here again, Schlesinger was in agreement 
with the official Soviet depiction of the 1860s as the significant decade for 
transition from feudalism to capitalism, although both texts were at pains to 
point out that this transition was not an abrupt change from one type of 
economy to another, but was a much more prolonged process.  
 
The second issue on which Schlesinger seemed to be in complete accord 
with the Short Course was on the theoretical base from which historical study 
was undertaken in the Soviet Union. In 1947, Schlesinger wrote, with 
approval:  
 
…. the Marxist conception of history was formulated, and 
achieved its main triumphs, in opposition to the traditional 
‘explanation’ of historical development by the enumeration of 
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the feats of ‘great men’ and by the description of the ideas 
influencing their actions. In opposition to such an ‘idealistic’ 
conception, Marxism stresses the importance of the objective 
structure of society, based on the material conditions under 
which men produced their means of livelihood. The objective 
structure of society influences the action of men both by 
influencing their ideas and by setting limits to the realization of 
their ideas.120 
 
Similarly the Short Course argued that, in contrast to the ‘idealism’ of the 
Narodniks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries: ‘The strength and vitality of 
Marxism-Leninism lies in the fact that it does base its practical activity on the 
needs of the development of the material life of society and never divorces 
itself from the real of society’.121 The text continued: 
 
It does not follow from Marx’s words, however, that social ideas, 
theories, political views and political institutions are of no 
significance in the life of society… We have been speaking so 
far of the origin of social ideas, theories, views and political 
institutions, of the way they arise, of the fact that the spiritual life 
of society is a reflection of the conditions of its material life. As 
regards the significance of social ideas, theories, views and 
political institutions, as regards their role in history, historical 
materialism, far from denying them, stresses the role and 
importance of these factors in the life of society, in its history.122 
 
Both texts emphasised the materialist element to the Marxist conception of 
history, the primacy of the conditions of material life in any causal 
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relationship. However, both also wished to demonstrate that this did not lead 
to the complete exclusion of social ideas as important factors in history. 
 
Yet, in the third part of Schlesinger’s series of articles on Soviet historiography 
he made an implicit criticism of the Short Course. Schlesinger pointed out the 
difficulties historians of the German revolution of 1918 faced, since their 
analysis was only free from criticism if it conformed to the official interpretation 
as elucidated in the Short Course. This led to criticisms of ‘a dogmatic 
character’.123 Schlesinger was arguing that the necessity of complying to the 
dictates of the Short Course impacted negatively on the research and writing 
of history. In the same paper he explicitly disagreed with the official Soviet 
interpretation of the German revolution. The Short Course insisted, ‘… the 
revolution in Germany was not a Socialist but a bourgeois revolution’.124 
However, Schlesinger argued: 
 
 …. if a revolution is defined as a certain form of mass-
movement which may be abortive, then it is true to say that a 
working class revolution with socialist aims occurred in 
Germany in 1918 and was defeated. In Germany of 1918, 
bourgeois society was a firmly established reality although there 
was still room for bourgeois-democratic reforms, and any 
thorough change would have been socialist.125 
 
This obviously represented a major distinction between Schlesinger’s writings 
and the interpretation in the Short Course. However, Schlesinger did not state 
this explicitly and elsewhere had suggested that the text was a reasonable 
presentation of official theory.  
 
                                                
123 Schlesinger, ‘Recent Soviet Historiography’, Part 3, p. 159. 
124 Short Course, p. 231. 
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It seems clear that Schlesinger did disagree with some aspects of the Short 
Course. He certainly did not echo any of its most vulgar descriptions or 
interpretations. In fact, he wrote little on any of the subject matter covered by 
the textbook, thus there is little that is directly comparable. There are, 
however, similarities in interpretation, and even in description, with some of 
Schlesinger’s earliest writings. So perhaps Schlesinger was following the 
party line, on some matters at least. However, this benevolence or lack of 
criticism is in contrast to the attitude Schlesinger presented after Stalin’s 
death. In the post-1956 era, Schlesinger wrote with praise of Mikoyan’s attack 
on the Short Course arguing that it was the ‘root of the evil’.126 Schlesinger 
now conformed to the new orthodoxy as represented by the speeches of the 
Twentieth Congress. 
 
Another textbook representing official Soviet interpretations was Istoriia 
SSSR: kratkii kurs, published in 1938 under the editorship of A. V. 
Shestakov.127 It was issued as a textbook after receiving second prize in a 
competition for school textbooks, announced by Sovnarkom and the Central 
Committee in 1936, and was intended for use amongst third and fourth grade 
students.128 K. Shteppa has argued that this text, ‘…. was named the 
standard textbook obligatory for all elementary and middle schools in the 
Soviet Union and until the late 1930s and early 1940s was the only material 
on Russian history for courses in these and even the higher schools’.129 Its 
pre-eminent position within the school curriculum demonstrates its importance 
and testifies to the orthodoxy of the interpretations it expounded. Schlesinger 
wrote about it specifically on a number of occasions in the years between his 
leaving the USSR and Stalin’s death.   
 
In Schlesinger’s 1938 report for Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung he offered 
much praise for the newly published textbook.130 He pointed to its inclusion of 
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sections on the Scythens and Black Sea Greeks as evidence that the text 
was not entirely based on the history of the Slav peoples. He argued that, 
despite certain ‘prettifications’, Shestakov’s book provided a balanced and 
detailed presentation of historical events. This would certainly suggest 
general agreement with the interpretations it contained. Again in 1947, 
Schlesinger made positive comments upon the textbook. He argued that, in 
comparison to earlier interpretations of Peter:  
 
Present Soviet historians, for example in the official textbook, by 
Shestjakov, acknowledge that Peter the Great, as he is again 
called, ‘did a good deal to shape and strengthen the state ruled 
by the big landlords and merchants’…. The achievement of 
reform within the existing system is recognized as well as the 
necessity of eventually overthrowing this system. This result 
seems to be reasonable from the historical as well as from the 
methodological point of view.131 
 
This, again, would suggest agreement with the interpretation of Peter I 
contained in Shestakov’s book. 
 
As late as October 1952, Schlesinger was praising the book.132 Whilst 
admitting the politically expedient, patriotic nature of the text, Schlesinger gave 
the impression that this did not necessarily detract from its balanced approach. 
In fact, in a footnote in the same paper, Schlesinger wrote:  
 
The treatment of the conquest of the Tartars in the 10th Century 
is, indeed, much more sympathetic to the victims of Tsarist 
expansion than would be conceivable in a Soviet publication 
today. This also applies to the treatment of the achievements of 
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Peter I; here the sufferings of the masses during the realization 
of these achievements are emphasized.133 
 
Although criticising more modern textbooks, Schlesinger, once again, offered 
praise of the interpretative line taken in the Shestakov work. This suggests 
that Schlesinger approved of the official Soviet line as represented by the 
textbook. 
 
When Schlesinger referred to the text in his writings after 1956 he revealed a 
similar attitude, showing consistency of interpretation in this matter at least. 
He continued to express admiration for the Shestakov work, particularly in 
relation to Shamil. He argued that the late Stalin period distorted the 
reasonable interpretations expounded in the text. Schlesinger followed the 
orthodoxy of the early Stalin period but explicitly rejected that of later. Whilst 
this condemnation was far more forthright in his later writings than in his 
earlier ones, Schlesinger’s opinion did not change over time. His consistency 
was in contrast to the general tone of his work, which displayed a marked 
alteration in the period after Stalin’s death. 
 
 It could be argued that Schlesinger so closely mirrored official Soviet 
interpretations over time that this was, in fact, his intended aim. This feature 
of his writing is particularly striking as regards his attitude to Pokrovskii. In 
earlier publications Schlesinger wrote in almost entirely critical terms, 
denigrating Pokrovskii for his schematic, abstract and a-historical approach to 
Russian history. He accused Pokrovskii of transforming dialectic materialism 
into ‘economic automatism’.134 The content of his criticism and even the 
vocabulary utilised were remarkably similar to official decrees concerning the 
teaching of history, such as those of May 16, 1934.135 His interpretation 
corresponded closely to the official Soviet one as expressed in the two-
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volume collection of essays, published in 1939-40.136 Schlesinger’s writings 
shared none of their polemical invective but the actual content of their 
scholarly criticism was similar in character. In contrast, after the Twentieth 
Party Congress the official Soviet stance toward Pokrovskii and his ‘school’ 
mellowed significantly. Enteen wrote: ‘Praise of his energy, his devotion and 
his practical leadership, coupled with warnings against a revival of his ideas 
long ago transcended might be considered the essence of the official 
interpretation’.137 This again is remarkably similar to Schlesinger’s attitude in 
his post-Stalin writings. Was Schlesinger being influenced by official Soviet 
interpretations when forming his own? Did Soviet policies affect the tone of 
his academic writing? Whilst this may be the case, it is vital to note that 
throughout both periods, and even in his memoirs, Schlesinger argued that 
the defeat of the Pokrovskii school was a progressive development. The 
Stalinist period of historiography had a positive impact on historical science if 
only because of this step. Schlesinger was consistent in this regard in both 
his writings before Stalin’s death and those after.  
 
Nonetheless, there remains a clear distinction between Schlesinger’s writing 
in the two periods investigated. The tone and content of his work suggests an 
attempt to provide a distinctly positive, optimistic portrayal of Soviet 
historiography, and Soviet life in general, in the years under Stalin. In 
contrast, after 1953, and particularly after 1956, Schlesinger retrospectively 
condemned events under Stalin and now expressed great optimism for 
developments in the post-Stalin era. Throughout both periods Schlesinger’s 
interpretation often appeared remarkably similar to Soviet orthodoxy as 
expressed through decrees, official textbooks and the Twentieth Congress. 
 
It is necessary to posit reasons for this change. Why did Schlesinger’s 
interpretations and attitudes alter so starkly? Why did his later work 
correspond to his own experiences and memoir reflections when his earlier 
                                                
136 See chapter 6, p. 215. 
137 Enteen, ‘Soviet Historians Review Their Own Past: The Rehabilitation of M. N. Pokrovsky’, 
Soviet Studies, 20, 3, January 1969, pp. 306-320 at p. 306.  
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work did not? Why were his earlier interpretations so different to those of his 
peers and modern commentators?  
 
One possibility is that Schlesinger was deliberately and slavishly following the 
changing Soviet line – acting as Stalin’s man in Glasgow. Whilst there are 
similarities between certain party orthodoxies and Schlesinger’s 
interpretations, this argument does not hold up to scrutiny. Schlesinger was 
certainly never uncritical of the Soviet Union and its policies. He regularly 
disagreed with Soviet orthodoxy and explicitly said so, although this was often 
in footnotes in the pre-1953 period. He had also demonstrated his belief in the 
necessity of academic independence and integrity in his activities as a scholar 
in the UK.138 One example of this integrity is demonstrated in Schlesinger’s 
attitude towards the publication of views at odds with his own. When the 
economist N. Jasny found that he was unable to publish in the US due to his 
unorthodox views on Soviet statistics, he discovered a forum in Schlesinger’s 
Soviet Studies. J. Wilhelm has noted that this was on Schlesinger’s 
instigation: ‘When one of the editors, Rudolf Schlesinger, published an article 
favourable to Soviet agriculture, he sent a copy to Jasny with the offer to 
publish an unedited reply from him because he knew Jasny disagreed with his 
assessments’.139 This presents a very different picture of Schlesinger than 
one of a loyal adherent to Soviet orthodoxy. It must also be remembered that 
it was his ‘liberal’ attitude towards freedom of debate that led to his expulsion 
from the KPD.  
 
Also, there were elements of consistency in Schlesinger’s writings. This often 
put him at odds with orthodoxy and provides evidence of his academic 
integrity. As much as the emphasis in Schlesinger’s writings on Pokrovskii 
may have altered, he consistently denounced Pokrovskii’s concepts and 
methods and argued that their defeat was a major achievement in the 
maturation of Soviet historiography. Schlesinger also always maintained the 
difference between actual, professional historical work within the Soviet Union 
                                                
138 See chapter 1, pp. 19. 
139 Wilhelm, ‘The Failure of the American Sovietological Economics Profession’, p. 62. 
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and those historians who were merely propagandists playing a game.140 In 
fact, Schlesinger seems to have believed in his own consistency. He made no 
reference to the shift in his interpretation following Stalin’s death. In History of 
the Communist Party of the USSR he cited early work to provide further 
information and verify his proposition. He referred readers to his Zeitschrift 
article of 1938 and his first paper on Soviet historiography, published in July 
1950, when discussing the positive impact the defeat of the ‘Pokrovskiian’ 
approach had on the historical sphere.141 This suggests that Schlesinger still 
believed in the legitimacy of these works. The fact that his writings can be 
seen to somehow mirror those of official Soviet orthodoxy on Pokrovskii 
should not necessarily be seen as an indication of his complicity with, or of the 
undue influence of, that state.  
 
Another explanation for the change in Schlesinger’s interpretation could be 
that the process of ‘de-Stalinisation’ in the Soviet Union threw new light on 
historical scholarship and thus altered his opinion. In this case, information 
offered to the CPSU at the Twentieth Party Congress would have been 
revelatory to Schlesinger. It seems clear that before 1956 he did believe in the 
existence of a conspiracy against Stalin, something he felt at the time justified 
the ‘purges’. In his memoirs, he explained that he had no doubts about the 
anti-Stalin conspiracy when writing Spirit of Post-war Russia.142 Schlesinger 
wrote that this belief changed as a result of the Congress; he now accepted 
that charges had been ‘trumped up’, but he continued to accept the 
functionality of this violent generational shift.143 It seems clear that the 
Congress did alter Schlesinger’s opinion of the USSR and this could explain 
his condemnatory attitude towards previous Soviet scholarship. However, it 
does not particularly elucidate his positive tone in pre-1956 writings since his 
memoirs show that he felt the intellectual environment in Stalin’s Russia to be 
incompatible with scholarly integrity. It also fails to explain why his earlier 
attitude was in contrast to the majority of international opinion, which argued 
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that Soviet historiography was controlled by the party to the detriment of 
scholarship. 
 
A more convincing explanation is that Schlesinger was reacting to what he 
perceived as the ‘cold war’ mentality of some Western and émigré authors. In 
1961 he had written that British research on the Soviet Union conformed, on 
the whole, to correct academic scrutiny. Yet much that was published on the 
subject in the U.S. was of a wholly reactionary character. Schlesinger referred 
to, ‘…the American method of promoting the study of the ‘potential enemy’’ 
and argued that:  
 
Scholarly insight cannot be achieved when it is based on the 
assumption that Soviet developments are due to some devilish 
disruption of the supposedly ‘natural’ state of society 
(tantamount to the official mythology about American society 
itself) or that they are due to the inherent dynamics of that 
abstraction called ‘power’ (the product of American 
disillusionment with the democratic ideology) and that 
consequently every action is permissible if it will weaken a 
supposedly hostile ‘power complex’.144 
 
In his unpublished book based on the Marxism-Leninism lectures, Schlesinger 
referred disparagingly to ‘cold warriors’, those writers and commentators who 
acted from the perspectives and motivations of their particular cold-war 
hemisphere rather than from academic principles.145 This attitude was also 
evidenced in History of the Communist Party of the USSR when he wrote of 
‘Western Sovietology’ in the pejorative.146 He argued that scholars of this type 
began their studies from ‘absurd expectations’, basing their criticism of 
communist states on capitalist criteria. 
 
Schlesinger often displayed an immensely sceptical view of observational 
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material published by émigrés, placing much of it firmly within the cold war 
camp. Again, Schlesinger felt that this type of publication was more common 
in the U.S., ‘We [in the UK] are also spared the emphasis that has become 
conventional in the United States on the ‘revelations’ of displaced persons, 
and the diversion of scholarly energies into ‘field studies’ and interviews with 
that particularly unrepresentative sector of the Soviet population’.147 His 
negative opinion of the value of émigrés work was also displayed in two 
papers on Soviet law, both published in 1951. In a book review, Schlesinger 
wrote: 
 
The problem of how to use the evidence available in the 
experiences of Displaced Persons constitutes one of the most 
urgent issues in the methodology of the analysis of any problem 
in Soviet society. The tendency of some Displaced Persons to 
become producers or inspirers of best-sellers, and the hopeless 
entanglement of experiences undergone in the U.S.S.R. with 
Western ideology and politics in which the analyst of such works 
finds himself caught do not encourage the use of that type of 
material.148 
 
Similarly, in a paper on the value of court cases as sources of information on 
Soviet society, he argued that, ‘… the refugees’ experiences are subject to a 
process of selection and editing, which are to a greater or lesser extent 
conditioned by the state of international relations and of public opinion in the 
country of publication’.149 If Schlesinger had always believed this to be the 
context from which a large amount of Western work emerged, it may well 
have encouraged him to provide an overly optimistic or positive interpretation 
of Soviet developments in reaction.  
 
That some of the academic output of the West in the 1950s and early 1960s 
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was heavily influenced by its ‘cold war’ context is now increasingly 
recognised. R. Markwick has written: ‘Sovietology, lavishly financed especially 
in the United States and Germany, emerged as an essential part of the West’s 
cold-war armoury in which the totalitarian paradigm, at least until the mid-
1960s, was a vital weapon. Nowhere has this been more evident than in 
Western scholarship on Soviet historical writing’.150 Scholars depicted Soviet 
historians as the handmaidens of political authority, producing nothing of 
academic merit. As Markwick pointed out, whilst there was certainly some 
truth to these accusations, ‘… unsubstantiated assertions about the myths 
allegedly woven by Soviet historians in their psychological prison were a 
major impediment to non-Soviet scholars taking the work of their Soviet 
counterparts seriously’.151 Adherents of this totalitarian model were often 
entirely unconscious of the fact that they too may have been involved in their 
own myth making. They tended to hold firm to the conviction that ‘our’ 
research is ‘objective’ whilst ‘theirs’ is ‘ideological’. McDermott and Agnew 
have commented on the almost total consensus surrounding the ‘totalitarian 
paradigm’ of the Soviet system that was dominant in Western academic 
circles from the 1950s onwards.152 They pointed out, however, that E.H. Carr 
and others ‘declined to pay homage’ to this ubiquitous theory.153 Schlesinger 
could admirably be placed in this lofty company, being unwilling to bow to the 
dominant historical and interpretative trend. 
 
S. Fitzpatrick, the renowned historian of culture in the Soviet Union, has also 
commented on the ‘moral protest’ and ‘totalitarian’ nature of much memoir 
and academic work about Stalin and the academic world. She argued that a 
great deal of memoir literature on cultural life under Stalin, ‘… expresses the 
viewpoint of the old Russian intelligentsia and tends to be a literature of moral 
protest, either against the Soviet regime as such or against the abuses of the 
Stalinist period’. Equally, she noted a body of Western work that analysed the 
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syndrome of ‘totalitarian control’ of culture:  
 
The element of moral condemnation in the concept of 
totalitarianism – developed in the postwar years, which were 
also the formative years of American Soviet studies – makes the 
scholarly literature strikingly similar in tone to the memoir 
literature of the intelligentsia.154 
 
Whilst most of this literature did provide a great deal of information upon the 
subject and was not incorrect in many of its theories and assumptions, the 
relationship between party and culture was often far more complex then was 
acknowledged. 
 
The paper by B. Wolfe in the edited conference proceedings, Totalitarianism, 
provides a good example of this kind of literature.155 Published in 1954 it 
discussed ‘totalitarianism’ and intellectual life, with a particular focus on 
history in the Soviet Union. Using the model of totalitarianism, Wolfe argued 
that there was nothing of value in Soviet historical output, it was merely myth-
making and there were no scholars or academics, just propagandists. He 
wrote: 
 
But to say that history has become a weapon and the historian 
a warrior is scarcely to touch upon what is essentially new in the 
new history. Historiography has been absorbed into ideology 
and must support and accord with and be pervaded by the 
ideology that justifies and takes its character from the regime. 
History is part of a myth or mystique, so that its actors, its forces 
and trends, its trajectories from past through present to the 
future, must be in keeping with the style that characterizes the 
whole system. Just as painting and poetry and music must 
conform to that ‘style’ so history, which is once more a form of 
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poetry in its primary sense of myth-making.156 
 
Explaining the totality of state control over history, Wolfe continued: 
 
 In the new historiography there is a startling reversal in the 
roles of history-maker and historian. In the pre-totalitarian epoch 
or in the free world, men make their history as best they can, 
and the historians try to determine the relations between what 
they thought they were doing, what they said they were doing, 
and what they have really done. But the new rulers know what 
they are doing. They possess in their ideology and in their 
charismatic attributes a prophetic insight and an absolute key to 
the future. They are history-makers in a new sense, having 
banished all uncertainty and contingency from human affairs. 
They no longer need critical interpreters and assayers of their 
intentions, their words, their deeds, and the consequences of 
their deeds.157 
 
Schlesinger may have reacted against this dualist view - of the ‘free world’ 
pitted against the intellectually stagnant Soviet system. The impact of 
Schlesinger’s overtly political bias on the value of his writings lessens when 
his work is compared to undoubtedly polemical peers such as these. Within 
this context, it could well be argued that Schlesinger was being sympathetic to 
Soviet historians in reaction; he was perhaps attempting to redress the 
balance.  
 
Other scholars took a far more neutral position than Wolfe when investigating 
Soviet historiography. However, many still occasionally betrayed what 
Schlesinger may have understood as their ‘cold war bias’ and wrote from 
within the ‘totalitarian’ model. K Shteppa often referred to the monolithic party 
machine that dictated historical interpretation from on high.158 He also 
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occasionally adopted a sarcastic tone when discussing Soviet 
historiography.159 C. Black wrote from a ‘totalitarian’ perspective and made 
clear his total rejection of the theory and methodology employed by Soviet 
historians.160 Schlesinger consistently argued that the West’s insistence on 
evaluation from their, necessarily one-sided, criteria did not allow for a full 
appreciation of events or developments.161 To entirely reject, from the outset, 
the methodology used by the historians being examined may have blinded the 
author to their achievements. Such a perspective was also clearly at odds 
with Schlesinger, who embraced that methodology. His early positive attitude 
may well have been to counter these very different approaches. 
 
In fact, as noted throughout the chapters, much of Schlesinger’s work seems 
to have been concerned with defending Marxism and the Soviet Union against 
unfair Western criticism. In his unpublished memoirs, Schlesinger explicitly 
noted his intention, on leaving Soviet Russia, to counter the prevailing anti-
Soviet campaign in the West by way of his writings.162 In a paper from 1967 
Schlesinger noted the West’s preoccupation with Stalin and his rule when 
discussing the Soviet Union. He wrote of the broadness of Marxist teaching, 
encompassing as it did the fields of art and even the natural sciences and 
argued: ‘But most Western argument on Soviet ideology rests precisely upon 
the record of the twenty-two years – out of a total Marxist record of 123 
years’.163 He also spoke of the, ‘…short-term distortion of the picture by the 
Stalin episode’, continuing, ‘…on which, and on the inflation of which to a 
counter-utopia the advocates of the not-so-open Western society rely to the 
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present day’.164 The concentration upon the Stalin era and its negative 
aspects was made clear and Schlesinger attempted to portray a more 
accurate or positive picture in reaction. Such an attitude would have become 
less tenable, or necessary, after the Twentieth Congress, perhaps explaining 
the alteration in his writings at this time. Now, it was possible for Schlesinger 
to denounce Stalin without appearing to validate all cold war criticism of the 
Soviet regime. 
 
In his unpublished book on Marxism-Leninism, Schlesinger again highlighted 
the defensive aspect of his writing. He argued that he wished to treat Marxism 
from a more correct perspective. Previous courses on Marxism had been 
delivered by opponents who denounced it as a threat to civilisation.165 The 
Western intellectual scene was dominated by a number of erroneous 
interpretations and Schlesinger wished to take a stand against them.166 For 
example, Schlesinger wrote that after the Twentieth Congress and the 
Hungarian insurrection of 1956, ‘…there has been a tendency to react to the 
obvious short-comings of Soviet-type ‘realistic socialism’’ by a revival of 
Marx’s pre-Marxist writings and an emphasis on the humanist elements 
therein.167 He disagreed with such a revival and felt that it was a distortion of 
Marxism.   
 
Other historians and scholars have described Schlesinger as ‘anti-cold war’ in 
his attitude and professional behaviour. This substantiates the view that 
Schlesinger’s changing perspectives can be partly explained by his desire to 
counter prevailing cold war tendencies in the West. Notable academic R. W. 
Davies referred to Schlesinger, Jack Miller, Deutscher and others as 
belonging to the ‘anti-Cold War’ camp. Describing this group, Davies wrote:  
 
If the primary characteristic of the members of this camp was 
their belief in the legitimacy and progressiveness of the 
Bolshevik revolution, one of their secondary characteristics 
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(curious though this may seem today) was that they all 
regarded the Soviet industrialization drive and the forced 
collectivization of agriculture as in broad outline inevitable, and 
in some ultimate sense progressive.168  
 
Davies counterpoised this group to those who viewed the Bolshevik revolution 
as illegitimate and wrote from that perspective. He referred to the shared 
outlook of the anti-cold war group again in a review published in 2000 which 
spoke of the ‘eccentric and flamboyant’ Schlesinger.169  
 
This explanation of Schlesinger’s changing interpretation as a reaction to cold 
war scholarship can be understood as part of his role as ‘scholar advocate’. 
Schlesinger was an advocate, a defender, of the Soviet Union and Marxism in 
general in the face of hostile Western reaction. His loyalty and pragmatism 
allowed Schlesinger to retain a reasonable attitude towards developments 
whilst opponents could only view events from a negative, polemical, 
perspective. Equally, disillusioned ex-supporters were blinded by their 
utopianism. They failed to recognise the necessary, if unfortunate, decisions 
that had to be taken if the Soviet Union was to survive and turned, instead, to 
opposition.  
 
There is considerable evidence of Schlesinger’s loyalty. His Marxist 
perspective shone consciously from all his work and his sympathy with the 
Soviet Union was always transparent. In his memoirs Schlesinger wrote of his 
awareness that KPD members expected him to attack his former party 
immediately on arrival in the West.170 He, thus, determined to prove his loyalty 
to Marxism. This desire to demonstrate his loyalty may have found expression 
in his publications; his favourable attitude to Soviet historiography in the Stalin 
era, his initial recognition of Stalinism as the successor to Leninism, and his 
subsequent agreement with the denunciations of the Twentieth Congress. Yet 
such a description of events could well be unfair. As Schlesinger wrote: ‘I 
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think that my further activities have sufficiently elucidated what I understand 
by the obligation of Marxists to contribute, inside or outside the established 
organisational framework, to the development of Marxist thought’.171 
Schlesinger was loyal to a particular ideology and methodology, not a state or 
party. He conformed to what he understood as the tenets of Marxist 
scholarship rather than the dictates of the Soviet Union. This does, perhaps, 
explain Schlesinger’s initial willingness to portray historical research 
conducted within a supposedly Marxist framework in a positive light. However, 
his writings were coloured by his sympathies to Marxism and the Soviet 
experiment in its entirety, not by vulgar party adherence. 
 
Schlesinger’s pragmatism or utilitarianism in respect to the Soviet Union has 
also been widely demonstrated, most notably in his attitude towards the 
purges and Stalin’s legacy. This perspective allowed Schlesinger to retain his 
sympathy when others rejected the Soviet Union, after the purges, the 
Hungarian events of 1956 or the revelations of the ‘secret speech’, for 
example. Schlesinger believed that hard decisions and actions were 
sometimes necessary for the greater good. To imagine otherwise was 
utopian. He argued that Rosa Luxemburg’s revulsion at the use of terror 
would not have lasted since it was necessary in some situations: ‘This is the 
crux of the matter: the Russian revolution has ceased to be a dream, it has 
become hard reality. If Rosa had survived and become responsible for a real 
revolution building a new order she, too, would have learned to do hard 
things’.172 This attitude helps explain why Schlesinger was able to discern 
positive outcomes from the Stalin era where others could only express 
distaste for the atmosphere and methods used. Schlesinger pointed to the 
advantages of the defeat of the Pokrovskii school and the reasonable 
interpretations within certain textbooks whilst recognising, although perhaps 
diminishing, the general character of a manipulated and cowed historical 
profession. After 1956, events had moved on and the Soviet Union was now 
discussing its errors. Schlesinger no longer needed to redress the balance of 
Western interpretation and could concentrate on the optimistic indications 
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emerging from Moscow. 
 
Detailed analysis and recognition of the outlined changes in Schlesinger’s 
writings on historiography inevitably affect their value to students of the 
subject. Yet a consideration of his possible motives has shown that they were 
unlikely to have been sinister in intent. It is doubtful that Schlesinger had 
deliberately followed the dynamics of official Soviet orthodoxy as anything 
more than a distant sympathiser. His desire to demonstrate his loyalty was 
more about proving that he was not an ‘enemy’ of the Soviet Union and his 
positive interpretation of facts and events may well have been heavily 
influenced by what he perceived as the reactionary character of some 
Western scholarship. Schlesinger’s real loyalty was to Marxism, as a theory 
and methodology in its widest sense. As an editor, Schlesinger demanded the 
very highest standards of academic integrity. His seeming pursuit of 
objectivity in practice surely lessens the criticism that the conspicuously 
political character of his early writings must inevitably attract.   
 
It is important to remember that the apparent inconsistency in Schlesinger’s 
description of Soviet historiography is fundamentally a matter of emphasis. 
The difference between his analyses before and after Stalin’s death was in 
their general impressions, the nuances of interpretation. Schlesinger never 
denied those elements which contradicted his overall analysis. His 
conclusions were never so strong that they denied the possibility of 
alternatives. His writing on Soviet historiography and Marxism can, therefore, 
provide a wealth of insightful information. 
 
Compared to other authors of his generation Schlesinger appears uniquely 
self-aware. He often began his books and papers with a statement of his 
political convictions and intellectual assumptions.173 Other writers were less 
forthcoming and yet their assumptions would nevertheless influence the 
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contents of their work.174 Whilst caution must clearly be exercised as regards 
Schlesinger’s work, it still remains a valuable resource for a better 
understanding of Marxist theory in the twentieth century, Soviet 
historiography, the Stalinist state and life as a scholar in the cold war West. 
Schlesinger’s political and ideological outlook coloured his scholarly output. 
However, an inclusion of the usual caveats necessary for any source 
evaluation allows for a proper appreciation of his work in terms of its 
contribution to the development of Soviet studies. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusions 
 
Rudolf Schlesinger was an important political activist, theorist and journalist. 
Involved in many of the key events of the first half of the twentieth century, he 
recorded his experiences in his unpublished memoirs and wrote academic 
works on the same subjects. On his departure from the Soviet Union in the 
late 1930s, Schlesinger established a career as a renowned and respected 
scholar in the UK. However, his activities and publications have remained 
relatively ignored since his death. This may be because his writing style and 
subject matters do not lend themselves to a broad or popular readership or, 
perhaps, the area of study has fallen out of favour with the end of the cold war 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless his academic writings 
remain a rich vein of scholarship and are worthy of detailed investigation. 
 
Two aspects of Schlesinger’s work have been examined in detail: his writings 
on Marxism and those on Soviet historiography. Marxism was both the 
political motivation and intellectual foundation of all of Schlesinger’s activities 
and publications. It was chosen as an area of study because it allows for an 
appreciation of all of Schlesinger’s other work; Marxism provided the 
methodology, theoretical paradigm and often the subject matter of his papers. 
Schlesinger was a reputable and prolific scholar of Marxism, displaying an 
encyclopaedic knowledge of the classics and Marxist developments in Russia. 
He was also a representative of his generation of left-wing, radical 
intellectuals.  
 
The second focus was Schlesinger’s writings on Soviet historiography. 
Although this was not an obvious selection since Schlesinger is not primarily 
known for his work in this field, the study was undertaken for a number of 
reasons. Not least because Schlesinger wrote specifically about Soviet 
historical output on a great many occasions, and consistently over time, and 
he referred to the topic frequently when addressing other matters. 
Developments within Soviet historiography were of great interest to him 
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throughout his publishing career. Also, an in depth critique of Schlesinger’s 
work on this subject demonstrated the change in emphasis discernable in his 
publications, depending upon the date written. In his early works on all topics, 
Schlesinger provided a positive, optimistic, even defensive, interpretation of 
events within the Soviet Union. In the period after Stalin’s death, and 
particularly from 1956 onwards, he condemned those same developments but 
expressed an optimistic attitude for the post-Stalin future of the Soviet Union. 
This change is most clearly highlighted in his writings on the subject of Soviet 
history. 
 
A critique of Schlesinger’s writing on Marxism and Soviet historiography is 
illuminating because it allows for a better appreciation of his value as a 
scholar to students of the Soviet Union. The overdeterminist foundation of the 
thesis suggests that it also throws new light on those very topics, the Soviet 
Union in general and the cold war nature of Western scholarship. Historical 
science and Marxist theory were two of the bases of Stalin’s rule. Thus, any 
illumination of them should, in addition, provide an insight into Stalinist 
Russia.  
 
Schlesinger’s intellectual development began with a devotion to the writings 
and theories of Rosa Luxemburg. She had a decisive influence on the young 
liberal, converting him to communism for the rest of his life. Schlesinger 
initially admired Luxemburg’s commitment to spontaneity, her attack on the 
bureaucratism of the trade union movement and her concern with the peoples 
of undeveloped nations. He remained an admirer of her political convictions 
but began to question her theories and methods when the disparities between 
the successful experiences of the Russian party were compared to those of 
the Luxemburgist KPD in Germany. On realising that Luxemburg and Lenin’s 
attitudes towards party organisation were incompatible, and fully 
understanding the difference in their conflicting economic theories, 
Schlesinger decided Lenin was correct.  From the mid-1920s onwards 
Schlesinger became a Leninist. 
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According to Schlesinger, Luxemburg remained a powerful icon but her 
theories were erroneous and contributed to the failure of the KPD in Germany. 
He supported Luxemburg but rejected the doctrine of ‘Luxemburgism’. He felt 
that she left the party unable to correct its mistakes without wildly veering 
towards deviations of the opposite extreme. He believed that, had the German 
party been successfully bolshevised, they would have been able to achieve 
power through revolutionary action sometime between 1918 and 1923. For 
Schlesinger, Luxemburg’s errors occurred because she did not recognise the 
new stage of capitalism, monopoly capitalism, unlike Lenin or Hilferding. 
Society had developed from the time of Marx and Engels but Luxemburg was 
unable to evolve from the classical model. Her understanding of Marxism and 
capitalism became obsolete.  
 
Schlesinger criticised those who tried to use Luxemburg in support of their 
own partisan political agenda. He argued that she was no arch-democrat and 
could not be used as a theoretical stick with which to beat the Bolsheviks. In 
his later writings on the subject, written after Stalin’s death, Schlesinger also 
derided Stalin’s distorting influence on Luxemburg’s legacy. He argued that 
the virulent anti-Luxemburg campaign in the KPD in the mid-1920s was 
merely an attempt by party members to visibly express their pro-Stalin loyalty. 
Schlesinger believed that de-Stalinisation offered an opportunity for Marxists 
to develop a correct perspective towards Luxemburg.  
 
Despite his early adherence to Luxemburg, by his mid-twenties Schlesinger 
transferred his allegiance to Lenin and Leninism. His admiration of Lenin, his 
political activities and Marxist theories, were a key feature of all of 
Schlesinger’s writing. This respect shone through his work consistently over 
time. It is also clear that Schlesinger believed Leninism to be the next stage of 
Marxism. It was not a distortion, as some critics argued, but the next 
dialectical development in a dynamic model. In fact, Schlesinger went further, 
arguing that Leninism led to the success of Marxism, created a higher phase. 
It was Lenin’s ability to develop theory, to change it to fit new material 
circumstances, that directly led to the success of the Russian revolution. 
Lenin recognised the nature of capitalist development in Russia and the 
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significance of the proletarianising process on the peasantry, for example. In 
contrast, Luxemburg’s failure to develop theory directly led to revolutionary 
defeat in Germany.  
 
Schlesinger argued that Lenin’s main contribution to Marxism was his theory 
of the party. Lenin’s methods of party organisation were outlined in his 
writings and were strictly adhered to as the Bolsheviks took power. Other 
parties wishing to emulate their success should, therefore, follow Lenin’s 
instructions.  According to Schlesinger, Lenin was able to blend a synthesis of 
the Russian revolutionary tradition with Marxist theory to create a new type of 
party, one capable of leading a revolution.  However, material conditions had 
now changed, in part owing to Lenin and his party’s success. The world was 
very different and Lenin’s Marxism now required development to take this into 
account.  
 
Schlesinger seemed to unquestioningly accept Lenin’s tenets and 
propositions. That Lenin carefully prescribed the necessary actions to bring 
about revolution in Russia appeared obvious, although this version of events 
can be easily disputed. Schlesinger also aped Lenin’s facile philosophical 
depictions and argued that his plans for the post-revolutionary state were 
correct, even if they were unable to come to fruition due to external 
circumstances.  His writings on Leninism broadly corresponded to the Soviet 
line of interpretation. His early works implied Stalinism was the natural 
progression from Leninism, they also stressed 1912 as a key date in the 
history of Marxism – the year Stalin joined the central committee. However, 
his later works emphasised the distorting effect Stalin had introduced to 
theory. It was necessary to return to Leninism before the next dialectical stage 
could be embarked upon. Despite this nuanced change in analysis 
Schlesinger’s writings on Lenin are insightful and scholarly. They also provide 
a wealth of information on Schlesinger’s personal Marxist development.  
 
Although Schlesinger wrote little about Marx and Engels, he held them in 
great esteem and was very knowledgeable on the subject of the classics. 
Schlesinger’s interest lay in the contemporary significance of Marxism – its 
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relevance for the present day. His emphasis was, thus, inevitably on later 
developments, on Leninism, Luxemburg etc. However, it is still possible to 
detect general themes in Schlesinger’s understanding of Marx and Engels.  
 
This understanding emerged from his relationship to Leninism. He used 
Leninist sources to explain Marxism and followed Lenin’s interpretations. In 
addition, Schlesinger made clear that Marxism was more important than Marx. 
Marx and Engels founded a theory and method that developed beyond their 
initial input. The founders were wrong on some issues, and others were 
solved over time, but this had no effect on the veracity of Marxism. 
Schlesinger insisted the two key elements of Marxism were dialectics and 
historical materialism. Although he varied his view on the importance of 
Hegelian dialectics to Marxism, he consistently argued that these two ideas 
formed the basis of the theory. He also stressed the active nature of Marxism, 
in contrast to contemplative philosophy. Marxism was intended to understand 
and then to change, not merely to observe.  
 
Schlesinger’s motive of myth dispelling was particularly clear in respect to his 
views on Marxism and Marx. Many of his writings on the subject seemed 
geared towards the clarification of misunderstandings and misconceptions in 
the West. For example, Schlesinger frequently emphasised Marx’s attitude 
towards Russia, arguing that Marx did not develop a universal model of 
development; there was more than one path to socialism. Schlesinger also 
hotly disputed the notion that Marxism denied the power of ideas and the 
human element or that it was overly deterministic.  
 
An examination of Schlesinger’s Marxism suggested similarities between his 
conceptions and those of contemporaries, particularly Georg Lukács. The two 
theoreticians did have much in common; such as their insistence on Marx’s 
debt to Hegel, their concentration on the active nature of Marxism and its 
importance as a method. They also both strongly rejected vulgar materialism 
and economic determinism. However, Schlesinger sided with Lenin wherever 
his views differed to Lukács’. Schlesinger argued that Marxism was a 
scientific method of universal validity and that dialectics were objective and 
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independent of man. This was in obvious contrast to Lukács. They also 
disagreed as to Luxemburg’s legacy since Lukács insisted she alone had 
advanced Marxist theory after Marx and Engels’ death. Schlesinger would 
necessarily have been influenced by Lukács’ concentration upon philosophy 
and his vocabulary since they emerged from the same intellectual and political 
milieu. However, their similarities are not as great as one might expect. 
Schlesinger’s own references to Lukács, though few, are consistently 
dismissive. 
 
Once more in the role of myth breaker, or ‘scholar advocate’, Schlesinger 
argued that Stalin was a Marxist theoretician. Although no genius, those who 
denied Stalin’s role in the development of Marxist theory did so for partisan or 
political reasons. Schlesinger felt Stalin was the first to recognise that 
Leninism was a new, more advanced, stage in Marxism. He was also 
instrumental in dropping utopian elements in world revolution. When 
discussing Stalin’s theoretical input, Schlesinger was, in general, more 
positive in his earlier works. He argued throughout his publishing career that 
Stalin had been significant as a ‘populariser’ of Marxism – he made the theory 
accessible to the average worker. However, in his later works, Schlesinger 
consistently pointed to the negative impact Stalin wrought, both in terms of the 
intellectual atmosphere he created and his own contribution. He argued that 
Stalin’s popularising involved vulgarisation. 
 
The investigation into his writings on Stalin revealed Schlesinger’s pragmatic 
attitude and this helps to explain the apparent inconsistency in his views over 
time. Schlesinger argued that Stalin was a brutal leader who carried out tasks 
in an illegal and inhumane manner. However, Stalin took decisions necessary 
for the survival of the Soviet Union, the embodiment of socialist hope. 
Schlesinger believed Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’ was not intellectually 
valid but was necessary to motivate the Soviet people at a time of isolation 
and doubt; the theory’s utility was the most important thing. He reacted 
against the horrors of the purges but pointed to their efficacy and insisted that 
Stalin’s leadership fulfilled a historical function, however distasteful that was to 
utopians.  
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Turning to Soviet historiography, Schlesinger’s memoir reflections on his time 
as a scholar and intellectual in the Soviet Union were examined. This was to 
provide a personal context to his academic publications. Schlesinger worked 
in the Soviet Union as an academic researcher and editor in the 1920s and 
1930s and wrote extensively of the experiences in his unpublished memoirs. 
He seemed to believe the historical field was very separate from his own 
intellectual circle and this may diminish any comparisons drawn between the 
two. This division may help to explain why his personal reflections differed so 
sharply to his attitude towards Soviet intellectual freedom expressed in his 
early writings in the West. However, his knowledge of the scholarly climate 
must surely have given him a general insight into the world of the historian. 
There is, thus, a contradiction between his negative personal evaluation of the 
intellectual atmosphere of Stalin’s Russia and his positive interpretation 
immediately after his expulsion. 
 
In general, Schlesinger’s memoirs detailed a hostile intellectual environment, 
one without academic freedom and in which party dictates were the final word 
in all discussions, if a discussion was allowed at all. Schlesinger encountered 
often insurmountable difficulties to publication and was soon reluctant to air 
disagreements in party meetings. He described the effect of Stalin’s 1931 
letter to Proletarskaia revolutsiia on the KPD and the ensuing clampdown on 
intellectual freedom; surely realising that its impact on Soviet historians must 
have been even greater. Schlesinger also argued that he rejected the concept 
of Marxism developed under Stalin, Marxism as an authoritarian symbol of 
party unity. Instead, Schlesinger believed that Marxism was a method 
developed by dialectical progression; it emerged through argument and 
discussion. To limit freedom of debate, thus, stifled Marxism.  
 
However, Schlesinger did point to one positive element of Stalin’s rule on 
intellectual life. He insisted the repudiation of Pokrovskii’s schematic, 
economist interpretation of history represented a clear advance in Soviet 
historiography. Schlesinger consistently argued this was the case in all his 
academic writings. He detailed other advances he felt had taken place in the 
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arts under Stalin, arguing that Stalin overcame the narrow mindedness of the 
earlier period. 
 
Schlesinger’s works on Soviet historiography written and published during 
Stalin’s lifetime were, generally, very positive in character. He praised recent 
interpretations of Peter I and current textbooks and argued that they 
represented progress from previous analyses and were historically 
reasonable.  He insisted the Marxist methodology employed by Soviet 
historians did not stifle debate but, instead, provided it with a sound 
theoretical foundation. There was, in fact, a great deal of critical debate; 
discussions and disagreements were how orthodoxy was established. Whilst 
Schlesinger never denied the difficult aspects of scholarship in the Soviet 
Union, in some of his writing, particularly Spirit of Post War Russia, he 
provided an entirely glowing characterisation of developments in the historical 
field under Stalin.  
 
Schlesinger’s interpretations and emphases often aligned with official Soviet 
campaigns. His depiction of Pokrovksii as a schematic, vulgar economic 
determinist was simplistic and distorting. Yet, it mirrored the official anti-
Pokrovskii campaign of the 1930s; often utilising the same vocabulary. 
Similarly, Schlesinger’s description of the nature of pre-revolutionary Russia 
altered subtly as official Soviet characterisations did. In his first works, 
Schlesinger insisted the pre-revolutionary state was substantially feudal, 
agreeing with the ensuing anti-Pokrovskii movement. Yet later, he conceded 
that there were notable elements of capitalist development; appearing to 
agree with the official post-war anti-cosmopolitanism campaign. 
 
The pre-1953 publications certainly admitted the negative aspects of Soviet 
scholarship. Schlesinger denounced Soviet campaigns, such as those against 
‘bourgeois objectivism’, and argued that they were having a detrimental effect 
on the historical sphere, the quality of scholarship and its international 
reputation. However, critical comments were often consigned to footnotes, 
inevitably lessening their impact. Individual reviews and papers were heavily 
censured, especially those concerning later periods. Yet, Schlesinger did not 
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appear to draw these negative impressions into his overall conclusions. He 
argued there was a difference between genuine historians, who produced 
scholarship of merit and substance, and mere propagandists. It was this latter 
group who tended to fall foul of authorities and participate in the dubious 
purges and denouncements of academics and interpretations. Schlesinger 
may have been keen to separate the work of the two groups. He would not 
wish to have Soviet historiography judged on the output of party 
propagandists. 
 
Initially after Stalin’s death, the change in Schlesinger’s attitude towards 
Soviet historiography was small. He continued to argue that work of value had 
been completed and that freedom of debate had existed. Although, he was 
now more condemnatory of the general academic environment and strongly 
criticised individual works. His analyses in works written after the Twentieth 
Party Congress, however, represent a sea change. Schlesinger outlined the 
events of the congress and the de-Stalinisation process and appeared in 
complete accord with developments. He approved of the condemnation of 
Stalin’s excesses and cult of personality, and wrote enthusiastically of the call 
for historians to take a more measured approach to their work. 
 
Schlesinger appeared optimistic about the future of historical science in the 
Soviet Union. However, he also portrayed a deeply hostile attitude towards 
earlier work, Soviet historiography completed under Stalin. He pointed to 
historians’ selective approach to facts and sources, taboos on certain themes 
and a general authoritarian degeneration in the intellectual environment. This 
was in stark contrast to his early positive appraisals. Schlesinger noted the 
deleterious impact of Stalin’s exhortations to Soviet patriotism, particularly on 
the study of early periods of Russian history. He also emphasised the terrible 
effect of Stalin’s 1931 letter. His early work barely referred to the event, yet 
was now described in damning terms. 
 
Schlesinger’s change in tone often corresponded to official Soviet orthodoxy. 
In the pre-1953 era, he agreed with interpretations in textbooks and the anti-
Pokrovskii campaign. After 1956 he supported the pronouncements of the 
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Twentieth Congress and appeared in complete agreement with the more 
conciliatory stance towards Pokrovksii. This, alongside the change in 
emphasis, required explanation if Schlesinger’s writings were to retain any 
value as academic work.  
 
Schlesinger could have been slavishly following the Soviet party line. 
However, there is plenty of evidence of his academic integrity. Schlesinger 
was never uncritical of developments within the Soviet Union and his analysis 
often contradicted official orthodoxy. Also, there were many elements of 
consistency in Schlesinger’s analysis. So this explanation seems unlikely. 
Perhaps the speeches at the Twentieth Congress were revelatory to 
Schlesinger, fundamentally altering his attitude towards earlier events. Whilst 
this is plausible, and explains Schlesinger’s retrospective condemnation it 
does not account for his earlier praise, in opposition, as it was, to the majority 
of international opinion. 
 
The most reasonable explanation for Schlesinger’s early positive perspective 
was that he was reacting against perceived cold war bias of the West. He 
expressly pointed to the cold war hostility of many writers and émigrés. 
Modern scholars have substantiated the assertion and have criticised the 
blinkered approach to Soviet historiography and the totalitarian paradigm of 
much Western work of the time. In addition, peers of Schlesinger argued that 
he was an ‘anti cold-war’ scholar. 
 
Alongside this motive, was Schlesinger’s desire to remain loyal to the Soviet 
regime, and, more importantly, to Marxism and communism in general. In his 
role as scholar advocate, Schlesinger defended and promoted the Soviet 
Union. That is not to say that Schlesinger was a propagandist or that he 
justified all actions of the state. However, his pragmatism and utilitarianism 
allowed him to eschew utopian disillusionment and instead accept the harsh 
realities of revolutionary governance and state building.  Knowledge of this 
aspect of Schlesinger’s scholarship affords a proper perspective on the value 
of his writings.  
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Whilst the notion of the ‘scholar advocate’ is helpful in understanding 
Schlesinger, it is not an absolute explanation of his motivations and writings. 
The concept is used to show the conflicting nature of Schlesinger’s work, his 
dual role as both a scholar and an advocate of Marxism and the Soviet Union. 
However, there were times when the advocate appeared to dominate the 
scholar and Schlesinger’s intellectual honesty must be called into question. 
His near total acceptance of Lenin’s writing on philosophy, and empirio-
criticism in particular, is a good example of this aspect of Schlesinger’s work. 
For the most part, Schlesinger simply aped the simplistic and distorting 
criticisms of his mentor despite his undoubted awareness of the crass nature 
of this abuse. The advocate was stronger than the scholar. 
 
Schlesinger’s attitude towards the ‘Twenty One Conditions’ of entry to 
Comintern are also illuminating in this respect. Schlesinger wrote frequently 
that he believed the conditions were mistaken; they created an overly 
centralised organisation aimed at little more than wholesale ‘Bolshevisation’ of 
the communist movement. The conditions failed to cleanse the parties as they 
were intended to and the principles they were supposed to convey were rarely 
understood by signatories. In fact, according to Schlesinger, the conditions 
made workers less willing to learn from Russian experiences. They needlessly 
alienated the very people they were to inspire. As a scholar, Schlesinger 
understood and commented on this. However, in spite of his misgivings, he 
left the Austrian Socialist Party when it refused to meet the conditions. He 
joined the Austrian Communist Party in order to remain loyal to the Soviet 
experiment. The need to remain alongside the victorious Russian communists 
was paramount even if they were mistaken or their actions harmful. In 
Schlesinger’s actions the advocate, once again, proved more powerful than 
the scholar.  
 
Schlesinger argued that many people in his generation silenced their personal 
misgivings in order to stay faithful to Soviet Russia. They felt this sacrifice was 
necessary for the greater good of the socialist cause. Like others, his motives 
were clear and he did not deny them. This provides an insight into 
Schlesinger’s work and helps explain the conflict within them. Yet his devotion 
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to Lenin, his naive belief that were it not for Soviet Russia’s desperate war for 
survival Lenin would have constructed an International along more open lines, 
run counter to his academic analysis of the situation and to many of Lenin’s 
own writings. In this, and on other occasions, Schlesinger appeared so, 
‘blinkered by his own intellectual idiom’, to use Jack Miller’s phrase, that it can 
be difficult to afford some of his work much credibility.1 
 
There were other sections of Schlesinger’s writings that can be placed in this 
category; times when advocacy seemed a stronger motive force than 
scholarship. His early failure to condemn the Short Course and Stalin’s letter 
to Proletarskaia revolutsiia or to acknowledge the hugely detrimental effect 
they had had upon the Soviet historical field are particularly striking examples. 
These works deliberately sought to stifle debate and dictate, quite explicitly, 
the boundaries of historical truth. Their facts and interpretations were the only 
ones that historians were permitted to use. Again, when writing about the 
‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ campaign, Schlesinger failed to highlight its anti-
Semitic character. This omission is remarkable. It would seem that 
Schlesinger’s desire to illuminate or advocate the positive aspects of Soviet 
historiography outweighed the need to paint a completely accurate picture in 
his scholarly work. Schlesinger hinted at his reasons for accepting Stalin’s 
letter in his memoirs. He argued that most understood the purpose of his 
intervention but were concerned about external threats to the Soviet Union 
and felt their solidarity with it was more important than expressing opposition 
and promoting disunity.  However, whilst there was clearly a conflict between 
Schlesinger as an advocate and as a scholar, it was only on certain occasions 
that the advocate entirely dominated. This should not affect an overall 
appreciation of his writings. 
 
Besides the body of work on Marxism and historiography discussed in this 
thesis, Schlesinger contributed to scholarship in many other ways. The 
‘scholar’ description can, thus, be further defended. These other aspects of 
Schlesinger’s career deserve further, more detailed study but can be briefly 
                                                
1 See above, p. 20. 
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summarised. Working at the Glasgow Institute of Soviet and East European 
Studies, Schlesinger became a leading light within a generation of scholars 
who founded the academic field of soviet studies in the UK. Alongside others, 
such as Maurice Dobb and E. H. Carr, Schlesinger helped to create an open 
British discipline in opposition to the more cold-war minded hostility of much 
US work on the same subject. His personal experiences of the Soviet Union 
and continental social democracy, coupled with his academic background and 
language skills were ideal preparation for this career. It is clear that 
Schlesinger’s colleagues and contemporaries found his contribution 
invaluable and he was described as an authoritative figure on Russian 
matters.  
 
One of Schlesinger’s most significant contributions to the new field was in his 
co-founding and co-editing the journal Soviet Studies, one of the world’s 
leading academic journals devoted to the Soviet Union. Based in Glasgow, 
the journal has remained an important periodical, changing its title to Europe-
Asia Studies in 1993 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The journal 
provided a forum for scholars with an interest in the field to publish and 
interact and bestowed academic credibility on a still new discipline. 
Schlesinger contributed prolifically to the journal throughout his career and 
was noted as an editor of integrity who strove for academic objectivity 
whatever his personal political convictions. In 1964 Schlesinger also founded 
and edited the journal Co-existence. Testament to Schlesinger’s scholarly 
integrity, this was a modern attempt to promote friendly academic dialogue 
between ideological and developmental divides.  
 
Schlesinger was also well-known for his two documentary readers produced 
for the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.2 The 
works, on the family and the nationalities problems in the USSR are 
significant for providing translated and annotated materials and documents 
unavailable in the west up to then. Schlesinger also spent much of his time at 
                                                
2 Schlesinger, (ed.) Changing Attitudes in Soviet Russia: The Family in the USSR; 
Schlesinger, (ed.) Changing Attitudes in Soviet Russia: The Nationalities Problem and Soviet 
Administration. 
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Glasgow publishing translations and annotations of Soviet texts in Soviet 
Studies. These, again, provided a wealth of information and source material 
for students and helped to lay the foundations of the discipline.  
 
Schlesinger, the scholar advocate, had several key attributes. Despite his 
occasional scholarly failures, when the role of advocate seemed to take 
precedence in his desire to remain loyal to the Soviet experiment, Schlesinger 
appears intellectually honest. Consistency in approach and motivation can be 
seen in his work on Marxism and Soviet historiography. In both, he fought 
against what he saw as vulgar Marxism, vulgar economic determinism; a 
misunderstanding of the ideology and method that distorted and blunted it as 
an instrument of social change and intellectual advancement. In 
historiography, Schlesinger believed Pokrovskii’s influence to have been 
hugely detrimental because it could be seen as simple economic determinism. 
This vulgarisation was increased yet further in the hands of his followers and 
popularisers. Schlesinger was supportive of developments under Stalin 
because historians finally overcame this error. Pokrovskii’s school became 
obsolete, an improvement upon pre-Marxist historical analysis but dated and 
vulgar nonetheless.  In Marxism, Schlesinger combated attempts to pit the 
young Marx against his more mature works and argued against vulgarisation 
and overly deterministic interpretations. 
 
Another key feature is Schlesinger’s lifelong desire to counteract the myths 
and distortions that he saw surrounding perceptions of Marxism and the 
Soviet Union. Whether caused by ignorant misunderstanding, utopian 
disillusionment or cold-war hostility, Schlesinger attempted to rescue Marxism 
from misinterpretation. He wished to show the West, in particular, the essence 
of true Marxism, the reality of the Soviet Union, rather than the jaundiced, 
one-dimensional version commonly propounded. His defence of both may 
have swung too far in opposition, but was done from an honest and stated 
standpoint. 
 
Schlesinger understood Marxism as a transforming ideology and method. It 
was supposed to change the world, for the better. This was also the essence 
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of his scholarship. Schlesinger, as a Marxist and scholar, was actively 
engaged in that transformation. His writings must be assessed from this 
perspective; his intention was to change things: to explain, inspire and lead. 
This would necessarily give his work a political colour but does not make them 
any less honest or credible. 
 
Schlesinger’s Marxism, his understanding of history, his personal motivation 
were all profoundly influenced by the success of the Bolsheviks and the rise of 
the Soviet experiment. Schlesinger viewed everything through the prism of the 
Soviet Union. Originally raised within the German communist movement and 
Marxism of Luxemburg, Schlesinger shifted allegiance to Lenin when the 
success of the Russian revolution became clear. To Schlesinger, this triumph, 
compared to the abject failure of German communism, was proof of Lenin’s 
superiority over Luxemburg. Schlesinger turned his attention east, and there it 
stayed. He was able to forgive almost anything the Soviet Union did, even 
when he was personally injured by those actions, because it was the current 
best hope for humanity. To Schlesinger, the Soviet Union was the pinnacle of 
communist achievement thus far. It was not perfect, it made mistakes, 
required development, but this was the nature of Marxist dialectical progress. 
To believe otherwise, was naïve utopianism.  
 
Schlesinger was loyal to the Soviet experiment and the Marxist method. This 
fact influenced all of his writings. Yet this loyalty was not to a specific party, to 
the machinations of political orthodoxy and the dictates of changing party 
personnel. It was to Soviet and Marxist ideals. In fact, Schlesinger’s 
commitment to these ideals – investigation, criticism, freedom of debate – led 
to his expulsion from the party he had devoted his life to. Schlesinger was a 
consciously transparent adherent of Marxism, his writings were politically 
coloured. With this in mind, one can appreciate the wealth of information and 
analysis he provided in the course of his academic career. His work is a rich, 
and largely untapped, source for the better appreciation of many aspects of 
the twentieth century. 
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